[The passage below is excerpted from: Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), Chapter 19 ("Darkness at Noon"), pp. 593-94.]
The complex tapestry of the Iran-contra affair is composed of seven distinct and identifiable strands. The first strand is the diminished sense of political accountability that prevailed after Reagan's landslide reelection gave him a second term at the age of seventy-four (as of February 6, 1985) and made him constitutionally ineligible to succeed himself. The second strand was Reagan's frustration at his inability to mount an effective response to terrorist activities or to rescue Americans held hostage in Lebanon. The third strand was the view of CIA officials and members of the NSC staff that Iran was strategically important and vulnerable to Soviet influence. The fourth was the strategic concern of Israel, which wanted to prevent its old enemy Iraq from winning the Iran-Iraq war. The fifth was the contras, whom Reagan had instructed [National Security Advisor] McFarlane to keep together "body and soul" after Congress withheld military aid to the rebels. The sixth was the opportunity for profit that the initiative presented to arms dealers, including the directors of The Enterprise.*
The seventh and connecting strand was the severely reduced political competence of the White House staff. The Iran initiative would have been inconceivable during the first term, when the president was surrounded by politicians who guarded his public approval ratings and by former Californians accustomed to protecting Reagan from himself. But Reagan had almost casually cut himself off from the political moorings that had prevented him from drifting astray during his first four years in office. Gone were Baker, Deaver and Darman, the trio of pragmatists associated with most of his political successes. Gone were Clark and Meese, the two conservatives most loyal to Reagan and most aware of the dangers of allowing him to indulge his predilections. The pragmatists and probably Meese would have recognized the political risk of selling weapons to Iran, knowing Reagan would be likely to forfeit his precious public credibility if he broke his promise and bargained with kidnappers. Clark was highly susupicious of the Israelis and, like Weinberger, tilted to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict. As far as the Iran initiative was concerned, this group had been replaced by Regan, the one-man band as chief of staff, and McFarlane. Both were well intentioned, but notably lacking in political judgment. McFarlane, who was close to the Israelis and had long favored a strategic opening to Iran, proposed the arms initiative. Regan, who indulged Reagan rather than protecting him, became its cheerleader. No one thought to warn Reagan, as Stu Spencer believed Baker or Deaver would have done, "Look, we can't do this. Look what we did to Carter on this issue." Spencer and such White House officials as Rollins and his successor, Michell Daniels, or even Patrick Buchanan would certainly have seen the political danger, but they were not privy to the initiative. Neither was Nancy Reagan. . . .
Reagan's own political instincts were dulled by the magnitude of his reelection victory, his isolation in the White House and his concern for the American hostages.
[*"The Enterprise" was a covert network of dummy corporations, Swiss bank accounts, aircraft and other resources operated by Richard Secord and Albert Hakim through wich the Iran arms sales were channeled. The Enterprise generated nearly $48 million from sales of the arms and from contributions from private citizens and third countries. It spent nearly $35.8 million on covert operations. At least $3.8 million of the income generated by the arms sales was diverted to the contras, less than the $4.4 million that Secord, Hakim and their associate Thomas Clines kept for themselves in "commissions." The balance of unspent funds remained in Swiss bank accounts when The Enterprise ceased operations after the November 1986 disclosures.]