SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
AND PHILIPPINE RESISTANCE
Outbreak of War, 1898
Spain's rule in the Philippines
came to an end as a result of United States
involvement with Spain's other major colony,
Cuba. American business interests were anxious
for a resolution--with or without Spain--of the
insurrection that had broken out in Cuba in
February 1895. Moreover, public opinion in the
United States had been aroused by newspaper
accounts of the brutalities of Spanish rule. When
the United States declared war on Spain on
April 25, 1898, acting Secretary of the Navy
Theodore Roosevelt ordered Commodore George
Dewey, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, to sail
to the Philippines and destroy the Spanish fleet
anchored in Manila Bay. The Spanish navy, which
had seen
its apogee in the support of a global empire in
the sixteenth century, suffered an inglorious
defeat on May 1, 1898, as Spain's antiquated
fleet, including ships with wooden hulls, was
sunk by the guns of Dewey's flagship, the
Olympia, and other United
States warships. More than 380 Spanish sailors
died, but there was only oneAmerican fatality.
As Spain and the United States had moved toward
war over Cuba in the last months of 1897,
negotiations of a highly tentative nature began
between United States officials and Aguinaldo in
both Hong Kong and Singapore. When war was
declared, Aguinaldo, a partner, if not an ally,
of the United States, was urged by Dewey to
return to the islands as quickly as possible.
Arriving in Manila on May 19, Aguinaldo reassumed
command of rebel forces. Insurrectionists
overwhelmed demoralized Spanish garrisons around
the capital, and links were established with
other movements throughout the islands.
In the eyes of the Filipinos, their relationship
with the United States was that of two nations
joined in a common struggle against Spain. As
allies, the Filipinos provided American forces
with valuable intelligence (e.g., that the
Spanish had no mines or torpedoes with which to
sink warships entering Manila Bay), and
Aguinaldo's 12,000 troops kept a slightly larger
Spanish
force bottled up inside Manila until American
troop reinforcements could arrive from San
Francisco in late June. Aguinaldo was unhappy,
however, that the United States would not
commit to paper a statement of support for
Philippine independence.
By late May, the United States Department of the
Navy had ordered Dewey, newly promoted to
Admiral, to distance himself from Aguinaldo lest
he make untoward commitments to the Philippine
forces. The war with Spain still was going on,
and the
future of the Philippines remained uncertain. The
immediate objective was to capture Manila, and it
was thought best to do that without the
assistance of the insurgents. By late July, there
were some 12,000 United States troops in the
area, and relations between them and rebel forces
deteriorated rapidly.
By the summer of 1898, Manila had become the
focus not only of the Spanish-American conflict
and the growing suspicions between the Americans
and Filipino rebels but also of a rivalry that
encompassed the European powers. Following
Dewey's victory, Manila Bay was filled with the
warships of Britain, Germany, France, and Japan.
The German fleet of eight ships, ostensibly in
Philippine waters to protect German interests (a
single import firm), acted provocatively--cutting
in front of United States ships, refusing to
salute the United States flag (according to naval
courtesy), taking soundings of the harbor, and
landing supplies for the besieged Spanish.
Germany, hungry for the ultimate status symbol, a
colonial empire, was eager to take advantage of
whatever opportunities the conflict in the
islands
might afford. Dewey called the bluff of the
German admiral, threatening a fight if his
aggressive activities continued, and the Germans
backed down.
The Spanish cause was doomed, but Fermin
Jaudenes, Spain's last governor in the islands,
had to devise a way to salvage the honor of his
country. Negotiations were carried out through
British and the insurgents to take part (the
Spanish feared that the Filipinos were plotting
to massacre them all). The Spanish, in turn,
would put up only a show of resistance and, on a
prearranged signal, would surrender. In this way,
the governor would be spared the ignominy of
giving up without a fight, and both sides would
be spared casualties. The mock battle was staged
on August 13. The attackers rushed in, and by
afternoon the
United States flag was flying over Intramuros,
the ancient walled city that had been the seat of
Spanish power for over 300 years.
The agreement between Jaudenes and Dewey marked a
curious reversal of roles. At the beginning of
the war, Americans and Filipinos had been allies
against Spain in all but name; now Spanish and
Americans were in a partnership that excluded the
insurgents. Fighting between American and
Filipino troops almost broke out as the former
moved in to dislodge the latter from strategic
positions around Manila on the eve of the attack.
Aguinaldo was told bluntly by the Americans that
his army could not participate and would be fired
upon if it crossed into the city. The insurgents
were infuriated at being denied triumphant
entry into their own capital, but Aguinaldo bided
his time. Relations continued to deteriorate,
however, as it became clear to Filipinos that the
Americans were in the islands to stay.
