“Over the last 30 years the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success”, according to Ian Hore-Lacey from the industry-funded Uranium Information Centre.

This theme is developed by John Carlson, head of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, a federal government agency which has as its motto "Safeguarding Australia’s Nuclear Interests".

Carlson says: "If we look to the history of nuclear weapons development, we can see that those countries with nuclear weapons developed them before they developed nuclear power programs. They have produced the special nuclear materials required for nuclear weapons using facilities operated specifically for this purpose - enrichment plants producing (very) high enriched uranium, or reprocessing/plutonium extraction plants together with reactors designed and operated to produce low burn-up plutonium. Indeed, in some of the countries having nuclear weapons, nuclear power remains insignificant or non-existent."

The kindest thing that could be said about the myth of the peaceful atom - the notion that peaceful nuclear power and research programs pose little or no risk of contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons - is that there is a shred of truth to some of the assertions. For the most part, however, the myth is comprised of deliberate lies.

It’s true that the declared weapons states - the US, UK, France, China and Russia - all have facilities dedicated to weapons production, though their military and civilian nuclear programs are entwined to a greater or lesser degree.

Where the myth of the peaceful atom looks really shaky is when considering the many other countries which have pursued nuclear weapons programs. In most countries, the military agenda has been covert, with peaceful nuclear power or research programs providing cover. The primary benefit of pursuing a weapons program covertly is that access to foreign nuclear technology is generally far greater if the nuclear program is ostensibly peaceful.

The NPT enshrines the “inalienable right” of signatory states to access to foreign nuclear technology. In the words of IAEA employees Elbaradei and Rames, the difficulty is that “The materials, knowledge, and expertise required to produce nuclear weapons are often indistinguishable from those needed to generate nuclear power and conduct nuclear research.”

The IAEA is charged with the impossible, contradictory tasks of both promoting “peaceful” nuclear technology and preventing weapons proliferation, primarily by conducting inspections of nuclear facilities.

Carlson’s assertion that nuclear power is insignificant or non-existent in some countries with nuclear weapons ignores the fact that nuclear RESEARCH programs, usually involving a research reactor, have provided the cover for many nuclear weapons programs.

Nuclear research programs can assist in the manufacture of nuclear weapons in several ways:
- plutonium production (requiring a reactor and also some capacity to separate plutonium from irradiated materials);
- production of other isotopes for use in weapons (e.g. to initiate or boost the fission chain reaction);
- weapons-related research;
- development of expertise for parallel or later use in a weapons program
- diversion of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for HEU bombs; and
- the establishment or strengthening of a political constituency ("bomb lobby") for weapons production.

One of the most spectacular stuff-ups was India’s 1974 nuclear test explosion, which used plutonium produced in a small “research” reactor known as Cirus (Canada-India-Reactor-United-States). Canada and the US insisted that the reactor (and heavy water moderator) be used only for peaceful purposes, and India insisted that it was a “peaceful” nuclear explosion, part of its program to use nuclear explosions in engineering projects.

India has also used power reactors to produce plutonium for bombs, thereby undercutting another thread of the myth of the peaceful atom. And if there was any doubt that “reactor grade” plutonium can be used for weapons, this was dispelled by the US government’s announcement that it used reactor grade plutonium in a successful weapons test in 1962.

Taiwan also purchased a research reactor from Canada, and also planned to use it to produce plutonium for weapons but was constrained by pressure from the US.

France was the preferred supplier of would-be nuclear weapons states in the Middle East. France supplied Israel with a research reactor which was used to produce the plutonium for Israel’s nuclear arsenal. France also supplied a similar research reactor to Iraq, which would have been used for the same purpose except that Israel bombed the reactor into oblivion in 1981.

Iran and the US have also bombed Iraq’s “peaceful” nuclear facilities, despite Iraq’s status as a NPT signatory, while Iraq itself took a few pot shots at nuclear facilities in Iran during the Iraq/Iran war in the 1980s. So much for the "conspicuous success" of the safeguards system.

