Introduction
1. Cancellation of in-situ vitrification (ISV)
2. Costs
3. Exhumation of pits
4. Burial of debris
5. Code of Practice
6. Overseas experience
7. Oversight of project
8. Safety
9. Appointment of GHD
10. Concluding comment

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this document is to draw attention to discrepancies between  project documents or events, and statements issued by the Minister for Industry, Resources and Energy, his department and others.  It shows that in many instances, the Minister or his department have provided answers or information that can only be described as distorted, misleading or simply not true.

This document was initially assembled and released in August 2000. That version drew on material from the draft Hansard of Senate committee hearings on 2 and 3 May 2000. This revised version takes account of corrections made to the draft Hansard.  In one section, comments attributed to Mr Harris in the draft are now attributed to Mr Farrow. That correction has necessitated the removal of some of my comments from the original copy. The opportunity has been taken to add some further comment or explanation on some of the statements.

Comments in the following are cross-referenced to media releases from the Minister or his department or to statements made in Senate Committee hearings.  The following codes are used in the cross-references:

1. DISR Media Release, 1 March 2000
2. Minister’s Media Release, 1 March 2000
3. Minister’s Media Release, 13 March 2000
4. Questions & Answers attached to Minister’s Release 13 March 2000
5. Minister’s Media Release, 17 April 2000,
6. Background Information attached to Minister’s Release, 17 April 2000
7. Minister’s Media Release, 1 May 2000
8. Response to Background Briefing attached to Minister’s Release 1 May 2000
9. Letter from John Loy to Minister, 29 February 2000
10. Minister’s Media Release, 1 August 2000
11. Hansard, Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Hearings, 2 May 2000
12. Hansard, Senate Economics Legislation Committee Hearings, 3 May 2000
13. Responses to Questions on Notice, 30 May 2000
14. Responses to Questions on Notice, 31 May 2000

Other reports mentioned are:
* The Pearce Report - Final Report on Residual Radioactive Contamination of the Maralinga Range and the Emu Site, by N Pearce, AWRE Report No O-16/68, dated January 1968
* The Cornish Report - Review of Contamination and Possible Treatment Options at Maralinga, by F W Cornish, AWRE Report No O 23/86, dated March 1987 and mailed to Australian authorities on 29 June 1987
* The TAG Report - Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test Sites in Australia, Report by the Technical Assessment Group, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, 1990

1. CANCELLATION OF ISV

Several statements addressing the decision to cancel vitrification of the Taranaki pits do not match project records.

1.1  Amount of Plutonium Expected in Taranaki Pits

References: (1) paras 9 and 15;  (2) para 16;  (3) paras 12 and 15;  (4) Why was ISV Chosen paras 1 and 3;  (6) Decision not to Continue with ISV para 4;  (8) section 4(c) para 2 and comment by MARTAC;  (11) pages CA40 and CA41;  (12) page E36.

There are numerous claims by the Minister, his department, ARPANSA and some MARTAC members that the quantity of plutonium in the Taranaki pits was less than assumed when ISV was selected.  In fact, the quantity uncovered is very close to what was expected as shown by the following:

* From my notes of the MARTAC meeting in August 1995, three members expressed their view about the amount of Pu that could be in each pit: Des Davy said 1-6 Ci (about 24-96 grams), and mentioned Beale (3 Ci); Bruce Church said tens of grams; Mike Costello said 10-100 grams.
* The minutes of the MARTAC meeting held in November 1995 show: “MARTAC decided that the available data could not lead to a definitive conclusion on the quantity of plutonium in the Taranaki pits beyond saying that there is likely to be 10 - 20% of the original plutonium inventory in the pits.” That is, the committee’s conclusion was that the amount of Pu would be between 2.2 and 4.4 kg.

According to The (Adelaide) Advertiser of 20 April 2000, Spectre that still haunts, Dr Perkins said there was about 2 kg total.

I sent an e-mail to Geoff Williams of ARPANSA on 6 June 2000, to tell him that he was mistaken when he stated (see reference 11, page CA41), in the Senate Committee hearings that MARTAC had assumed the pits contained 20 kg.  In his reply of the same date, he said he would correct it, but I have not yet seen a correction.  Geoff had mentioned the Pearce Report, but that was written in 1968 and it could never have been taken as a serious estimate of the amount of plutonium in the pits.  It is interesting how reports generated by MARTAC through 1998/1999 dwell on the Pearce Report and studiously avoid mention of the Cornish Report, which is a much better guide, written in 1986 and received in Australia in June 1987, and a copy was sent direct to Mr Davy, Convenor of MARTAC, on 29 June 1987.  This report indicated that the total pit content was probably about 2.2 kg total.

The Cornish Report was the guiding document in the preliminary engineering studies of the TAG Report.  As already shown, MARTAC never thought, not even for one minute, that the pits contained 20 kilograms.  It would take less than a minute to reflect that the pits could not possibly have contained 20 kg of plutonium.  Hundreds of square kilometres were contaminated with plutonium from as high as 70 MBq Pu-239/m2 down to zero many kilometres from the firing points.  Further, long before the clean-up project commenced, Australia had copies of a report on the Roller Coaster trials in the USA.  The report indicated that only about ten per cent of the plutonium would be close in to the firing point; the remaining ninety per cent would be spread far and wide.

This obsession with the Pearce Report is apparent in reference 12, page E36, and in that exchange, Mr Harris of DISR said that they worked to the conservative estimate of 20 kg as reported in Pearce.  This is simply not true but, since Harris was not involved in the first four years or so of the project, he would not have known what passed in earlier assessments.  Which then begs the question of why he was attempting to answer questions on which he had no knowledge.

1.2  Amount of Plutonium Exhumed

References: (11) pages CA40, CA41 and CA42; (14) questions 7 and 9

Although the department has made statements about the amount of plutonium on debris exhumed or vitrified, the report of plutonium on the debris does not mention the nine firing pads that were buried in Pits 5 and 11 (see Cornish Report, Table 12, page 102).  Whatever figure the department puts forward, it does not include these nine firing pads (see Section 3.3).

Page CA40 of reference 11 recounts how ARPANSA conducted confirmatory measurements of the amount of plutonium on debris exhumed from the pits.  The description is really an admission that not all debris was scanned by ARPANSA.  Since ARPANSA did not have a presence on site for most of the exhumation, they could only have checked what GHD gave them to check.  It should also be noted that the report on plutonium in the pits, prepared by CH2M Hill notes the difficulty of obtaining reliable measurements and states that repetitive measurements of the same piece of debris could vary by as much as a factor of ten.

ARPANSA agreed at page CA40 of the reference to provide a copy of the report of plutonium on exhumed debris.  I do not know whether that report was provided or not.

ARL (now ARPANSA) would not accept measurements of soil clearance provided by Hill; they checked the whole of the cleared area themselves.  This raises the question of why they would find it necessary to check the soil clearance but are prepared to accept what Hill say for the exhumed debris.

At a meeting of the Consultative Group, I asked for a written statement, signed by an official of ARPANSA to say how much plutonium was exhumed from the pits and reburied.  Since ARPANSA did not measure the radioactivity of the debris as it was exhumed (see reference 14, question 9), they cannot provide such a statement.  Unofficially, they admitted to me that such a statement would have to be prefaced by words such as “Based on the information provided by GHD ...”  I never saw the statement.  As with other reports and documents that the department agreed to make available, it might not have been provided.

At reference 14, question 7, Senator Allison asked: “What was the measure of Becquerels of plutonium per kilogram being buried at Maralinga?”  In reply, the department said that 100 kBq/kg is buried and said: “Disposal of this amount of plutonium would be permitted in repositories in the US, and in the UK.”  Expressing the amount of plutonium as a concentration is quite misleading; the value can so easily be fudged, for example simply by making the trench far bigger than is necessary and then including the whole volume of the trench in the calculation.

There is a major difference in using that approach for burial of contaminated soil and burial of contaminated debris.  In the former case, dilution can readily be accomplished by mixing the contaminated soil with clean soil, as happens anyway in collecting the soil.  In the latter case, no matter how much clean material is added, the contamination is still in discrete pockets and there is no dilution.

1.3  Safety of Exhumation

References: (1) para 15;  (2) para 16;  (3) para 15;  (4) Why was ISV Chosen ... para 3;  (6) Decision not to Continue ... para 4;  (8) section 4(c) para 2;  (12) pages E52 and E53

In reference 4 Why was ISV Chosen, the department said that the technique was chosen because “it was thought that there could be problems developing safe methods for the excavation and reburial of debris which was highly contaminated with plutonium.”

In several places, the Minister or his department says: “Experience gained from the safe exhumation of other debris pits at Maralinga proved that exhumation and reburial could be conducted safely without placing workers at risk.”  This is a bold statement in view of the fact that one worker could very easily have been exposed to plutonium, courtesy of an accident while exhuming a pit at the TM site.  In that incident, a piece of reinforcing bar from the concrete cap sprang back and broke the cab window of the excavator, thus breaking the sealed environment.

The fifth meeting of MARTAC, held in February/March 1995 concluded that exhumation of the pits was technically feasible.  During our discussions, we never doubted that the pits could be exhumed.  What was questionable in our discussions was exhumation of Pits 19A and 19B which, according to British reports, were filled with concrete as the debris was placed in, thus making them, in effect, large concrete blocks and difficult to exhume.

1.4  Cause of Explosion

References: (4) What was the Cause ... para 2;  (6) Decision not to Continue ... para 1;  (12) pages E39, E42 and E43;  (14) question 21 (c)

On 21 March 1999, as treatment of Pit 17 was virtually complete, there was an explosion within the melt which severely damaged the hood and spewed molten glass some 50 metres or more from the pit.

Immediately following the incident, Geosafe set up an investigation team comprising personnel from several companies with relevant expertise to offer.  A preliminary report was issued at the end of March.  The Project Authority (GHD) commissioned a company to review the Geosafe report, and the outcome was an audit report.  The final Geosafe report was delivered in October 1999, and the audit of that report in December 1999.
In reference 12, page E39, both Senator Minchin and Mr Farrow said that the explosion could have been caused by the process itself.  In reference 4, What was the Cause of ..., the department said: “We consider that the cause of the explosion has not been conclusively identified.” In making these statements, the department has been selective in what it chooses to accept as evidence.

The Geosafe report of the investigation concluded that, taking all evidence into account, the most likely cause of the incident was some explosive material in the pit.  The audit report concluded that a more likely cause was a sealed drum or other container of inflammable material.  Although the exact cause of the explosion was not agreed, the two reports did agree that it was something in the pit and not due to the process.  The audit report states: “The Pit 17 event was clearly related to unknown and unacceptable pit contents.”  Why does the department pay for two reports and then selectively ignore the conclusions of both?

In question 21 (c) of reference 14, Senator Allison asked: “Why does the Minister’s media release attachment say that ‘The conclusion was that explosives were most unlikely to have caused the Pit 17 incident’ when the independent report says ‘...the most likely cause of the explosion is suspected to be due to the detonation of explosive materials’ and ‘Many of the investigation samples contained chemical evidence of common explosives such as Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil.’  How do you explain the claim in the attachment?”  In his response, the Minister said: “... the detonation of ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO), was most unlikely to have been the cause of the Pit 17 explosion.  It was indicated that it was most unlikely that this substance would have been used for the pit excavations ...”  The audit of the Geosafe investigation states: “The final reports of Geosafe and its consultants contain factual errors and misunderstandings regarding ANFO.  We consider it is unlikely that ANFO would have been used for pit excavations ...”  It should be noted that Orica provided information as part of the Geosafe investigation, and they are experts in ANFO.

Some further information provided to me from an independent source says: “A large amount of explosive was used for quarrying and excavations for instrument shelters etc.  I think it was called ‘monograin’, it looked and poured like chaff, was packed in tar paper inside a wooden box, the total weighing about 50 lb.  This low explosive acted like ANFO, other military explosives such as shaped charges were also kept in a magazine in the forward area.”

Several strange suggestions were advanced as to the cause of the explosion in attempts to lay blame on the process.  The audit report dismissed these suggestions, saying: “Geosafe is well justified in not reaching for speculative or far-fetched explanations in the absence of hard data and rigorous scientific arguments to support them.”

It is noticeable that the decision to cancel vitrification of the pits was made five months before these reports were available.

It would be an interesting exercise to speculate on exhumation of the pits.  Let us assume that the incident at Pit 17 was indeed caused by an explosive in the pit.  Now speculate what would have happened had that pit been exhumed and the excavator had struck the explosive causing detonation.  Adopting the DISR logic, they would have had to abandon exhumation and nothing further could have been done to rehabilitate the pits.  And this raises the question of why such a scenario was not considered, and if it was, why continue with something that was so obviously dangerous?

