The National Defense Panel poses a danger to the United States Army by providing a vehicle to conclude that America does not face threats sufficient to warrant our current Army. Specifically, the standard established by the Quadrennial Defense Review and previous reviews of being able to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) has been attacked by some as being based on the Army's desire to protect the current force rather than being a realistic possibility of what the Army could face. The review could be an excuse to arbitrarily assign the Armed Forces the task of winning only a single MTW. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 at the start of the First Gulf War replicates in size the United States Army commitment currently judged necessary to decisively win a limited conventional war. The Iraqi defeat--despite all indications that Iraq would win decisively--should be a cautionary tale for those committed to further cutting an already small ten-division Army.

During the Second Gulf War (Desert Storm), the Army carried out the prototype MTW with the (vital) support of the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Air Force. Although the decisiveness and low American casualties make this war ideal for the prototype, reductions in the size of the Army since 1991 make it impossible to commit this size of a force to another war. Prior to the deployment of VII Corps, in October 1990, the Army was prepared if necessary to commence the war with the existing XVIII Airborne Corps and supporting forces. That force is more in line with the current force judged necessary to win a single MTW. While XVIII Airborne Corps likely would have pushed the Iraqis out of Kuwait, it could not have decisively beaten them. The consequences of a less than decisive victory over Iraq would still be confounding us today due to the need to watch a sullen but not crushed Iraqi army eager for revenge.

We do not need to speculate about how the American one corps assault could have failed to win decisively in 1990. In 1980, five Iraqi divisions were thought sufficient to smash an Iran wracked by the chaos of the Islamic revolution. Outnumbering their foes on the invasion front by 6:1 odds, the Iraqis failed miserably. Iraqi deficiencies in training, intelligence, and equipment plus fear of casualties hobbled the Iraqi invasion. Ultimately, the Iraqi invasion campaign of 1980 teaches us the danger of calculating minimums required to beat an enemy. By every measure, those five divisions should have crushed their Iranian enemies in a brief and limited war to impose Iraqi demands on Iran. Instead, the Iraqis ended up conceding the initiative to Iran and hoping that they could wear out the Iranians and convince them to end the war. Nearly eight years and 100,000 to 300,000 killed in action later, the Iraqis "succeeded" in wearing out the Iranians.

We must consider the friction of war that could turn a Second Gulf War into a First Gulf War. The United States Army needs the training, equipment, and numbers necessary to defend the interests of the nation it serves. Anything less risks what few consider possible for the victors of Desert Storm--defeat.

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