A Concept Evolves
Knowing the RIMC is impossible until one knows the background of the historical events which led to the setting up of this college. Illustrating the background of events was an ardous task and a challenge accepted by Jasbir Khurana, Kitchener (1939-45) and the previous editor of the Rimcollian.
The Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military college (RIMC), today's Rashtriya Indian Military College, was formally inaugurated on 13th March 1922 by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (Duke of Winsor), later King Edward VIII, at Dehra Dun. It was located on the premises of the erstwhile Imperial Cadet Corps ( also called Rajwara Camp), set amidst 150 acres (now 138 acres) of lush green countryside adjacent to Garhi Village in Dehra Dun Cantonment.
The purpose of this institution was to provide Indian boys with suitable education and training to ensure a high pass-rate for the Indians being sent to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, as part of the Indianisation programme of the officer cadre of the Indian Army. RIMC was not, in fact , a College, but a pre Sandhurst institution run along the lines of an English public school. The British believed that for becoming an army officer, if an education in Britain was impossible, a public school education in India was an absolutely necessity. The British believed that public school education was particularly necessary for Indian boys whose up-bringing made them unsuitable for the rigours and self-discipline of army life.
The evolution of RIMC is closely linked with the overall Indianisation of the officer cadre of the army at a very critical period under the British. Therefore, to understand the history of RIMC and view it in its right perspective, it becomes necessary to have a clear picture of the process of Indianisation of the civil and military services in India and also comprehend the full impact of the changing political environment leading to India's independence.
The Political Scene and the Independence Movement
In the post 1857 period, beneath the burnished cover of the
British administration, the mind of India was in ferment. Western ideas and way of life
had not been accepted and nor were they rejected outright. India had seen the collapse of
the Great Mughal empire, the marauding raids of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali and now
the rise of the British in India. The import of western ideas and their spread through
western education, foreign officials and administrative methods opened new vistas which
set the scene for an ideological invasion. From this transformation arose the phenomenon
of Indian nationalism. It was by no means nationalism in the commonly accepted western
sense, a common aspiration for self government based on a common language, territory, or
racial strain. Rather it was a mingling of old ideas with new, which produced both a
political movement against the foreigners and a transformation of traditional society. The
concept of an Indian nation of equal citizens was itself novel with important consequences
for the social structure itself.
The religious movements, The Brahmo Samaj of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the Arya Samaj of Swami Dayanand and even the Ramakrishna Mission during the middle and latter part of the 1800s did not evoke any political aspirations. The first Indian suggestions of an Indian government were made by the Bengal Indian Association ( a body of landlords in Bengal) in the Charter discussions of 1853. Subsequently the Indian Association was formed in 1876. Both these bodies were regional, and prior to the advent of the Indian national Congress in 1885, political activity in the country was confined to regional movements in Bengal and Bombay Presidency.
The first Congress held in Bombay in 1885 were of the opinion that the proposed increase in the military expenditure was unnecessary and excessive. P Runiah Naidu (of Madras) who had moved this resolution stressed the loyalty of the natives to the Queen and argued that the poverty stricken condition of the country required the government to rely on volunteers in a crisis, to cut down the size of the Indian Army, and so significantly reduce the British element of the Army. The high cost of the army was a recurrent theme (although dwindling in intensity till the 1920's.
The First World War formed a watershed in modern Indian history. It provoked a revolution in the Indian consciousness. Before 1914 the Government of India on the whole held the initiative; after 1918 it was grasped by the congress. Until 1914 it had seemed self-governance on Western lines would come with stately strokes at intervals measured by the imperial government in a manner totally dependent on them. The World War had totally transformed the concept of supremacy over the Asian races. The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-5; the successful revolutions in Turkey, Persia, and China; and the fratricidal struggle and accusations of atrocities committed by and among western nations during the War, changed the concept of this supremacy of the western nations brought out the realisation that they were in no way superior. The entry of USA in the War in 1917 and its world ascendancy in 1918 with its declaration on self determination, particularly the talk about individual rights, raised India hopes. To cap it all, the Communist revolt in Russia overthrew the Czar.