1.5  Geosafe Preparedness to Continue with Vitrification

References: (1) para 14;  (2) para 15;  (4) Was the Outcome ... para 5;  (8) section 4 (b) para 2;  (13) question 35;  (14) question 21 (a)

Several times, the Minister or his department say: “Following the explosion, Geosafe Australia advised that it would not be prepared to undertake further ISV operations of uncharacterised pits at Maralinga due to uncertainties about the pit contents, and risks to worker safety.”

Far from being unwilling to continue with ISV, Geosafe said at a meeting only five days after the incident that, having discussed the event with their workers and with a change of procedure, they were prepared to continue with ISV of the two remaining inner pits.  However, they said that since the outer pits were being exhumed, it would be sensible to exhume the two remaining inner pits and treat their contents ex situ.

Senator Allison asked at question 35 of reference 13: “You say in various releases that Geosafe were not prepared to continue with ISV.  Isn’t it the case that they were prepared to continue with melting the debris after it had been exhumed and placing it in a specially designed pod? (ex situ vitrification).”  The Minister admitted: “Geosafe were prepared to continue with the hybrid option, ....”, but then followed with the spurious reasons mentioned many times elsewhere for abandoning vitrification.  Senator Allison also raised this at question 21 (a) of reference 14: “Why did you not mention that Geosafe were working towards ex situ vitrification as part of the hybrid option and they were happy to continue that process?”  The answer states: “Geosafe were willing to continue with vitrification in the hybrid situation.”  It is a mystery why the department should have kept back this piece of information in their releases or, more to the point, why they should have distorted the truth.

1.6  Debate of ISV versus Exhume and Bury

References: (1) paras 9 and 12;  (3) para 12;  (4) Why was ISV Chosen ... paras 1 and 3;  (6) Decision not to Continue para 5;  (7) para 11;  (8) section 4a, Section 4c paras 1 and 6;  (11) pages CA39 and CA40;  (12) pages E46 and E47;  (13) questions 25, 26 and 38;  (14) question 28

Discussion of the possible termination of Geosafe’s contract was part of a meeting between DISR and GHD on 15 April 1999.  At that meeting, GHD “advised that if ISV work has to be discontinued then this should be able to be achieved contractually without a formal termination as Geosafe had received more than their initially estimated income and fee from the project.”  This was very poor advice.  It is extraordinary advice by a company supposedly proficient in project management.  The contract was to treat 21 pits, not to earn a specified sum of money.

The minutes of MARTAC 14 held on 8 - 12 May 1999, suggest that the decision to abandon vitrification had already been made at that time, at least by MARTAC.  Paragraph 27 of the minutes reports: “MARTAC recommended to ISR that it develop its ‘facility licence’ application on the basis of the ‘burial option’ .....”  There was no mention of vitrification, either in situ or ex situ.

In reference 8, Section 4 (a), Dr Loy said: “Claims that the clean-up of Maralinga is not to world’s best practice are not well founded.”  Every member of the Minister’s own advisory committee (MARTAC) agreed that vitrification was a superior, even far superior, waste form.  If they are right, then what has been done cannot possibly be world’s best practice.  I took issue with Dr Loy’s statement and my letter was published in The Canberra Times on 22 April 2000.  In my letter, I said: “Is Dr Loy saying that a hole in the ground, without any treatment or lining is world best practice?  That isn’t even world best practice for disposal of household garbage, let alone a long-lived hazardous substance such as plutonium.”

In reference 12, page E47, Mr Farrow said: “What MARTAC said about vitrification has to be taken in the context in which it was said and the time at which it was said, and you need to take into account the events that happened subsequently.”  Before ISV commenced, all members of MARTAC agreed that vitrification was a superior waste form and they all repeated that view at the meeting of the Consultative Group in May 1999 after the explosion.

In reference 1 paragraph 12, the department says: “Particular uncertainties emerged about the dimensions and host environments of a number of specific pits during the remediation works.”  This is true, but was suspected in 1993 before the start of development of the ISV technology to match the Taranaki geology.  It was confirmed almost two years before melting started at the site.  Once the pits were uncovered, it was fairly clear where the boundaries were.  The attachment  (Explanation of MARTAC’s Recommendation for the Remediation of the Outer Taranaki Pits Using the Hybrid Option, prepared for MARTAC 12) provided as part answer to question 27 of reference 14, displays how contentious statements were accepted without question in selecting the hybrid option.  For example:

* Sorting was to be done by size, not by level of radioactivity.  Later they agreed that it should be done by level of radioactivity but no criteria were forthcoming.
* The method of sorting by size coupled with the statement “Soil and smaller fragments likely to be less contaminated than larger debris fragments ....” shows how unfounded assumptions have been accepted.  There is absolutely no basis for assuming smaller fragments were less contaminated. [Note: The most radioactive piece that I saw at Maralinga was a fragment about 1 mm diameter, and it sent the monitors off-scale from a distance of at least a couple of metres.]
* The heading of Section (b) of Advantages of Hybrid Option, “It Saves Time and Money” shows where the emphasis was placed in this ‘debate’.  It is quite apparent that the emphasis was on cost savings, not long term safety.
* The final paragraph of Section (e) is another example of criteria being proposed and then ignored when it came to implement the proposal.  The paragraph states “...the result of the combination of ISV and soil burial at 5 metres depth is considered appropriate as it provides a protection of at least that of the Code.”
* Section (k) of the document refers to “the regulatory and technical criteria established by the department” for ISV, but no criteria have ever been published, even though the department has twice agreed to release them.  It should be noted that there were no criteria at all for the first 10 melts.

In reference 3, the Minister said: “ISV was initially chosen because it may have been safer for the workers if the pits had contained significant amounts of plutonium.”  The department says: “The ISV treatment process was selected because the pits might have contained contaminated material for which there was no certainty that safe handling methods could be readily developed.” (see reference 1, para 9).  It is doubtful if that was a reason for selecting ISV in the first place.  ISV was initially chosen because it was part of Option 6 (c) and this had been agreed with the South Australian government and the Maralinga Tjarutja.

In reference 12, page E46, Mr Farrow said: “There has been no suggestion by MARTAC that the exhume and bury option that we have now had to go to will need to be redone.”  This is misleading.  Absence of a statement by MARTAC does not mean that they have considered it and dismissed it, and a statement now could be construed as produced under pressure.

At the MARTAC meeting of 17 - 20 March 1996, we compared advantages and disadvantages of ISV with burial.  We did this “using the ISV method as a benchmark since an advantage to one would often represent a commensurate disadvantage to the other.”  The following chart shows the outcome.

Advantages of ISV
1.  Better product, intrusion free, highly leach resistant.
2.  Better estimate of Pu locked in each of the treated melts.
3.  Lower cost uncertainty.
4.  Less subsidence, lower requirement for engineering maintenance.
5.  Represents a final solution.
6.  Potential cost saving could be substantial.
7.  Based on proven (US) experience, will do the job tasked, no problem with tangled pit contents.
8.  Less health physics risk involved, fewer workers exposed.
9.  Represents best practicable technology.
10. Non-intrusive, safer.
11. Better cost control.
12. Will not need to be redone.

Disadvantages of ISV
1.  Unnecessarily complex technology, higher profile, magnifies a small problem of contamination.
2.  Potentially higher cost.
3.  SO2 disadvantage.
4.  Logistic problems for re-supply of fuel of 30,000 L/d
5.  Uncertain comprehensiveness, could miss parts of the contamination in the pits, exhumation will remove all contamination from inner Taranaki.

Senator Allison asked, at question 28 of reference 14: “Did MARTAC imply when it stated that vitrification was a ‘final solution’ that exhuming and burying contaminated debris was not a final solution?”  The answer provided again avoids the question: “At the time of MARTAC 7, well over four years ago, the assumption was that the concentration of plutonium contamination within the waste was about 100 times higher than the level which was subsequently established.”  Whether or not vitrification provides ‘a final solution’ has nothing to do with the spurious introduction of ‘concentration’ of radioactivity.  In this answer, the Minister also said: “It is not expected that there will need to be further remediation of the buried debris.”  This is a bold prediction - to forecast 250,000 years ahead (about as long as homo sapiens has been on the earth).  Although not minuted, one of the points in our discussion in MARTAC 7 was that exhumation repeats the problem but by then the debris will be covered by soil, making rework more difficult.

Senator Allison asked: “Is it the case that GHD were on the record early in their contract as saying that the waste should be buried and not vitrified?  When was this?” (see question 25 of reference 13).  In answer the Minister said: “GHD has not advised us that waste from the 21 Taranaki pits should be exhumed and buried rather than treated by ISV.”  While they might not have put their view in writing, both they and Thiess had often expressed this view, claiming that it would be a far cheaper method of disposal.  In fact, I even asked with tongue in cheek if they would like to undertake that work for a fixed price.  They did not respond.

Senator Minchin is correct in his answer to question 26 of reference 13: “Is it the case that Mr Parkinson was asked in May 1998 to advise on the possibility of exhuming some pits, sorting the debris and melting some and burying the rest?  Why was this?”  I was not asked by anyone in the department or on MARTAC for my view of exhuming the outer pits.  This request was by some-one in the Minister’s office and the views were conveyed back to that person by telephone and by e-mail of 13 May 1998, and to members of MARTAC on 8 June 1998.

1.7  Consultation with the Consultative Group

References: (7) paras 6, 7 and 12;  (8) section 3 para 1, section 3d para 4, section 4d paras 2 and 3;  (12) pages E41, E42 and E43

Reference 8, Section 4 (d), paragraph 2 states: “The issue of further treatment of the Maralinga pit debris was fully discussed with the Maralinga Tjarutja and the South Australian Government at meetings of the Consultative Group.  The Group met on three occasions after the explosion, on 13 April, 12 May, and 23 June 1999, and in addition, relevant information was circulated to Maralinga Tjarutja and their advisers, and the South Australian Government between meetings.”

It is true that meetings were held on these dates and on 8 May, but attendance at a meeting does not constitute consultation.  I attended meetings of the Consultative Group both as the Commonwealth’s Representative for the project and later as an adviser to the Maralinga Tjarutja. Often the meetings were of the nature of telling the SA officials and the Tjarutja what the department had decided to do.  While some information was circulated by the department, it was not usually in sufficient detail to allow proper assessment.  Further, one set of minutes was withheld ‘for legal reasons’, and although the department twice agreed to release the criteria that were supposed to have been agreed for ISV, they did not do so.

The department seems to think that attendance at meetings to be told what is to happen constitutes consultation.  Typical of the attitude is the statement in the minutes of the meeting of the Consultative Group on 23 June 1999: “Mr Harris said ISR would welcome the Community’s comments, but that in this issue, the Commonwealth does have to be a decision maker and ISR sees no alternative but to choose the burial option.”  In response: “Mr Collett said that the issue here is not whether the Commonwealth has a responsibility to the entire community but whether ISR is serious about consulting.”

In reference 7, paragraph 7, the Minister said: “As the primary risk from plutonium is inhalation, all these groups have agreed that deep burial of plutonium is a safe way of handling this waste.”  [The groups referred to are the Consultative Group, MARTAC and ARPANSA.]  It is not true that the South Australian government and the Tjarutja agreed to the deep burial of the debris let alone the shallow burial that has resulted.

The Tjarutja wrote to the Minister on 24 September 1998 to complain about the lack of consultation and in particular, the government’s decision to adopt the hybrid option without an opportunity for the Tjarutja to express its view on that option.

In explaining the decision to abandon vitrification, Senator Minchin said at reference 12 page E41: “The formal decision making responsibility rested with me, based on the department having consulted with the Consultative Group ...”  At page E43, Mr Harris said that all available information had been provided to the Tjarutja.  That is not correct.  Neither the investigation report nor the audit report were provided, but a preliminary report was distributed to the meeting of 23 June 1999.

The minutes of that meeting show: “Mr Collett said he would not convey ISR’s position to the MT until Mr Harris put the matter in writing.  If ISR went ahead with this approach, it would imply grave consequences for the consultative process.  Mr Collett said the MT were not yet in receipt of all the information that was promised to its technical consultants and if the Commonwealth wanted to go ahead, then so be it, but the MT will doubtless have to consider the consequences.  There is a very real risk that the MT will withdraw from the consultation process.”  The Tjarutja wrote to the Minister on 2 July 1999 to complain about the announcement that the department was going to abandon vitrification, and reserved the right to publicly dissociate itself from that decision.  It was in this letter that the Tjarutja asked the Minister to remove Mr Harris from chairmanship of the Consultative Group meetings.  This meeting was a supreme example of the lack of consultation.

