An employee of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) has revealed information about a series of accidents at the nuclear reactor plant in the southern Sydney suburb of Lucas Heights.

The ANSTO whistle blower provided a statement to a journalist from the St George and Sutherland Shire Leader and to Sutherland Shire councillor Genevieve Rankin.

The statement began, "Some very serious accidents have happened at ANSTO over the last few weeks. The first accident was, while retrieving a spent fuel rod from its mortuary hole in the waste management section, the operators didn't realise that the rod was in a very poor condition. The rod fell off the retaining mechanism while being transported in its flask. As the operators opened the flask door the spent fuel rod fell out of its shielded flask and onto the floor in front of them. These rods, although they have been stored for many years, are in very poor condition and are highly radioactive. The operators quickly lowered the transport flask onto the rod so that they were shielded from massive doses of radiation. I believe this happened a few weeks ago and they still do not know how they will ever retrieve the rod from the floor under the flask."

ANSTO released a statement acknowledging that the accident occurred on February 1. According to ANSTO, four staff members were exposed to radiation doses between 50 to 500 microsieverts; the upper figure is half the ANNUAL limit for members of the public.

On March 16, ANSTO confirmed that the spent fuel rod remains where it fell. ANSTO says it intends to design and build a device to grasp the fuel rod and place it inside its flask.

Last year, it was revealed that a number of "airtight" tubes containing spent fuel rods had been breached by water and a number of fuel rods had corroded as a result. Increased humidity levels suggested other tubes also contained water, and it was during investigation of these tubes that the February 1 accident occurred. When the revelations were made last year, ANSTO's executive director, Helen Garnett, said the fuel rods posed "no safety or environmental hazard" regardless of the infiltration of water.

Former ANSTO scientist Murray Scott says "the corrosion of old spent fuel HIFAR rods is a real concern. A few rods are already deemed unacceptable for reprocessing in the US."

Radioisotope processing emissions

The ANSTO whistle blower described another accident which occurred in February 1999 and involved the processing of radioisotopes: "A large amount of radioactive gas was emitted from building 54 two weeks ago. I am told the filters were bypassed at the time, a mistake was made and radioactive gas was emitted into the atmosphere. The escape was that large that the monitors in the HIFAR nuclear reactor were set off. This distance would be about 500 metres. I am also led to believe that staff members working outside were contaminated. ANSTO have covered this incident up and have not even told the staff that this incident occurred. Many staff believe that a site emergency should have been declared."

Yet another accident was described as follows by the ANSTO employee: "A large amount of radioactive iodine was released into the atmosphere from ARI (ANSTO's radioisotope processing plant). Again ANSTO has covered up the incident. I received this information from a very reputable source and we think these incidents have been covered by ANSTO as they are desperate to get the new reactor approved. These incidents I'm sure would not go down well with the environmental impact statement being considered at the moment."

Responding to these claims, ANSTO acknowledged that during a period of three weeks in February 1999, there were two occasions when radiation releases above routine levels required its isotope processing plant to be shut down. One involved the release of xenon and krypton, and the other, iodine. According to ANSTO, "On neither occasions did the release exceed the permitted level of emissions. There were no significant personnel exposures and no offsite health impacts." ANSTO did not confirm or deny the claim that alarm systems in the HIFAR reactor were triggered by the release of radiation some distance away.

At odds with ANSTO management's version of the accidents were the ANSTO staff members who wrote in a March 3, 2000, letter to Genevieve Rankin: “The ANSTO Board has a very limited idea of what is really transpiring at Lucas Heights. For instance, the radiation contamination scare last year was only brought to the staff’s attention because of a local newspaper. The incident was of such gravity, that the executive should have made an announcement over the site emergency monitor about the incident to inform the staff. Instead the management practiced a culture of secrecy and cover up, even to the extent of actively and rudely dissuading staff from asking too many questions about the event. The unions were outraged at the executive management concerning this incident but passively towed the management line because they wanted job security with a new reactor.”

