AAVV, Studies on the History of Logic,

Walter de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1996, pp.197-208.

My initial intention for this symposium was to determine the historical place of the notion of copulatio in Peter of Capua, but in the process of preparing it I realized that if I really wanted to offer relevant facts for the history of semantics, I would have to provide an entire framework for which I do not yet possess all the elements. For this reason my presentation will be more thematic than historic. First I will present some basic facts, which will be the basis of a future elaboration of a properly historical nature. I will show how the notion of copulatio invokes other proprietates terminorum, and how, taken together, they illuminate the nature of the proposition. The nucleus of this second part will not focus so much on the historical development of the thought of Peter of Capua and other authors that I will mention; rather, based on their works, it will attempt to illuminate the concept of copulatio. This will be possible considering that their formulation, insofar as it answers a problem, reveals in some way the very reality behind the problem.

The aspects that at first sight seem to me the most relevant are the following:

1. Copulatio appears strictly bound with the function of the "verbal copula" (vid. Appendix, nn.1-2) (1);

2. Copulatio applies to substantives (and not only to adjectives, participles and verbs) (2).

I think that it is these two characteristics that could most probably constitute a contribution to the history of the notion of copulatio. The following two are no less important, but in them I find, above all, suggestions about the nature of a proposition:

3. Copulatio receives a peculiar use next to the notions of "significatio", "prædicatio", "appellatio" and "suppositio" (vid. Appendix, nn.3-6).

4. Copulatio serves to clarify the meaning of a term:

a) making explicit what (and to what) the term copulates (vid. Appendix, nn.3-5, 7-12), and

b) making precise how the term copulates it (vid. Appendix, nn.13-17).

John Malcolm (3) proposes a hypothesis to explain the disappearance of copulatio by dividing into four phases the development of the medieval doctrine of proprietates terminorum (4). The first phase (12th century) is dominated by the term significatio (connotative) and by appellatio (denotative). The second phase begins in the 13th century (5) in which copulatio appears. This property and suppositio--which substitutes the earlier appellatio--are the two parts in which significatio is divided, the former in the case of adjectives and the latter for substantives. As the parts of a division (i.e. as subjective parts), both "are" significatio and include the connotative and denotative aspect. During the third phase things changed very rapidly, with Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre. Significatio is no longer the sum of suppositio and copulatio; significatio assumes the connotative function leaving the denotative function to copulatio. The fourth phase of Malcolm's scheme brings with it the disappearance of copulatio. "During the 14th century, however, copulatio is gone from the list [of proprietates terminorum]. It does not appear in Ockham and is used by Burleigh (De puritate p.54), to signify the uniting or connecting of a predicate with a subject. But this is to describe the function of the copula which joins (the subject and predicate) terms and hence copulatio is no longer considered as a property of a term" (6).

If we are to follow this scheme in order to historically situate the notion of copulatio in Peter of Capua, we must first make some clarifications. I am principally interested in the first stage and its relation to the following two, but Malcolm quickly leaves it behind; I believe this is due to the fact that the object of his study is, precisely, the disappearance of copulatio (7). Moreover, Malcolm takes into account only treatises of logic and not, as is our case here, texts using the terminology of logic.

The first characteristic note of the notion of copulatio in Peter of Capua is its affinity with the function of the verbal copula, which should not be tied to the fourth phase of Malcolm's scheme, since this use of the term "copulatio" is common to the four phases and is already present in Boethius (8). Of this first note what is remarkable is its proximity to the thought of Peter Abelard (9). However, even though in the presentation of the officium copulandi and the officium significandi the two authors coincide, even terminologically, Peter of Capua's presentation shows a particularity: in numerous examples the (metalinguistic) subject of the verb copulare is not the copula (the verb "est"), and not even a notional verb, but rather the nominal predicate (vid. Appendix, nn.3-4, 7-8, 18). That is: copulare is not the action of a term (the copula) which unites two other terms (subject and predicate), but rather the action of a term--which is not the copula but what in the previous scheme we would call "predicate"--which joins its significatio with the thing being designated by the subject (10). I think that this use announces the advent of the notion of "copulatio" (11) proper to the 13th century (and appellatio of the 14th), but: a) without a trace of contamination of logic by metaphysics, which, although considered by some authors characteristic of the Middle Scholastic Logic (12), was present in Abelard (13), and b) with the particularity that the term that is the nominal predicate very frequently is the substantive, according to the procedure of our author in many examples.

