Essay:

Hobbes and the right to withdraw from the Commonwealth

Hobbes and the right to withdraw from the Commonwealth

Hobbes had a generally poor view of man's fate if left to his own devices. He described in Leviathan a human beings natural state as one where s/he was only subject to the 'rights of nature', that is to use as much force as s/he saw necessary for self-protection [ Hobbes Ch XIV p 91] , and where natural inclinations are towards either war or the acquisition of power. In such a situation, the inevitable result is an unpleasant form of anarchy, where the poor and weak suffer or die, the strong might succeed, all men degenerate, and there is no means of prospering as all energy is directed towards personal defence. In such a state of being, there would be no industry, no culture, no innovation. At best, a swift, short, violent end to a life without anything to recommend it - as Hobbes viewed it 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. [Hobbes ch XIII p 89]

With Hobbes' pessimistic view, the accompanying 'laws of nature', that man should 'seek peace, and follow it', seems to have little hope of succeeding. Individuals might form contracts with each other towards this end, but there is nothing to hold men to their contracts, other than fear of the consequences. So in this natural state, we might be willing to covenant with other individuals in the hope that, by doing so, we may obtain a measure of security in our own lives.

But unless we go one step (or several steps) further than this, we may be buying only a limited sense of security for ourselves. Hobbes felt that the only way that individuals could live a life without continual fear of war was to be willing to hand over our individual rights, either to one person, or to a group or Assembly of people, and in doing so investing that person or group with enough power to enforce peace. For him the only solution was for men to covenant to form a commonwealth wherein all men gave up their rights to one sovereign power, all consenting to be governed by this sovereign. To ensure this power was sufficient, it would not be enough for only a small group of men or selection of families to simply band together without covenanting, as this would be a temptation for other groups of equal size to do the same, and would only lead to threats of invasion and more violence[ ch XVII p 118]. Also, without power being vested in one person or assembly, each individual member of the group would be following his own reasoning, and not only would this prevent a united action against a common enemy being taken, but would lead, in times of comparative peace, to individual members turning on one another. So, to be effective, a commonwealth would consist of all men in a nation or society covenanting.

Once the commonwealth has been formed, there is, according to Hobbes, an obligation on the part of all who have covenanted to keep their contract. This applies whether individuals have agreed to the covenant by a means which we would see today as democratic, or if the commonwealth has been imposed in some way. In this, there is a difference between the more usual form of contract between individuals, where there is the possibility of withdrawing, particularly if the contract has been made under duress. Usually, the amount of trust that individuals can place in others keeping their word is limited. Hobbes speaks of bonds as only enforceable by fear under normal circumstances. If this is the case, then for the covenant to form a commonwealth to be enforced, the power granted to the sovereign would have to be absolute.

Unlimited power is a concept which we have grown to associate with dictators and tyrants, yet the state as set up in most nations has the type of sovereign power Hobbes describes. Hobbes accepts that there may be 'evil consequences' of such unlimited power, but the absence of it would be far worse, a state of permanent war It makes little difference in this situation whether one individual has sovereignty or the institution of government, there are very few areas on earth that an individual is not at least nominally subject to sovereign power. Whether the individual chooses or not, the framework of laws embraces him/her from his birth, and by being born within a particular country, in Hobbes view he has tacitly consented to the covenant. The option to leave is there in theory, but in practice an individual may be prevented by bureaucracy; exit visas, and the difficulties of existing as a stateless person may be insurmountable.

This idea of consent might be problematic; there are types of consent in Hobbes' view which we would today find it hard to agree with. An example would be the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina in 1982; in Hobbes' eyes, the fact that the Governor of the Falklands had at one stage surrendered to the Argentine commander would have meant that all subject to his sovereignty, ie the Falkland Islanders, had transferred their original covenant with him/her to the new sovereign power, as is the case with subjects of any sovereign power forced to surrender to another. The wishes of the Islanders to remain British would be immaterial. In this situation, an individual who attempted to depose a conquering sovereign would be just as much acting unlawfully as if s/he had acted against his original sovereign.

Consent does not have to be active; an individual has consented if s/he continues to live in a nation where the system is such that the majority have consented to a form of commonwealth. This seems to deny even the right of protest, in Hobbes' words

It is difficult to see how this could work in a democracy. If each government had sovereignty for a fixed term, at the end of this term, would individuals campaigning for any change be in breach of their Covenant? The result would seem to be the original holders of office being in power for life. Hobbes acknowledges some problems with rights of succession, where they are not in the control of the existing Sovereign, and the transfer of power from one elected government to another has historically produced problems even in ordered democracies (viz transfer from the Heath to the Wilson government in Britain early 1974). The momentary dissolution of the Covenant takes place when governments are dissolved under less ordered circumstances, and there would be some difficulty to ascertain where an individual's obligation should lie.

