PEACE ENFORCEMENT: THE MYTHICAL MISSION
SYNOPSIS
Our world is still in flux over six years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and nearly five years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The single main threat which the United States Army organized and trained to defeat--the Red Army--is no longer poised to slash its way to the Rhine. The Army seeks to redefine its role just as policy makers seek to send the Army on new missions under the umbrella term Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Yet the public resists OOTW because of the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and the Somalia intervention. Rapid and overwhelming victory is expected by the public and PKOs are inherently lengthy, ambiguous, and restrained.
"Peace enforcement" has emerged as the type of OOTW that can reconcile the arguable need to refocus the Army from the Fulda Gap to OOTW and the public pressure for decisiveness and brevity. The idea of compelling combatants to halt a war with combat proven United States Army units seems to offer a new mission without compromising the combat edge that the Army has honed. Peace enforcement, however, as a mission distinct from peacekeeping, does not exist. Peace enforcement is simply a PKO with heavy weapons and better marketing. Inasmuch as peace enforcement is nothing more than peacekeeping, training the Army and deploying it for "peace enforcement" operations reduces the combat skills of the Army in ways that make it more difficult to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs).
While the debate over the role of the Army in a changing world must be energetically pursued, we must abolish the concept of "peace enforcement." It is a mythical mission that falsely promises that the Army can routinely engage in OOTW without suffering the deleterious effects of training for PKOs. We must not be fooled into thinking that we can simply change the name of PKOs to a tougher-sounding "Peace Enforcement" and avoid the trade offs in readiness to fight that training for OOTW entails.
Response to my essay was not exactly enthusiastic (at least according to two letters printed in ARMY following its publication).
For commentary on current events, see The Dignified Rant.