The minutes of the meeting also show a comment by Mrs Fitch, Director of the Radiation Protection Branch of the South Australian Health Commission: “Ms Fitch commented that she was concerned that the consultation process could be at risk.  She had hoped that today’s meeting would have put sufficient technical data on the table to enable an informed decision to be made.  Although she recognised the views of both sides, she had not expected the Commonwealth to state its position in such emphatic terms, prior to its receiving comment from MT.”

2. COSTS

References: (2) para 4;  (8) section 4a para 3, section 4c para 6; (12) page E33

Reference 8, Section 4 (a), paragraph 3, said: “The Maralinga rehabilitation was designed to improve the situation at a site which had already been contaminated.”  If the intention was merely to improve the situation, it could have been done far more effectively for $108 million.

The Minister says: “Once work is completed ...... the work will have been concluded on time within its $108 million budget.”  The words ‘on time and within budget’ are meaningless.  Much depends on the tightness of the schedule, and the accuracy of the budget in the first place.  It is easy to finish within budget if the work is curtailed as money is exhausted.

Reference 8, Section 4 (c), paragraph 6, said: “Background Briefing also suggested that cost was a factor in the decision to terminate ISV.  This is not correct - the effectiveness of each technique in delivering a safe outcome while protecting the safety of workers was the prime consideration.”

In reference 12, page E33, Senator Minchin said: “Can I refute the scurrilous suggestion which I see floating around in the media that suggests that this decision was made on cost grounds.”

Whatever the Minister or his department says, the original push for exhuming the pits was to reduce the costs.  Well before Geosafe was asked, in November 1997, to provide a revised price for treating all pits by ISV, the department was already seeking ways to minimise costs.

A paper Cost Comparison for Treatment of Outer Pits, MARTAC 12 Item 4 provided to the Consultative Group on 20 October 1998, states: “The recent consideration of alternative treatments for ISV for these outer pits has arisen as a result of the revised estimate for ISV being considerably above the project budget.”

A paper provided to the Consultative Group A Role for Excavation in the Rehabilitation of the Waste Pits at Taranaki, Maralinga - Information Paper for Consultative Group, 17 July 1998" contains the following statement:
“MARTAC’s final recommendation to DPIE will be formulated at the August meeting after consideration and weighting of the following criteria:
a. Time savings
b. Cost savings
c. Nature of waste form
d. Potential for exposure of waste
e. Efficiency of operation”

There was no mention of important factors such as worker safety, or long-term safety, and yet the latter should have been the prime consideration.  It should be added that the paper was: “...prepared by the Convenor of MARTAC as an information paper for members of the Consultative Group.  It has not been reviewed by MARTAC and does not constitute a MARTAC paper.”

The following extracts from the draft minutes of a meeting of the Consultative Group on 13 April 1999 show that cost was the major concern in the discussions.

* Mr Davy commented that he, as MARTAC convenor, was very concerned about escalating costs, but he saw MARTAC’s role primarily to comment on technical issues.  Even so, he was aware that some MARTAC members felt it was time to “call it quits” on ISV and go to full exhumation for safety and cost reasons.
* Mr Davy said that given what is now known, complete exhumation and burial was the most attractive option.  It was radiologically acceptable, it was safer for workers and it was the least expensive of the options. [Note that this totally ignores long-term safety.]
* Mr Davy said it (burial) was radiologically acceptable, it was safer, it was quicker and it would allow cost savings that could be used to put quality into other parts of the Maralinga clean-up.  [Note that this also totally ignores long-term safety.]
* Mr Chamberlain said that, ignoring the discussion about the technical adequacy of the ISV process and commenting on it from a project manager’s view, it was much easier, quicker and cheaper option to exhume and bury.

There are several examples of distortion of facts when discussing costs.  A good example was in the discussions at the meeting of the Consultative Group on 23 June 1999: “Mr Davy commented that .... there was a need for a project manager to balance all aspects of the project’s management and it was not unreasonable for the Commonwealth, particularly when it was costing the government one million dollars a month in stand-down fees .....”  This is a gross distortion; the combined stand-down costs for Geosafe and Thiess (by far the major contributors) was $517,000 a month.

On the question of stand-down costs, it is worth noting the statement in the draft minutes of a meeting of the Consultative Group on 8 May 1999: “This makes the end of June a critical date.  After the end of June, if no decision is made, the project will be on ‘stand-down’, ....”  DISR announced its decision on 23 June.

There is a coincidence about the date of 23 June.  The notes of a meeting between DISR, GHD and Thiess (date unknown, but it appears to be a Project Review Group meeting) state: “Thiess estimated that 23 June was the appropriate date that exhumation would be complete.  A decision on backfilling the burial trench was therefore required prior to that date.”

It was also in the meeting on 8 May that Dr Perkins said: “...money saved on the treatment of the debris would mean more money would be available for the long term stewardship of the site.”

2.1  Contract Structure

References: (8) section 4c para 6;  (12) page E60;  (13) question 6

There was some discussion about the contract structure in reference 12, page E60 and the conflict of the Commonwealth’s contracts with Geosafe and GHD, which were on different bases.  As Senator Allison pointed out: “There was no disincentive for GHD to not delay the length of the contract whereas there was for Geosafe.”  It is a fact that when the variation was signed, the contract with GHD was on the basis of hourly rates, but the contract with Geosafe was on the basis of recovery of an estimated cost plus a capped management fee.  If the estimated cost was exceeded, Geosafe was required to complete the work for no management fee.  If the work was completed below the estimated cost, the savings would be shared by Geosafe and the Commonwealth (noting that Geosafe could not take the saving in cash).  So the conflict was that a delay in the work, which could have been occasioned by GHD, could jeopardise Geosafe’s profit margin, but GHD would continue to be paid throughout the delay, and their profits would not suffer.

The department avoided answering Senator Allison’s question 6 of reference 13: “(a) Is it the case that Geosafe was on a contract which was for recovery of an estimated cost plus a capped management fee so that if the cost rose above the estimate then Geosafe were to complete the work for no extra management fee but the contract with GHD was on an hourly rates basis so any delay caused by GHD to the Geosafe work could jeopardise Geosafe’s income but there would be no penalty to GHD?  (b) Isn’t there a conflict of interest in these circumstances where GHD is the project manager?”  Since first neglecting to inform the Minister of the conflict of the two contracts, the department has avoided this question.  Instead of answering the question, the department claims that GHD did not impede the work in any way.  Collectively, GHD and MARTAC caused severe disruption to the ISV work.  GHD imposed several requirements on the health physics regime that were not necessary and were contrary to what had been agreed with the Health Physics Auditor.  MARTAC imposed many requirements for treatment of the pits that were not contractual.  The result of these additional requirements was slowing of the project and further cost increases.

2.2  Payments to GHD

References: (12) pages E57 and E58;  (13) questions 7 and 44

When discussing payments to GHD (reference 12, pages E57 and E58), Mr Farrow said: “I think we can confidently say that the estimate would have been exceeded, as indeed has all of the work that has been associated since the Geosafe contract took place.”  The implication here is that Geosafe were somehow to blame for cost increases.  This is not so, and the implication should be withdrawn.  The greatest cost increase in the ISV part of the project was because the pits were very much larger than had been understood from the British records, necessitating 40 melts instead of the 26 planned.  Further increases in cost came about because of additional requirements placed on Geosafe by GHD, DISR, and MARTAC.

Question 7 of reference 13 was: “What did GHD gain financially from the decision to exhume the pits and bury the debris rather than vitrifying the contents?”  In response, the department claimed that GHD did not gain, quoting the duration of the project as the reason.  This totally ignores the gains by undertaking several studies and cost comparisons, attendance at more meetings, additional supervision of Thiess work at site, additional health physics personnel, and several other ways.  If GHD did not gain financially then why were they paid well over $2.5 million, instead of the $250,000 quoted in their proposal?

The department made some silly statements in various meetings concerning the amount paid to GHD.  For example, at a meeting between the Tjarutja and DISR on 28 October 1998, the department said: “GHD does not earn more money if there is more earthworks. ......  The hybrid option will give GHD more work but for no additional payment.”  GHD were on an hourly rates contract so would have been paid for all hours spent on the project.

Question 44 of reference 13 posed by Senator Allison was: “How has the cost of GHD project management changed from the estimate of $250,000 to cover ISV?”  In reply, the Minister said: “The fees for GHD’s management of the treatment of pit debris, including ISV and other remedial work, total $1.4 million.”  As shown below, GHD received very much more than that.  Even this reported amount is almost six times the quoted cost.

2.3  Breakdown of Costs

References: (13) questions 30 and 32

Senator Allison asked for a breakdown of costs at question 30 of reference 13 and this was provided up to 30 April 2000.  While such a breakdown in itself does not give much of a story, some additional knowledge assists.  The agreed fee for GHD’s services to the project was initially $5.13 million total.  By the end of October 1997, they had received $2,833,982 for their services for Phase 2 (the actual clean-up on site).  At the end of May 1999, they had received $5,070,000, so far from receiving $250,000 as quoted in their letter of 21 November 1997, they had been paid $2,236,018 by then.  Also, according to GHD’s monthly report for April/May 1999, the project cost for their services was $4,425,458 for Phase 1 and $7,334,225 for Phase 2 giving a total of $11,759,683 instead of the $5.13 million that was expected.  The information provided in reference 13 states that GHD received $7,363,244 for Phase 2; that indicates that GHD received only $29,019 in the period June 1999 to May 2000 - very strange!

The uncertainty of the department’s record keeping is illustrated by answers to questions 30 and 32 of reference 13.  The breakdown, provided in answer to question 30, shows payments to Geosafe at $34,280,706, but the payments reported in answer to question 32 total $34,832,803 - a difference of $552,097.  Whatever the correct figure is, it must include the three year development program, the design and construction of the equipment and use of that equipment at Taranaki.  It also includes a lot of one-off payments so no-one should pro rata the amount to arrive at a likely final figure.  Whatever the final amount paid to Geosafe, since vitrification was un-necessarily abandoned, $34 million is a lot of money to waste.

2.4  Additional Requirements

References: (13) question 38

Senator Allison asked about costs of ISV, particularly about one-off cost items, and the additional requirements placed on Geosafe by GHD and MARTAC, see question 38 of reference 13.  Again, the Minister avoided the question and did not show what costs were for one-off items.  The importance of this is that in several other places, the cost to date was extended without recognition of one-off items, to arrive at a likely final cost.

The Minister said: “There were no additional requirements put on Geosafe by the Department, MARTAC or GHD.  Rather, Geosafe had underestimated the compliance costs to perform to a standard consistent with the contract.”  This is a peculiar statement; since the contract did not specify acceptance criteria, Geosafe could not possibly have underestimated ‘the compliance costs to perform to a standard consistent with the contract’.  MARTAC required the insertion of very expensive thermocouples in the melt, collection and analysis of many more samples than would be normal, and constant redesign of the melt.  In addition, Geosafe was required to continue to melt 600 mm beyond the historic depth of the pits.  GHD overturned the health physics regime that had been agreed with the Health Physics Auditor (ARPANSA) and imposed a regime that was far in excess of what was necessary.  They insisted on leaving work vehicles in the cleaned area at Taranaki, which meant additional vehicles to transport workers from the village to Taranaki; they insisted on duplicate attachments for the heavy equipment; and they imposed health physics conditions such as wearing respirators and cotton gloves which were not always necessary.  Information provided by Geosafe shows that to February 1999, the volume melted (first 9 pits) was 1,273 m3 compared with 135 m3 expected from volumes quoted in the Cornish Report, on which their price for the work was based.  The cost comparison was:

* Original rate for 21 pits: $6,632/ m3
* Pits to February 1999 (up to Pit 6): $8,072/ m3 for a volume of 1,273 m3
less extras required by GHD: $3,014/ m3
current cost: $5,058/ m3

So Geosafe had actually reduced the cost of the vitrification per volume of material treated.

The Minister said: “GHD did not demand extra vehicles, but reacted to the discovery of minor traces of contamination on Geosafe vehicles being taken back to Maralinga village.” and said that Geosafe’s solution was to purchase the additional vehicles.  If the additional vehicles were required because of ‘minor traces of contamination’, then GHD should have looked further.  Was the contamination plutonium or (more likely) radon?  Where is the consistency in the health physics regime whereby GHD checked the Geosafe vehicles (which only went into the cleanest part of the whole work site) but they did not check the fuel delivery vehicles which then left site and went onto public roads.