The Indian War Effort was considerable. 1,200,000 soldiers, out of which 800,000 were combatants were recruited. A hundred million pounds were given outright and thirty million contributed annually towards war expenses. The German submarine warfare and demand for wheat caused shortages. Muslim loyalties were strained by the war against Turkey whose Sultan was to the millions of Muslims the revered figure as Khalifa (Caliph) or the head of the Islamic brotherhood. Then came the great influenza epidemic which swept away five million people. At the same time there were changes in Russia and America. It was in these circumstances that the mood of the political classes changed from loyalty to anxiety. The imperial giant who was to hand out democracy as reward of loyal support turned out to be not such a giant after all. He remained aloof and apparently interested only in calling for sacrifice. In 1915 Annie Besant and Bal Gangadhar Tilak started the Home Rule league and in 1916 the Congress concluded the Lucknow pact with the Muslim League which ensured Muslim support for the Congress demand for self government.
Montague-Chelmsford
Reforms
Consequent to the declaration of a
post-war policy statement made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for
India, Edwin Montague, in August 1917, the new Viceroy in India, Lord Chelrnsford produced
the Montague-Chelrnsford Report in April 1918.
The centre had an Executive Council consisting of six members besides the Viceroy and the C-in-C. Three of these were prominent Indians including Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sir Fazl-e-Hussain. The Centre controlled customs, income tax, posts, salt and railways. The states controlled land, excise, irrigation and stamps.
In the provinces, executives were divided between the Governor's Executive Council, responsible only to him, and popular ministers responsible to the new Legislative Councils. The Governor's Council controlled the "Reserved" functions of the administration whereas the "Transferred" functions were controlled by the ministers. The reserved subjects covered land revenues and laws, justice and police, irrigation and labour matters. The "transferred" subjects covered local self-government, education, public health, public works, agriculture and co-operative societies.
The implementation of these reforms involved setting up and selection of an electorate based on qualifications of education and property ownership levels. The result was to provide over 5 million voters for the provincial councils, a million for the legislative council and 17,000 for the Council of State. These figures were small compared to the total adult population of over 150 million. A start had however been made from select constituencies into general ones and from the limited to the mass vote. The curiosity of dyarchy in the provinces was matched by the division of constituencies into "general" and "reserved".
The "special" constituencies represented special interests like universities, landholders, industry and commerce and had no special feature. But the division of "general" constituencies was of fundamental importance. All shared the same general qualifications but some voters were placed in the reserved constituencies for special reasons. This applied specially to the Muslims whose grant of six years in 1909 was now widely extended both at the Centre and in the Provinces, but Sikhs also received them in the Punjab, and Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans elsewhere. Communal representation, regarded as an exception to the rule earlier, was now described as a regrettable necessity. It was to become an essential feature of Indian politics having far reaching consequences. These reforms marked a great departure in the pattern of the Indian political scene. India had moved from the consultative and select bureaucratic control to a government with the first hints of mass politics with a legal and responsible, political entity, in a manner that it never had been before. The new arrangements were transitional and looked forward towards full self-government on the responsible parliamentary model.The implementation of this constitution was disturbed by the political happenings in the country following the Home Rule Agitation, the Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the Muslim League. The political stirrings went far deeper than the politicians or their followers could imagine. Disillusioned by the prolonged western belligerency, irritated by war shortages, restrictions and soaring prices, dazzled by the Russian revolution and American talk of democratic rights and self determination, India as a whole was restless, expectant and hyper-sensitive. The large Muslim population was in addition alarmed by the steady collapse of Turkey, which preceded that of Germany by some months, and rumours of its partition. If Hindus were aroused by their discontents and their hopes, Muslims were stirred by their fears.
The precipitation of these feelings into an anti-government movement came about, as so often, as the governments attempted to prevent it. The terrorist movement following the partition of Bengal, the Rowlatt Act, the Khilafat Movement, the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in April 1919, the Hunter Committee report exonerating Dyer in 1920, resulted in a massive anti-British feeling and non co-operation with the Government. This included resignation of government office, withdrawal from government schools and colleges and boycott of forthcoming elections to the councils. The movement caught the imagination of the country and gained a unique all-India character with general support of the Muslims who had started the Khilafat movement in support of Turkey and linked with Gandhi's non co-operation movement.
