The following two letters appeared in the January 1997 ARMY and criticized my essay from the previous November. It was rather fun to be involved in a debate over defense issues. Since college days, such arguments are infrequent and my current job does not allow for such entertainment. I did have to look up "facile" to make sure my argument was being insulted! [I typed these in as-is from the published issue and apologize for any transcription errors. I certainly believe they are accurate. For privacy's sake, I have deleted the authors' names.]
Peace Enforcement is No Myth
Brian J. Dunn's article, Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission" (November) raises important issues. He is correct in stating that policymakers have sometimes mischaracterized peacekeeping operations as peace enforcement. A good example is the Implementation Force in Bosnia, which takes place within an agreed upon--if shaky--political framework, backed by the threat of NATO military action. Whether this is done to justify a U.S. armed role in messy political situations as he suggests ("peacekeeping with a marketing edge"), or simply because U.S. government officials are sometimes unable to keep their stories straight, others can decide.
This is altogether different from the contention that peace enforcement is "nothing more than peacekeeping with heavy weapons." As its definition clearly suggests, peace enforcement takes place in a different and more challenging operational and political environment. For this reason, the United States understandable will continue to be reluctant to become involved. Once involved, every effort will be made to make the transition quickly to a more stable role, or, failing this, to withdraw.
Does this mean that these situations will never arise or that the United States will always stay at arm's length? The Unified Task Force's experience in Somalia, at least in its early days, suggests otherwise. In fact, the definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement identify the bounds of a continuum from "classic" U.N. peacekeeping operations to something approaching multilateral contingency operations. In the post-Cold War world, most peace operations are likely to fall somewhere in between. So long as the definitions continue to make important distinctions--which I contend they do--we should use the existing terms correctly, rather than banning one from the lexicon for fear that it may be misused.
Beyond the definition lies, I believe, the author's real point: an aversion to operations that distract the U.S. military from a focus on major regional conflicts. Much of what he says to make his case is true. Combat skills are necessary but not sufficient for peacekeeping; a unit that does not conduct multi-echelon, mission-specific training risks failure. Many combat skills do degrade over an extended peacekeeping tour. The operating tempo and expense of these operations strain an already overcommitted Army. The real issue is what the Army will be required to do in the future.
To say that "today's Army is expected to achieve clear and decisive victory based on an overwhelming application of power" is to tell only part of the story. The Army has been--and will continue to be--challenged to do many things. If recent history is any guide, peacekeeping will be on the Army's plate. Notwithstanding Mr. Dunn's reservations, so may peace enforcement. Our challenge--a very difficult one--is to be equipped and ready for peace operations across the spectrum of conflict. We do not have the luxury of choice.
There are no easy solutions, but we can start by understanding the requirements for all types of operations and by avoiding "cookie cutter" solutions derived from any one type of operation.
To the extent that our success in these operations may reduce the likelihood of wider conflict, perhaps Mr. Dunn's concerns--which are shared by most military professionals--can be mitigated. As we relearned in Vietnam, victory is ultimately defined in political, not military, terms.
Col. _______K., USA Ret.
Alexandria, Va.
Brian J. Dunn's article is seriously flawed in its characterization of peace enforcement as a mythical mission--"peacekeeping with a marketing edge." The key is the consent of the parties to the conflict.
In peacekeeping, such consent is clear and unambiguous. The history of the conflict and good faith intentions of the parties involved argue for lightly armed forces used primarily to monitor and observe compliance with solid peace agreements, cease-fires or truces, and to bolster confidence among all concerned. An assessment of "good faith" in such instances is not impossible. The course of negotiations, the intensity and duration of the conflict, and the extent to which diplomacy and persuasion alone have led to agreements will provide a baseline for consideration.
In Peace enforcement, a history of behavior in which parties ignore agreements and commitments and flout international appeals and mandates will be met by a robust military force prepared to protect itself against any dimension of threat. This force may apply consequences for lack of compliance more heavily and with conviction, yet with attention to post-conflict peace building. When parties cease fighting and comply, that is to say, the military peace enforcement has succeeded, then that effort may begin to resemble a peacekeeping mission in its activities.
To roast the peace enforcement mission on the spit of its success in order to challenge its relevance to the situation, as Mr. Dunn does, is wrong. One of the purposes of peace enforcement is to get to peacekeeping. This is the premise behind the preparation for and execution of Operation Joint Endeavor. And as Maj. General William L. Nash has pointed out, the ability of the U.S. Army to perform such a mission is predicated on its warfighting capabilities and credibility, and its ability to execute any mission quickly and decisively.
The first U.N. Force commander in Rwanda during the crisis there in 1994 has argued that such a rapid and decisive action by a relatively overwhelming force compared with indigenous elements could have prevented their depredations.
Yet, as Mr. Dunn correctly points out, peace enforcement is not a war, like Operation Desert Storm, at least in terms of U.S. doctrine. Moreover, U.S. doctrine is clear that it is "up to the parties to achieve peace," as stated by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in testimony cited by Mr. Dunn. More important, the military effort is only one part of a concurrent political, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian process. Nor will U.S. forces "impose a settlement on the parties," as stated in the "NATO Fact Sheet" cited by Mr. Dunn. Rather, peace enforcement is defined in the dictionary of military terms as "the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."
More than 300 incidents of the use of force without war by U.S. military forces since 1946 support the underlying rationale of this definition. The concept of peace enforcement has been long overdue for treatment in our doctrine. On that score Mr. Dunn is correct--"Armies can become distracted from reality if the doctrines they follow do not reflect the real world." To insist that "we stop using the term 'peace enforcement' when we really mean 'peacekeeping'" is not just semantic extremism. It rejects the world as it is for one we might like it to be, a facile but dangerous approach for the Army and the nation.
Lt.Col._________ R., USA Ret.
Newport News, Va.
Synopsis of "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission."
For commentary on current events, see The Dignified Rant.