Spearhead Ardennes

Spearheading with the Third Armored Division

Ardennes Winter Campaign

Chapter 2 - The "Bulge"

The front suddenly erupted in an action that shocked the allied world. German General Field Marshall von Rundstedt, generally accepted as the Reich's most able military leader, had gambled most of his remaining western reserves in a bold stroke to smash completely through allied lines of communication and supply feeding the Anglo-American armies. The great counter-offensive swept into the Ardennes on December 16, broke through a thin American line and began to swiftly exploit initial gains. That Jerry was capable of such a counter-offensive was quite generally conceded. Intelligence knew that the Sixth SS and Fifth Panzer Armies had been out of the line. The question remaining was this: how much power can the enemy muster, and where will the blow fall? Now, the 3rd Armored Division, and other units of the First and Third Armies, were to have the answers delivered in hot steel and were to experience the full fury of a Nazi force which held, for a horribly swaying moment in history, the initiative of battle.

Hold That Tiger

The "Spearhead" Division picked up its tracks in a hurry, and roared out of the Stolberg salient. First to go to the threatened area was Combat Command Hickey, which was detached to the V Corps, on December 18, to defend the Eupen area. There, the command rounded up parachutists and remained in Corps reserve until attached to division on December 21 in the Grandmenil area.

To Combat Command Boudinot went a grim task. Attached initially to V Corps for the defense of Verviers, it was immediately switched to the XVIII Airborne Corps upon arriving at its assembly area and, working with the 30th Infantry Division, helped create and eliminate the famed "La Gleize Pocket" which resulted in so much destruction to the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Panzer Division, one of Germany's elite of the elite.

On December 20, Task Force Lovelady, moving south from Pont de Lorrain, encountered and destroyed an enemy column, set up a road block, met opposition at a junction near Trois Ponts, established another road block, and a third at Grand Coo. At this point, Lovelady was ordered to move east from Petit Coo to Parfondry, an operation bent on the retaking of Stavelot.

At Parfondry, Task Force Lovelady found evidence of German atrocities in the bodies of murdered Belgians, women, children, and the aged. And, in this town, the enemy cut off the route of Lovelady's entrance plus his route to the road block near Trois Ponts, where Major George Stallings was in command. It was not until the 24th that the junction of these two forces was made.

Meanwhile, Task Force McGeorge had attacked south from LaReid on December 20, using two columns, with Battle Group Jordan given the mission of taking Stoumont and joining McGeorge at LaGleize on the 24th, and entered after destroying 26 tanks, four self propelled guns, and taking 150 prisoners.

On the 25th, Christmas day, Combat Command Boudinot assembled near Spa, and reverted to division control.

Meanwhile, after Combat Command Hickey and Combat Command Boudinot had been detached, the remainder of the division began a "hell for leather" march to the Hotton-Manhay area on December 19, with only combat Command Howze and the 83rd Armored Reconaissance Battalion left under division control.

By noon of the 20th, these units had arrived, and where given the mission of securing the road from Manhay to Houffalize. Task Force Kane was given the highway as a route of advance. Task Force Orr: Erezee, Amonines, Dochamps, and Samree, and Task Force Hogan a secondary road parallel and east of the Ourthe River. This small force, actually one third of the division, was attempting to cover an arc of 15 miles cut by more than 30 roads and trails!

Heavy fighting broke out around Samree and Dochamps. The road junction south of Manhay on the Houffalize road was also a hot corner. Task Force Hogan, ordered to seize the crossings of the Ourthe between Gouvy and Houffalize, met heavy defenses and was forced to pull back to Beffe. Short of gasoline, Hogan holed up in Marcouray where he organized a strong perimeter of defence based on high ground. He was shortly surrounded and faced with the threat of complete annihilation.

Combat Command Hickey was re-attached to the division on December 21, and began moving into the Grandmenil area. The 83rd Armored Field Artillery Battalion had been attached the previous day. On December 22, the 1st Battalion of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 643rd Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached.

Task Force Doan was ordered to cut the Marche-Bastogne road, and Combat Command Howze, which had established a road block in the Soy area, was reinforced. On this day, Task Force Kane, holding a position 1,000 yards north of Dochamps, and Task Force Orr, reinforced, ground forward to take Amonines.

On December 23, the Division was further strengthened by the 290th Regimental Combat Team of the 75th Infantry Division, the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, and the 188th Field Artillery Battalion. Task Force Doan was attached to the 84th Infantry Division, and the 3rd reverted to VII Corps after being with the XVIII Airborne Corps for several days.

Task Force Richardson took over Kane's road block, which had been cut by the Germans. Hogan remained surrounded in Marcouray.

