John
F. Kennedy Jr.
T h e L a s t N i g h t
Each person has its own limitations
disregarding of what the FAA states or recommends and has to
determine where this boundary lies. Each pilot must be aware and
always stay well above it or reestablish control whenever this
line is crossed. The mandatory voice that we pilots should hear
when we cross the edge is "fly the airplane",
everything else becomes secondary in priority.
John F. Kennedy Jr. was in control of his airplane during 99.2%
of the total flight time the night of the accident. After this
point it only took him 32 seconds to loose control and crash into
the ocean. In my opinion the cause of the accident was lost
of Situational Awareness due to an extremely stressful and
anxious situation. 6 minutes and 35 seconds were enough to drive
him to the edge.
The NTSB states that the night of the accident Visual
Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevailed in the area of the
accident. I will ask to reconsider this statement since there was
no visible horizon, visibility was low in fog over the island and
the moon was still too low to reflect any considerable amount of
light. In other words, the scenario after JFK initiated the
descent 34 miles out over the ocean was total darkness with zero
visual references or horizon. Clearly Instrument Meteorological
Conditions IMC due to a zero visibility condition. Starting with
this premise, I will also state that a pilot without enough
experience in Instruments would have suffered Spatial
Disorientation (SD) from the very beginning of the approach
phase. John was able to descend without autopilot in an almost
constant rate of descend, airspeed and heading. Obviously during
these 3 minutes and 40 seconds he was in perfect control of the
airplane although the scenario was already IMC. We know he was
receiving Instrument Instruction and had some experience under
real IMC which allowed him to handle the descent. What about the
following turns? He first did a 13º right bank standard turn
90º to the south. It took him 50 seconds to complete it! More
than you probably will spend reading this paragraph and again,
under total control. Not only he was able to maintain a constant
descent rate under IMC for almost 4 minutes without the use of
the autopilot, but he also managed to continue under these
conditions making a shallow turn to the south, then he was able
to stop the descent and level off, all of it in total darkness
without any visual clues from the outside, not even a single
light below for reference.
At this point during the next 60 seconds he flew to the south
maintaining a leveled attitude and a constant speed. After this
maneuver, he started a constant rate turn to the left with a 30º
bank and a 900 fpm descent which completed in 25 seconds leveling
off at 2300 feet still under total darkness but this time much
closer to the ocean. This is definitely not the picture of a
pilot who suffers SD but someone who is trying to complete his
flight visually. Then, why did he loose control the following 32
seconds and killed himself, his wife and sister in law?
The Chain Effect
The chain effect is the sum of small factors which when put together may produce an accident. Each factor may look insignificant or irrelevant by itself, but all together become a powerful threat that may lead to disaster. We always want to know "the reason". Most of the time there is not "a reason" but a sum of small errors each of them with a relative low specific weight. I have considered a list of factors which might have conformed this chain.
Everything points out to a distraction from the pilot or lost of Situational Awareness under an IMC scenario at low altitude boosted by anxiety and stress.
Nothing challenges more a pilot than an unexpected situation for which he/she is not prepared.
I have discarded already SD as the cause.
Everything points out to a distraction from the pilot or lost of
Situational Awareness under IMC at low altitude boosted by
anxiety and stress. I think it is more probable he started to
feel this terrible anxiety after he initiated the descend, 35
miles west of Martha’s and 7 minutes before the crash. It is
very important to picture out the situation. How it changed at
that point. Before then the flight had progressed under excellent
visual references, city lights all along the northern shoreline,
road lights everywhere, airports, etc. I am talking about 55
minutes of pleasant flight in a calm clear night which was
supposed to continue that way. Then, everything turned black.
Once he left the north shoreline he entered total darkness into
the Atlantic Ocean. The island would be out of sight for about
2-3 minutes. Of course if you have done this flight before at
night as he did, you might had felt just a little uncomfortable
but nothing else because once the shore beacon light is on sight,
you continue visually to it and then you would soon see the
airport. So it would take only a little bit of courage to fly the
first couple minutes in total darkness and then you continue VFR.
But nothing challenges more a pilot than an unexpected situation
for which he/she is not prepared. Once he realized he was not
receiving visual references he probably tuned to the ATIS (The
ATIS frequency was found set on the standby frequency).
Unfortunately, the ATIS that night didn’t have the fog
reported. The tower was reporting visibility up to 10 miles which
was totally wrong since we all know it was between 3 and 5 miles,
probably mostly 3 miles in fog at that hour. Maybe the base of
the fog was a few hundred feet above the airport, and that would
explain why they weren’t able to see it from the tower.
Anxiety grew higher when he stopped his descent at 2600 feet and
realized everything was wrong, because he was still in total
darkness now half closer to the "ground", and by this
time he should have seen the airport under this reported clear
skies night ideal for visual flight. If he had used the
navigation facility (VOR), he could have been able to fly
directly to it, even check the DME instrument to know exactly how
far he was from the airport. But the VOR frequency wasn’t
found set in the navigational instruments. A very bad mistake
because it could have been used as a backup.