This last aspect is the second of the characteristics mentioned at the outset. Since with it I have entered into the consideration of the nature of the proposition, I will now move to the second part, the analysis of the other two characteristics.

As a model of this semantic mechanism, the following formulation may prove useful: "Hoc nomen 'Pater' determinate significat 'paternitatem' et eam copulat: significat etiam et 'Patrem'" (14). Note that the significatio of the term ("pater") is made explicit with the corresponding abstract ("paternitas"). This content is "copulated" not by the copula but by the term itself, "pater". In Peter of Capua the denotative function ordinarily corresponds to the suppositio; the appellatio is used either in the sense of "being the name of", or else as an effective, real attainment of what is signified (15). In this context Peter of Capua seems to give the verb "significare" a denotative sense.

Unfortunately, there is no text in the first book of the Summa that relates copulatio and suppositio. For this I will have recourse to Peter of Poitiers, who in his Sententiarum libri quinque drafted, probably before Peter of Capua (16), three chapters with the following very indicative titles:

XXV: De his que significant relationes et appellant sed non copulant ("paternitas", "filiatio", "processio");

XXVI. De his que significant relationes et copulant sed non appellant et supponunt personas ("Pater", "Filius", "Spiritus Sanctus");

XXVII: De his que significant relationes et copulant sed non appellant nec personas supponunt, ut gignens, genitus, procedens.

In Peter of Poitiers "appellatio" and "suppositio" have a denotative function, but, as can be observed in these titles, suppositio is reserved for persons (17). In Peter of Capua copulatio and prædicatio seem to be equivalent (18). The determination of the mode of copulating indicates that copulatio is used in cases for which late scholasticism will use the term "attributio" (extrinsic and intrinsic) (19). This brings to mind the definition of appellatio in the Ars Meliduna, which was contemporaneous with our author: "per verbum temporis vera attributio sive copulatio" (20).

Peter of Capua distinguishes the significatio from the prædicatio with a curious affirmation: "Non aequis passibus ambulant significatio vocis et prædicatio, nam significationem semper retinet, sed prædicationem non" (21). I wish to call attention to his allusion to steps. Allow me now to skip over seven centuries. Frege describes the difference between the semantic of the conceptual term and that of the proper name in words that are remarkably similar: "In the conceptual term there is one more step before the object than in the proper name, and the last step may be omitted (...) and not because of this does the conceptual term cease to be scientifically useful" (22). This is what I once called "disphase" (23). Frege's text comes immediately after a scheme indicating by arrows the relationship between term, sense and reference in the proposition, in the proper name and in the conceptual term. The "disphase" can be observed graphically by the diverse height at which the proper name and the conceptual term are situated, although they coincide in their content. From it comes naturally to speak of steps, but the remarkable fact is that Peter of Capua, without a spacial and "vectorial" formulation of the problem, resorts to the same figure ("non aequis passibus..."). Moreover, just like Frege, he immediately adds that vox always conserves significatio, even when it cannot in fact be referred to something (i.e. even when it cannot be predicated): "numquam enim predicat aliquid nisi illud appellet" (24).

Note, however, that what is "called", the object of the appellatio (in this case what is not called), is not the individual to whom the significatio of the vox is "copulated" but rather the significatio itself ("numquam predicat aliquid nisi illud appellet"). That which is signified and that which is called are the same, but significare and appellare are not the same. For significatio is possible without appellatio, although appellatio without significatio is not. However, this is not yet the notion of appellatio as suppositio in the present. Rather, what is intended is an effective signification, the reality of the signified. The example offered is the following: "Posito ergo quod Deus nil creet, hoc verbum 'creat' eandem retinet significationem quam prius, set cum nil appellet, nil de deo predicat vel ei copulat" (25).

The equivalence between predicating and copulating is not, however, total. It cannot be taken further than the context of this passage. Here is underlined the aspect of prædicatio that remains outside its value of signification (in which it coincides with significatio): its attributive, applicative... copulative value. Prædicatio is: significatio plus copulatio.