Further, now that the clean-up is ‘complete’, when the land is returned to the Tjarutja, they will be free to drive across country just outside the soil removal boundary, where the soil is up to thirteen times higher than in the ‘cleaned’ area, without any health physicists checking their vehicles before they return to the village.  They will also be free to drive across the Tadje site where the contamination is 300 times greater than the clearance level.  Are the health physicists saying that vehicles have to be checked whenever the Tjarutja travel through the area within the boundary markers?  If so, who will carry out the checks?

2.5  Cost Estimates

References: (12) pages E32 and E33;  (13) question 36;  (14) question 1

In reference 12, at pages E32 and E33 there was a discussion about the cost estimates for hybrid options.  The department agreed to provide a copy of the estimates to Senator Allison.  In the exchange, Mr Harris said estimates had been prepared for three options.  In fact four options were estimated, but the interesting thing is that the fourth option was to exhume the pits and melt all contents ex situ, and even though this would have been work for Geosafe, they did not provide any input - the estimate was prepared by GHD alone.  Also in this exchange, Mr Harris described GHD as the ‘independent’ project manager.  How can they be ‘independent’ if they are contracted to DISR?

In answering question 36 of reference 13 posed by Senator Allison: “Did Geosafe offer to complete the work for a fixed price?”, the Minister said: “No, Geosafe did not offer to complete the work for a fixed price.” and then admitted there had been some discussion about this as a possibility.  The minutes of the infamous meeting of the Consultative Group on 23 June 1999 show: “Geosafe was so confident that specifications could be met that it was prepared to offer further work at a fixed price basis.”  In a paper Geosafe Response to MARTAC Paper to ISR dated 30 April 1999 “Review of Hybrid Treatment of the Buried Plutonium Waste at Taranaki” Geosafe reminded the department: “Approximately six months before commencing the melting operations, during a meeting with the Commonwealth on control issues, Geosafe offered to undertake Phase 4 on some other contract structure, such as a fixed price contract.  The Commonwealth declined Geosafe’s offer.  Geosafe is willing to consider an approach that fixes all or part of the costs associated with the hybrid melts.”  It could be noted that a fixed price contract could have had an adverse impact on the earning capacity of GHD.

Senator Allison asked at question 1 of reference 14, for details of cost estimates prepared for the various options.  In answer, the Minister said at answer 1 (b): “In November 1995, GHD estimated that it would cost $3.9 million to exhume and bury contents of the Taranaki pits.”  If that was a typographical error, it occurred twice in the documents provided by the Minister.  The estimate provided by GHD was $8,913,395.  The answer then goes on to say that a further estimate of $7.5 million was prepared in February 1996; that estimate was actually $8,304,100.  By a very slight change in the assumptions on which those estimates were based, the amount could be doubled; thus there was considerable uncertainty about the likely cost.

The answers provided by Senator Minchin seem to have been designed to confuse.  Estimates for the four options were provided but they were estimates compiled at different dates.  Why could they not simply provide the estimates on which they based their decision to adopt the hybrid option, which were prepared in the one exercise?

On 20 October 1998, the department provided cost comparisons for the four options, and their decision to adopt the hybrid option was based on these estimates.  There were considerable doubts about the estimates, but while some were quite clearly questionable more detail than was provided would have been needed to dissect them properly.  It seems that no-one subjected the estimates to detailed scrutiny.  The comparisons are shown in the following table.

ISV all 21 pits as original Option 6 (c): $20 million
ISV inner pits, exhume 7 outer pits: $11.5 million
ISV inner pits, exhume 7 outer pits, sort debris, vitrify some and bury remainder: $16.6 million
ISV inner pits, exhume 8 outer pits, vitrify all debris: $24.6 million

GHD developed the estimate for the fourth option (exhume outer pits and vitrify all debris) with no input by Geosafe, but allowed $8 million for melting.  The estimate is extremely doubtful.  The third option was based on exhumation of 7 pits but there were 8 pits to be exhumed; therefore the estimate was under what it should have been.

Earlier, on 22 September 1998, DPIE (Harris) provided estimates which were the same as the above, except that the fourth option was $22.2 million compared with $24.6 million shown above.  There was no explanation for the change.

3. EXHUMATION OF PITS

3.1  Experience in Exhumation

References: (8) section 4g para 5;  (12) page E53

In several places (for example, reference 12, page E53), the Minister or his department says: “Experience gained from the safe exhumation of other debris pits at Maralinga proved that exhumation and reburial could be conducted safely without placing workers at risk.”

There was never any doubt that the pits could be exhumed and that this could be done with relative safety.  What was questionable in our discussions was exhumation of Pits 19A and 19B which, according to British reports, were filled with concrete as the debris was placed in, thus making them large concrete blocks.  The fifth meeting of MARTAC, held in February/March 1995 concluded that exhumation of the pits was technically feasible.

However, the cause of the explosion in the melt of Pit 17 was not identified.  There was a possibility that it could have been caused by a discarded explosive.  If that was the cause, then there could have been other explosives in other pits and exhumation was therefore a risky business.

3.2  Measurement of Debris

References: (14) question 9

Senator Allison asked: “What is  your understanding of the way ARPANSA measured the amount of plutonium in the pit debris?” (see question 9 of reference 14).  The answer provided in response: “At various stages of the exhumation of the pits, the ARPANSA field team carried out high resolution gamma-ray spectrometric measurements from ground level above the burial trench ...” hides the fact that ARPANSA were not present for most of the exhumation and did not measure all of the debris exhumed, nor did they confirm all measurements by CH2M Hill.  This places large question marks over the values that have been provided.

3.3  Missing Firing Pads

References: (11) page CA42;  (12) page E38

There was some confusion at reference 11, page CA42 between concrete firing pads and concrete caps.  In the Vixen B trials a nuclear bomb was placed on a featherbed which in turn was placed on a concrete firing pad.  Both the featherbed and the firing pad were contaminated with plutonium and were buried in the pits.  All but two of the pits were covered by concrete caps.  As the concrete caps were removed from the pits, one was found to have some plutonium on the underside and GHD decided, on the basis of that one sample, to bury all of the concrete caps.

The Cornish Report says that four of the concrete firing pads were buried in Pit 5 and five were buried in Pit 11.  It is the firing pads which have not been included in the inventory of what was exhumed from the pits.

In reference 12, page E38, Dr Perkins said: “If the inference is that there are some firing pads that have somehow been missed, I can assure you that is not the case.”  These pads were 3.6 metres square and 300 mm thick.  How can nine of them have been missed?  Fortunately I photographed them before they disappeared.  In a meeting of the Consultative Group, I asked that these pads be exhumed and transferred for melting in one piece; if they had been broken up then the smaller pieces would have been buried, not vitrified.  My mentioning the pads in that meeting should have reminded the department that they were there.

The importance of these pads is the amount of plutonium that could have been on them, as reported in Residual Plutonium Contamination at the Former Maralinga Range - South Australia (A Preliminary Note) by R F Carter, Aldermaston, June 1985).  In that paper, Carter says that the “field estimates of about 1 Ci for the pad contamination on these pads given in [AWRE Report T4/61] were known to be gross underestimates, probably by an order of magnitude ...” [Note 1 Ci (Curie) of plutonium is about 16 grams.]  Also in Carter, is the statement “.....it is evident from the data available at the present time that the probable pit content is much smaller, and probably of the order of 2 kg, or approximately 10% of the total amount used.”

3.4  Sorting Debris

References: (11) page CA45;  (14) questions 8 and 20

At reference 11, page CA45, Senator Allison suggested that debris exhumed from the pits should have been sorted by level of radioactivity rather than by size.  In this exchange, ARPANSA seemed to be more concerned with the safety of the workers than the long term safety of the site.  At a meeting of the Consultative Group, I stated that it was wrong to sort by size, and there was general agreement that sorting should be done by level of radioactivity.  It was agreed that sorting criteria would be developed, based on level of radioactivity, but none were ever produced.

Questions 8 and 20 of reference 14 addressed the subject of sorting the debris and in response (to question 20), the Minister said: “A broad separation of larger debris items from soil and small items was undertaken, but the additional risks that would have been faced by workers having to carry out a more detailed level of sorting, involving the breaking apart of contaminated structures, could not have been justified.”  This is a very strange answer.  The whole basis of the hybrid option should have been to vitrify the most contaminated material and bury the remainder, so this always implied sorting among the small material.  There would have been no need to break apart large structures.  And the fourth option would not have required any sorting at all, simply exhumation and placement of all material in the pod for vitrification.  This option would have overcome the concerns about worker safety in sorting and would have provided the outcome agreed under Option 6 (c).

3.5  Drum

References: (6) Buried Drum para 1;  (8) section 4b para 9; (11) page CA44

A sealed drum was exhumed from one of the outer pits and was immediately buried again.  When questioned about this, neither DISR, ARPANSA, nor MARTAC knew of this episode.  In fact at first they denied that a drum had been uncovered.  After admitting that a drum had been uncovered, GHD informed the meeting that it had immediately been buried again: “The drum had subsequently been used by Thiess as part of a mock training exercise in the handling of potentially dangerous objects” (see draft minutes of Consultative Group 12 May 1999).  Surely  if such a trial burial was indeed necessary there were better things on which to practise.

In reference 6, paragraph 1, the department admits: “A drum was dug up from one of the pits during excavation of contaminated debris and was reburied in the burial trench. ...  It was decided that burial was the most appropriate method of treatment.”  Since none of the bodies supposedly overseeing the project (DISR, ARPANSA and MARTAC) were aware of this incident, the decision to bury the drum must have been made by GHD or their subcontractor - a decision which was not theirs to make.

In reference 8 Section 4 (b), paragraph 9, the department said: “It was also reported on Background Briefing that a drum was dug up from one of the pits during the excavation of contaminated debris and was reburied in the burial trench.  This is correct, however, there was the implication that this was the only drum exhumed.”  It is most likely that other drums were uncovered, but that is not the point.  The disturbing feature of this incident is that ARPANSA, DISR, and MARTAC did not know that a drum had been uncovered and reburied.  Since DISR and ARPANSA were supposed to be overseeing the project, one has to ask what else was uncovered and buried without their knowledge or without any record.

The timing of this incident was also important; it occurred just after the explosion in Pit 17, and the drum could have provided valuable information for the investigation into the cause of the explosion.

When this question was raised in Senate Committee hearings (see reference 11, page CA44) Dr Loy seemed to have no knowledge of the drum, and he is the CEO of the regulatory organisation.

4. BURIAL OF DEBRIS

4.1  Depth of Burial

References: (7) para 7;  (8) section 2b para 2 , section 4c para 1;  (11) page CA59;  (12) page E51

In reference 7, paragraph 7, the Minister said :“As the primary risk from plutonium is inhalation, all these groups have agreed that deep burial of plutonium is a safe way of handling this waste.”  [The groups referred to are the Consultative Group, MARTAC and ARPANSA.]  I have not seen any record whereby these groups agreed that burial is acceptable.

Reference 8, Section 4 (c), paragraph 1, said: “In July 1999, having regard to the safety issues and uncertainties involved in further vitrification, the Commonwealth decided to treat the remaining pits by exhuming the pit contents and burying all the remaining material in a deep trench under a layer of at least five metres of clean soil.”

The department and ARPANSA have difficulty in defining what is meant by ‘deep  burial’.  Under no definition could 2 - 3 metres below grade be construed as ‘deep burial’.  ARPANSA said in at least two documents that the burial should be covered by 5 metres of soil below grade, and earlier they had proposed a cover of 10 metres of soil, for example see the draft minutes of MARTAC 12 (23 - 27 August 1998): “Excavation and disposal (at a depth of not less than 10 m clean soil cover) of the pit debris ....”

The draft minutes of the Consultative Group meeting of 13 April 1999 state: “Dr Williams confirmed that if all material was buried under at least 5 metres of cover to grade, and engineered to reduce ingress of water, it would be consistent with NH&MRC Code of Practice for the Near-surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Australia.”

In a letter to DISR dated 29 April 1999, ARPANSA said: “The option to exhume and bury would place the material at least 5 metres, and up to 10 metres, from the surface.”  Later in that letter, Peter Burns said: “In particular, it would be considered prudent for contaminated waste in the new burial trench to be covered by 5 metres of clean fill below grade, whether or not any additional capping above ground level was included to assist run-off of water.”  The emphasis (below grade) was in the letter, not added here.

