Little the world can do to help Burma's forests

3D VISION:

      The Nation,
      Thursday, Dec 17, 1998

           By James Fahn

      A new report underlines the dilemma environmentalists
      face in deciding whether to practice ''protective
      engagement'' with the military powers in Rangoon.

      Any high-profile corporation deciding to invest in Burma
      under its current military regime is bound to become the
      subject of controversy. But the same is also true for
      non-government organisations seeking to work in the
      strife-torn country.

      A new report on Burma's forests compiled by the
      US-based World Resources reveals just how difficult it is
      for outsiders to help Burma conserve its natural bounty.
      The issue is crucial because Burma now contains half of
      the remaining forests in mainland Southeast Asia, but
      perhaps not for long. Burma's forests are increasingly
      falling prey to loggers exporting timber, usually illegally, to
      neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand and India,
      which have already cut down most of their own forests due
      to unsustainable logging practices. Unless action is taken
      soon, Burma will follow in their footsteps, and suffer all the
      related environmental problems of massive flooding, soil
      erosion and dry-season water shortages that have
      become so common in the region.

      Thailand helped kick off this trend when, following the
      takeover of Burma by the ruling State Law and Order
      Restoration Council (Slorc) in 1988, then-Army chief Gen
      Chavalit Yongchaiyudh flew to Rangoon and helped
      secure 42 logging concessions for Thai companies in
      exchange for hard currency that helped the cash-strapped
      regime stay afloat.

      Apparently fed up with the Thais' clear-cutting tactics,
      Burma has since revoked the concessions, but illegal
      logging by both Thai and Chinese firms continues inside
      Burma, with authorities either turning a blind eye or
      extending a greased palm. Meanwhile, an illegal timber
      trade is now also said to be flourishing along the
      Indian-Burmese border.

      This dire situation is highlighted in the report ''Logging
      Burma's Frontier Forests: Resources and the Regime'',
      which provides a welcome addition to our scant
      knowledge of the forestry situation in a country isolated by
      its dictatorial rulers. A useful summary, complete with
      interactive maps, can be found on the Internet at
      http://www.wri.org/ffi/burma/.

      Slorc, now known as the State Peace and Development
      Council (SPDC), is not solely to blame for logging in
      border areas, where most of Burma's remaining forests
      can be found. Some of the country's ethnic minority groups
      have also overseen extensive logging operations to
      support their insurrections against the central government.
      But the report makes clear that most of the blame falls on
      the country's military rulers.

      ''The rate of deforestation in Burma has more than
      doubled since the Slorc came to power in 1988,'' it states.
      ''Timber exports have helped pay for the regime's arms
      purchases and a doubling in the size of the army.''

      Logging also seems to be at its most rapacious in the
      areas controlled by the military. The declared value of
      Burma's timber exports amounted to roughly US$190
      million in 1995, making it the country's largest foreign
      exchange earner. Teak sales alone totalled more than
      $150 million, close to 10 per cent of Burma's GDP. And
      these are just the official figures.

      Making the situation even more precarious is that Burma's
      system of protected areas is so weak. Only five per cent of
      the country's area falls under protected status, and
      enforcement is often lacking. For instance, Burma's first
      wildlife sanctuary, the 200,000-hectare Pindaung reserve
      set up in 1918, has been so degraded by poaching,
      encroachment and government counter-insurgency
      measures that, according to the report, it ''has effectively
      ceased to exist''.

      Officials at Burma's Ministry of Forestry are generally
      considered to be well-meaning and capable, and the
      Forest Policy it came up with three years ago is
      considered promising (if lacking in terms of social
      forestry), but it has been rendered largely ineffective due
      to the ministry's lack of political power, especially
      compared to the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE), a
      state agency which has a monopoly over teak sales and
      funnels revenue to the SPDC.

      Indeed, although it is not mentioned in the report, in 1995
      Slorc effectively broke a ceasefire agreement and went to
      war with the Karenni National Progressive Party, a
      resistance group which was undermining the MTE's teak
      monopoly by smuggling logs into Thailand's Mae Hong
      Son province.

      Even where logging is kept at bay, a thriving illegal wildlife
      trade has ''hollowed out'' Burma's few conservation areas.
      ''Hunting with the aim of selling wildlife parts to China is
      particularly severe,'' according to the report. ''For example,
      the rhinoceros population of Tamanthi, Burma's largest
      national park, has been almost completely wiped out [and]
      all indications point to the tiger population being very thin
      throughout much of its native habitat.''

      Under these conditions, official plans to increase the
      number of protected areas to cover 10 per cent of the
      country, although admirable, will have a limited impact,
      and in some cases the motives behind declaring
      conservation zones seem murky at best. Total and Unocal,
      two oil companies which have built a pipeline to transport
      gas from Burma's Gulf of Martaban into Thailand, have
      proposed the creation of the huge Myanmoletkat Nature
      Reserve in southern Burma which would cover the area
      the pipeline runs through. It would also overlap with the
      Kaserdoh Wildlife Sanctuary established by the Karen
      National Union, another resistance group still actively
      fighting the SPDC.

      In the words of the WRI report, the gazetting of the reserve
      ''has raised concerns about the extent to which the
      regime's renewed interest in environmental protection is
      being driven by its desire to relocate populations that
      might pose a security risk to key infrastructure projects''.

      The issues surrounding Myanmoletkat highlight the
      political difficulties outsiders face in their efforts to
      promote conservation in Burma. Among all the
      international environmental groups, only the US-based
      Wildlife Conservation Society has decided to bite the
      proverbial bullet and work with the government by helping
      to train officials in protected area management, despite
      the criticisms of pro-democracy activists, who claim it is
      helping to prop up the military regime. Most green groups
      seem to agree that constructive engagement -- or in this
      case, protective engagement -- with the military regime is
      not a wise policy, and have opted to stay out.

      By all accounts, the authors of the WRI report had a
      difficult time coming to a decision on this issue, but in the
      end they essentially concluded that attempting to work with
      the current Burmese regime simply isn't worthwhile.

      ''Under different political circumstances, our overriding
      recommendation to the international community would be
      that it should support the Ministry of Forestry to implement
      its own Forest Policy. In practice, however, this
      recommendation is meaningless because none of the
      preconditions for more rational forest management exists
      in Burma,'' the report concludes.

      The authors content themselves with advising the
      international community to ''support projects that shed light
      on what is happening on the ground'', include forestry and
      environmental issues in any international dialogue with
      Burma, and use existing treaties to exchange information
      about forestry management with Burma.

      In practice, this means that the only hope for Burma's
      forests rests with a more responsible attitude from the
      country's neighbours, and that is a faint hope indeed. In the
      end, like so much else in Burma, meaningful action to
      protect the forests must await some kind of political
      settlement.


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