Who is to be believed? ANSTO management, despite its documented record of secrecy and its documented record of being fast and loose with the truth? Or anonymous ANSTO staff members?

Cover up

In a clumsy attempt to diffuse concern and anger about the accidents, ANSTO asserted that "None of the events was associated with the HIFAR research reactor." However the fuel rods were originally used to fuel the reactor, and most or all of the radioisotopes were produced in the reactor.

The accidents, and the cover up, occurred at a crucial juncture in the debate over the plan to replace the HIFAR nuclear reactor. The ANSTO whistle blower said "these incidents have been covered up by ANSTO as they are desperate to get the new reactor approved. These incidents I'm sure would not go down well with the environmental impact statement being considered at the moment."

Genevieve Rankin said:

"Neither the Health Department, the Sutherland Council or local schools were notified about the February accidents although Council has an agreement with ANSTO that it would be notified of such accidents."

"It is a disgrace that ANSTO management continues to be allowed to expose the community to high levels of radioactive gases and doesn't even bother to inform the community when this happens. We only find out by way of information supplied by public spirited staff who believe the community should be informed."

"Local residents can't help wondering how many other accidents have been covered up over the years. ANSTO has clearly tried to suppress the information on the latest accidents during the assessment period for the new reactor. The environment minister Senator Hill decided to delay the announcement of the approval for the new reactor until the Monday after the NSW state election in order to minimise public comment on the issues during an election period."

ARPANSA

ANSTO denies covering up the accidents, saying the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) was notified. However, ARPANSA was nonexistent at the time of the accidents involving fuel rods, the most noteable of which took place on 1 February 1999 when a fuel rod fell from its flask. ARPANSA came into existence on 5 February 1999.

ARPANSA itself said, "These incidents occurred at facilities that are not yet regulated by ARPANSA." (First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer for the period 5 February to 31 March 1999.)

If the acting CEO of ARPANSA was notified about the accidents, he did not release the information publicly.

ARPANSA said: "Four incidents at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre run by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), have recently been reported in the media and discussed at the Senate Inquiry hearings at Sutherland, NSW on 14 April 1999. One incident did not involve radiation (the release of water into the Woronora River), while the others were not serious incidents in the sense of causing significant exposures of workers or the public to radiation. These incidents occurred at facilities that are not yet regulated by ARPANSA. Under the ARPANS Act ANSTO has until 5 August 1999 to apply for facility licences. However, the three incidents are being fully investigated by both ANSTO and ARPANSA to determine their root causes and to establish improvements which will help to ensure that such incidents do not recur." (ARPANSA, First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer for the period 5 February to 31 March 1999.)

ANSTO says the government appointed Safety Review Committee was notified of the recent accidents. But the Safety Review Committee was abolished during the restructuring of regulatory bodies. What power did the Committee have at the time of the accidents? Perhaps the Safety Review Committee was advised of the accidents, but the Sutherland Council's representative on the Committee was not.

Evidently the Nuclear Safety Bureau was also notified, but it too was abolished as part of the restructuring. (And approximately half of the NSB staff were former ANSTO employees.)

ALP skeletons

NSW premier Bob Carr attempted to minimise the electoral fall out from the ANSTO accidents and cover up. Carr said the ANSTO nuclear plant is on commonwealth land and that state powers to regulate ANSTO were removed in 1992. He did not note that it was a Labor federal government who passed the 1992 law making ANSTO immune from state environmental and public health regulations.

The following information is provided on three events which occurred in operational areas at Lucas Heights during February. None of the events was associated with the HIFAR research reactor.

On 1 February, a spent fuel element was being transferred by a group of four operators from ANSTO’s spent fuel storage area to an examination area. As part of this process, fuel elements are placed over a drip tray to ensure that any water adhering is collected. This involves raising the shielding transport flask containing the element some 20cm above the tray. On this occasion, when this was done some 20 cm of the 60 cm element was seen to be protruding from the bottom of the flask. The operators immediately lowered the flask to shield personnel from radiation.