We see then, that to the disphase indicated by Frege, correspond two complementary distinctions in Peter of Capua. One alluding also to steps, distinguishes between significatio and prædicatio. The other is the point of coincidence beteween Peter of Capua and Peter Abelard, who called it the "gemina vis" of the verb (26): the distinction between "officium significandi" and "officium copulandi" (27). In Frege we have the disphase of two diverse semantic structures, that of a proper name and that of the conceptual term. The latter needs three steps to attain what the other reaches in two steps. Peter of Capua's distinction between significatio and prædicatio does not relate two different semantics but rather two moments of the same one. A term--whose nature is not specified--can signify without predicating. If it predicates, it also signifies; moreover, it does so by signifying. The same term can take one or two steps.

The other distinction made by Peter of Capua refers specifically to the verb, and here the duality of semantics is re-established under the form of a bifurcation. The officium significandi distinguishes itself from the significatio of the earlier distinction only insofar as it limits itself to the verb. The officium copulandi indicates the encounter of the signification of the verb with something previously signified (which presupposes another act of signifying).

As we can see, we are facing exclusively semantic criteria. This has nothing to do with the notion of inherence or with the distinction between substantial form and accidental form. Here at least, the distinction between suppositio and copulatio does not follow from any contamination of logic on the part of metaphysics (28).

Applied semantics, particularly in the field of theology, does not simply "complement" the studies of medieval logic (29). The preceding pages are a proof of this reality. The historiography of this semantic, in comparison with that of pure logic--namely, that contained in treatises of logic--, is still in its early stages. Within this history, the chapter on Peter of Capua is just now beginning to be written.

(1) All the texts come from the first book. -^

(2) In contrast with what is read in the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum (12th century ex.), the Dialectica monacensis (13th century in.), the Introductiones Parisienses (13th century in.) the Logica "Cum sit nostra" (c.1200), the Summe metenses (c.1220-1240), the Tractatus of Peter of Spain (c.1230), the Introductiones in logicam of William of Sherwood (Ý 1249), the Royal MSS 8 A VI (second half of the 13th century), etc. -^

(3) Malcolm 1977, pp.120-138. The specificity of the article is the division of the four periods in order to explain how copulatio came to be superfluous. The same historical journey is found with an abundance of facts in Maierù 1972, pp.195-215. -^

(4) Phase I: Ars Meliduna, De Rijk 1967, II-I, p.539. Phase II: Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum in De Rijk 1967, II-II, pp.711-712; Dialectica monacensis in De Rijk 1967, II-II, pp.606-607; Introductiones Parisienses in De Rijk 1967, II-II, p.317; Logica "Cum sit nostra" in De Rijk 1967, II-II, p.451; Summe Metenses in De Rijk 1967, II-II, p.455. Phase III: Peter of Spain, Tractatus VI (Peter of Spain 1972, p.80); Lambert of Auxerre, Logica [Summa Lamberti] (Lambert of Auxerre 1971, p.207); Royal MSS 8 A VI, fols.47ra-48vb in in De Rijk 1967, II-I, p.26. Malcolm does not place William of Sherwood in any specific phase: Introductiones in Logicam, V (Sherwood 1983, p.265). -^

(5) Only the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum seems to remain in the 12th century. -^

(6) Malcolm 1972, p.120. "Afterwards, copulation was defined as the union or composition of a predicate with a subject (W. Burley, De puritate...: longior, p.54 ed. Boehner). From then on the theory of copulation only concerned the significative function of all predicate-terms of a proposition and covered adjectives, participles and verbs when united with a substantive term in a proposition. Since the distinction of subject-term and predicate-term is of little relevance in this respect, many logicians abandoned the distinction between supposition and copulation. As a matter of fact William of Ockham does not even mention the concept of copulation in his logic (Cf. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, p.188, n.1)" (De Rijk 1967, II-I, pp.580-581). -^

(7) It would have to be added that his thesis refers to the disappearance of copulatio with respect to two determinations: a) as proprietas terminorum, because this denomination remains for the verbal copula, and b) with the name "copulatio": although it is true that in Burleigh and Ockham things are as Malcolm says (vid. also De Rijk 1967, II-I, p.581), nonetheless they continued to speak of the same concept (at least a substantially identical one) under the name "appellatio" (as if the term did not already have a sufficiently problematic plurality of meaning!). This is the case of Buridan in the fourth treatise of his Summulæ de dialectica. Already in Ockham appellatio had been announced as the characteristic property of the predicate--"prædicatum appellat suam formam" (Summa logicæ, II,7 and III-1,43)--, although it deals with an appellatio explicitly subsumed under suppositio (Cf. I,62). Albert of Saxony will follow this line: "Appellatio est proprietas prædicati. Solemus enim dicere prædicatum appelare suam formam in ordine ad verbum quod est copula illius propositionis" (Perutilis Logica, II,11); "Subiectum non sic appellat suam formam" (ibid., II,11). And with a purely terminological coincidence, Vincent Ferrer: "Et quod dictum est de significatione, subiectione et suppositione, idem debet intelligi de significatione, prædicatione et appellatione" (Tractatus de suppositionibus, c.I; Ferrer 1977, p.92). -^