The department also uses an indeterminate term ‘at depth’ in some instances, for example in reference 8, section 2b, paragraph 2: “At Taranaki, 11 pits were treated by in situ vitrification (ISV), and the remaining pits by excavation of the debris and burial at depth.”  The term ‘at depth’ is meaningless, but no doubt is meant to convey something deeper than the 2 - 3 metres below grade that has been adopted.

There was a short discussion recorded in reference 11, page CA59 about what is meant by ‘buried at depth’.  It is quite obvious from the exchange that ARPANSA has no definition of the depth required for burial of hazardous materials.

The depth of burial was also discussed in reference 12, page E51.  When Senator Allison asked: “What depth are you referring to when you said ‘deep burial’?”  Mr Farrow said “Under five metres of clean fill minimum.”  On further questioning he said: “In this context, what is meant is under a minimum of five metres of clean fill from grade.”  He made this statement ignoring the fact that the burial of debris at Taranaki is as close as 2 metres below grade, which certainly is not ‘deep burial’.  It is also very doubtful if 5 metres below grade could possibly be accepted as ‘deep burial’.  In the TAG studies, we assumed ‘deep’ to mean in a sub-trench at the bottom of the burial trench, that is 22 metres deep, and that was proposed to be encased in concrete.
The code sometimes quoted by the department states: “Near-surface disposal or shallow ground burial means the disposal of radioactive waste in structures located below and/or above the natural ground surface (within approximately 30 metres of it) and covered by layer(s) of natural and/or manufactured materials.”  This suggests that ‘deep’ burial should be at least 30 metres below grade.

4.2  Comparison with TM Burials

References: (8) section 4g para 5

Reference 8, Section 4 (g), paragraph 5 states: “It is worthwhile noting that the burial of  contaminated debris at Taranaki is in principle no different from burial of similar debris at other sites elsewhere at Maralinga.  Mr Parkinson was working on the project when debris exhumed at other sites was reburied rather than treated by ISV.  When working on the project, Mr Parkinson gave every indication that he fully supported the decision to exhume and bury the debris.  It is inconsistent to initially accept this method for some pits and later claim that it is not acceptable for others.”  This is a case of attacking the critic in an effort to make something sound plausible.  There is no comparison between the burial of debris at Taranaki and the burials at the TM site and Wewak.  At both of these latter sites, the debris was placed at the bottom of the burial trench, 16 metres deep at the TM site and 13 metres deep at Wewak, and then covered by the contaminated soil collected from those two sites before being covered by 5 metres of clean soil.  Further, the debris at Wewak consisted of two large concrete blocks which had been contaminated with plutonium and then covered with 300 mm of concrete to encase the contamination.

4.3  Encase in Concrete

References: (12) pages E33 and E34

At page E33 of reference 12, Mr Harris said: “...I can assure you that we sought advice on that [encasing the debris in concrete] and we reached the decision, based on that advice, that it was unnecessary to encase the material in concrete when we had already placed the material under five metres of clean fill.”  What a peculiar answer!  If the debris was to be encased in concrete, it would not be done after it was covered by 5 metres of soil; the burial trench should have been  lined with concrete, the debris placed in, and the top sealed with concrete.  This would have been the best alternative after abandoning vitrification, because the debris would have been segregated and retrievable should a future administration decide that simple burial was not acceptable.

As with other recommendations by ARPANSA, encasing the debris in concrete has been ignored.  In most cases the recommendation was ignored because GHD said it would be difficult to implement.  Encasing the debris in concrete is one example as shown by the exchange in the teleconference between DISR, ARPANSA and GHD on 1 July 1999, a week after the department had announced that it was going to abandon vitrification:

“Peter Burns did suggest that it may be sensible to concrete encase the highly contaminated items which, in his view, only amounted to a small number of units.  GC [Garth Chamberlain, the GHD Project Manager] stated that this would include some plates and some walls and that these could not be readily separated from the less contaminated material, certainly not just visually.  He seemed to drop the idea at this stage.”

It is quite extraordinary that the regulator should be making suggestions or recommendations instead of stipulating requirements, and that even so the suggestion should be overturned because a contractor says it would be difficult to comply, as he did in this case with both sorting and encasement in concrete.

See also Section 6.2.

4.4  Disposal of Soda Ash

References: (12) pages E50, E51;  (13) question 43

The Code of Practice for the Near-surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Australia (1992) specifically prohibits disposal of alkaline materials in the same pit as radioactive debris unless that alkaline material has been neutralised.

When questioned about the disposal of 60 tonnes of soda ash in the trench at Taranaki (see reference 12, page E51), Mr Harris said: “...the limestone environment at Maralinga is an alkaline environment which has a neutralising effect on the soda ash.”  Soda ash is sodium carbonate and it would require an acid to neutralise it, not another alkali such as limestone (calcium carbonate).  Somebody must have drawn attention to this mistake because on 15 May 2000, Mr Harris sent a ‘correction’ which said: “What could be observed is that the limestone environment at Maralinga is an alkaline environment which is sodium and carbonate rich, and the addition of about 60 tonnes of soda ash will not substantially change the chemical nature of the environment.  The soda ash is not buried in the debris disposal trench, but in a trench used for general debris.”  This is almost as bad as the original - limestone is calcium carbonate not ‘sodium and carbonate rich’.  Actually the trench referred to is called the ISV trench and the first material deposited in that trench was the contaminated material from the Airfield Cemetery, which included plutonium and other radioactive substances.  The trench was also used to dispose of the block from the ill-fated Pit 17 melt and to dispose of some unmelted material found below the ISV blocks when they were removed (see Minutes of Consultative Group Meeting held on 23 September 1999).

It seems that the department does not know what is buried where.

The response to question 43 of reference 13 again shows how little the department knew about what happened at site.  It also shows some ignorance on technical matters stating: “Soda ash will  not act as a corrosive material in the Maralinga environment.  The limestone at Maralinga is rich in sodium and carbonate ...”  Limestone is calcium carbonate; soda ash is sodium carbonate (rich in sodium and carbonate).  When rainwater filters into the burial trench, it will react with the soda ash and be corrosive.

Mr Harris also said that the soda ash was stockpiled at Maralinga, but that is not correct.  The soda ash was stockpiled at Ceduna and because the project had no further call for it, the department paid for it to be transported over 300 km to Taranaki to be disposed of - without informing the Tjarutja that this was being done.  The soda ash could have been sold back to the supplier.

5. CODE OF PRACTICE

References: (3) para 5;  (5) paras 5 and 6;  (6) Code of Practice paras 1, 2, 4;  (8) section 3c para 2;  (11) page CA38;  (12) pages E49 and E50

In MARTAC 14 held on 8 - 12 May 1999, Dr Costello was reported to have said: “.... in relation to the ‘burial option’, that contaminated steel from the pits be encapsulated in concrete in the trench and reiterated that he did not believe application of the Code was relevant to the situation.”  Since that time, three of the five authors of the Code have stated that it was not relevant to Maralinga; the other two authors are Commonwealth public servants and probably felt constrained to comment.

In reference 5, paragraph 5, the Minister said: “Whilst the government was under no obligation to refer to the NH&MRC Code of Practice for the Near-surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Australia (1992), as the Code was not specifically designed for a situation like Maralinga where there already was contamination, in the interests of enhancing safety the government elected to observe the Code.”  Quite apart from admitting that the Code was not applicable, not a single requirement of the Code has been satisfied.  Also, it begs the question of what obligations were placed on the government.

In a discussion about the applicability of the Code, in reference 12, page E50, Mr Harris said: “We have done our utmost to comply with the Code.”  As noted above, not a single requirement of the Code has been satisfied, with the possible exception that the concentration of radioactivity is less than allowed (10 7 Bq/kg), although that of course is easily fudged.

In reference 5, paragraph 6, the Minister said: “I am advised by ARPANSA that the amount of plutonium buried at Maralinga is less than what is allowed for in the Code.”  Even if the Code were applicable, it does not state any amount of plutonium (or any other radioactive material) as being acceptable for burial.  I had an exchange of letters with Dr Loy published in the Canberra Times on 28 April 2000 and my response on 3 May 2000.  In the former letter, Dr Loy again used the ploy of speaking about the concentration of radioactivity, not the amount.  In my letter, I referred to the statement by the Minister which used the word ‘amount’ (as shown above) and I said: “This is not the same as the concentration limit, which by the way can be easily fudged.  In fact the code says that, before disposal commences, the appropriate authority (which I assume is ARPANSA) ‘shall establish a limit on the total radionuclide activity for the proposed disposal facility, see Clause 2.6.4 and they did not do this.”

In reference 6, paragraph 2, the department said: “The Maralinga Rehabilitation Project is described as an intervention, that is a situation where existing contamination is being cleaned-up.  The Code, on the other hand, was written for normal practice, that is a situation where provisions for radiation protection and safety can be made before an activity is started.”  Surely, if the Maralinga Rehabilitation Project was planned as an intervention, the department should improve the situation as much as possible within the available budget.  This could have been readily achieved at far less cost than has been the case, and with a better outcome.

In reference 8, section 3 (c), Peter Burns of ARPANSA said: “While the Code was not intended to apply to remediation of contaminated sites, the principles and methodologies to assess the consequences of shallow ground burial can be applied to the Maralinga situation.  The limit given in the Code for shallow ground burial of contaminated bulk soils in a remote arid region in Australia is much greater for plutonium than the levels in the burial trenches at Maralinga.”  Two things are noticeable in this statement.  First is the use of the term ‘shallow ground burial’ which works against other statements that the debris has been placed in a deep burial.  Second is the fact that Peter restricts himself to speaking about burial of soil, not debris.  Contaminated soil can easily be diluted by mixing with clean soil.  No matter how much clean material is added, contaminated debris cannot be diluted - the contamination remains in discrete clusters.

At reference 11, page CA38, Dr Williams of ARPANSA said: “.... the code is entirely relevant to the situation [at Maralinga] .... The code allows for that specific situation [at Taranaki], but the government was not obligated because of the nature of the clean-up.  The code is not for a clean-up situation, it is for where you have radioactive waste and you want to dispose of it.”   The statements made here seem to contradict each other.  The first part of the quotation says that the code is relevant, and the second part says it is not relevant.

6. OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE

6.1  Double Tracks

References: (6) Comparison .... paras 2, 3, 4;  (8) section 4e paras 3, 4, 5;  (12) pages E48 and E49

Double Tracks is a site in Nevada at which the USA conducted a trial similar to the Vixen B trials at Taranaki, except that the Americans detonated only one device at that site.  The treatment of the Double Tracks site is addressed in reference 6, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.

In paragraph 2 of the reference, the department said: “The Double Tracks site is located on the Nevada Test Site, which is controlled by the US Defense Forces, and is still used for weapons testing.”  The department obviously has limited knowledge of the site.  Double Tracks is no longer used for weapons testing, and is actually located on Range 71 North of the Nellis Air Force Range, some 330 km by road from the Nevada Test Site.  One objective of that clean-up was to return institutional control of the site to the USAF.  Perhaps that is why the USAF would not allow the debris and contaminated soil to be buried at the site, but required it to be bagged and transported to the Nevada Test Site.  Their ignorance is also demonstrated in the exchanges in reference 12 pages E48 and E49.  For example, at page E49, Mr Harris said: “As I am told, 470 grams of plutonium was removed to the low level repository in the United States.  That is leaving a total of something like one to two kilos of plutonium still on the ground at the Nevada Test Site.”  The amount of 470 grams was about that removed from Double Tracks, and the amount still on the ground also refers to Double Tracks, not Nevada Test Site.

In paragraph 3 of the reference, the department said: “There is still considerable (1.5 kg) of plutonium remaining on the surface at Double Tracks.”  This shows how difficult it is to remove all of the plutonium in a clean-up operation.  The contamination at Double Tracks resulted from a single explosion using plutonium and this can be compared with the contamination resulting at Taranaki from 12 explosions - so how much is still on the ground at Taranaki?

A parallel can be drawn with Taranaki where ARL issued a Clearance Certificate for Lot 32, declaring that the soil removal satisfied the end-state criteria.  Pit 2 was located in that lot, and when the cap of that pit was removed, it was found that it did not cover the pit at all.  ARL had just issued a certificate for a lot which contained a large pit full of contaminated debris.

6.2  Overseas Practice

References: (6) Decision not to Continue with ISV para 5;  (8) section 4e para 5;  (14) questions 2, 3, 6

In reference 6, paragraph 5, the department said: “The technical advisory committee to the project, MARTAC, recommended the adoption of this approach (5 out of 6 committee members supported burial) ...”, but two of those who supported burial were not allowed to do at Double Tracks (see Section 6.1) what they advocated for Maralinga.