The maximum dose to any person near the flask was less than 0.5 milliSieverts*, which is 1/40th (2.5%) of the annual occupational dose limit recommended by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) for radiation workers. This dose is about one quarter of that received from naturally occurring radiation each year.

There were no impacts outside the building. The regulator, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, and the Safety Review Committee were notified promptly. Recovery arrangements have been developed and will be sent to the regulator for approval.

The other two events involved medical radiopharmaceutical production. These operations involve processing a number of isotopes in various buildings round the ANSTO site. Small amounts of discharges to the atmosphere occur during these operations but these are controlled to be well below the currently approved levels. The maximum dose from all discharges on site is less than 1% of the NHMRC recommended public dose limit. Even if discharges occurred continuously at these approved levels, the offsite doses would be well within the public dose limit.

A system of alarms and monitoring arrangements is in place so that if releases above normal occur, the process can be shut down well before the approved levels are reached.

During a period of 3 weeks in February, there were two occasions when releases above routine levels required nuclear medicine production to be shut down. One involved a release of the inert noble gases, xenon and krypton, and the other, iodine.

On neither occasion did the release exceed the permitted level of emissions. There were no significant personnel exposures and no offsite health impacts. The appropriate authorities were informed, even though no limits were exceeded.

* The Sievert is the measure of radiation dose.

All the other literature I have seen - including the above statement from ANSTO - discusses spent fuel mishaps on August 13, 1998 and/or February 1, 1999. An internal ANSTO document confirms that in fact three spent fuel mishaps took place in 1998/99. The document is titled "Root Cause Analysis of Spent Fuel Handling Incidents and Recommended Improvements" and is dated September 1999 from ANSTO's Safety Division. If you are determined and/or patient you might be able to get a copy from ANSTO or ARPANSA. The document summarises the three incidents on page 1:
1. March 2, 1998: Drop of the canister containing two spent fuel elements within the Building 41 Hot Cell transfer tunnel.
2. August 13, 1998: Drop of the canister containing two spent fuel elements into storage tube T24 in Building 27.
3. February 1, 1999: Drop of the canister containing two spent fuel elements from GP flask onto the drip tray within Building 27.

Notes from comments by Dr. Des Levins (head of radioactive waste management at ANSTO), at a Negotiated Solutions meeting, March 10, 1999, on the spent fuel problems:
* containers hold 11 flasks, each with two spent fuel rods
* in 1998, three flasks were found to have water, which was removed.
* other rods were suspect, increased humidity levels suggested the presence of water
* ANSTO started to remove one or more of these flasks in August 1998
* in the process of doing this, a flask door closed before a spent fuel rod was properly in place, the fuel rod slid back down the container shaft. This fuel rod was recovered but when it slid down the shaft it damaged another fuel rod in the container shaft. When this damaged flask was removed for inspection (I think this is February 1999), the fuel rod fell a distance of about 20 cm from the flask (onto the ground? or just protruding from the flask?) The building was evacuated. They got the flask over the element. The radiation badges of the workers indicated an exposure of 51 microsieverts. (Their exposure for a period of one month was less than 0.5 millisieverts according to ANSTO.)
* as at mid march 1999, the fuel rod was still on the floor (?) with the flask over it. ANSTO's plan was to inspect it using a camera and to devise a method to move the fuel rod and flask.

ARPANSA comments on the spent fuel mishaps

ARPANSA: First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer
Fuel Handling Incident, February 1999:

"On 1 February 1999, a spent fuel element was being transferred by a group of four operators from ANSTO’s spent fuel storage area to an examination area. As part of this process, fuel elements are placed over a drip tray to ensure that any water adhering is collected. This involves raising the shielding transport flask containing the element some 20cm above the tray. On this occasion, when this was done some 20cm of the 60cm element was seen to be protruding from the bottom of the flask. The operators lowered the flask to shield personnel from radiation. ANSTO reported that the maximum dose to any person near the flask was less than 0.5 millisievert, which is 1/40 th (2.5%) of the annual occupational dose limit recommended by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) for radiation workers. There were no impacts outside the building. ARPANSA was promptly advised of this incident. On 19 February 1999, the CEO wrote to the Executive Director, ANSTO seeking a detailed report on the incident in the context of overall fuel handling arrangements and advising that recovery procedures should be approved by ARPANSA before recovery was attempted. On 10 March 1999, the Executive Director responded seeking ARPANSA’s approvals for and comments on actions proposed and indicating that a detailed report on fuel handling incidents was being prepared. That letter also advised that a new position of Manager, Fuel is to be created to ensure clarity in the lines of responsibility for fuel movements. ARPANSA strongly supports this step being taken. An ARPANSA officer witnessed the successful recovery operation on 14 April 1999. ANSTO will report to ARPANSA on the root causes of the incident and proposed actions to prevent its recurrence, and on the results of inspections of the fuel element involved."

"ANSTO notified ARPANSA that the INES 1 ratings of the spent fuel handling incident that occurred on 1 February 1999 (reported in the previous quarter) and an earlier incident on 13 August 1998, had been revised upward from a provisional rating of Level  0 to Level 1, i.e. anomaly beyond the authorised operating regime. ARPANSA agreed with the revised ratings. A submission was received from ANSTO on 14 April 1999 detailing the proposed procedure for recovery from the February 1999 incident. This was reviewed and agreement to the operation provided on 15 April 1999 when the recovery operation was carried out successfully.
During the quarter, ANSTO provided reports by their Materials Division of visual observation of the retrieved canisters and fuel elements dropped in August 1998. The examination revealed some damage to the canisters but only slight mechanical damage of the fuel plates, and a small amount of pitting corrosion. However, the actual fuel material was not exposed and the damage will not effect safe handling, storage and transport of the elements.
A detailed report on the root causes of these fuel handling incidents, requested by ARPANSA, is being prepared by ANSTO. ARPANSA has been notified of, and will review, the measures being taken by ANSTO to prevent a recurrence of the incidents. These include revision of procedures, training of operators and upgrading of the flask used in spent fuel handling operations."

"In 1992 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in conjunction with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD, invited the formal adoption of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) for power reactors. Also, they invited the trial use of the Scale for other types of nuclear installations. In 1995 the period for the trial use of the Scale for other types of installations ended with the recommendation that INES be adopted for all civilian nuclear installations, including research reactors. The primary purpose of the INES is to facilitate communication between the nuclear community, the media and the public, in relation to such events. The INES runs from Level 0, for events of no safety significance, to Level 7 for major accidents, e.g. the Chernobyl accident."

"Two abnormal occurrences involving the handling of spent nuclear fuel occurred during the year. The first was classified as INES Level 0, and involved dropping of a canister containing two spent fuel elements back into a storage hole from which it was lifted into a shielding flask. In the second incident, rated at INES Level 1, a canister fell from the grab inside the shielding flask onto a drip tray 20cm below the flask. It is believed that the drop may have resulted from damage sustained to the canister’s lifting flange during the earlier incident. The operators lowered the flask to shield personnel from radiation. ANSTO reported that the maximum dose to any person near the flask was less than 0.5 mSv, which is 2.5% of the annual occupational dose limit adopted by ARPANSA. There were no radiological impacts outside the building. ARPANSA was promptly advised of both incidents. The CEO wrote to the Executive Director, ANSTO seeking a detailed report on the incident in the context of overall fuel handling arrangements and advising that recovery procedures should be approved by ARPANSA before recovery was attempted. Approval was subsequently provided and an ARPANSA officer witnessed the successful recovery operation. ANSTO advised that a new position of Fuel Manager was to be created to ensure clarity in the lines of responsibility for fuel movements. This was strongly supported by ARPANSA. ANSTO will report to ARPANSA on the root causes of the incident and proposed actions to prevent its recurrence, and on the results of inspections of the fuel element involved."