Although not many government officials resigned or returned their titles, the schools and colleges were disrupted. The elections were held but only a third of the electorate went to the polls. Thus the councils existed and were dominated by the Liberals but were unrepresentative. The government machine did not break down but was under visible strain and for a time excitement was intense. In this charged atmosphere violence was expected to break out but did not erupt. Gandhi called off the campaign after the Chauri Chaura incident and soon after was arrested in 1922, sentenced for six years, but released two years later. The storm had blown over, subsiding nearly as quickly as it arose. But things could never be the same again. The 'colonial' mentality had been discarded; Indians now felt .themselves politically adult and able to deal with the government on an equal footing. The government never sank back into its old euphoria. It had suffered a great shock and now recognised that public opinion existed and that the Congress was a force to be reckoned with. The extent to which this force was powerful was yet to be rightly assessed.The Renaissance
Politically the country went through a period of catharsis followed by refreshing changes leading to the laying of the foundations of self-rule and ultimately freedom. The communal riots gave way to the Congress-League alliance in 1924. The abhorrent Rowlatt and Press Acts were repealed. The most significant act for the future was the enlarged recruitment of Indians to the Indian Civil Services and the Army. A serious beginning was made in Indianisation of the Army by formation of the Military Requirements Committee under Lord Rawlinson.
The Government of India Act, 1935 was another landmark. It marked a point of no return in the constitutional development of the country. Dominion Status was now the accepted goal, federalism the accepted framework and parliamentary institutions the accepted form of government. Provision was made for changing the Constitution from within. In many ways the Act was a blueprint for Independence, a fact to which the retention of its general shape and lifting of whole sections of the text into the Constitution of 1950 testifies.
The first feature of the Act was the federal principle. This was a logical step in the development of a united India since it was a necessary recognition of local differences and the need for local freedom within the overall control of the Centre. It also made it possible to include princely India in the whole. The problem of residuary powers was resolved by the preparation of three detailed legislative lists, Central, Provincial and Concurrent, the latter enabling the Centre to assume extra powers in times of emergency.
The second innovation was provincial autonomy, not only in relation to the Centre but to that of the British as well. Dyarchy was swept away in favour of provincial ministries responsible to the electorate and restricted only by emergency powers which in fact were never used under ministry rule. The provincial franchise was enlarged to include 30 million voters, one sixth of the adult population, instead of the previous six.
The other principal features of the Act were consequential or extensions of previous practice. Provinces were re-arranged with Burma being separated.
If the Constitution of 1935 was a far-sighted document which merited attention as a prelude to independence, it also had serious defects. First it proposed a conservative framework for an independent India. The vital feature of this framework was participation by the Princes. Secondly the Constitution failed to prevent a partition.
To delve further into this subject goes beyond the scope of the current study. Suffice it to say that the Act was passed in 1935 and elections under it held in 1937 and provincial governments formed.
Political leaders were content to ignore the Army except for Tilak, Bose and to some extent Gandhi who in varying ways admired the military. Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the military; although not a pacifist, he found too much in the military mind which appalled him. Nehru simply rejected the military and militarism as viable instruments or targets for the national movement. His ambition was political control, which he assumed would bring control of the military; until independence came it would not be necessary to deal extensively with military problems. Motilal Nehru, however, was more pragmatic in his advice given to young Indian Army officers -when the late Gen KS Thimayya, then a young subaltern, and others met him and dined with him after attending a public speech by Mahatma Gandhi at the Purshottam Das Ground in Allahabad in 1929. Thimayya and others offered to help, and wanted to know what they could do for the cause. Motilal Nehru said, "We can't use you now. Nothing would please the British more than your resignation."
Indianisation of the Civil and Armed Services Theoretically, with the promulgation of the Charter Act of 1833 and Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858, Indianisation of the civil and military services was possible. In fact, no induction of Indians had been made into the civil services till 1870. By 1871 four had been taken into the civil services and by 1879 a statutory Civil Service created. The number of Indians entering by examination progressively increased to 63 by 1915—a mere five per cent of the total. There had been no move at all towards Indianisation of the Army.
Indianisation of the Army
The demand for Indianising the
officer cadre of the Army goes as far back as the days of the Presidency Armies under the
East India Company. During the period just prior to 1857, the Presidency armies were
officered by a Hindustani speaking British captain who was the unit Commander assisted by
"native Commandants" who had Indian sub-unit commanders (Subedars and Jamadars)
reporting to him. Although the real power and control vested in the British captain, this
system ensured that an opportunity existed for the ambitious Indian soldier for promotion
in rank and status. However after Mohammed Yusuf's rebellion in the 1760s) the appointment
of the "native Commandant" was done away with. The problem of meeting Indian
aspirations remained and these were sought to be met by introducing the rank of Subedar
Major in 1820. Even though the British officers had been conscious that the recruited
classes were placated by providing some avenues of promotion and advancement they were
hesitant to make any changes in the overall structure.
