The failure of the atrium bridge in the Hyatt Regency hotel in Kansas City, Missouri resulted in the deaths of 114 people. The investigation and court actions that ensued determined the technical, organizational, and professional weaknesses that contributed to this debacle. By analyzing the arguments and conclusions brought out during the investigation and trials, we uncover issues fundamental to the subject of ethics, regarding the limits of responsibility and the ranges of punishment.

The technical investigation of the failure determined the design weakness which caused the failure with reasonable certainty. Often, this type of information is useful because it may reveal properties or conditions which were not previously considered . For example, The failure of the Tacoma Narrows bridge revealed the tendency of average winds to create positive harmonic resonance. This information can be used in future designs and in the analysis of existing designs which may be susceptible to similar failure. The discovery in the Hyatt’s bridge weakness was, however, of little comfort. The failure was a simple response to predicted conditions, well within the grasp of competent engineers. There was not, then, a failure in the technology, but a failure in its implementation. The true weakness, then, is not in the joint itself, but in the organization which allowed the flaw to go unnoticed.

As is typical in a capitalistic society, the Hyatt enterprise was organized as a hierarchy, in which each level of management takes responsibility for the activities underneath it. While this structure is necessary in order to bring the various aspects of such a large project together, it creates a gap between the creators of the work and those responsible for it. Engineers who participate in the design process might assume that their managers would correct any mistakes, while the managers might assume that the correctness of the engineers’ work is assured by the design process. Accountability breaks down when a manager can no longer directly supervise all the activities for which they are responsible. Thus, considering the complexity of the Hyatt enterprise, it is not surprising that a detail as small as a weakness in the connection change would not be noticed. While regulation of organizational structures can better define roles of responsibility, it is important to remember that individuals must be willing to accept this responsibility.

Assuming technical and organizational weakness are identified, what can be gained by placing blame on individuals? Although the engineering profession is more than a century old, there is precious little precedent for the assessment of engineers’ culpability. While there are positive motivations for conscientious behavior, some may argue that to dismiss personal accountability is to encourage people to behave recklessly. Certainly, an engineering firm firms may sacrifice quality for quick gain, but those whose designs match expectations will prosper. At the very least, accountability will help to eliminate from the field those who are reckless or incompetent. At best, it will encourage others to use their best judgment and to avoid more responsibility than they can reasonably handle. This philosophy will help to flatten the hierarchy internally and to close the gap between the designers and the managers.

If it is decided that there is fault within the organization, which individuals should be held accountable? Negligence is inherently hard to determine because it questions not action but inaction. Did all who saw the design but did not recognize the mistake also show negligence? Could there be varying degrees of negligence, dependent on the party’s position in the hierarchy, even though the same non-act was committed by all? While it seems reasonable to hold a boss responsible for an subordinate’s work, there is a point at which this seems to break down. It might seem absurd, for example, for a restaurant owner to offer a sincere apology after a waiter scalds your lap, since the owner cannot control the dexterity of the waiter. While this can be debated philosophically, the law is rather clear: the engineers who seal plans were responsible for the plan design.

Once responsible individuals have been identified, a suitable punishment is required. The dilemma faced by the state licensing board was a practical one, with its core interest being the reputation of the industry. One option is to prosecute the guilty engineer to the maximum extent practicable. This would demonstrate the strictness of the industry in its efforts to assure that only the most competent engineers are allowed to practice. While this sort of ruling might please some members of the public, few would argue that the engineers involved were less competent than any other engineers of similar position and experience. Another option is to avoid any sort of punishment which would tend to defame the engineer. By protecting the reputation of the individual engineer, the industry preserves its own reputation. The problem here, however, is that justice dictates that a punishment should be administered, and that such a punishment would bring a needed feeling of resolution to those injured. Clearly, there must be some sort of compromise between the interests of the engineering profession, injured parties, and justice.

Perhaps the level of appropriate punishment is dependent on the extent of the damage done? Certainly, a loss of property can be considered small compared to a loss of life. In criminal law, convicts are sentenced according to the severity of the consequences of their crime. If the consequences are mitigated even by forces beyond the control of the criminal, the sentence is lessened. Surely, the Hyatt’s design error was no more significant than those in the designs of the Hartford Coliseum or the Citicorp Center. In the latter situations, however, fortunate circumstances allowed the errors to be discovered and corrected at only a monetary expense, and those responsible received far less punishment, if any. While this may seem consistent, it may not seem quite fair. If identical criminals commit identical crimes, should they not receive identical punishments, regardless of fortuitous, fortunate circumstances?

Some claim that an action that merely places people at risk causes harm even if there are no tangible effects attributable to the action. For example, a nuclear power plant may be fined for poor maintenance practices, even if radiation levels around the plant do not change. It then follows that a greater risk will constitute a greater harm, and a greater punishment should be applied. If a cabal is discovered to be plotting a destruction of New York City, they will be punished more severely than one plotting to destroy South Hadley. Thus it would seem reasonable for engineers whose negligence might cause a large loss of life to be punished more than those who might be responsible for a smaller loss. In contrast to the criminal justice system, the engineering community seems to ignore potential for harm.

The revocation of professional licenses in the aftermath of the Hyatt "horror" demonstrates the willingness of the engineering community to hold its members accountable for their work. The rarity of disciplinary action and a lack of consistency in enforcement, however, demonstrate the immaturity of the process. While it is, perhaps, unrealistic to expect the enforcement arm of professional societies to act with the swiftness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system, justice dictates that improvements be made.