Part I

If you were to base your viewpoint of mathematics education on a social constructivist epistemology, what would mathematics instruction look like?

Please read all notes while reading this essay denoted (*#).

Epistemology and Constructivism are interrelated concepts. Epistemology is "the study of, or theory of, the nature and grounds of knowledge, especially with relation to limits and validity" (Webster, 1999). Constructivism has it's root in the word construct which means "to make or form by combining or arranging parts or elements" (Webster, 1999). It is in this light that constructivism can be viewed, as how one assembles knowledge. Before presenting my views of mathematical instruction from a social constructivist perspective, it is necessary to discuss the work of two influential individuals in this area, Jean Piaget and L. S. Vygotsky. Their general theories concerning epistemology and developmental learning theory shall be contrasted by first presenting the crux of each theory and then examining the relationship between their major components. It is in the context of these two individuals that I shall present my idea of mathematical instruction, drawing on some of their idea's, as well as my own.

Piaget's general theoretical framework was termed genetic epistemology, because of his primary interest in how knowledge took form in the human organism. Before presenting Piaget's genetic epistemology, I must address the philosopher Immanuel Kant and his epistemological views, for it is from this ideology that Piagets' theories evolve. Kant's world-view (and hence philosophy) comes from the outcome of the use of human reasoning faculties, this undertakes investigations a priori, or independently of human experience. Kant believed that sensory experience was not a reliable source of knowledge because of the fallibility of the senses, wherein we may see a phenomenon which is not completely accurate (*1). When Kant read of Hume and his views that sensory experience did play an important role in knowing, Kant agreed, but thought that Hume made a mistake in his formulation of knowledge coming into the human mind in pure form (*2). "Kant said that sensory experience (sensations from the environment), in which the empiricists placed so much confidence, must be interpreted before it can become knowledge" (Popp, 1997). Kant thought that the "mind" brought something to the interpretive process.

Piaget later termed the Kantian idea of interpretive process as assimilation, wherein he rejects the "direct input" view of knowledge (of Hume), and accepts that what is perceived is interpreted and assimilated by previous structures. This means that however we perceive our respective environments is interpreted by whatever perceptual framework we have set up. Piaget's inquiry and explorations in this area sparked great interest, and more questions. Piaget questioned how these structures came into being. How did a newborn infant construct these mental frameworks by which to interact with reality, and more importantly, how did it add onto these structures? Piaget devoted his life to these questions. Piaget referred to the process of formulation as "accommodation", where there are various degrees of assimilation by an organism in response to it's environment (*3). As an organism survives in existence it interacts with it's environmental surroundings (people, weather,…, stimulus). This interaction produces information (effects). We construct meaning out of this information. When an organism encounters idea's and information which exists in a contrary relationship with the organisms existing schema (set of ideas), then this creates a dissonance, or (as Piaget put it) a disequilibriation. When this dissonance occurs, the organism is faced with the task of balancing the harmony between it's pre-existing schema, and the new contradictory schema. When the organism successfully manages the disequilibriation, then it has accommodated itself. The more an organism is said to be accommodated, the more it is at peace. This is a task of modern science in essence (not to mention religion and almost everything else humans do), to offer rational (hopefully) schema for the understanding of our environment. A prime example of this in a mathematical perspective, would be the subject of conservation of quantity. In this experiment (Piaget, 1953) a child was given two receptacles of different sizes (one tall and thin, the other short and wide) and an equal number of red and blue beads. He was then asked to place each of the beads inside of the receptacles. All the red beads in one container and all of the blue beads in the other. He did so, and was then asked which container contained more beads. He was sure that both contained the same number of beads, but the size of the containers gave the "illusion" that the tall thin container contained more beads. The child is said to be disequilibriated. This now leads us into Piaget's theories on developmental stages of learning.

In Piaget's view, humans are said to be at certain levels of developmental learning. These are certain levels, or ages, at which children are ready to assimilate a more accurate world view. Many children when first entering school have a intuitive, or pre-operational way of thinking, while others will be thinking in terms of concrete operations, and others still may be thinking at a formal operative level. It is necessary to understand the distinction between these if we are to fully understand our role as educators.