After 1857, British were extremely tardy in introducing Indians in the same category as the King's Commissioned Officers in place of British officers. At this time there were two categories of officers in the Army — the King's Commissioned Officers from the British Army and the Indian officers known as sub-officers.
Although there were a few Britons desirous of upgrading Indians to the King's Commission level, from 1885 onwards there was a strong opposition from Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) who consistently opposed this move with Major General Sir George Chesney, the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. Roberts recorded, "Indian soldiers, like soldiers of every nationality, require to be led; history and experience teach us that eastern races, however brave and accustomed to war, do not possess the qualities that go to make leaders of men, and native officers in this respect can never take the place of British officers. I have known natives, whose gallantry and devotion could not be surpassed, but I have never known one who would not have looked to the youngest British officer for support in time of difficulty or danger".
There were others like Sir Theodore Morrison of Aligarh Muslim University, who in his book Imperial Rule in India in 1899 counters Roberts: "The natives have just cause for complaint against us that we do not admit them to posts of military command ... Every other suggestion that has from time to time been made for establishing natives (as officers) into the regular army, bristles with difficulties, but the same objections cannot be made to their admission as a special corps. I venture to think that the Empress herself might devise a practical solution to the problem, by raising a corps of Imperial Guards, to be officered by the aristocracy of India. It would perhaps not consist of more than three regiments... successful candidates would then proceed to Sandhurst ... When the first English commandants' term had expired, the regiments should be left within the charge of the native officers... They should be given liberal opportunities of seeing service, that the others might have a chance of seeing whether... the native leaders of Indian society have in them the stuff of which rulers are made....".
The first concrete step towards Indianisation of the officer cadre, though small, came from Viceroy Lord Curzon, in his "Memorandum on Commissions for Indians" on 4 June 1900. Against much opposition he had established the Imperial Cadet Corps first at Meerut and then at Dehra Dun in 1901. In July 1905 four graduates of the Imperial Cadet Corps were granted a modified form of commission in "His Imperial Majesty's Native Indian Land Forces". One more was commissioned in July 1906, three in January 1907 and one in September 1911. The approximately 71 others trained either dropped the idea of a military career in the Army or in their State Forces. This commission was only for "gentlemen", and not for all civilians, or those "sub-officers", later known as VCOs. Curzon had seen in this modified form of commission, a military career for those "whose pride of birth or surroundings prevents them from embracing a civil profession, whose interests lie naturally on the side of the British Government, but whose sympathies are in danger of being eliminated, and their energies dulled by the absence of any field for their natural ambitions." These aspirants were to be from princely or feudal families, and not from "the new aristocracy who, if the criteria were one of wealth or education or precocity in European manners, would flood us with a stream of applications supported by every sort of examination test, but resulting in the very last type of young officers we desire to procure".
These officers were, however, in effect posted to "supernumerary" appointments, in order to avoid their commanding British personnel in any way. At regimental duty in the Indian Army, they were to be squadron/company officers. They could, however, command Imperial Service (State Force) Troops. In 1903, Curzon did apparently announce that Indians would be made eligible for full King's Commission, but Roberts was totally opposed to this. Even after he ceased to be the C-in-C in India, Roberts continued to oppose this as a forceful member of the India Council in Britain till his death in 1915.
General Sir O'Moore Creagh, who succeeded Lord Kitchener of Khartourn fame as C-in-C in India in 1910, ventilated his views in 1918, after he had retired. In his "Indian Studies" he wrote: "In 1903 Lord Curzon publicly announced that Indians would be made eligible for King's Commissions. The matter was let to drop till 1910 when I put forward a scheme for complying with the promise made so long before. It is no use discussing now, because the proposal was rejected. It was a great pity that this was done... this change had to be made sooner or later, for a Governor General's official promise must be kept but it was delayed for politicians love handing over contentious questions to their successors, and this moral cowardice has necessitated a somewhat difficult problem... being left for solution during this war".