I can picture him trying to remember the frequency at the last
moment, and blaming himself because he probably didn’t have
the navigational chart handy and this was not the best moment to
ask her wife for help to find it. He was "L O S T"!
(How could this happen to him? He had more than 300 hours
experience!) He would be considered an irresponsible pilot by
her, someone that is putting her in such risk even though she
trusted him! He decided to give himself another chance to fix all
mistakes. He started a very shallow right turn to see if he could
find a visual clue down there. He didn’t want to get any
lower in the mist. Once initiated the turn he realized how lost
he really was. Every second after then increased anxiety and
embarrassement. He probably blamed himself for not being prepared
for it. It had been always so easy to find the airport, but
tonight it was a total mess. This was not the proper time trying
to set the GPS. He probably was not used to it (new airplane),
and this would make him more nervous because he would loose too
much time and the girls would start to ask things. He had to find
the airport or the beacon lights over the shore, and quick! That
was his only chance left to solve this undesirable situation
while still looking proficient in front of the ladies. He started
a 30º bank left turn which could be considered a steep bank at
night. But he had to, maybe the lights were hidden below the
wings. No they weren’t there! Maybe turning to the right
(Another steep turn to the right).
At this point the ladies realized there was a problem with her
pilot, they noticed the steep left turn in total darkness, then
the right turn steeper and accelerated, everything dark out
there. When they asked him very anxiously and full of fear about
it, he wasn’t even prepare to talk. Talk is another element
of distraction, thinking quickly for a reasonable response is
even more distracting and adds to the anxiety level. One of the
main reasons to loose situational awareness is stress. Anxiety
had surpassed his stress limits after he started to turn to the
right while his wife broke the ice. He heard her desperately
asking him loudly for an explanation. He was thinking a response
while trying to focuse on a light down there, maybe it was a
yacht? He was convinced in his desperation that he founf the
airport. All of the sudden it disappeared. At this time it was
already too late, he had forgotten to fly the airplane for a few
seconds and was focused on the desperate voices of his wife and
sister in law and the blink of light down there in the black
soup. His fixation was so intense that he wasn’t able to
hear the strenuous noise of the engine as it reached the top of
the airspeed indicator..
A
SCRIPT OF THE ACCIDENT
The next part recreates the last minutes of flight. All the comments and thinkings are fictional but the script has been created based on the NTSB report and the analysis of the Chain Effect for this case. It may be the clue to understand the behavior of the pilot during the last seconds of flight.
This is a visual night flight with plenty of visual references, I’ll follow the north shore for almost all the flight then I will turn into the sea to the east 35 miles out of Martha’s island. The shore lights are a visual reference on this clear and perfect night all the way down to Martha’s. Once I head into the ocean, it will take only 3 to 4 minutes to see the beacon light on the east shore of the island. I wont need to set any VOR or preset the GPS for this kind of flight. In 3 to 4 minutes I will also start to descend. Nothing easier, nothing simpler!
"John? How are you doing there?"
"Fine thanks, everything looks good here. It’s a great night to fly!"
"I’m sorry we are not giving you any attention but this way you don’t get distracted right?"
"That’s fine, everything is under control here, don’t worry"
John would have to deal in loneliness with an unexpected situation that would lead him into the limit of existence.
John is in the cockpit, left seat. The right seat is empty. In the back of the airplanes his wife and sister in law are backwards, just behind him, probably talking slowly about issues surely not related to aviation. Even though John doesn’t see the girls unless he turns his head back, he knows they are just a few inches behind him. He remembers how doubtful they were to come with him tonight. For the first time he is flying this new airplane without any help at night. This airplane is very different from the ones he used to fly during the last years, more powerfull, quicker reactions, faster approaches, it was grea!. His instructor wanted to join him tonight, but he clearly expressed his desire to do it by himself. His wife heard something of this conversation and didn’t agree either. But now this was reality, they were about to land in Martha’s in about 10 minutes and so far the flight had been very pleasant and calm. The girls forgot their fears already and were just killing time talking and talking. John would have to deal in loneliness with an unexpected situation that would lead him into the limit of existence.
OK, we just left the continental shore line and now we are heading into the ocean directly to Martha’s, just 35 miles to go. It is time to start the descent. I don’t see the beacon light yet, but this is normal, I've done it before. It should be visible in a couple minutes, I know this is kind of uncomfortable, but it is they way it is at night. I still don’t see it, strange!
Is it damaged? anyway I will see the airport lights very soon.
I don’t like they way this looks! I am descending in total darkness to the front, what is going on there? I still can see a couple dimmed lights back on the continental shore, almost nothing now, nothing in front,.. not anymore, nothing, total darkness, wow!
Well, it’s time to fly by instrument, there is no horizon here, nothing!! Very strange! I don’t like it at all. I shouldn't have any problem with my instruments it’s OK!Probably there are a few clouds in front shading the shoreline beacon and the airport, that’s why I can’t see anything yet. But I can't see the horizon! Am I on the right course?