"Piaget discovered that children do not learn to conserve matter, weight, and volume at the same time," and the inability to conserve all of these three is characteristic of the intuitive, or pre-operational child" (Popp, 1997). Piaget also used mathematics to explain these developmental stages, more specifically a child's sense of geometry starts out topologically (*4), which is equated with pre-operational thinking. In this sense, "a child's order of development in geometry seems to reverse the order of historical discovery (*5)" (Piaget, 1953). By saying a child is thinking topologically, Piaget is saying that he is thinking only of properties which are invariant under transformations. For example, a circle and a triangle may be viewed as the same, because they are both closed figures.

Piaget's level of concrete operational thinking is equated to projective geometry. In this perspective, this level of thinking is seen as a collection of discrete mappings which when taken together yield some result, but the holistic perspective is lost. In one study involving the analysis of angles (Epstein, 1980), the students could not generalize the results of their data set. "They viewed the results of their experiment as a collection of point-to-point relationships" (Popp, 1997). The particulars of the study are irrelevant for this essay, but the core idea of the concrete operational thinking phase is that the child cannot make generalities from given information.

Piaget's final geometrical analogy is equated with Euclidean geometry, and is termed formal operational thinking. It is in this stage that the child learns to think conditionally and extrapolate outcomes, to deal with abstract relations, and offer hypotheses. Piaget also suggests that "the discovery of logical relationships is a prerequisite to the construction of geometrical concepts, as it is in the formation of the concept of number" (Piaget, 1953). Let me make note that all of Piaget's notions of accommodation result from the organisms interaction with its environment, in the above cases, social interaction is emphasized. When approaching students from a teachers perspective, it is essential to consider the students level of thinking. In general, as students progress in school, the percentage of formalized thinkers increases.

Vygotsky operated in the theoretical framework that social interaction plays an essential role in the development of cognition. Critical to this theory is that the potential for cognitive growth for an individual is limited to certain periods of time. These times he terms, "Zones of Proximal Development" (ZPD). While the philosophy of Hume infested Kantianism is the foundation of Piaget's experiments in constructivism, with Vygotsky we have a Hegelian dialectical foundation. Let me discuss Hegel's philosophy in brief so we have a better grasp of Vygotsky. This may at times seem a bit abstract, but this is a necessary philosophical foundation in order to fully appreciate Vygotsky's theories.

Hegel's philosophy concern's the Absolute, the One, the Totality, All (Hegel, 1830). From this One, all has arisen. This one is the All, from which all comes. In an effort to know of itself the one has split into the many, but by being many, an individual piece of this many is not the totality, and so there is an absence. This "absence" naturally gives rise to a third by the fact that there are 'two, in opposition'. The science of philosophy is a way of the One to know itself (*6). Let us now place this general Hegelian overview into the context of thought, and then by way of Vygotsky, into a social context. For Hegel, thought is a process, it is not a discrete thing that we can discuss, but occurs in action. Hegel's concept of thought is called the dialectic method (*7). The negation is the core concept here which is described in three parts: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (*8).

Thesis is a thought which on itself proves itself incomplete, this incompleteness gives rise to antithesis, which is the affirmation of the existence of the negation, all in reflection. Both of these taken together (*9) gives rise to synthesis, which is a transcendence of both the thesis and antithesis in a more enlightened perspective.

One can already see differences in the core philosophies between Kant and Hegel, which in turn give rise to differences in Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories. In Kant's view the use of analytic logic is suited to make sense of the phenomenal world based upon ones sense experiences. Hegel's logic paradigm emphasized that analytical understanding was acceptable only for practicality and the natural sciences (not for philosophy). Kant viewed knowledge as transcendent, which was assimilated by an individuals interaction with it. Hegel's dialectic is not concerned with the transcendent (*10), but with the Totality which is reality. For Hegel (as stated previously) knowing is doing, with respect to the totality (for what else is there in his perspective). With this core philosophy in mind, I now turn to Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory.

Vygotsky's genesis of concepts from early childhood manifests in a theory based upon thought-language interaction. There are three phases to this interaction. The first phase, called syncretism, deals with the unification of objects only by relations formed by the organism, not by the intrinsic qualities possessed by the objects. Examples of this phase may constitute things in the child's visual field, or random trial and error experiments. The second phase, called complexes, deals with the unification of objects by personal relations (subjective) as well as any incidental facts associated with this connection. Examples of this phase may include the identification of a member of a baseball team (i.e. Fred is a member of the Red Socks ergo, Fred plays baseball), or connection by transitivity (i.e. aý b & bý c implies aý c). The third phase, called concepts, deals with the abstraction of an attribute to form a basis for a collective. An example of this would be generalizations concerning a mathematical property (all circles have area=2(pi)radius). These phases are all successive of their predecessors and yet co-existent and co-functional. The interaction of these three levels gives rise to increases in conscious awareness. Blunden describes the relation of the individual (a piece) to society (the totality) perfectly in the following quote:

"Vygotsky then considers the role of formal instruction in which a child learns socially acquired concepts which are remote from experience, and learns to operate with them "formally", i.e. to manipulate abstractions. As education continues, such concepts become more concrete. At the same time, the conceptual skills learned on the basis of concepts acquired by instruction are applied to spontaneous concepts applied unconsciously but rooted in day to day experience. The spontaneous concepts drawn up to the level of conscious application of abstract thinking; abstract concepts bearing the experience of society come down and make a connection with experience and begin to become 'natural'" (Blunden, www).

 

Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory focuses on the idea that human intelligence originates from society (culture), and individual cognition occurs first through interpersonal environmental interaction, rather than just the assimilation of knowledge. One study based upon Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory had teachers promoting scaffolding (*11), thinking critically, and meta-cognitive thought processes among an ethnographic sampling (Miller, 1995). This study showed "how social environment can influence students' learning and thinking" (Hsiao, www). A critical idea to Vygotsky's theory is the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD). The ZPD is a range of time in which an individual can have more of a potential for cognitive growth. This growth occurs with the interaction among the social denizens in the individuals environment. The contrast between Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories should now be apparent and kept in mind (*12). I would now like to offer my own view of mathematics instruction relating to both Piaget and Vygotsky.

I enjoy both the ideas and the pitfalls of adhering to a particular philosophy and ethos, but my approach to mathematical education & instruction stems not from a concept of truth (*13) in standard sense of the word, but a concept of use (*14). The functions of Kant's interaction with transcendental knowledge interpreted by mind and the dialectic of Hegel are only important to me as they are of use to me, in a case by case basis (*15) . This is of course in view of Piaget and Vygotsky. From these two individuals I "borrow" certain ideas which I like and discard the rest. If any of the ideas and findings of Piaget or Vygotsky do not seem to be helping in a particular case of teaching, then I would search till I found something that would. So, it is in this sense that I must make it clear that my view of mathematical instruction is one of functionality (*16) (C1).

In the context of a social constructivist paradigm I would include the following in my "null structure" approach to teaching, after which I shall give an example of how I may go about this. Piaget has offered much, but the idea which seems to be of greatest import (to me) is the concept of dis-equilibrium, which is what happens when an individuals cognitive equilibrium is upset. It is at these times that an individual is ripe for re-adjusting their existing schema, or adopting new schema for whatever concept the teacher is trying to convey. The dialectical method of Vygotsky (Hegel) is a wonderful stimulation to the disequilibrium effect, so from him I take this. Glasersfeld stated the crux of my position crystal clear in the following quote:

"the function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organization of the experimental world, not the discovery of ontological knowledge" (1989, p.g.182).

Glasersfeld again agrees with the functionality of Null Structure in the following exert:

"In this one respect the basic principle of radical constructivist epistemology coincides with that of the theory of evolution: Just as the environment places constraints on the living organisms (biological structures) and eliminates variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or "viable", so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures)" (Glasersfeld, 1981) (C1)

"Any cognitive structure that serves it's purpose…has done what was expected of it." (Glasersfeld, 1981) (C1)

In short, my idea of mathematical instruction from a social constructivist epistemological view resembles the idea of Null Structure that I have just established.

I would now like to describe some of the views and theories of a mathematical educator who draws from a social constructivist perspective, Paul Ernest. Ernest is a mathematics educator from the University of Exeter. Epistemology is a great concern for teaching and Ernest is concerned with the philosophy of mathematics (a branch of epistemology) from a social constructivist perspective. Ernest "builds on the principles of radical constructivism together with the assumption of the existence of the physical and social worlds," and proposes a social constructivist philosophy of mathematics (Ernest, www). Ernest views epistemology as a subject that must be continually questioned and re-evaluated. Traditional methods of inquiry and research should not be just accepted and utilized, but subject to re-verification and even variations on how knowledge is viewed (*17). Ernest has a view on Epistemology that is similar to Piaget's disequilibriation. To bring up and question an epistemological stance causes a dissonance in the social patterns. Society does not like this and seeks calm and complacent individuals which do not threaten the established order. But it seems that when this order is upset, growth occurs (*18). All of this in the context of mathematics education, is traced by Ernest down to the foundations of mathematics. One view asserts that mathematics is absolute and can be known, the other asserts that it is fallible (as everything else) and a social effect. The absolutists are those that believe "mathematical truth" to be universal, and independent of human existence. Ernest dispenses with the absolutists claims and offers social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics (*19). In this view, mathematics is a social construct (and therefore fallible). He makes this assertion on two claims: (1) that mathematics origins are socio-cultural in nature, and (2), that mathematical justification is "quasi-empirical". His proof rests on two assumptions: the existence of the physical world and the existence of the social world (*20). This existence does not require that we have any explicit knowledge of these worlds. Now, this is where Ernest brings in social constructivism and build upon ideas from radical constructivism. He outlines six underlying assumptions:

Ernest claims, that on the basis of these assumptions, he can account for the effectiveness of mathematics in modeling the world to such a high degree, and also account for the high degree of certainty in mathematics. He does this (in brief) by tracing our perceptions, to the formulation of mathematical structures, which are invariably linked to language, as we must share these theories (C2). Language, in turn is changed into mathematical language and truths taken from one language follow to the other; "Mathematical certainty rests on socially accepted rules of discourse embedded in our 'forms of life' (Wittgenstein, 1956)". (*22) Ernest is an example of a modern social constructivist with which I share views (*23).

Now I wish to describe a lesson plan which reflects ideas in Algebra which would exemplify teaching mathematics from a social constructivist perspective. In order to accomplish this, the lesson shall first be presented, then I shall critique it. I make commentary notes in the lesson's explanation denoted, C#, which are used for reference.

Algebra Lesson

Source: EMT 708 Summer Quarter 1998 L. P. Steffe University of Georgia

Subject: The fundamental theorem of counting, unknown, arrays and binomials.

Description: This lesson's activity set is exerted from a quarter long problem solving class in which we (as graduate students) addressed various alternative constructivist approaches to mathematical problem solving. This activity set took a week and a half to discuss and complete. During this time our class engaged in group discussion, formulation, questioning, argumentation with mathematical presentations and proofs. Dr. Steffe challenged our engrained, "taken for granted" concepts of number, multiplication and algebraic formulations. The lesson did not follow a traditional format of presentation/ exploration etc… but was dynamic, totally interactive, and non-linear. Since the lesson is very large, I provide only exerted problem sets.

Activity Set II (C0)

The fundamental theorem of counting, unknowns, arrays, and binomials.

"We need to seek ways of helping students base their construction of algebraic knowledge on their natural number knowledge. The assumption is that if students construct algebraic knowledge using their natural number knowledge, they have a good chance of experiencing algebra as generalizing their knowledge of arithmetic and as being useful to them in human endeavors (C1). In this, they have a good chance of experiencing algebra as a constitutive part of their intelligence in a way that they experience their natural language (C2). As mathematics teachers, this goal is well worth working toward, and to work toward it we need to continue investigating constructive possibilities in the mathematics that we know.

The strategy here is to explore the implications of the fundamental theorem of counting for constructive possibilities. Remember, we need to emphasize students' quantitative reasoning and base algebraic reasoning on quantitative reasoning (C3). Let's consider the natural number 6, as the measure of a particular kind of quantity such as the number of possibilities of the occurrence of an event E. As example, consider E to be the possible outcomes of the experiment of tossing a die. The quantity is the numerousness of the possible outcomes and this quantity can be measured by counting. The result, six, is the numerosity of the possible outcomes. Thinking of natural numbers as measures of quantities is a very important connection between arithmetic and algebra.

Before we counted, we could denote the possible results of counting by using a letter, say a. In this case, we call a an unknown. In general, an unknown is the possible results of measuring a specific quantity. A known is the actual result of measuring a specific quantity. This should help students to regard a as a numerical symbol. Initially, at least, the students' algebraic symbols, like a, can refer to "real world" experiments. I use quotations to indicate that these experiments need not necessarily be recurring events in their everyday lived experiences, although they should hold that possibility in so far as possible." (Steffe, 1998) (C4)