Creagh had recommended irregular regiments for such Indian officers hoping a favourable decision would be announced at the time of King George V's visit to India in 1911-12. He was however, a proponent of the "warlike races" (later what came to be known as "martial classes") and had opined that the "warlike classes" would resent being officered by "non-war like races" thus creating discontent. Meanwhile Lord Curzon having earlier departed, interest in the Imperial Cadet Corps had faded. Even a negligible degree of Indianisation was, by and large, considered an affront by a majority of the British officers who were rigid in their attitude towards Indians. Lord Minto did, however, agree with O'Moore Creagh's proposal, that the Imperial Cadet Corps establishment of Dehra Dun be converted to an Indian "Sandhurst" but any such connotation was anathema to the War Office in London where Lord Roberts' s advice was against any such programme.The First World War 1914-18
At the outbreak of World War I in
1914 all plans for Indianisation were put on "hold". The Imperial Cadet Corps
was disbanded in 1914 and the premises used as the Mechanical Transport Training School
from 1914 to 1921. For a part of the War, a portion of the campus was used as a
convalescent home and hospital.
Although the impact of World War I on Indian society was important and diverse, two developments particularly affected both the traditional military groups and the more Westernized gradualists. The first was the scope and intensity of recruitment. Classes which had been dropped from the recruitment lists were again recruited, as well as new classes which had never been recruited. Also, the British made promises to increase recruitment. And the second was the political awareness created in the Indian soldier which awakened his ambitions and desires for higher promotions and political freedom.
Post-World War I
During the recruiting drives,
especially in the Punjab (Punjab then comprised the present Punjab, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh and the Punjab province of Pakistan), which was the main recruiting area and
provided one third of the strength of the Army, people were cajoled and even threatened to
join the Army. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab during World War
I had toured from district to district exhorting the martial races to come forward.
Threats of conscription were used but promise of commission as officers was more effective
in the Punjab. On 4 May 1918 he reiterated: "As regards the further grant of King's
Commissions the Government of India have already made their proposals before the Home
Government and we may be sure they will receive early and sympathetic consideration.
Meanwhile, eleven representatives of leading martial tribes have received commissions in
the King's Indian Land Forces within the last few months". Large areas of land were
allotted in the developing colonies in Punjab as rewards and for luring recruits, but none
of these methods was more effective than the promise of a King's Commission. Large grants
of land were made and 4,20,000 acres of land were distributed among 5,902 VCOs and over
14,000 persons had been given "Jangi Inams"— war pensions—for two
lives. 200 specially selected VCOs had been given "Jagirs" and 200 VCOs granted
honorary commissions. By January 1923, 371 honorary commissions had been bestowed. Such
honorary commissions now carried both pay and pensionary benefits. There were, therefore)
great expectations of Indians being granted King's Commission from among the people
hailing from these areas.
While laying the foundation stone of the War Memorial (now called India Gate where today's Amar Jawan Jyoti is also located) in New Delhi on 20 February 1921, the Duke of Connaught said, "On this spot in the Central Vista of the capital of India, there will stand a Memorial archway designed to keep present in the thoughts of the generations that follow after, who fought and fell in the Great War ... Today we know that more than a million Indians left these shores to serve abroad, of whom nearly 60,000... gave up their lives... In this hour of crowding memories, let us... recapture once again that thrill that passed through all of us that the Indian troops had landed at Marseilles and were pressing towards our thinly held battle lines in France and Flanders".
As mentioned by O'Dwyer eleven VCOs had been given King's Commission for past services. By 1923 the aggregate of such commissions bestowed was twenty-three. These commissions meant little for these persons were advanced in age and could not aspire to much promotion. Thus despite the August 1917 announcement by Edwin Montagu of increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration, nowhere was implementation more dilatory than in the Indianisation of the military officer cadre. The need for increased Indian assistance had diminished with the end of the First World War.
The plan for the Indian Army was on induction of 10 Indians to be trained at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst annually from 1918. At this rate it would take many years—possibly a century—to Indianise the Army in India and without being Indianised, India could not achieve self-sufficiency or even Dominion Status. At this time neither the Navy nor the Air Force existed as part of the Armed Forces in India and so the plans for Indianisation covered only the Army.