ARPANSA comments on the isotope processing mishaps

ARPANSA: First Quarterly Report of the Chief Executive Officer
Releases of Radioactive Gases, February 1999:

"These two events concerned medical radiopharmaceutical production, which involves processing a number of isotopes in various buildings round the ANSTO site. ANSTO reported that during February there were two occasions when releases above routine levels required nuclear medicine production to be shut down. One involved a release of the inert noble gases, xenon and krypton, and the other, iodine. Calculations by ANSTO indicated that there were no significant exposures to personnel or the public resulting from these releases. This was confirmed by ARPANSA’s own calculations."

"Both incidents are still being investigated by ANSTO and detailed reports on root causes and corrective actions will be sent to ARPANSA. In the meantime, officers of ARPANSA visited the sites of the incidents, interviewed ANSTO staff and reviewed corrective actions to date. It appears that the release of noble gases was due to a failure of an operator to check the position of a valve and was terminated promptly by the operator after an alarm on the discharge stack sounded. The ARPANSA officers noted revisions made to procedures to ensure that this does not reoccur."

"In the case of the iodine release, ANSTO believes that a filter on a hot cell failed, releasing increased quantities of radioactive iodine gas to the environment. The filter has been replaced, and will be inspected when the radioactivity trapped on the filter has decayed to acceptable levels. The ARPANSA officers viewed new detectors and alarms fitted to the isotope production process to ensure that any similar incidents are immediately detected and rectified. Procedures have been developed to ensure any alarms are investigated and immediate actions taken to limit any abnormal release of radioactive materials."

---

"ANSTO reported two abnormal occurrences involving medical radiopharmaceutical production in separate buildings. On both occasions releases above routine levels required production to be shut down. One event involved a release of the radioactive noble gases, xenon and krypton, and the other, radioactive iodine gas. Calculations by ANSTO indicated that there were no significant exposures to personnel or the public resulting from these releases. This was confirmed by ARPANSA. Both incidents are still being investigated by ANSTO and detailed reports on root causes and corrective actions will be sent to ARPANSA. In the meantime, officers of ARPANSA visited the sites of the incidents, interviewed ANSTO staff and reviewed corrective actions to date. It appears that the release of noble gases was due to a failure of an operator to check the position of a valve and was terminated promptly by the operator after an alarm on the discharge stack sounded. The ARPANSA officers noted revisions made to procedures to ensure that this does not recur."

"In the case of the iodine release, ANSTO believes that a filter on a hot cell failed, releasing increased quantities of radioactive iodine gas to the environment. The filter has been replaced, and will be inspected when the radioactivity trapped on the filter has decayed to acceptable levels. The ARPANSA officers inspected new detectors and alarms fitted to the isotope production process to ensure that any similar incidents are immediately detected and rectified. Procedures have been developed to ensure any alarms are investigated and immediate actions taken to limit any abnormal release of radioactive materials in the future. In a third incident, ANSTO reported that a staff member was exposed to radiation of the extremities in excess of the statutory limit, while preparing radioactive microspheres for use in a new medical procedure. The officer received 550 mSv to his fingers, which is in excess of the annual limit of 500 mSv as adopted in the ARPANS legislat ion. Init ial invest igat ions by staff of both ANSTO and ARPANSA revealed that similar incidents (with lower doses) had occurred previously. Investigations into this incident by ARPANSA are continuing and an audit of the safety of the processes will be undertaken."

ARPANSA: Second quarterly report of the Chief Executive Officer for the period 1 April to 30 June 1999.

"On 10 March 1999, ANSTO reported that an ANSTO staff member was exposed to radiation of the extremities in excess of the statutory limit, while preparing radioactive microspheres for use in a new medical procedure. The officer received 550 milliSievert (mSv) to his fingers, which is in excess of the international limit of 500 mSv as adopted by the NHMRC in 1995, and recently adopted in the new ARPANS legislation. Initial investigations into this incident by staff of both ANSTO and ARPANSA reveal that similar incidents (with lower doses) had occurred previously. Inadequate follow up and management procedures had failed to prevent a recurrence. Further investigations are continuing and will be reported in subsequent reports."