  1. Let E be the possible outcomes of tossing a coin four times. First, find a systematic way to count how many elements in E.
  2. Let E1 be the outcomes of tossing a die and E2 tossing a tetrahedron. What experiment does E1 x E2 represent?
  3. In (2), make a representation of the outcomes of a specific experiment E1 x E2 using a rectangular array. (This is a critical connection that can be used to relate the fundamental theorem of counting and multiplication of binomial).
  4. A bowl contains 14 cards with the numerals from "1" to "14" printed on them, one on each card. A card is drawn and replaced, and then another card is drawn and then replaced. If E1 represents the outcomes of drawing a card on the first trial, and E2 the outcomes of drawing a card on the second trial, make a rectangular array that represents the outcomes E1 x E2. Then, develop a thinking strategy for finding the number of elements E1 x E2. Be sure to use your array when developing your thinking strategy. (it is important that students know how many elements in the square patterns through a 20x20 square pattern or that they engage in binomial reasoning to find such squares.
  5. Develop a pattern of reasoning for finding n2, where 0 < n <100.
  6. Develop a pattern of reasoning for finding n2, where 100 < n < 1000.
  7. The computational form of multiplication of two natural numbers usually needs to be reconstructed by students (C5). Consider the following computational form of product: 23 x 7 =

What meaning do you want your students to give the product?

Comments:

CO: This is an entire quote.

C1: It is quite clear to see that Steffe is bringing use of Piaget's concept of Formal Operational thinking. Operating under the assumption that students, which construct their algebraic knowledge (using the natural numbers), have a good chance at extrapolating whatever knowledge they may possess from arithmetic in this construction. This can also be seen as an indirect use of Vygotsky's scaffolding technique. In addition we find him in agreement with Glasersfeld, as well as my Null Structure approach, with the idea of functionality strongly in mind.

C2: Here we see a clear agreement with Ernest, with the analogy of mathematics resulting and interrelated with language usage.

C3: Here we have good math reasoning instruction, by offering emphasis on foundations of thought.

C4: The remainder of the discourse deals will the establishing a meaning construction of schema for dealing with these concepts, which can be viewed in light of an internal dialectical dialogue which gives rise a new perspective.

C5: In this problem we see a direct use of purposeful disequilibriation (Piaget).

If I were to explain the value of a social constructivist perspective for teaching mathematics to a college (or high school) mathematics faculty, I would use the word awareness. The value of this perspective is most present in the effect upon a persons awareness. Social constructivism is an active view of epistemology. It places mathematics in a context which directly relates to human consciousness and thought. It allows for a continuously transforming epistemological stance, that does not have to be self-consistent (as long as it works). These are my idea's on mathematical instruction.

Notes:

References:

Blunden, A. Vygotsky and the Dialectical Method

(http://www.merple.net.au/~andy/txt/vygotsk1.htm)

Epstein, C. Brain Growth and Cognitive Functioning, in the Emerging

Adolescent (Columbus: Middle School Association, 1980).

Ernest, P. Social Constructivism as A Philosophy of Mathematics: Radical Constructivism

Rehabilitated. (University of Exeter http://www.ex.ac.uk/~PErnest/soccon.htm)

Von Glasersfeld, E.V. (1989) Constructivism in Education, in Husen, T. and Postlethwaite, N.

Eds. International Encyclopedia of Education (Supplementary Vol.), Oxford: Pergamon, 162-163.

Von Glasersfeld, E.V. (1981) An Introduction to Radical Constructivism (exerted from chapter

10 of The construction of knowledge - This is readily available), 197-198.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1830) Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.

Kant, Immanuel (1781). Critique of Pure Reason 1'st edition. Translation

by Norman Kemp Smith

Miller, S. M. (1995). Vygotsky and education: The Socio-cultural genesis of

dialogic thinking in classroom concepts for open-forum literature discussions. (http://www.glasnet.ru/~vega/vygotsky/miller.html). This web address is inaccurate and was obtained through reference concerning the Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) project by Hsiao, J. W. D, whose web address is at (http://www.edb.utexas.edu/csclstudent/Dhsiao/theories.html#vygot).

Piaget, Jean (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1971). Biology and

Knowledge: An Essay on the Relations Between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes

Piaget, Jean (1953). How Children form Mathematical Concepts. Scientific

American, 189(5), 74-81.

Piaget, Jean (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York:

Basic Books.

Popp, Jerome A. Piaget's Genetic Epistemology. Copyright 1997.

Spencer, L. Krauze A. Hegel For Beginners. Icon books, ltd.

(http://www.werple.net.au/~andy/easy.htm)

Steffe, L. P. EMT 708 Class Curriculum in Mathematics Education (University of Georgia

Summer 1998)

Webster, Merriam Dictionary (1999) WWW - edition

(http://www.m-w.com/)

Wittgenstein, L. (1956) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, revised edition,

Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978.


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