Foreword to The First Gulf War and the Army's Future
The size of the Iraqi force at the outset of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 approximaes in size the United States Army commitment currently judged necessary to decisively win a limited conventional war. The Iraqi defeat--despite all indications that Iraq should win decisively--should be a cautionary tale for those committed to further reducing the capabilities of an already small ten-division Army.
Five Iraqi divisions were thought sufficient to smash an Iran wracked by the chaos of the Islamic revolution. Outnumbering their foes on the invasion front by 6:1 odds, the Iraqis failed miserably. Iraqi deficiencies in training, intelligence, and equipment plus fear of casualties hobbled the Iraqi invasion. Ultimately, the Iraqi invasion campaign of 1980 teaches us the danger of calculating minimums required to beat an enemy.
The tale of the Iran-Iraq War reminds us of the continuing need for the U. S. Army to train, and ultimately fight, as a joint force. This involves using its own comined-arms fighting capabilities in concert with the unique capabilities of the other services to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield.
Jack N. Merritt
General, U.S. Army Retired
President (Note: of AUSA)
October 1997.
If you are interested in a summary of the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, see my summary
For commentary on current events and other topics, see my blog The Dignified Rant