Questions 2, 3 and 6 of reference 14 deal with overseas practice in the disposal of radioactive waste.  The Minister said: “Disposal has occurred at Drigg [in the UK] in both lined and unlined trenches.”  That is true, but the answer should have been completed by noting that all future burials of plutonium contaminated waste has to be in trenches lined with concrete, as reported in Feasibility Study of a Low-level Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal Facility, Ansto/C103 and in Classification and Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Australia - Consideration of Criteria for Near-surface Burial in an Arid Area, prepared by ARL (ARPANSA) but not published.  [Note: The draft report was provided to Senator Allison on 9 August 2001 in part answer to Question on Notice No 3714, noting that the paper would soon be published.]

In answer to question 3 of reference 14, the Minister said: “... the main barrier is the geological characteristics of the surrounding rock or soil.”  Surely he is not suggesting that limestone or dolomite displaying considerable cracking (such as Taranaki) is suitable geology for disposal of radioactive waste. What does this imply for the proposed national radioactive waste repository?

7. OVERSIGHT OF PROJECT

7.1  Who Provided Oversight?

References: (1) paras 5, 16;  (4) Who has Oversighted ... para 1;  (7) para 6;  (8) section 3 para 1, section 3b paras 1, 2;  (10) para 5;  (11) pages CA36 , CA37;  (14) question 9

The department says that as from its formation on 5 February 1999, ARPANSA “has oversighted the clean-up operation, .....  Prior to that date, its predecessor the ARL provided such oversight.” This statement has been repeated in every release, until the Minister’s release of 1 August 1999.  It is surprising that ARPANSA should allow this assertion to continue.  By doing so, they are leaving themselves open to blame for anything that has gone wrong, or anything that has been done without their knowledge, like the burial of the drum, and disposal of nine concrete firing pads that are not now recorded.

ARPANSA is not be the appropriate organisation to oversee a project since, as the regulator for example, they should not have any interest in the cost.  The role of the regulator is to confirm that their requirements have been satisfied.  Oversight of the project should have been provided by the department, with assistance from GHD.

Since ARPANSA was not represented on site for much of the time that work was in progress, it is not possible for them to have provided the oversight necessary.  Senator Allison noted at reference 11, page CA36 that ARPANSA could not provide oversight if they were not on site.

The Minister changed his stance on who provided the oversight in his statement of 1 August (reference 10) saying: “The Maralinga Rehabilitation Project was undertaken by private contractors, with oversight by my department, and regulation by ARPANSA.”  He could have added that nobody in his department connected with the project had any experience in project management, and were therefore not qualified to provide that oversight.

7.2  Approvals by ARPANSA

References: (3) paras 3, 5;  (12) page E57;  (13) question 28

At reference 3, paragraph 3, the Minister said: “the clean-up methods were approved by the independent regulator ARPANSA.”  Since ARPANSA have no interest in the cost, they did not approve the methods; their only interest was that the methods satisfied the health physics policy for the project.  Also, they were contracted to the department so they could not be described as independent.

That ARPANSA did not approve work procedures is shown by the letter of 9 April 1999 to GHD, provided in answer to Question 28 of reference 13.  The opening paragraph states: “Please find attached Health Physics Auditor Reports 38 and 39 approving revised health physics procedures for exhumation of the remaining pits and acknowledgement of Method of Work Statements and work procedures for Thiess.”  The statement at the head of the list of work procedures states: “The following Method of Work Statements and Thiess Work Procedures have been reviewed and are considered to be acceptable from a health physics perspective.”  This wording is not approval of the process of the work.

Until the end of 1997, the clean-up methods were approved by the department; it is not clear who approved them after that time, assuming they were approved.

Also in reference 3, paragraph 5, the Minister said: “ARPANSA also certifies that the burial trenches at Taranaki, TM 100/101and Wewak have been constructed consistent with the Code of Practice for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste in Australia.”  The code was not used at all in the construction of those trenches, and it certainly would not have been ARPANSA’s task to certify the construction.  See also Section 5.

7.3  End-state Criteria

References: (9) para 3

In the Explanatory Notes attached to reference 9, Dr Loy said: “The ‘end-state criteria’ against which the sites have been cleared are those set by the Maralinga [Rehabilitation] Technical Advisory Committee (MARTAC).  In general terms, for soil removal areas, the criteria are less than 3 kBq-Am241/m2 averaged over 1 hectare and no particles greater than 100 kBq and not more than one 20 kBq particle per 10 sqm.  MARTAC was established as a scientific group by DISR to, inter alia, develop and specify the ‘end-state criteria’ for the MOU and the Maralinga Rehabilitation Project generally.”  MARTAC did indeed specify the end-state criteria and they must explain why the criteria appear to be inconsistent from one site to another.  ARL, the predecessor of ARPANSA, refused ownership of the criteria and constantly referred to them as MARTAC criteria.

The regulator should really specify the criteria and perhaps ARPANSA should now re-assess them and issue a statement to say that they are acceptable.

7.4  Independence of ARPANSA

References: (3) para 3;  (11) page CA35

As mentioned above, at reference 3, paragraph 3, the Minister said: “the clean-up methods were approved by the independent regulator ARPANSA.”  The Minister seems keen to refer to ARPANSA as the independent regulator, when ARPANSA was under contract to the department.  Is that independence?

Page CA35 of reference 11 records the questions by Senator Allison concerning a fax sent to ARPANSA by Mr Harris of DISR. That fax asked ARPANSA to provide an assessment which showed that ‘ex situ vitrification was not acceptable’. Unfortunately ARPANSA managed to deflect the question.  It is a pity that the faxed letter was not tabled.

8. SAFETY

References: (8) section 3 para 1

The Minister and his department are very keen to mention ‘safety’ as often as possible, but they do not distinguish between the safety for the workers and long term safety of the site for the returning Aboriginals.  It is particularly confusing to read the statement in reference 8, section 3, paragraph 1, viz:
“The safety of the clean-up has been assured through a number of factors, including:
(a) The involvement of local and overseas specialists in radioactive waste management
(b) The oversight by the independent nuclear regulator ARPANSA
(c) Compliance with both international regulations and domestic codes of practice on radioactive waste management
(d) Ongoing consultation with the Maralinga Tjarutja people and the South Australian Government.”

The first three factors might have contributed to the safety for the work force, but the last factor is presumably referring to long term safety, since the safety of the work force was not the concern of the Consultative Group.

8.1  Worker Safety

References: (4) Was the Project Conducted .... para 2;  (5) para 8;  (13) questions 1, 2

In reference 4, Was the Project Conducted ..., the department said: “During the clean-up, no worker received a measurable uptake of plutonium.”  This statement is repeated in other references and might well be so, but since plutonium was found by accident in several places, including in the village, and not all workers were subject to the health physics regime, they should not be so firm in their pronouncement.  They cannot, for example, be certain that any worker not subject to the health physics regime did not receive an uptake of plutonium.  There were many workers in this category, including the APS, the camp management staff, those who repaired the road to Taranaki, and those who excavated the burial trenches.

In reference 13, questions 1 and 2, the department repeated that: “... no worker has ever received a measurable uptake of plutonium during the clean-up.”  While that might be so, there is a story around the project that a worker received a measurable uptake of uranium.

From my own experience, the health physics regime was rather slack at times.  They did not require me to attend for final medical and lung monitoring until eighteen months after I left the project.  It also appears that they have lost part of my personal file.

8.2  Contaminated Worker

References: (6) Contamination in Shirt Pocket paras 1, 2, 7;  (8) section 4h para 8;  (11) pages CA56 and CA57;  (13) questions 1, 2

In reference 6, Contamination in Shirt Pocket, paragraph 2, the department said: “All work procedures were approved by ARPANSA, and were audited twice during the project.”  This was repeated in reference 13, questions 1 and 2, and it gives the impression that the incident was included in the discussions of the audit team.

The health physics regime was audited twice and the second audit was a few weeks after the incident, but it is not mentioned in the audit report.  One must therefore assume that it was not discussed.  It is also misleading to say that work procedures were audited.  What they should have said is that health physics procedures were audited and they are quite different from work procedures.

Also in this reference at paragraph 7, and at reference 8, Section 4 (h), paragraph 8, the department said: “No such incident occurred again.”  Since the contamination was detected only because the worker visited ARPANSA for final lung monitoring, how is it possible to say that no such incident occurred again?  This one was found by accident and there is no way of knowing whether other workers went home with contaminated clothing.

Reference 11, pages CA56 and CA57 contain a discussion about the worker concerned and assert that he travelled to Melbourne directly from Maralinga for his medical and lung monitor.  It is very questionable if he did this since he would not have arrived in Melbourne until late afternoon and would not have had time to visit both ARPANSA and the Commonwealth Health Service.

8.3  Long Term Safety

References: (2) para 11;  (4) Now that the Rehabilitation ... para 2;  (7) para 9;  (8) section 2c para 3, section 4a para 4;  (11) page CA48;  (12) page E29

The Minister said in reference 2 that “the site is safe for use by the traditional owners, the Maralinga Tjarutja people.”  This is a statement that has been repeated in several releases, but safety is a relative term and should be qualified.  Such qualification was provided by a statement received from ARL during the progress of the work: “...it is true that (potential) radiological hazards exist outside the red area if people were to be stupid.  For example, on the centre line of the north-west plume, adjacent to the soil removal boundary, extended periods of heavy dust raising with no respiratory protection would constitute a radiological hazard.”  There has been no rehabilitation of that part of the site, so the potential hazard must remain.

At reference 11, page CA 48, is a discussion about the institutional control period and it is quite obvious from this exchange that little thought has so far been given to how long this should be.  This is a very important matter for the future custodians of the site.  The following is an extract from the exchange:

“Dr Loy - I think the issue is whether there should be continued institutional control, as they call it in the trade, over the area and how that should be achieved.  I would think that really goes to the issue of whether there would be intrusion into the burial pits in some future time.  This will not occur in the near future but -

Senator Allison - What is the ‘near future’?  Could you quantify the near and long future that you are talking about?

Dr Loy - Yes.  We would certainly want to say that there must be records kept, such that there is knowledge of the fact that there are burial pits here that could contain long-lived radionuclides.  I think it is only realistic to say that you can only impose that as a rule for the lengths of time that we think about our society being as it is now.

Senator Allison - What are those lengths of time?

Dr Loy - One hundred years, 200 years.  What happens after that is for future generations to decide.  I think it would be ludicrous for us to make a rule saying 24,000 years.  We can only say, ‘For the foreseeable future, while it is managed in the current arrangements and current political system that we have now, there ought to be these arrangements adopted.”

Senator Allison also questioned the term of a risk assessment (see reference 12, page E29).  It was quite obvious from answers provided by department staff that they had given no thought to this important matter either.  The following is an extract:

Senator Allison - Will ARPANSA’s assessment of what kind of lifestyle will need to be adopted in these areas be a long-term assessment?  What period will that cover?

Mr Harris - ARPANSA will work out some risk scenarios.  They will go back and review the risk scenarios that were taken into account in the TAG report.  They have already started work on what those risk scenarios would cover.  They will then be discussed with the traditional owners, the Maralinga Tjarutja and, through the consultative group that Malcolm Farrow, my division head, is chair of, they will also be discussed with the South Australian authorities, then ARPANSA will calculate the exposure levels on the basis of those risk scenarios.  To give you just one indication, it is not just a case of how frequently it would be reasonable to assume that an Aboriginal family might camp in the area, but how long it takes to change a tyre, for example.  Simple things like that are all taken into account.

Senator Allison - No, my question was: was it long term or short term?  What is the term that this risk assessment will cover?

Mr Harris - Long term.

Senator Allison - What is long term?  Is that 100,000 years, to the end of this century or what?

Mr Harris - I think you possibly need to go back to what we are trying to achieve here that is, that we are trying to ensure that the area is cleaned up to the standard below the risk contour.

Senator Allison - No, I am asking a specific question about the time frame.

Mr Harris - You need to appreciate that we take into account all reasonable scenarios. But the point is that we are trying to limit the dose uptake, which is an annualised uptake, so that the risk contour is met.

Senator Allison - So the risk assessment is only for a year?

Dr Perkins - The risk assessment will look at various ways someone could get a dosage. It is looking at various behaviour patterns.  So a whole range of possible scenarios would be considered: for example, if someone is hunting or, as Jeff said, if someone has a breakdown and has to change a tyre in an area which could be contaminated or someone who is going to be changing a tyre perhaps in a similar way now or in the future.  You are looking at behavioural patterns.