The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris
After returning to the islands, Aguinaldo wasted
little time in setting up an independent
government. On June 12, 1898, a declaration of
independence, modeled on the American one, was
proclaimed at his headquarters in Cavite. It was
at this time that Apolinario Mabini, a lawyer and
political thinker, came to prominence as
Aguinaldo's principal adviser. Born into a poor
indio family but educated at the University of
Santo Tomas, he advocated "simultaneous
external and internal revolution," a
philosophy that unsettled the more conservative
landowners and ilustrados who initially supported
Aguinaldo. For Mabini, true
independence for the Philippines would mean not
simply liberation from Spain (or from any other
colonial power) but also educating the people for
self-government and abandoning the paternalistic,
colonial mentality that the Spanish had
cultivated over the centuries. Mabini's The True
Decalogue, published in July 1898 in the form of
ten commandments, used this medium, somewhat
paradoxically, to promote critical thinking and a
reform of customs and attitudes. His
Constitutional Program for the Philippine
Republic, published at the same time, elaborated
his ideas on political institutions.
On September 15, 1898, a revolutionary congress
was convened at Malolos, a market town located
thirty-two kilometers north of Manila, for the
purpose of drawing up a constitution for the new
republic. A document was approved by the congress
on November 29,
1898. Modeled on the constitutions of France,
Belgium, and Latin American countries, it was
promulgated at Malolos on January 21, 1899, and
two days later Aguinaldo was inaugurated as
president.
American observers traveling in Luzon commented
that the areas controlled by the republic seemed
peaceful and well governed. The Malolos congress
had set up schools, a military academy, and the
Literary University of the Philippines.
Government finances were
organized, and new currency was issued. The army
and navy were established on a regular basis,
having regional commands. The accomplishments of
the Filipino government, however, counted for
little in the eyes of the great powers as the
transfer of the islands from Spanish to United
States rule was arranged in the closing months of
1898.
In late September, treaty negotiations were
initiated between Spanish and American
representatives in Paris. The Treaty of Paris was
signed on December 10, 1898. Among its conditions
was the cession of the Philippines, Guam, and
Puerto Rico to the United States (Cuba was
granted its independence); in return, the United
States would pay Spain the sum of US$20 million.
The nature of this payment is rather difficult to
define; it was paid
neither to purchase Spanish territories nor as a
war indemnity. In the words of historian Leon
Wolff, "it was . . . a gift. Spain accepted
it. Quite irrelevantly she handed us the
Philippines. No question of honor or conquest was
involved. The Filipino people had nothing to say
about it, although their rebellion was thrown in
(so to speak) free of charge."
The Treaty of Paris aroused anger among
Filipinos. Reacting to the US$20 million sum paid
to Spain, La Independencia (Independence), a
newspaper published in Manila by a
revolutionary, General Antonio Luna, stated that
"people are not to be bought and sold like
horses and houses. If the aim has been to abolish
the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale
of persons, why is there still maintained the
sale of countries with inhabitants?" Tension
and ill feelings were growing between the
American troops in Manila and the insurgents
surrounding the capital. In addition to Manila,
Iloilo, the main port on the island of Panay,
also was a pressure point. The Revolutionary
Government of the Visayas was proclaimed there on
November 17, 1898, and an American force stood
poised to capture the city.
Upon the announcement of the treaty, the
radicals, Mabini and Luna, prepared for war, and
provisional articles were added to the
constitution giving President Aguinaldo
dictatorial powers in times of emergency.
President William McKinley issued a proclamation
on December 21, 1898, declaring United States
policy to be one of "benevolent
assimilation" in which "the mild sway
of justice and right" would be substituted
for "arbitrary rule."
When this was published in the islands on January
4, 1899, references to "American
sovereignty" having been prudently deleted,
Aguinaldo issued his own proclamation that
condemned "violent and aggressive
seizure" by the United States and
threatened war.
War of Resistance
Hostilities broke out on the night of February 4,
1899, after two American privates on patrol
killed three Filipino soldiers in a suburb of
Manila. Thus began a war that would last for more
than two years. Some 126,000 American soldiers
would be committed to the conflict; 4,234
American and 16,000 Filipino soldiers, part of a
nationwide guerrilla movement of indeterminate
numbers, died.
The Filipino troops, armed with old rifles and
bolos and carrying anting-anting (magical
charms), were no match for American troops in
open combat, but they were formidable oppo-
nents in guerrilla warfare. For General Ewell S.
Otis, commander of the United States forces, who
had been appointed military governor of the
Philippines, the conflict began auspiciously with
the expulsion of the rebels from Manila and its
suburbs by late February and the capture of
Malolos, the revolutionary capital, on March 31,
1899. Aguinaldo and his government escaped,
however, establishing a new capital at San Isidro
in Nueva Ecija Province. The Filipino cause
suffered a number of reverses. The attempts of
Mabini and his successor as president of
Aguinaldo's cabinet, Pedro Paterno, to negotiate
an armistice in May 1899 ended in failure because
Otis insisted on unconditional surrender.
Still more serious was the murder of Luna,
Aguinaldo's most capable military commander, in
June. Hot-tempered and cruel, Luna collected a
large number of enemies among his associates,
and, according to rumor, his death was ordered by
Aguinaldo. With his
best commander dead and his troops suffering
continued defeats as American forces pushed into
northern Luzon, Aguinaldo dissolved the regular
army in November 1899 and ordered the
establishment of decentralized guerrilla commands
in each of several military
zones. More than ever, American soldiers knew the
miseries of fighting an enemy that was able to
move at will within the civilian population in
the villages. The general population,
caught between Americans and rebels, suffered
horribly.