With the attachment of the 289th Regimental Combat Team of the 75th Division, the 730th Field Artillery Battalion, two companies of the 87th Chemical Battalion (4.2 mortars) and the return of Combat Command Boudinot on the following day, General Rose had under his command a force approaching corps strength. In addition to the organic elements of the division there were two complete regimental combat teams, two battalions of parachutists, two companies of 4.2 mortars, four battalions of artillery and two TD battalions.

The Battered Spearhead Holds

On December 24, knowing that the German was to continue his attack, it was ordered to stabilize the line. To straighten the defensive position, Combat Command Howze was ordered to advance. It was also necessary to withdraw Richardson's road block to narrow the Manhay-Grandmenil sector. As Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division was going through Manhay, eight enemy tanks and some infantry managed to get behind Richardson's road block and into the town. Richardson withdrew, having only light tanks, and ordered Major Brewster at the road block, to fall back to Malempre. Caught on the move by fire from both sides, Brewster quickly lost two of his four tanks. He destroyed the remaining vehicles and came out on foot.

Task Force Hogan, still surrounded hopelessly, was running out of ammunition and medical supplies as well as gasoline. Several attempts at supply by air had failed, the parachuted material falling into enemy hands. The 54th Armored Field Artillery Battalion had attempted to fire shells packed with medical supplies in on the beleaguered forces, but were unable to do so.

After refusing an ultimatum to surrender, Hogan ordered all vehicles destroyed. He and his men, the famed "400", infiltrated through enemy lines on Christmas night, to reach American positions after a 14 hour march through German territory.

On December 26, Kane's force was withdrawn. The line was secure. Combat Command Boudinot relieved Combat Command Howze in the Soy area on December 27, and defenses were further improved. In front of the "Spearhead" Division at this time were miles of wire and hundreds of anti-tank mines. Our armor was dug-in, ready to defend.

Rundstedt Loses The Gamble

There was a short breathing space in which to take stock of the situation. Certainly von Rundstedt's great gamble had failed, but by a margin too close for comfort. Committed here against the 3rd Armored Division had been: the 2nd SS Das Reich Panzer Division, in the Manhay-Grandmenil sector and, on the night of December 27, the 12th SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division in the Samree-Dochamps area. The Manhay north-south road was the boundary between the Sixth SS Panzer Army on the east, and the Fifth Panzer Army on the west. Their avowed intentions were a powerful drive to Liege and then a sweep to Antwerp coordinated with a curving thrust to take Aachen. Because divisions like the 3rd Armored fought to the last cartridge and the last drop of gasoline, Jerry ground to a halt in flame and death and destructions.

There were the usual heroic small actions. One of these, an event which played no small part in halting von Rundstedt's drive, was the engagement at Hotton, beginning on December 21. Here, the division had left a small force of headquarters and 143rd Armored Signal Company personnel, a few MP's of Major Charles Kapes' detachment, some infantry of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment, and a few men of the 23rd Armored Engineer Battalion.

The force was later joined by a platoon each of tanks from G Company of the 32nd Armored Regiment, C Company of the 33rd Armored Regiment, and B Company of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment, all elements of Combat Command Howze.

However, no such strength was represented when the enemy began his all-out attack on December 21, The piecemeal task force held, and on the 22nd, was reinforced by parachutists of the 517th Parachute Infantry.

Still outgunned and outnumbered, the defensive line held and beat off several German attacks which penetrated into the outskirts of the town. When the beseiged group was relieved on Christmas day it had held its position doggedly in the face of superior forces, heavy shelling, mortar and small arms fire.

On December 28, the enemy bolstered his waning drive with an attack by the 12th SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division. This drive penetrated to the Briscol-Sadzot area, where it was sealed off and repelled. An attack above Magoster, on the same day, was broken up by artillery. After less than two weeks of heavy fighting, the offensive was smashed. Now Jerry dug in and knew that the pendulum must swing back.

By the end of December, the 3rd Armored Division was out of the line and preparing for a new offensive.

The Bitter Battles

Hilly terrain, the worst weather a Belgian winter had to offer - and the best of remaining German troops faced the division when it jumped off on January 3 from a line of departure, roughly Manhay-Snamont.

With Combat Command Hickey on the left, Combat Command Boudinot on the right, and the 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion echeloned to the rear, the "Spearhead" advanced 11 hard-won kilometers in six days, reducing village after village.

Colonel Hogan's force, re-equipped, operated down the Manhay road, under Combat Command Howze.

Towns with the names of Malempre, Floret, Jevigne, Baneux, Lansival, Xhout-si-Ploux, LaVaux, and Lierneaux, fell in swift succession.