Research reactors have supplied the plutonium for the nuclear arsenals of India and Israel, and many other countries have produced and separated small quantities of plutonium using research reactors and reprocessing facilities (or smaller “hot cells”). Examples include Iraq, North Korea, Romania, Yugoslavia, and possibly Taiwan. Pakistan has recently completed construction of a “research” reactor which is likely to be used to produce plutonium for bombs.

Only 20-30 research reactors have an adequate power level to produce significant quantities of plutonium. However, low-power reactors can also be used for weapons-related research. Very low-power and zero-power research reactors, known as critical assemblies or split tables, are ideal for weapons-related research.

Research reactors (and power reactors) can also be used to produce isotopes used in nuclear weapons. In some cases, the same isotope has both peaceful and military uses. The most important example is tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen which has medical uses but is first and foremost used in nuclear weapons (to generate neutrons to initiate the fission reaction, or to "boost" the yield of a fission weapon, or in thermonuclear/fusion weapons).

A number of countries are believed to have used research reactors to produce tritium, including India, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan. The US government recently announced a plan to use a power reactor to produce tritium for bombs, and India is believed to have developed the expertise to extract tritium from heavy water used as a moderator in power reactors.

Whereas power reactors are fuelled with low-enriched uranium or non-enriched uranium, dozens of research reactors have been fuelled with highly-enriched uranium (HEU), thus raising the potential for diversion to produce HEU bombs. For example, Iraq’s long-term weapons program gave way to a “crash program” in 1990; central to the crash program was diversion of IAEA-safeguarded HEU originally supplied to fuel two small research reactors.

Civil nuclear programs often add to the political constituency for nuclear weapons. One of the clearest illustrations of this point is the situation which prevailed in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s, when the most persistent, determined and technically literate advocate of weapons production was Philip Baxter, Chair of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC).

Jim Walsh wrote in the Nonproliferation Review in 1997 that, "By the mid-1960s, the AAEC became the leading voice on nuclear affairs. The chair of the AAEC was Sir Philip Baxter, credited by friend and critic alike for his bureaucratic acumen and influence over government policy. ... Baxter personally supported the concept of an Australian nuclear weapons capability and, perhaps more importantly, viewed the military's interest in nuclear weapons as consonant with the AAEC's need to expand its programs and budget."

Iraq’s covert weapons program is of particular interest because it exposed the flaws in the IAEA’s safeguards program and it exposed the weaknesses of nuclear export controls. Year after year Iraq got the IAEA’s tick of approval, yet all the time thousands of workers pursued a covert weapons program - sometimes in the same buildings, and often at the same sites, as facilities subject to IAEA inspections.

According to Khidhir Hamza, a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq’s weapons program: "Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. ... Under cover of safeguarded civil nuclear programs, Iraq managed to purchase the basic components of plutonium production, with full training included, despite the risk that the technology could be replicated or misused."

Efforts have been made to strengthen the safeguards system since the Iraq debacle, yet it is clear from IAEA literature that cost cutting is a major objective of the so-called Strengthened Safeguards Program. Similarly, efforts to strengthen export controls inevitably conflict with the commercial interests of the nuclear industry.

While the number of nuclear power reactors in the world is steady, and the number of research reactors falling, the amount of uranium, and uranium derivatives such as plutonium, is increasingly rapidly. The number of “Significant Quantities” of nuclear material - loosely defined as the amount required to make a nuclear  bomb - has been growing at about 12% annually, a doubling time of 5.7 years.

There is little likelihood that the planned new Australian research reactor will be involved in a weapons program. Nevertheless, the Australian government is treading dangerous new ground with its reactor plan.

Many countries argue (falsely) that research reactors pose little or no risk of contributing to weapons proliferation, but the Australian government goes one step further in arguing that reactor expertise will make a positive contribution to non-proliferation initiatives. Would-be weapons states might easily run with the same argument and point to the Australian precedent.