The Military Requirements Committee - 1921 and Setting up of RIMC
The wheels of Indianisation of the Indian Army had been set into motion. The threat from the North, the Third Afghan War, aftermath of the Jalliwanwala Bagh Massacre, the mutiny amongst Indian troops inJullunder and Solan in 1920, the turmoil caused amongst Sikh troops by the Akali Babbar Movement in 1920-21, had a cumulative effect resulting in the formation of the Military Requirements Committee called by Lord Rawlinson, the C-in-C in 1921. The Committee proposed formal postulation of the eventual replacement of British by Indian officers, indigenous self-sufficiency and broadening base of all recruitment. They recommended a 25 per cent level of Indianisation with an annual increase of two and a half per cent in Indianisation. Since this was not acceptable to Whitehall, subsequent deliberation by the Military Secretary in the India Office, Lt Gen Sir Alexander Cabbe, VC, and Lt Gen Sir John Shea came out with a proposal which postulated complete Indianisation of the Indian Army to be carried out in three phases of 14 years each. If the first phase was successful, the second phase could be reduced to nine and subsequently to seven years. From the second phase the British officers would cease to be recruited for the Indian Army. The Shea Committee also recommended the establishment of an Indian Military College. The Shea Committee recommendations were modified and it was agreed to Indianise six infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments. Lord Rawlinson also proceeded with opening a pre-Sandhurst institution in the old campus of the Imperial Cadet Corps with a capacity of 27 cadets. The Prince of Wales, later King Edward VIII, formally inaugurated the College on 13 March 1922, it being designated the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College (RIMC), today's Rashtriya Indian Military College. The full duration of education was normally to be six years; sons of VCOs could be nominated on payment of half the normal fees of Rs. 1500/- per annum, or a total waiver in special cases.
Whereas there was need for increased troop deployment on the Frontier following problems created by the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the political pressure in the Legislative Assembly demanded a reduction in deployment of troops and reduced defence expenditure. Nationalist pressure also increased for the establishment of an Indian "Sandhurst". An Indian Sandhurst Committee was formed under Lt Gen Sir Andrew Skeen and one British and twelve Indian members (including MA Jinnah and Motilal Nehru) in 1926. The Committee found that in the last eight years, against 83 vacancies for Indians at Sandhurst 44 had passed successfully. With boys fromRIMC also competing now, the results had improved considerably. The recommendations were that vacancies at Sandhurst be increased to 20 per year, increased gradually till establishment of the Indian Sandhurst in 1933; the capacity to be 100, with an annual intake of 33 for a three-year course. An option for Indians to continue at Sandhurst concurrently and for Indians to be trained at Royal Military College at Woolwich for entry into the Artillery, Engineers and Signals were to continue.
This was not wholly acceptable to Field Marshal Birdwood, the C-in-C in 1928 but the political pressure came through the Defence Sub-committee at the Round Table Conference in London in 1930. As part of the Defence Sub-Committee's recommendation, an Indian Military College Committee had been appointed to work out the details of establishing an Indian Sandhurst. This institution, the Indian Military Academy (IMA), was opened at Dehra Dun in the autumn of 1932. From this date Indians were no longer eligible at Sandhurst. The IMA's capacity was sixty regular Indian Army cadets and twenty for the Indian State Forces. The length of training was fixed at two-and-a-half years. A Dehra Dun graduate was called an Indian Commissioned Officer (ICO). The commission was valid only in India, and carried lower pay and allowances than those received by the Sandhurst Indian. The "Indianisation" of the Army was extended from 8 regiments to cover one-eighth of the Indian Army. However, this increase was still inadequate to absorb the increased number of Indian officers. Nevertheless, thus ended the first phase of the Indianisation of the officer cadre of the Indian Army. For the RIMC, the original government order had appointed a military commandant of the rank of Lt Colonel, a civilian headmaster, senior/junior British masters and Indian Masters. The first commandant was Lt Col HL Houghton of the Sikh Regiment, who took charge of the college on February 22, 1922. JGC Scott was appointed headmaster. The first group of British masters were—-JM Alien, CA Phillips and Kittermaster. The first mess contractors were MS Hazir and Co and the mess staff consisted mostly of Goans. Later the mess was taken over by the Army Service Corps. Hira Lal Atal was the first Cadet Captain (head boy). Among the early cadets were KS Thimayya, Asghar Khan and others, who had illustrious military careers. Thus a tradition was set, an act of history begun and an institution came to exist.THE END