The British organization Military Policy Research lists the articles in the January 1999 Army Magazine. Mine was one of them and it highlights it by quoting from my article, “A Total Army for Total War: The Guard Divisions Role”:

"Amazingly, nobody considers whether we may need to fight a large-scale war as we did in 1861-65, 1917-18 or 1941-45... While a peer competitor is not anticipated in the near term, reserves capable of fighting a larger-than-MTW threat must be maintained... Counting on a safe environment for the next two decades is itself too optimistic (p10)... The United States exhibits hubris by assuming nobody can challenge it in a conventional fight" (p12).

The following commentary savaged my essay:

I don’t know when this was written. I discovered the brief critique in March 2004. I have a web page, so I will respond to what is stated.

I must wonder if the reviewer read my article. The reviewer complains that I spoke of the threat in only abstract terms and states I may not have had the “gumption” to write that I feared all-out war. The reviewer felt I was indulging in sarcasm for expressing amazement that we were not preparing for a larger war.

The reviewer misses my point completely.

I was not speculating about any particular threat. I was not, for example, hinting that we might have to fight China by invading and therefore need a continental-sized army. That said, China certainly could be an enemy. Or India. Or any of a number of countries in the arc of crisis from North Africa to Northeast Asia that might field a large army. My point was that our military strategy did not even include our Guard divisions in our war plans. We had capped the largest conceivable war as a major theater war that would call upon only five Army divisions and one or two Marine Expeditionary Forces to rapidly win. Given that we’d fought three large-scale wars against large conventional enemies in our history, I was amazed that we felt safe enough to make the assumption that we’d only face a Desert Storm Light conflict. I explicitly stated that I was not advocating a World War II-sized Army—or even the Army of 1990. I clearly stated that combat-focused Guard divisions were needed as a hedge against strategic surprise—not to fight a particular enemy coming down the pike. My point was that I could not predict the future and didn’t believe others could either—and that the Guard divisions were our only insurance policy so we’d best prepare it.

In addition to worrying about strategic surprise, I was concerned that even a predicted major theater war could stress our assumptions if we faced setbacks. If we endured heavy casualties and needed fresh forces, our theoretical ability to respond to a second war would be severely crippled. The need to rotate fresh divisions would require combat-focused Guard divisions to preserve our strategic reserve and deter a second war.

This was also the time of a peacekeeping focus for our Army and I was worried that assuming that the worst case scenario we might face was a short, decisive, and virtually bloodless major theater war was hubris. I thought I could see the beginnings of the victory disease being incubated and that a peacekeeping mindset would set us up for defeat in the initial battle of a war against a determined foe. I thought it would be wise to train and prepare for something worse than Desert Storm II (smaller version). The worst consequence of preparing for a tough enemy would be that we’d win faster and with fewer casualties if we did not face anything worse than our anticipated enemies.

Finally, I wanted the Guard included in our war plans because I value the bridging role of our reserve forces. Going to war should require the Guard to promote debate and to make sure that our leaders believe going to war is worth calling up our civilian reservists.

Is all this is a deficiency of strategic thinking? The strategic surprise did indeed take place on 9-11. I’d say that the war on terror has shown that our assumptions about how much landpower we need were inadequate. Instead of a rapid, contained victory followed by a fast return home, we face a generation of potential conflict. We do indeed need ground forces to rotate troops through Iraq and Afghanistan after the initial rapid, decisive conventional victories required continued fighting against irregulars to secure the war gains. The next rotation into Iraq in 2005 has already alerted a Guard division’s headquarters. And we went from considering a cut of two divisions in our active Army to considering adding two divisions. We may need more infantry divisions in the Guard as opposed to heavy divisions as I assumed in 1999, but we still need the divisions for warfighting purposes. I would not be surprised if the 2006 rotation puts two Guard divisions into Iraq (though by then I think it will be more of a garrison than a fighting force) and not require any active divisions at all.

I’d say the deficiency in strategic thinking—or at least imagination—rests elsewhere.

Still, I confess that getting ripped is kind of fun. It at least showed somebody was paying attention.

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