I received the following letter from Donald Crowe. He is an acquaintance
from church and wrote this letter in response to Revision 1 of my Y2K
power paper. I would like to thank Don for his concern and his desire
to "get it right."
I've included the letter below and have intersperse my replies or
comments as appropriate:
December, 1998 Mr. Don Law 7730 NW 11th Place Fort Lauderdale, FL 33322 OPEN LETTER Dear Don:I received a copy of your paper, "Y2K Preparation Prudence and Paranoia." Your effort is commendable, and I thank you for it. Although I do not disagree with much of what you presented, I would like to raise a few objections to your argument. Allow me to share them with you.
I would like to begin by restating that argument, as I understand it:
Premise A: There should be relatively little problem with electrical generation and distribution as the result of "Y2K."A good summary. For the benefit of web readers, let me interject that the original purpose of the paper was to help guide the preparation efforts of a local church.Premise B: There could be substantial problems with non-Y2K compliant computers.
Conclusion: Therefore, Americans should not be so concerned with an electric supply problem, and should instead focus their efforts and resources where it is needed; that is, ensuring Y2K compliance with computer systems.
Assuming I have not misunderstood your case, allow me to proceed. First, it appears your argument is directed at two different audiences: a) individuals who play roles in business or government in which they are in positions to influence resource allocation, and b) "some people planning on a significant personal expense for equipment (generators, presumably) that they will not need for the millennium rollover."
Of course, business managers or owners playing the former role must decide whether to spend large sums addressing Y2K compliance in business computers systems, or instead wait to see what happens and fix it when (and if) it does; perhaps deciding at this time only to spend a smaller amount on contingency plans to cover potential issues such as power outages. For this audience, your recommendation may be appropriate.
However, there may be many others who read your paper who have little ability to influence Y2K compliance efforts in the organizations around them, other than to encourage them to that end. For these individuals (primarily families) it may in fact be most appropriate for them to focus their efforts on planning for the possibility of power outages. For example, any extended lack of power is at least a major inconvenience; at worst a severe disruption to 'business as usual.' Also, many view even a tropical storm or hurricane warning as sufficient reason to prepare for a lack of power; and for the reasons outlined below, it would seem that reason is at least as great given the potential Y2K scenario.
I would agree that there is nothing wrong with
a little harmless preparation. As I stated in the paper, I'm concerned
with the folks spending a lot of time, money, and effort in preparation
for a power outage that isn't going to come. At the time I wrote the paper,
the attitude I encountered was that an extended power outage is a
foregone conclusion. That is where I disagree the most.
I do not think that a Y2K power outage is as likely as a hurricane power
outage. I have found that a extended widespread power outage caused by
Y2K is about as likey as an extended widespread power outage tomorrow.
As you well know, if a hurricane comes onshore, an extended power outage
(although not usually widespread), is very likely.
This is an excellent point! We have got some serious problems to worry about: communist China now has long-range missile ability, terrorist want to retaliate against the US, our government has become corrupt at the highest levels, the Asian economy threatens the world economy, etc. I agree with you totally that it is a good idea to prepare for hard times. However, my specialty is how Y2K affects power, so everything else is beyond the scope of my paper. Second, your premise that there should be minimal electric power generation and distribution problems does not appear to address these potential issues:
1. Maintaining fuel production and supply to power generating facilities. Depending on fuel reserves, interruptions in these areas could compromise this portion of the power supply equation.
This will be addressed in future revisions of the
paper. First, note that fuel is not an issue for nuclear (about 20% of
our capacity) and hydro power plants. The remainder, (and in fact the
majority) use fossil fuels: coal, oil, and gas. (The solar and geothermal
are such a small percentage that I'll omit them.)
The common claim by the alarmist is that the rail system will shut down
and that is the end of the coal supply. Well, first of all, the rail system
will not shut down. Even if they have complete computer failure, they can
still move coal using manual methods. I have heard reports stating that this
is not possible, but I have verified that it is - three times over. Granted,
the rail system will be quite inefficient in manual mode, but it can still
operate. Track switches can be operated manually. I have verified
this with three independent methods:
Then there is oil and gas, delivered mostly by pipeline or tanker ship.
These systems are relatively easy to operate in manual mode. Oil and
gas are also stockpiled by the power companies.
Here in Broward County, we are particularly fortunate that we have two
power plants, both primarily fueled by oil. We can receive oil from
any provider at Port Everglades. Even in the event that no
oil is available,
the plants can be switched to run on natural gas as a backup.
I can't find a plausible
case where our plants would run out of fuel here in Broward.
The power plants are capable of stockpiling coal to keep running for
long periods of time. A few years ago, the Union Pacific rail system
completely shut down for weeks, but there was no interruption in electric
power.
This would be true if there were significant problems in the grid. My whole premise is that there will not be any. 3. Since such a wide variety of interrelated and interdependent infrastructure could be involved (e.g., transportation, energy, communications), the effect of multiple isolated failures on power availability through that interdependent system is also very difficult to predict. One might reasonably envision a "domino effect."
Apart from fuel (discussed above), the electric
system has a major dependence on communications. They have their own
communications systems in part, but also depend on the phone companies.
All of this communication is being stringently tested, and commitments
have been made to have the communication system Y2K ready by July 1999.
But just in case that doesn't even work (highly unlikely), there is
a contingency plan in place to use alternative communication systems.
The first test of this contingency plan will take place in April 1999.
A valid point, but this has been considered by
NERC. They define their own term, "Y2K Ready." This gets around the
legal issues you mention. The Y2K testing and remediation under way takes
outside suppliers (primarily the phone company) into consideration.
You are right about outside suppliers affecting readiness. There have
been about 20 power plants identified that cannot be ready by the NERC
deadline of July 1999 because of outside suppliers. However, as best
as we can tell, backlog will be satisfied before 2000 hits.
Again, thanks for your opinion, but even in light of your letter, I still come to the same conclusion: there is no credible case for an extended power outage. I would be interested in your response. In the meantime, please feel free to contact me if you have any questions, or if you need more information.
Best regards,
Donald R. Crowe