I’ll continue descending to 2500 no less than that, I should see the island before I level off..
Just a little patience needed here ..!
John was at this time an experienced Private Pilot with more than 300 hours and her wife trusted him enough to follow him in his flights, even though she had fear to fly. Now, how could he all of the sudden, a few minutes before arrival, tell his scared to fly wife and sister in law he had a problem with his flight, with his command? How to tell them that all was wrong and even worse, that he didn’t understand what was going on?
..blinking lights reflected from his own imagination into the darkness of the ocean.
Maybe I did something wrong! There are no lights in front where the island is supposed to be, maybe I drifted to the north, yeah, that’s it! The island is to the right!
No! It is not there! Oh, I’m not sure if my heading was correct, maybe I descended too fast and the island is still further ahead to the east.
No way! It’s not there! I should have seen the Beacon light 20 miles out, where are the airport lights then? I will start a shallow turn this way the girls wont notice my searching and will think everything is fine, at least they are on the back seats looking backwards. Maybe there are some clouds below. If a descend I might see better.
This is not possible, I saw the radar picture, it was clear.
Oh God! I AM LOST! It can’t be happening to me. The island is vanished! It disappeared! Where is it? (Checks altitude - makes slight correction)
Maybe it’s to the right just below my wing, I have to bank steeper if I want to see what is below it ..!
"John! Why are you turning? I can’t see anything out there! Where is the airport?"
"John?"
"What is going on?"
".."
They heard for the first time a whispering agonizing voice faded in fear and embarrassment, a defenseless soul still trying to calm and give comfort while desperately focusing on an unreal outside world, blinking lights reflected from his own imagination into the darkness of the ocean.
"I, d.. d.. don’t know, .. it should be.. down there! .. I .. I .. caaan’t .. "
"John?"
"John!!!"
"Oh Lord!"
Note from the author:
I was born the 21st November 1963, the day before JFK was killed.
I had a dream since I was a kid, to fly airplanes. I had a vague
idea about JFK Junior but after the accident, I learned about him
much more and felt identified with his passion and determination
to become a pilot. I was really sorry of his destiny but decided
to follow these dreams too. I also promised to be a safety pilot
and focused on aviation safety.
Dear JFK Jr.,
Rest in peace in heaven and follow all your dreams through eternity.
Respectfully,
Max Harald Vargas Diez
Private Pilot
http://geocities.datacellar.net/maxvargas_99
**The recreation of this script was based on the facts exposed by the NTSB report NYC99MA178 and the analysis made in this article. The words and thoughts expressed by John F. Kennedy Jr. and passengers are fictional and the only intention is to draw a convincing atmosphere which may better reflect the development of the last moment of this flight and help to understand the cause of the accident considering also all the psychological factors involved.
We certainly wont ever know exactly what happened but at least this article will offer a reasonable approach to the scenario that may have lead to the accident. I want to emphasize that he probably was a good pilot or not, I don't have enough information to make any judgment about that. I just realize he didn’t know where was his safety boundary or how to manage risk under this particular unexpected situation.
God had for sure better plans for him, his wife and sister in law! God bless them all in Heaven!
July 17th, 2000.**
The Lessons
What I learned from all this, as a pilot is that we have to face reality all the times. We have to be sincere with ourselves when anything worries us. We have to determine our safety limits for all kind of operations. If we get close or we cross this boundary, we take immediate conservative actions to reestablish total control. The first reaction is to "fly the airplane" and like divers say, you have to "stop", which means, establish a leveled normal speed attitude, rest, breath deeply a while, and then define the problem. Once you do this, the problem will look much simpler than before. Plan your actions to solve the problem. Our safety boundaries varies, we as human beings have a fitness level that changes every day. We have to recognize these variations and act accordingly. If they are low, we may cancel a flight or take more precautionary actions, we may need some simulator practice or fly with someone first, or maybe just do some excersise and get on a diet. We as pilots have a very big responsibility for ourselves, our passengers and people and properties that get close to the airplane. Civil Aviation is a very safe activity. Like other human activities, it depends on who is involved. The key for safety is to be always conservative and never take any chances. If an unexpected situation arises, we have to reestablish control and use all available resources, communicate, define the problem, share it either with the crew, passengers and or the ATC system. They all can help, communication may be a distraction, but it is necessary and the more we use it the less distractive it becomes. It helps to organize our thoughts and actions, it keeps us on the rational side, especially if we are of the spontaneous type. If you are flying solo, think loud to hear yourself, and try to make radio contact. Here were I live they don't have weather information availabe on airports, FSS that you can contact via phone or on flight, flight following, ATIS or TWEB's like in USA. Sometimes before I take off I interviewed the arriving pilots to get weather information for the enroute part or the destination airport. But, you valorize what you miss. While I was learning to fly in Florida last year, I thought all these services were excessive, now I see them really as they are and envy who can use them every day.
© 2000 Max Harald Vargas
Diez