Senator Allison - But will this assessment say: ‘The half life of the plutonium in this area is going to be there for 24,000 years’ - which is what I understand the half life of this plutonium is?  Will it look at the time frame over which we can expect this material to become less hazardous.

Mr Harris - I think the answer to your question is a simple yes.

Senator Allison - A simple yes.  So we will be able to see that in the document?

Mr Harris - Yes.  What you will see in there is a statement of what the hazard at Maralinga is, and that includes the fact that there is plutonium there which has a half life of 24,000 years.  You will see the risk scenarios that ARPANSA, in consultation with the traditional owners, the South Australian health officials, and government have worked out as being reasonable scenarios for how Aborigines living in a traditional lifestyle will likely pick up a risk of exposure to plutonium.  That will all be very clearly put out in this paper.

That all sounds very good, ARPANSA are qualified to make such an assessment, but one must ask why the regulator should be undertaking that work rather than assessing it after it has been completed by others.  It also raises the question of who will specify the behavioural patterns of the Tjarutja; that surely is not in ARPANSA’s charter.

8.4  Restricted Area

References: (1) para 11;  (4) Now that the Rehabilitation ... para 2;  (4) How was the Type para 4;  (7) para 9;  (8) section 2c para 3, section 4a para 4

In many instances, the Minister and his department say: “[The Tjarutja] will be able to travel and hunt across the entire area safely and will be able to reside on all but 120 km2 of land at Taranaki which remains contaminated.”

To advise the Tjarutja that some land is still contaminated and not suitable for permanent camp, a large area around Taranaki, including the atomic bomb test sites, is encircled by boundary markers which advise of the hazard.

Since the Tjarutja will not have Geiger counters to tell them where the contamination starts and finishes, they will have to assume that all land encircled by the boundary markers is contaminated.  This is closer to 450 km2 than the 120 km2 claimed by the department.

In reference 4, Now that the Rehabilitation ..., the department said: “Most of the former Maralinga test site is now safe for unrestricted access.”  Most of the 3,200 km2 site was safe before the clean-up started, the only additional safe area is the 2.1 km2 from which contaminated soil has been removed.  However 1.6  km2 of that is within the boundary markers so, in effect,  only 0.5  km2 has been added for unrestricted access.  Also 120 km2 remains contaminated at levels above the clearance level, and not all of that area is within the boundary markers.

8.5  Effective Dose

References: (7) para 9;  (8) section 4a paras 7, 8;  (12) page E29

In reference 7, paragraph 9, the Minister said: “Aboriginals living a semi-traditional lifestyle on the land will be exposed on average to less than 1 milliSievert of radiation - this is less than the 5 milliSieverts used to guide the clean-up and is less than the 2.3 milliSieverts which is the average annual dose an Australian will receive from natural background radiation and medical exposure.”  According to reference 12, page E29, this 1 mSv/a dose includes the background radiation !!!!

In reference 8, Section 4 (a), paragraph 8, the department said: “With the level of clean-up achieved, it is confidently predicted that the annual doses to Aborigines who reoccupy the Maralinga lands will be less than 1 mSv.”

These are very strange assertions.  The effective dose of 5 mSv/a was estimated for permanent occupancy at the 3 kBq Am-241/m2 contour.  No clean-up work was done along this contour so the effective dose cannot possibly be less than was planned, let alone five times less.  Also that level of contamination still exists where contaminated soil has been removed, so how can it suddenly be reduced by a factor of five, unless by changing the assumptions on which the dose was based?  Further, they are saying that Maralinga, the old atomic bomb test site which is still contaminated and where radon was a problem for the health physicists, is the cleanest place in Australia, with far less background radiation than elsewhere.  The estimated effective dose, whether it is 1 or 5 mSv/a should be added to the background.

Reference 8, Section 4 (a), paragraph 7 said: “It was considered that the maximum acceptable annual committed radiation dose was 5 mSv (a measuring unit which takes into account various ways different types of radiation interacts with living matter).  This was based on the extreme case of 100% occupancy by semi-traditional Aborigines in the most contaminated areas (very small pockets).”  It appears that the department people do not know how the cut-off dose was developed.  The clean-up criteria were based on the effective dose that an Aboriginal might receive living a semi-traditional lifestyle at a contamination level of 3 kBq Am-241/m2 and this dose was 5 mSv/a.  Hundred per cent occupancy in the most contaminated areas (Tadje, which is several hundred times more radioactive, and the immediate north of Taranaki, which is over ten times more radioactive) would result in very much higher doses than 5 mSv/a.

9. APPOINTMENT OF GHD

9.1  GHD Proposal

References: (13) questions 3c and 5d

The Minister provided a copy of the invitation to GHD in answer to question 3c of reference 13.  The invitation showed the inexperience of the department in the wording of the letter; it was three short sentences which merely said: “We ... invite GHD to submit a proposal for the management of the [Geosafe] contract.”  There was no definition of what the work entailed and no specification of the department’s requirements.  There was not even a date by which the submission had to be received.  Neither was there any requirement for GHD to demonstrate their qualification or suitability for the work, something that is almost a permanent inclusion in tender documents.

The Minister provided a copy of GHD’s proposal in answer to question 5d of reference 13.  The flimsy nature of the proposal is now on public record for all to see.  In addition, the Minister provided a few pages of dot points for discussion with GHD, but did not provide what was requested, minutes of the meetings at which the extension of the contract was discussed.  It seems that there were no minutes or other record kept of these three important meetings.

9.2  Advice from Alan Parkinson

References: (8) section 4g paras 2,3;  (12) page E54; (13) questions 9, 11

The Minister and his department are very reluctant to confirm that I was the Department’s Representative overseeing the contracts with both GHD and Geosafe.  They eventually did so hidden away in reference 13.  Senator Allison asked (see question 9 of the reference): “What advice did you seek for the contract extension negotiation?  Did you ask Mr Parkinson’s advice?”  The answer provided says: “We asked Mr Parkinson’s advice on GHD’s proposal for the contract variation of their contract with the Commonwealth to manage the Commonwealth/ Geosafe contract.”  When asked:  “Why did you not include the Department’s representative for both contracts in those discussions?” (see question 11), the Minister replied: “....The Department’s representative for both contracts, Mr Parkinson, gave us written advice concerning the issue.”  That is completely untrue.  My only involvement in the whole grubby exercise was to comment on the flimsy proposal submitted by GHD.  That does not constitute giving advice and neither Rawson nor Perkins would discuss the situation with me.

On 21 November 1997, I received a copy of the GHD submission with a covering note from Dr Perkins which said: “Any comments you might have would be welcome.”  I provided written comments to Dr Perkins on 23 November; these were restricted to comments on the GHD submission as requested.  I finished my comments with: “Please let me know if the above satisfies your request, or if you require further explanation of any point.”  At the same time, I wrote to Mr Rawson of the department urging him to reconsider the invitation to GHD since it would severely damage the project in terms of cost, schedule and project relationships.  Neither Rawson nor Perkins made any attempt to discuss the comments or concerns.  This could hardly be described as seeking or giving advice.

The Minister did not provide a copy of my comments on the GHD proposal in answer to Senator Allison, perhaps because I concluded with: “I cannot recommend to DPIE that they accept this submission as a basis for extending the GHD contract.”

9.3  Appointment of GHD

References: (4) Why was GHD Appointed para 2;  (6) Removal of A Parkinson paras 1, 2;  (8) section 4f para 1, section 4g para 2;  (13) question 14

In reference 4, Why was GHD Appointed, and in reference 6, Removal of Alan Parkinson, the department said: “Due to the very specialised nature of the project, the isolated site, and the fact that GHD already had contract management of many of the site contractors, the decision was made to extend GHD’s project management contract to cover the ISV.”  GHD had management of only three contractors: CH2M Hill, SHRM, and Thiess.  More importantly, the statement notes the ‘very specialised nature of the work’, and so one would have expected them to have appointed a company with a detailed knowledge of the technology.  In the event, the department appointed a company with no knowledge at all of the technology.  GHD had never even seen the equipment and had not been involved in any way in the three year development program to match the technology to the Taranaki geology.  In short GHD had no knowledge or experience of ISV, and, after my departure, neither had the department.  See also Section 9.7.

If GHD were assessing tenders for management of a complex project, would they appoint a company with no experience in the field?  If not then why were they so keen to be involved as project manager of a project of which they had no knowledge at all, and then also accepted appointment as Project Authority?

Reference 8, Section 4 (g), paragraph 2 states: “Following the extension of GHD’s contract to project manage the in situ vitrification, the contract with Alan Parkinson’s company as engineering adviser was terminated, and Mr Parkinson was removed from MARTAC.”  This is true, but it should also have stated that the public servant who cancelled my membership of MARTAC exceeded his authority, as admitted by the Secretary of the Department by letter of 8 July 1999, eighteen months after the event.  It can also be noted that the department could not find anyone in Australia to replace me.  My replacement is an American, formerly head of the Nevada Test Site, domiciled in USA and travels to Australia for MARTAC meetings.

9.4  Department Experience

References: (12) page E58;  (13) questions 5, 13, 14

At reference 12, page E58, Senator Allison asked several questions about the GHD estimate of $250,000 to manage the ISV part of the project, and how that was managed by the department.  In answer, Mr Harris said: “We had month by month meetings with GHD on project management.”  He seemed to think that project management consists entirely of monthly meetings.  In the exchange, Mr Harris claimed that increases in cost and payments to GHD were approved, but could not give details of how such approvals were granted.  The exchange illustrated how little control the department had over their project manager, or indeed over their project authority.

The inexperience of the department in project management is illustrated by the response to question 5d of reference 13, when they said: “A contract was not negotiated .... A contract variation of the existing Commonwealth/Geosafe (sic) was put in place.”  Even a contract variation should have been negotiated.  A very strange feature of this episode is that there appears to be no record of the three meetings held between DISR and GHD to discuss the extension of the contract.

At question 13 of reference 13, Senator Allison asked: “What experience and knowledge did Dr Perkins and Mr Rawson have in ISV?”  In his reply, Senator Minchin said: “Experience and knowledge of ISV was provided by the ISV contractor, Geosafe.  It was not the role of Dr Perkins and Mr Rawson to be technical experts in ISV.”  This is a most unusual structure for a large contract; the only expertise and understanding resided with the contractor!!!  No wonder MARTAC had to get involved to the extent they did; but without the day-to-day involvement necessary.  It also highlights how ill equipped Dr Perkins and Mr Rawson were to discuss the project with GHD.  The real answer to this question is “NONE.”

Question 14 of that reference asked: “Was it the first time either had negotiated a contract of this sort?”  In his reply, the Minister again avoided the question: “A contract variation was the relevant process, not a contract negotiation.”  This again completely ignores the fact that a contract variation should also be negotiated, not simply awarded.

9.5  Advice to the Minister

References: (13) question 5

Senator Allison asked (see reference 13, question 5) whether, when advising the Minister of the extension of GHD’s contract, the department made him aware that GHD had no experience or knowledge of ISV.  In response, the department completely ignored the question and again spoke about GHD as project managers.  They should have answered “NO WE DID NOT INFORM THE MINISTER.”

In their advice to the Minister (reference M1997/4390), the department said: “the decision to appoint GHD as project manager was based on:
* a strategy of risk minimisation for the Commonwealth. ...... The appointment of GHD, the large engineering firm which has a history of involvement with the Maralinga Rehabilitation Project ..... was seen as the best way to minimise the risk to the Commonwealth ...”

In fact the appointment did not reduce the risk.  Because GHD and the department itself had no-one with knowledge or experience of ISV, the technical risks were increased.  Further, since no-one in the department connected with the project had any engineering or project management experience, the financial risks were considerably increased.  Had those in DISR responsible for this decision had even a passing knowledge of the project, they would have known that in some aspects, GHD’s performance in earlier parts of the project were not what was expected.

The Geosafe team included as their major subcontractor the international firm Amec.  Although Amec was subcontracted to Geosafe, the arrangement worked more as a joint venture.  This is important because Amec is the third largest engineering company in the world (far bigger than GHD) and they have an international reputation for sound project management.  In addition, they are well experienced in process engineering and were very knowledgeable in the ISV technology having designed, built, and operated the Taranaki equipment.  It could be added that a few months after the Pit 17 incident, Amec bought the world licence for vitrification technology from Geosafe.