(8) Cf. Maierù 1972, pp.197-199. -^

(9) Cf. Dialectica, I, III, in Abelard 1956, pp.129-135. -^

(10) I have not found this use in Abelard. Peter of Capua can give the impression of identifying prædicatio and copulatio. In the examples of Book I, almost all the terms to which he applies this notion are the predicates of a proposition, and none is the subject. He also uses the expression "nil de Deo predicat vel ei copulat" (q.22, T f.15 ra), which although true, insofar as it does not necessarily indicate synonymy (especially through the repetition of the subject by the pronoun "ei"), yet it does not resolve the situation in the other direction. We will return to this point further on. -^

(11) In the same way the Ars Meliduna ("per verbum presentis temporis vera attributio sive copulatio") announces the new notion of appellatio as: "La définition [de appellatio] dejà mentionnée la rattache à l'attribution ou copulation (...). Ainsi sont introduites des relations intra-propositionnelles. Certes, l'attributio pourrait être entendue comme attribution d'un nom à une chose, mais la copulatio, de même que les indications sur le temps du verbe, attestent que le rapport appellatif est immédiatement transposé en relation propositionnelle" (Biard 1987, p.127). -^

(12) Pinborg speaks of the "embrace of ontology" which logic suffered during this period (Cf. Pinborg 1972, p.14). "Ich möchte nur noch erwähnen, daß Sherwood noch eine eigene Eigenschaft, die copulatio, für Verben und Adjektive als Prädikate aufrechthält. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß er (im Sinne der Inhärenztheorie) noch zwischen der Bedeutung von Subjekts- und Prädikatsterminus unterscheidet" (Pinborg 1972, p.65). -^

"Da es zwei formæ gibt (substantialis und accidentalis), paßt die Analogie zu den zwei Arten von Prädikationen: per se und per accidens. Shyreswood (IL, S.82ff.) behauptet sogar, daß das Subjekt eine suppositio actualis hat, das Prädikat lediglich eine habitualis! Das ist natürlich nicht stichhaltig, da er in seinen Beispielen den Prädikaten suppositio zuspricht (m.W. hat nur Vincent Ferrer diese Idee tatsächlich befolgt). Damit aber zeigen sich ganz klar die Verbindungen zwischen den grammatischen, logischen und ontologischen Ebenen: suppositio, Subjekt, Substanz und Substantiv werden immer miteinander assoziiert. Entsprechend stehen als Gegenassoziationen: copulatio, Prädikat, Akzidens und Adjektiv" (Dufour 1989, p.38; the analogy referred to at the beginning is: forma materiæ / materia = forma prædicabilis / individua).

Whichever way it took place, I do not believe this accusation was always done with justice. I must clarify for example that Vincent Ferrer does not assign suppositio to the predicate but rather explicitly denies it to it, and as we saw above, assigns to it appellatio.

(13) Cf. Maierù 1972, pp.204-205. Nonetheless, the type of "contamination" that could be attributed is, for Maierù, of a different nature: "Nel secolo XIV (ma solo in Burleigh e Occam), troviamo gli ultimi cenni a una dottrina della copulatio. Essa, però, mediante la progressiva sistemazione e chiarificazione della dottrina della supposizione (tutti i termini della proposizione hanno supposizione) si è liberata delle incrostazioni di origine grammaticale che si portava addosso dal tempo di Abelardo ed è tornata ad essere la dottrina della copula" (Maierù 1972, p.213). -^

(14) Q.29, V f.15va. There is another passage almost identical: "Cum dicitur 'iste est pater istius', hoc nomen 'pater' principaliter significat paternitatem, et illam ibi copu-lat isti; dat etiam secundario intelligere filiationem, et ilam nec copulat isti vel illi, set tantum dat intelligere circa illum. Illa autem copulatur illi cum dicitur 'iste est filius'" (q.23, T f.15ra). -^