Major George Stallings, subbing for Colonel Lovelady, took Fraiture on January 6, surprising a German battalion in an assembly area and taking 250 prisoners. Hogan's force cut the crossroads formed by the junction of the Manhay-Houffalize and LaRoche-Salmchateau roads, a crossing which now bears his name in countless yellowing newspaper files.

In bitter, crisping cold, the combat commands drove forward. There seemed to be a paralyzing icy mist over the entire battle front, a cloud of fine, driving snow that left every tree silvered and weighted with the clinging stuff. All of the roads were glazed to slippery ribbons, and tank tracks skidded alarmingly on the shoulders. Snowdrifts covered extensive fields of anti-tank mines, and hard ground made foxhole construction a nightmare when shells were falling. Men came out of the line with frozen feet, were treated at aid stations, and trudged back up to fight again. The Ardennes looked like a Christmas card, but appearances were again deceptive: it was agony all the way.

Task Force Doan, back with the division, took Sart, Grand Sart, and Provedreux on January 7, while Richardson seized Verleumont and Joubieval and Welborn took Regne, Hebronval and Ottre.

Lierneaux was the site of a famed Belgian institution for the mentally ill. German forces carefully booby-trapped the place, even though a number of the afflicted inmates were at large. Here, in an abandoned building, division headquarters was established for several days. Nearby the 45th Armored Medical Battalion established a rest center which catered to lightly wounded and near frozen men.

During the period of time from January 10 to 20, the "Spearhead" advanced another fiercely contested 10 kilometers.

In the first stages of this drive, the 12th Volksgrenadier Division, recalled from Stolberg campaigning, was encountered and thoroughly chewed up. As this unit faded, the 326th Volksgrenadier Division was put into the line and the 9th Panzer Division was reported to be on the front. Later, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division came from the south to help hold 3rd Armored Division advances.

On January 13, Colonel Yeoman's 83rd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion accomplished a spectacular drive in this so-far battle of attrition. His force cut deep into enemy positions and established road block astride the Houffalize-St. Vith road, a key highway. Meanwhile, Task Forces Kane and Hogan battled into Mont le Ban. The same day, Lovelady took Lomre in a coordinated tank attack. The following day, Task Force Welborn's men entered Baclain.

The towns of Sterpigny and Cherain are engraved on the memories of the 3rd Armored Division tankers. Here, part of Task Force Welborn was cut off on the 15th, and its light tanks destroyed by a marauding Panther. A single Sherman bounced three rounds off the frontal armor of the Nazi, only to be destroyed by this potent enemy. Richardson's forces strengthened the group on the following day, and later pushed eastward.

Cherain was initially attacked by Task Force Lovelady, which lost heavily in tanks to the German defenders and their carefully emplaced anti-tank guns. The town finally fell to Hogan's infantry - I Co. of the 36th.

As the "Spearhead" fought south of Cherain on January 16, German vehicles, attempting to pull out of the rapidly closing bulge pocket, streamed across the 3rd Armored Division's direct front. Slipping and sliding on the icy pavements, these columns were taken under fire by artillery of the 67th Armored Field, the 83rd Armored Field, and the 183rd Field Artillery Battalion. Thirteen of a total 25 enemy tanks observed were destroyed by the concentrations of shellfire. It was a highly satisfactory sight to the tired and half-frozen Yanks on this line of battle.

During this time the division had worked closely with the 83rd Infantry Division.

Gradually, the division units were withdrawn. Finally, the entire "Spearhead" was out of contact and billetted in the Ouffet-Durbuy area for rest and refitting.

A final chalk-up of enemy losses for the "bulge" meetings with 3rd Armored Division elements totaled: 98 tanks, 20 self propelled guns, 76 motor transports, eight artillery pieces, 23 AA and AT guns, 1,705 estimated Nazis killed, 545 estimated wounded, and 2,705 hard-won prisoners or war.

During the campaign, known facetiously as "the bitter battle for billets in the Belgian bulge", the Germans had attempted to infiltrate sabotage teams, clad in American uniforms, through our lines. There were few U.S. soldiers who had not only been asked for the password, but forced to name the capitol of their state, give Sinatra's first name, or other similar, spontaneous proof of nationality.

The "Bulge" campaign was finished. It had been one of the hardest - if not the hardest - fights in which the division had ever engaged. The "Spearhead" emerged victorious, but badly mauled.

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[Appendix 1 - Units Referenced in this Document]
[Appendix 2 - Soldiers Referenced in this Document]
[Appendix 3 - Sites Referenced in this Document]

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