In both their advice to the Minister and the answer to Senator Allison’s question, the department was quite misleading.  For example in answer to question 5 c of reference 13, the department said: “As GHD (and its subconsultants) already had the role of project manager oversighting all other contractors working at the site, and had site wide responsibility for such issues as radiation safety, site access control, and general site safety ...”  GHD did not oversee all other contractors at the site (for example they did not oversee ARL, HydroGen, or the APS), and at the time they did not oversee Geosafe.  Further, they did not have responsibility for such issues as site access control - that responsibility rested with the Australian Protective Service under contract to the department.

9.6  Objections by Geosafe

References: (13) question 4

In the answer to question 4 of reference 13, “Isn’t it the case that Geosafe raised very strong objections to the appointment [of GHD] in letters on 20 and 28 November 1997 and continued their objection well into 1998?” the department said: “Various exchanges occurred between the Department and Geosafe over the matter of the appointment of GHD ..... Geosafe raised various issues concerning the appointment, to which we responded.”  In those letters, Geosafe several times noted GHD’s complete lack of knowledge of ISV and were most concerned about what this meant for the project.  In their response to Geosafe dated 1 December 1997, DPIE said: “... we acknowledge that Geosafe has a high level of technical expertise and we are satisfied with the way Geosafe is managing its responsibility for the project.”  This of course raises the question of why change the arrangements if they were satisfactory?

9.7  GHD Experience in ISV

References: (12) page E60;  (13) questions 16, 18

In reference 12, page E60, Senator Allison said, in asking about the extension of GHD’s contract: “Were you aware at that time that GHD had no experience or knowledge of the ISV process?”  In reply, Mr farrow said: “I am not sure that is the case” and then tried to extol GHD’s virtues as a project managers.  It is well known that GHD had never seen the ISV equipment, had not been involved in any way in the three year development program to match the technology to the Taranaki geology, and had no involvement in the design of the equipment or its testing, and Mr Farrow should have known that.

In their letter to Geosafe dated 1 December 1997, the department acknowledged that GHD had no knowledge or experience of ISV, viz; “While we do not seek to underestimate the complexity of the ISV technology and its application, we are confident that a professional engineering firm of GHD’s standing would have no difficulty in getting across the issues of relevance to their Project Management role.  The extensive technical knowledge of MARTAC and DPIE’s advisers as well as that of Geosafe would be available to GHD and would facilitate this process.”  And later in the same letter: “We noted Geosafe’s refusal to have a GHD representative present as an observer at the trial of the ISV technology in Salisbury this week in advance of the Commonwealth concluding arrangements to extend GHD’s role.  This is regrettable from DPIE’s perspective as it would have facilitated GHD familiarising itself with the technology and more quickly being in a position to advise DPIE on the acceptability of the on site equipment trials.”

The Minister constantly avoids the question of GHD’s knowledge, and therefore suitability to be awarded a contract to manage the ISV project.  In reference 13, question 16, Senator Allison asked: “What knowledge and experience of ISV did GHD have?”  Instead of answering with a simple “NONE AT ALL”, the Minister switched the answer to GHD as project managers, even claiming that they had mechanical and electrical engineers with ‘considerable experience in the relevant disciplines’.  One must ask where they accumulated this experience, for example in understanding the electrical transformer used in ISV work - a rather special device with three phase input and two phase output.  And where was their knowledge of geochemistry, which was far more important in understanding the ISV process?  Again, if GHD were assessing tenders for a management of such a complex process, would they appoint some-one with no experience?

In over forty years of engineering experience, I have never heard of a company being appointed to manage a project when they have no knowledge at all of the technology involved.  In the case of the Maralinga project, this was made even worse because GHD was also appointed Project Authority, in which position they should have had a very detailed knowledge of the work since they were then in a position to give technical direction to Geosafe.  In other words, a company with no experience was in a position to direct the world’s experts in the technology.

In question 18 of reference 13, Senator Allison asked: “Isn’t it the case that the Project Authority should have a detailed knowledge of the project and give technical direction to the contractor?”  In answer, Senator Minchin said: “The Project Authority exercises the powers of the contract as defined in the contract.  The contract is based on Geosafe being the expert on ISV and not being subject to technical direction by another party.”  The confusion in the minds of those in the department between Project Authority and Project Manager is illustrated in the Brief to the Minister M1997/4390.  Paragraph 3 of the brief states: “With respect to the contract between Geosafe Australia Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth for the ISV work on the Maralinga Rehabilitation Project, a decision was recently made to appoint Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey (GHD) Pty Ltd (the purchasers of Works Australia) as the Project Authority (project managers).”  Similar statements are seen in other documents such as the department’s letter to Geosafe dated 1 December 1997.

An example of GHD giving technical direction to Geosafe is Pit 15.  The department and MARTAC quote Pit 15 as an example of inadequate vitrification noting the presence of unmelted steel in the hard rock.  Even though there was no requirement, contractual or otherwise, to melt all of the steel in a pit, this pit was used to denigrate ISV technology.  An interesting point about this melt is the instruction from the Project Authority (GHD) which says: “This fax provides written confirmation of the advice to terminate melt 8, Pit 15 today.  This decision is based on careful consideration of the data provided ...”

9.8  Project Relationships

References: (13) questions 6 and 24

In answering question 6 of reference 13, the department said: “GHD managed the Geosafe/Commonwealth contract in a professional and effective manner.”  Judging from the harsh words and the involvement of lawyers, this is not a true reflection of the project relationships.  An independent investigation would find that relationships between GHD and other groups at the site were not good either, for example, field workers from ARPANSA complained that GHD tried to marginalise them.

Project relationships were also the point of question 24 of reference 13.  Senator Allison asked: “(a) Is it the case that there was a high level of animosity developed between GHD and Geosafe, and between Geosafe and some members of MARTAC?  (b) What steps did you take to sort out this problem?”  In his answer, the Minister said that GHD had no animosity towards Geosafe, but statements by the GHD Manager, such as: “This is the sort of crap that Leo is to feed to the Consultative Group” on a document from Geosafe, and the fact that correspondence is between lawyers hardly suggests good relations. [As an aside, Geosafe was asked to submit their proposed comments to the department before meeting the Consultative Group.]

The answer provided to part (b) again shows the lack of experience of the Minister’s team in charge of the project.  They quote site management meetings and partnering meetings, which include all contractors, as means of sorting out the problems on the project.  None of these forums are suitable for sorting out problems between a contractor and the Project Manager, or between a contractor and the Minister’s advisory committee.

9.9  Dust Suppression

References: (12) pages E56, E57;  (14) questions 23, 24

Senator Allison asked about dust suppression at Taranaki, see reference 12, pages E56 and E57.  Mr Farrow said: “If any [soil] was blown away it would be quite insignificant compared with the amount which was scraped up.  It would not be measurable in those terms.  If there is a suggestion that because of the way the operation was conducted soil was blown away and therefore the contractor did not have to bury that soil, it may well be that some grams of soil blew away.”

Senator Allison then asked Mr Farrow to check the amount that was blown away, and in response, Mr Farrow said: “There would be no records of what soil had blown away.  We are not talking about measurable quantities here.”

Mr Farrow should look at the department’s own video record of the project.  He would have been more correct to have said that tens of thousands of tonnes of contaminated soil blew away.  The airborne dust was so thick on several occasions that work had to be suspended because of the danger of moving heavy equipment in very poor visibility.  Also, on at least one occasion, the dust was so thick that the health physicists evacuated the forward area facilities, and they were over a kilometre from the work site.

Further, because of the huge amount of soil which blew away, that collected for burial fell outside the quantity assumed by Thiess when they prepared their price for the work.  Thiess then claimed compensation for the shortfall, and were paid $80,000 or $90,000 in settlement.  In other words, GHD paid Thiess to collect the soil and then paid them for not collecting the soil which blew away because of inadequate attention to dust suppression.  So Mr Farrow should be able to provide Senator Allison with a statement about the compensation paid to Thiess, and this will show that there was a huge shortfall.

Senator Allison asked at question 23 of reference 14: “What is the estimate of how much soil was due to be scraped up compared with how much actually was?”  The Minister provided information on the amount of soil removed by Thiess, but confused the issue by including the debris also collected and lumping the three sites (Taranaki, TM and Wewak) together.  By this device, the Minister shows that the total soil and debris collected was very close to the total.  If the Minister maintains that is the case, then one must ask why Thiess were paid $80,000 (or $90,000) compensation because the amount of soil removed was outside the limits used in preparing their price for the work.  GHD apparently paid this compensation without even questioning the amount of soil which blew away.

In reference 12, page E57 there was some confusion about a sum of $100,000 made available (by letter of 21 January 1997) for additional dust suppression facilities.  That was an amount that was made available for another water cart to be taken to site as an additional dust suppression measure (two water carts operated at Taranaki and they were quite inadequate).  The intention was to water the surface as soon as possible after stripping away the contaminated soil.  The third water cart never arrived and inadequate dust suppression continued.  In fairness to Thiess it should be noted that, with a change in work procedure to wetting the stripped area at the end of the shift, the dust suppression during soil collection at the TM site and Wewak was excellent.  Senator Allison posed question 24 of reference 14: “Was the $100,000 put aside for dust suppression spent?”  In his reply, the Minister did not attempt to correct the confusion, merely added to it.

10. CONCLUDING COMMENT

The above has been mainly restricted to the statements emanating from the Minister or his department following the expose on ABC Radio National program Background Briefing of 16 April 2000.  I sent copies of the original paper to many people in politics and the media.  In particular, I sent a copy to Senator Minchin so that he would be made aware of all of the misleading and untrue statements that he and his department have made.  This should have alerted him to the fact that advice he receives is doubtful and he then had the opportunity to correct the many untrue or misleading statements that he had made on the advice of his departmental officers.  I did not expect the Minister to correct his statements; the cover-up has gone too far for a politician to back-track now.  The truth is at such odds with what has been released that the whole fabrication will crumble if the facts of the project are released.

The Minister and his staff have not taken heed of my paper and the misrepresentation continues.  There are many more instances of statements that are misleading, or not true.  A good example of this can be seen in newsprint in May and July 2001.  The Australian of 17 May 2001 published an article by Ian Henderson under the headline Maralinga clean-up ‘botched’.  Mr Henderson quoted me in the article, he quoted my term ‘botched’ and my claim that “the site is not as clean as the commonwealth tries to make out.”  The article continued: “But the Department of Industry, Science and Resources has dismissed Mr Parkinson’s warnings, saying the clean-up of the contaminated areas, completed early last year, had been a success.”  Now is that playing politics or what?  I have not criticised the clean-up of contaminated areas, except to note that there are still hundreds of square kilometres still contaminated.  What I have been most concerned about is the burial of debris contaminated with plutonium and the misleading statements issued by the Minister and his department, and the department’s response to Mr Henderson does not address the burial of debris, which was done in a totally unsatisfactory manner.  Neither did the department comment on my follow-up letter to The Australian, published on 22 May 2001 in which I said: “The clean-up was not the success the department claims.  In fact the second phase of the project was an abject failure and the solution adopted for the disposal of plutonium contaminated debris would not be allowed in Britain, the source of the plutonium.”

A more damning exchange was made in The (Adelaide) Advertiser in July 2001.  This was prompted by a letter by Dr Jim Green published on 12 July 2001.  Half of Dr Green’s letter consisted of quotes from statements made by me.  Again, instead of addressing the issues, the Minister attacked a critic through a letter published on 18 July 2001.  Senator Minchin’s letter, under the heading 'A classic green scare campaign' was nothing more than an attempt to discredit Dr Green, and did not address my comments as quoted in the original letter.  The Senator said in the second paragraph of his letter: “Anti-nuclear campaigners won’t tell you some simple facts.”  What a case of the pan calling the kettle black!  Well I am not anti-nuclear and I have been telling some simple facts, something which the Minister seems either unable or unwilling to do.  The Minister continued with: “It was Australian and US nuclear experts with experience in cleaning up radioactive waste overseas who advised us that the best way to clean-up Maralinga was to bury the plutonium at site.”  That may be true for the disposal of contaminated soil, but it is not true for the disposal of plutonium contaminated debris.  In fact the US nuclear experts referred to by the Minister were not allowed to bury plutonium contaminated debris in their own country in the manner adopted for Maralinga; they were not even allowed to bury contaminated soil at the site - it had to be bagged and transported some 300 kilometres for burial at a guarded facility.  I made the point in a letter published in The Advertiser on 20 July 2001 in which I said: “Every member of the minister’s advisory committee, including myself when I was a member, said that immobilising the plutonium in glass (in situ vitrification) was a far superior method.”  There has been no correction or denial by the Minister or his department, and the misleading and untrue statements continue.