(15) "Posito ergo quod Deus nil creet, hoc verbum 'creat' eandem retinet significationem quam prius, set cum nil appellet, nil de Deo predicat vel ei copulat" (q.23, T f.15rb). -^

(16) "Written at Paris certainly before 1176 and probably before 1170" (Moore-Dulong 1943, p.vi). The Suma theologie of Peter of Capua was written between 1170 and 1190, dates based on the dedication found in it to Gualterio, Archbishop of Palermo during this period (Cf. Chacón 1988, p.383). With these facts the work of Peter of Capua can be as early as five years before that of Peter of Poitiers, or as late as 20 years after (or more). -^

(17) About the use of the terms proper to the proprietates terminorum Cf. Lahoz 1992, pp.54-138, especially pp.68-70 and 134-138. -^

(18) "Nos dicimus quod hoc nomen 'creator' vel hoc verbum 'creat' et similia, de Deo predicant essentiam; cum enim dicitur 'Deus est creator' hoc nomen 'creator' principaliter significat quandam relationem, scilicet increatam sive di-vinam essentiam et illam ibi copulat Deo" (q.23, T f.15ra). -^

(19) The text of the preceding note continues in the following way: "dat etiam secundario intelligere quandam relationem creatam et illam non copulat Deo, set nec creature, set tantum dat intelligere circa creaturam. Illa autem copulatur creature cum dicitur 'creatura creatur'. Sicut cum dicitur 'iste est pater istius', hoc nomen 'pater' principaliter significat paternitatem, et illam ibi copulat isti; dat etiam secundario intelligere filiationem, et ilam nec copulat isti vel illi, set tantum dat intelligere circa illum. Illa autem copulatur illi cum dicitur 'iste est filius'" (q.23, T f.15ra). -^

(20) De Rijk 1967, II-I, p.539. -^

(21) Q.23, T f.15rb. -^

(22) "Beim Begriffsworte ist ein Schritt mehr bis zum Gegenstande als beim Eigennahmen und der letzte kann fehlen--d.h. der Begriff kann leer sein--, ohne daß dadurch das Begriffswort aufhört, wissenschaftlich verwendbar zu sein" (Letter to Husserl, 24.5.1891, in Frege 1976, p.96). -^

(23) Cf. Jiménez Cataño 1991, p.48. -^

(24) Q.23, T f.15rb. -^

(25) Ibid. -^

(26) Abelard 1956, p.135. -^

(27) Cf. q.5, T f.5ra. -^

(28) I contend that this can also be said of the appellatio of the 14th century. -^

(29) Supporters of this thesis include, among others, Alain of Libera and Alfonso Maierù. -^

Abelard, Peter 1956

Dialectica, ed. L. M. De Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Albert of Saxony (see Saxony)

Biard, Joël 1987

"Semantique et ontologie dans l''Ars Meliduna'", in Jolivet and Libera 1987, pp.121-144.

Chacón, Alfonso 1988

"Sobre la autoría de la Summa theologiæ del cardenal Pedro de Capua (= 1214)", in Saranyana and Tejero, 1988, pp.379-387.

De Rijk, L. M. 1967

Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, II-I: On the Origin an Early Development of the Theory of Supposition; II-II: Texts and Indices. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Dufour, Carlos A. 1989

Die Lehre der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik. München-Hamden-Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Ferrer, Vincent 1977

Tractatus de suppositionibus, critical edition with an introduction by John A. Trenntman. Stuttgart-BadCanstatt: Fromman-Holzboog.

Frege, Gottlob 1976

Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Jiménez Cataño, Rafael 1991

Semántica y racionalidad en Frege. Un estudio desde las operaciones mentales. México: Minos.

Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de (eds.) 1987

Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la Logica Modernorum, Napoli: Bibliopolis.

Lahoz, Carlos 1992

Reglamentación del lenguaje trinitario en Pedro de Capua. Análisis semiótico y contextualización histórica. Romæ: Athenæum Romanum Sanctæ Crucis.

Lambert of Auxerre 1971

Logica [Summa Lamberti], ed. Franco Alessio. Firenze, La Nuova Italia.