According to historian Gregorio Zaide, as many as
200,000 civilians died, largely because of famine
and disease, by the end of the war. Atrocities
were committed on both sides. Although
Aguinaldo's government did not have effective
authority over the whole archipelago and
resistance was strongest and best organized in
the Tagalog area of Central Luzon, the notion
entertained by many Americans that independence
was supported only by the "Tagalog
tribe" was refuted by the fact that there
was sustained fighting in the Visayan Islands and
in Mindanao. Although the ports of Iloilo on
Panay and Cebu on Cebu were captured in
February 1899, and Tagbilaran, capital of Bohol,
in March, guerrilla resistance continued in the
mountainous interiors of these islands. Only on
the sugar-growing island of Negros did the local
authorities peacefully accept United States rule.
On Mindanao the United States Army faced the
determined opposition of Christian Filipinos
loyal to the republic.
Aguinaldo was captured at Palanan on March 23,
1901, by a force of Philippine Scouts loyal to
the United States and was brought back to Manila.
Convinced of the futility of further resistance,
he swore allegiance to the United States and
issued a proclama- tion calling on his
compatriots to lay down their arms. Yet insurgent
resistance continued in various parts of the
Philippines until 1903.
The Moros on Mindanao and on the Sulu
Archipelago, suspicious of both Christian
Filipino insurrectionists and Americans, remained
for the most part neutral. In August 1899, an
agreement had been signed between General John C.
Bates, representing the United States government,
and the sultan of Sulu, Jamal-ul Kiram II,
pledging a policy of noninterference on the part
of the United States. In 1903, however, a Moro
province was established by the American
authorities, and a more forward policy was
implemented: slavery was outlawed, schools that
taught a non-Muslim curriculum were established,
and local governments that challenged the
authority of traditional community leaders were
organized. A new legal system replaced the
sharia, or Islamic law. United States rule, even
more than that of the Spanish, was seen as a
challenge to Islam. Armed resistance grew, and
the Moro province remained under United States
military rule until 1914, by which time the major
Muslim groups had been subjugated (see Islam, ch.
2).
By a protocol signed at Washington August
12, 1898 . . . it was agreed thatthe United States and
Spain would each appoint not more than five commissioners
to treat of peace, and that the commissioners so
appointed should meet at Paris not later than October 1,
1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a
treaty of peace, which treaty should be subject to
ratification according to the respective constitutional
forms of the two countries.
For the purpose of carrying into effect this stipulation,
I have appointed you as commissioners on the part of the
United States to meet and confer with commissioners on
the part of Spain.
As an essential preliminary to the agreement to appoint
commissioners to treat of peace, this government required
of that of Spain the unqualified concession of the
following precise demands:
1. The relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over
and title to Cuba.
2. The cession to the United States of Puerto Rico and
other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies.
3. The cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be
selected by the United States.
4. The immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies.
5. The occupation by the United States of the city, bay,
and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty
of peace which should determine the control, disposition,
and government of the Philippines.
These demands were conceded by Spain, and their
concession was, as you will perceive, solemnly recorded
in the protocol of the 12th of August. . . .
It is my wish that throughout the negotiations entrusted
to the Commission the purpose and spirit with which the
United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war
should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only
in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the
fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. We had
no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest.
Through the long course of repeated representations which
preceded and aimed to avert the struggle, and in the
final arbitrament of force, this country was impelled
solely by the purpose of relieving grievous wrongs and
removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its
tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind,
and which could no longer be endured.
It is my earnest wish that the United States in making
peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which
guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and
magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just
and humane in its original action. The luster and the
moral strength attaching to a cause which can be
confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the
world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed
by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive
demands or into an adventurous departure on untried
paths. It is believed that the true glory and the
enduring interests of the country will most surely be
served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and
a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by
such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in
victory as best comports with the traditions and
character of our enlightened republic.
Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to
lasting results and to the achievement of the common good
under the demands of civilization, rather than to
ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed
upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western
Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In
presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty
universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous
reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of
the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not
compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and
near our own territory that the Spanish flag should
remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and
of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the other islands belonging to Spain in this
hemisphere.
The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is
nonetheless true, however, that without any original
thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the
presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon
us obligations which we cannot disregard. The march of
events rules and overrules human action. Avowing
unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our
effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot
be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our
part, the war has brought us new duties and
responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as
becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from
the beginning the ruler of nations has plainly written
the high command and pledge of civilization.
Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the
commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship
cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate
means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek
no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all.
Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to
accord the open door to others. The commercial
opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated
with this new opening depends less on large territorial
possession than upon an adequate commercial basis and
upon broad and equal privileges. . .
.
In view of what has been stated, the United States cannot
accept less thanthe cession in full right and sovereignty
of the island of Luzon. It isdesirable, however, that the
United States shall acquire the right of entry for
vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the
United States into such ports of the Philippines as are
not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor
with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relationto
port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce,
together withother rights of protection and trade
accorded to citizens of one country within the territory
of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such
concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have
similar rightsas to her subjects and vessels in the ports
of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United
States.