In response to the letters to the editor criticizing my essay, "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission," or aspects of it, I submitted a response that ARMY did not publish. It was tempting but would have been unfair to research a lengthy answer to place here so I will stick with my initial response. The letters did make me wish that in my essay I had clearly distinguished the newer American concept of peace enforcement from the older United Nations definition. The latter is simply a euphemism for "war" while the former is a euphemism for "peacekeeping" at best and sheer folly at worst if taken as a real mission. My unpublished letter is as follows:
I appreciate the commentary by Colonel _____K. and Lieutenant Colonel _____R. (in the January 1997 issue) on my essay "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission." A number of objections were raised to my contention that peace enforcement does not exist in practice. I would like to address these objections to clarify the debate.
In stating that peace enforcement is no myth, Lt. Colonel R. asserts that the key to success is consent of the parties to the conflict. This statement is at odds with the definition set forth by CALL, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (easily the best definition I have seen of the current American usage of the term "peace enforcement"). To say that Operation Joint Endeavor was an implementation of peace enforcement is to ignore the "key" of consent by the warring parties to intervention. Despite IFOR's formidable strength, this consent places Joint Endeavor in the category of a peacekeeping operation (PKO). Colonel K. at least granted that Joint Endeavor cannot be defined as a peace enforcement mission. Lt. Colonel R. further states, as does Colonel K. (with the caveat that withdrawal in case of failure may be necessary), that the purpose of peace enforcement is to halt the violence and transition from combat oriented operations to classic peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The idea that an Army unit will be expected to transition between combat and peacekeeping when each role assumes radically different approaches to the indigenous forces is alarming. CALL further points out that a peace enforcement force is ill suited to transitioning to a peacekeeping force because that force, by engaging in combat, loses its reputation for neutrality. These two significant stumbling blocks by themselves call into question the concept of peace enforcement
In an example of how use of the term "peace enforcement" hinders debate, Lt. Colonel R. defends the concept by citing a definition that describes the more arcane Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that provides for member nations to enforce peace by military means. This definition is not the same as the current American definition of the term and is therefore irrelevant to the point of my essay. His argument that more than three hundred incidents of the use of force without war by the United States since 1946 support the underlying rationale of peace enforcement and demonstrate that I deny the usefulness of the military in non-war situations is wrong. I agree that shows of force, joint training with allies, port visits, evacuations of civilians, and humanitarian missions are valid and useful missions. These uses of the armed forces, as well as the more demanding operations other than war are indeed part of the real world. As Blechman and Kaplan state in Force Without War, since World War II, hundreds of American political-military operations "have been generally successful in stabilizing situations so as to gain time for other forms of diplomacy to achieve lasting solutions." They are not, however, in the same league as the concept of peace enforcement which assumes combat or the possibility of combat against all sides in an ongoing war. I readily concede, and did so in my essay, that the Army cannot be kept solely in readiness for high intensity combat. This is a far cry from accepting that peace enforcement is a valid mission.
Ultimately, I do accept that one can define on paper a theoretical mission of "peace enforcement." What I do not accept, without question, is that the Army should attempt to execute such a mission or pretend that it can without harming combat readiness. That peace enforcement assumes a different and more challenging operational and political environment, as Colonel K. states, is an understatement. It is, if I may repeat my essay, folly to expect the Army to endure casualties in such an environment against both sides (or all sides in the case of the collapse of a state) in a conflict for the nebulous objective of "settlement" rather than victory or to expect public support for such a mission.
Colonel K. believes that the real purpose of my essay was to warn about the impact of peace operations on combat readiness. He is only partly correct. Generally, I do oppose routine involvement in peace operations. I have particular concern about the concept of peace enforcement, however, and would prefer to debate the merits of peace operations without the needlessly confusing use of the term "peace enforcement" as CALL defines it. Peace enforcement is definable--it is simply not executable in the real world at a reasonable price. The Army's challenge, as Colonel K. correctly points out, is to be equipped and ready for operations across the broad spectrum of conflict. But the goal of preparedness is not well served by perpetuating the concept of the unrealistic, and yes, mythical, mission of peace enforcement. Insisting that such a mission exists can only cloud the issue of how we can train our Army to meet the defense needs of America in the decade ahead and is a threat to achieving that goal. Fortunately, with the interest and input of individuals such as Colonel K. and Lieutenant Colonel R., the issue of the proper role for the Army will be addressed so that the quadrennial defense review accurately assesses America's defense needs.
Brian J. Dunn
December 31, 1996
Synopsis of "Peace Enforcement: The Mythical Mission."
For commentary on current events, see The Dignified Rant.