Maierù, Alfonso 1972

Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

Malcolm, John 1977

"On the Disappearance of 'Copulatio' as a Property of a Term", in Franciscan Studies, 37, pp.120-138.

Moore, Philip S. and Dulong, Marthe (eds.) 1943

Sententiæ Petri Pictaviensis. Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press.

Ockham, William 1974

Opera philosophica et theologica, vol.I, eds. Philoteus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephanus Brown. St. Bonaventure (N.Y.): Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae.

Pinborg, Jan 1972

Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick. Suttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.

Saranyana, Josep-Ignasi and Tejero, Eloi (eds.) 1988

AAVV, Hispania Christiana, studies in honor of J. Orlandis, Pamplona: EUNSA.

Saxony, Albert of 1988

Perutilis Logica, ed. Angel Muñoz García. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Sherwood, William of 1983

Introductiones in Logicam, in Traditio 39, pp.219-299.

T Todi, Bibl. Com. 51.

V Vat. Lat. 4296.

1. "Quotiens hoc verbum 'est' est tertium adiacens, scilicet cum copulat predicatum subiecto, cadit ab officio significandi; nec significat aliquid, set tantum tenet officium copulandi" (q.5, T fol.5ra). -^

2. "Item. Queritur an hoc verbum est in eadem significatione vel in diversis copulet Christo hec duo predicata: 'Deus', 'homo'. (...) Set huius solutio patet ex predictis. Cum enim hoc verbum 'est' in predicta locutione sit copula, nichil ibi significat, set tantum copulat" (q.5, T fol.5rb).

3. "Hoc nomen 'Pater' determinate significat 'paternitatem' et eam copulat: significat etiam et 'Patrem'" (q.29, V fol.15va). -^

4. "Nos dicimus quod hoc nomen 'creator' vel hoc verbum 'creat' et similia, de Deo predicant essentiam; cum enim dicitur 'Deus est creator' hoc nomen 'creator' principaliter significat quandam relationem, scilicet increatam sive divinam essentiam et illam ibi copulat Deo; dat etiam secundario intelligere quandam relationem creatam et illam non copulat Deo, set nec creature, set tantum dat intelligere circa creaturam. Illa autem copulatur creature cum dicitur 'creatura creatur'. Sicut cum dicitur 'iste est pater istius', hoc nomen 'pater' principaliter significat paternitatem, et illam ibi copulat isti; dat etiam secundario intelligere filiationem, et ilam nec copulat isti vel illi, set tantum dat intelligere circa illum. Illa autem copulatur illi cum dicitur 'iste est filius'" (q.23, T fol.15ra).

5. "Posito ergo quod Deus nil creet, hoc verbum 'creat' eandem retinet significationem quam prius, set cum nil appellet, nil de Deo predicat vel ei copulat; et si nil predicatur in affirmativa, nil removetur in hac negativa 'Deus non creat'" (q.23, T fol.15rb).

6. We can add the following text which does not include copulatio: "Hoc nomen 'Deus' convenit persone Filii etiam per appellationem, et aliquid supponit; ergo potest supponere illam" (q.2, T fol.2ra). -^

7. "Cum dicitur 'iste homo est iustus', non copulat ibi hoc nomen 'iustus' qualitatem, set iustitiam quasi confuse, sicut dictum est de verbo substantivo" (q.6, T fol.5va).

8. "Hoc enim nomen 'Pater' copulat relationem, non qualitatem vel essentiam" (q.8, T fol.6ra).

9. "Hoc verbum 'predestinor' nulli copulat passionem, quod patet per hoc quod ipsum potest dici de re etiam non existenti; de eo enim qui cras nascetur potest vere dici 'ille predestinatur'; sicut cum dicitur 'hec res videtur a me', per hoc verbum 'videtur' nulla passio copulatur rei in se" (q.19, T fol.11vb).

10. "Hoc nomen 'unus' in singulari non copulat unitatem, nisi in neutro genere, /fol. 13rb/ ut 'sunt unum', set secundum distinctionem; non est enim sensus: 'sunt unus', id est participant unitate; set 'sunt una persona distincta'. Set hoc homen 'iustus', etiam in singulari, copulat iustitiam, et est sensus: 'sunt iustus', id est participant iustitiam; et ideo hanc concedimus, et non illam; cum vero dicitur: 'sunt unus Deus' et hoc nomen 'unus' non copulat distinctionem, set tantum excludit pluralitatem deorum" (q.27, V 13ra-b).