If individuals are under obligation to the sovereign power, with no automatic right to express their dissent, are there limitations to their obligation? Has an individual by consenting to the covenant whether explicitly (eg by voting) or implicitly (by staying and living under a states laws) given away all his rights? Can a sovereign force his subjects, for example, to go to war? Interestingly, Hobbes suggests that there are some limits, and that whilst conscientious objection as we have understood it in recent wars might not be legitimate, Hobbes accepts that neither women, nor 'men of feminine courage' should be made to fight.[ Ch XXI p 151] Conscientious objection, rather than cowardice, is not an alternative, as an individual hands over, as part of his consent to the covenant, the right to decide what is good and what is evil. In that, s/he is giving up the right to choose whether a particular conflict is for the public good. An individual, whatever his own conscience dictates, only has a right to refuse to kill another human being at his sovereign's request if his refusal does not 'frustrate the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained' [Ch XXI p 151] As the sovereignty was certainly in part ordained to protest the state against invasion by foreign powers, an individual's covenant includes an implicit agreement to defend his country in any war which his sovereign power has decided to involve him/her in. And as kings and others in authority as individuals are subject to passions directed towards 'partiality, pride, revenge, and the like'[Ch XVII p 117], historically an individual can consider himself very fortunate if his generation has not been legitimately conscripted to fight in defence of his country.

This obligation might seem at odds with the reasons for forming a commonwealth; if an individual hopes to avoid war, to be able to enjoy peace and some prosperity by giving up his rights, does the sovereign have an obligation to him/her? There is no implicit obligation for the sovereign to provide these conditions; there is moreover, no sanction that can be applied, no punishment for a sovereign by individuals. Although many states have devised systems of checks and vetos to prevent sovereign power turning into tyranny, this is not an aspect of Hobbes idea of Commonwealth. War-crimes, for example, would not be punishable, as any act 'in declared Hostility', no matter how evil, is lawful. [Ch XXVIII p 217] There is no means of legitimate rebellion under Hobbes commonwealth should the sovereign have failed to provide security, for once the covenant has been made, all means ( no matter how seemingly democratic) of changing the covenant, or making a new one, become unlawful.

Hobbes view of political obligation seems somewhat extreme when examined from the perspective of a Western Liberal Democracy. In Britain, almost built into our 'rights', by custom and usage, is the feeling that whatever sovereignty we live under, we should be critical of it; publicly on any and every occasion, in the press, the media. Dependent on a variety of factors, such as ethnic background or class position, an individual may feel that the protest should take an active form, such as the riots in various inner city centres since the 1980s, or refusal to pay poll tax. It is difficult to imagine absolute sovereign power being exercised. Yet at the time Hobbes formulated his ideas, he had seen the effects of the disintegration of commonwealth; civil war, marauding armies, families set against each other. At such a time of uncertainty, just as when periodic riots erupt here and now, there is a great outcry for more law and order.

Hobbes idea of sovereignty recognised than human beings seem to have an instinctive need for walls, in the shape of defined boundaries of acceptable behaviour. Because we fear the result of the removal of all restrictions, we accept the need for government, and although critical of it, tend to live as if we accepted being governed at times almost to excess in return for peace and stability. We are critical of those we see as examples of having broken the covenant in our own society - and with liberty far more restricted than in Hobbes day, this might include New Age travellers, peace protesters, or trade unionists indulging in secondary picketing. It seems impossible in 'civilised' society to be released from the covenant, no matter how unwillingly we may have entered into it.

Yet is Hobbes initial premise correct? Without a commonwealth, are humans in their natural state only concerned with pursuing self interest?

We are usually able to view the results of extreme dissolution of commonwealth too often on our television screens; Beirut one year's example, Bosnia another's. On the other hand, we do not have to look back further than a few years to find examples of the over-zealous application of Hobbes principles in the shape of dictators, and restrictive regimes, from Hitler to Pol Pot, Idi Amin to Papa Doc. Singapore under Lee is the only immediate example of a state "successfully" operating with as limiting an idea of sovereignty and political obligation as Hobbes advocates which comes to mind.

It might be that civilisation with its emphasis on material wealth is what has brought about the need for commonwealth. There are few societies left to study which are still in an early enough stage of development to determine whether a simple structure with no government, and no legal system produces the hostile existence Hobbes described. Some Aboriginal tribes have customs of valuing sharing, rather than acquisition of power. It would appear that until man develops an idea of property rights and ownership, his violence is only a reaction to a perceived threat, not a basic natural state. When all have little or nothing of material value, there is no need for a commonwealth; when most have little, but the few have much, there is every need, and every danger for the few if the most should decide to be released.

© 1993 Franni Vincent