11. "Set obest. Augustinus dicit: 'cum ingenitus dicitur, non quid sit, set quid non sit dicitur'; ergo hoc nomen 'ingenitus' nil ponit set potius removet; set idem prorsus significat 'ingenitus' et 'innascibilis'; ergo et hoc nomen 'innascibilis' tantum removet; non ergo ipsum copulat innascibilitatem. Respondeo. Potest solvi premissa auctoritas per supplementum, ut sit sensus: 'non tantum quid sit, set etiam quid non sit dicitur'. Vel distingue equivocationem huius nominis 'ingenitus', vel huius 'innascibilis': primo ponitur hoc nomen 'ingenitus' tantum remotive, ut sit sensus: 'non genitus'; set quod divina essentia est ingenita, et Spiritus Sanctus est ingenitus, secundum hoc accipitur in predicta auctoritate Augustini; et dicit quod potest etiam hoc nomen 'ingenitus' privative et remotive teneri; et privando secundum hoc copulat innascibilitatem; et secundum hoc dicitur de solo Patre; sicut hoc nomen 'iniustus' potest tantum remotive teneri, id est 'non iustus', secundum quod etiam lapis est iniustus; potest etiam poni privative, secundum quod copulat iniustitiam ut: 'hic homo est iniustus'" (q.31, V fol.14ra).

12. "Innascibilitas non est relatio, set notio quedam qua Pater non refertur ad alium; ipsa tantum significatur hoc nomine 'innascibilis', quod dicitur relative non determinate ad aliquam, quia nil esset dictu: Pater est innascibilis Filii et Spiritus Sancti; set confuse notat respectum, sicut essentia divina non refertur ad aliquam, ipsa tamen copulatur per hoc nomen 'similis', quod dicitur relative" (q.31, V fol.14va).

13. "Cum dicitur 'isti duo ferunt lapidem', hoc verbum 'ferunt' sine distinctione singularitatis vel pluralitatis copulat lationem lapidis" (q.5, T fol.5ra). -^

14. "Nos vero dicimus quod omnia adiectiva adiective retenta possunt in plurali predicari de pluribus personis, nam nullum adiectivum, nisi sit numerale, copulat rem suam cum distinctione singularitatis vel pluralitatis" (q.6, T fol.5va).

15. "Sic intelligenda est premissa auctoritas 'tota trinitas operata est incarnationem Filii', id est tota trinitas incarnavit Filium; incarnatio autem Filii potest intelligi vel passive, que copulatur ei cum dicitur 'Filius incarnatur', non quod sit passio predicamentalis, set que modus passionis copulatur: et illa est divina essentia et est solus Filius; vel active, que copulatur cum dicitur 'Filius vel Pater est incarnans'; et illa est divina essentia, et est tam Pater quam Filius et Spiritus Sanctus" (q.24, T fol.15va).

16. "Secundum hoc non est concedendum: 'Pater et Filius sunt unus', quia per hoc nomen 'unus' in singulari copularetur una distinctio confuse; ipsi autem non sunt una distinctio nec una persona distincta" (q.27, V fol.13ra).

17. "Potest dici quod tres sunt infusiones passive, id est que passive copulantur, et infusio qua infunditur Pater est solus Pater, vel Paternitas; et illa qua infunditur Filius est solus Filius vel filiatio; illa qua infunditur Spiritus Sanctus est solus Spiritus Sanctus vel processio. Item. Divina essentia vel tota Trinitas infundit tres personas active infusione, id est que active copulatur; sicut tota Trinitas incarnavit Filium, vel divina essentia; et potest dici quod ille /fol.15v2/ tres infusiones que passive copulantur sunt illa una essentia que active copulatur, sicut tres notiones sunt una essentia. Sicut incarnatio, que passive copulatur Filio; cum dicitur Filius incarnatur, est solus Filius; et est illa que active copulatur toti Trinitati, cum dicitur: tota Trinitas est incarnans Filium; que etiam activa est quelibet trium personarum" (q.34, V fol.15va-b).

18. "Nos vero dicimus quod omnia adiectiva adiective retenta possunt in plurali predicari de pluribus personis, nam nullum adiectivum, nisi sit numerale, copulat rem suam cum distinctione singularitatis vel pluralitatis" (q.6, T fol.5va). -^