Little the world can do to help Burma's forests
3D
VISION:
The Nation,
Thursday, Dec 17, 1998
By James Fahn
A new report underlines the dilemma
environmentalists
face in deciding whether to practice ''protective
engagement'' with the military powers in
Rangoon.
Any high-profile corporation deciding to invest
in Burma
under its current military regime is bound to
become the
subject of controversy. But the same is also
true for
non-government organisations seeking to work in
the
strife-torn country.
A new report on Burma's forests compiled by the
US-based World Resources reveals just how
difficult it is
for outsiders to help Burma conserve its natural
bounty.
The issue is crucial because Burma now contains
half of
the remaining forests in mainland Southeast
Asia, but
perhaps not for long. Burma's forests are
increasingly
falling prey to loggers exporting timber,
usually illegally, to
neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand
and India,
which have already cut down most of their own
forests due
to unsustainable logging practices. Unless
action is taken
soon, Burma will follow in their footsteps, and
suffer all the
related environmental problems of massive
flooding, soil
erosion and dry-season water shortages that have
become so common in the region.
Thailand helped kick off this trend when,
following the
takeover of Burma by the ruling State Law and
Order
Restoration Council (Slorc) in 1988, then-Army
chief Gen
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh flew to Rangoon and helped
secure 42 logging concessions for Thai companies
in
exchange for hard currency that helped the cash-strapped
regime stay afloat.
Apparently fed up with the Thais' clear-cutting
tactics,
Burma has since revoked the concessions, but
illegal
logging by both Thai and Chinese firms continues
inside
Burma, with authorities either turning a blind
eye or
extending a greased palm. Meanwhile, an illegal
timber
trade is now also said to be flourishing along
the
Indian-Burmese border.
This dire situation is highlighted in the report
''Logging
Burma's Frontier Forests: Resources and the
Regime'',
which provides a welcome addition to our scant
knowledge of the forestry situation in a country
isolated by
its dictatorial rulers. A useful summary,
complete with
interactive maps, can be found on the Internet
at
http://www.wri.org/ffi/burma/.
Slorc, now known as the State Peace and
Development
Council (SPDC), is not solely to blame for
logging in
border areas, where most of Burma's remaining
forests
can be found. Some of the country's ethnic
minority groups
have also overseen extensive logging operations
to
support their insurrections against the central
government.
But the report makes clear that most of the
blame falls on
the country's military rulers.
''The rate of deforestation in Burma has more
than
doubled since the Slorc came to power in 1988,''
it states.
''Timber exports have helped pay for the
regime's arms
purchases and a doubling in the size of the
army.''
Logging also seems to be at its most rapacious
in the
areas controlled by the military. The declared
value of
Burma's timber exports amounted to roughly
US$190
million in 1995, making it the country's largest
foreign
exchange earner. Teak sales alone totalled more
than
$150 million, close to 10 per cent of Burma's
GDP. And
these are just the official figures.
Making the situation even more precarious is
that Burma's
system of protected areas is so weak. Only five
per cent of
the country's area falls under protected status,
and
enforcement is often lacking. For instance,
Burma's first
wildlife sanctuary, the 200,000-hectare Pindaung
reserve
set up in 1918, has been so degraded by
poaching,
encroachment and government counter-insurgency
measures that, according to the report, it ''has
effectively
ceased to exist''.
Officials at Burma's Ministry of Forestry are
generally
considered to be well-meaning and capable, and
the
Forest Policy it came up with three years ago is
considered promising (if lacking in terms of
social
forestry), but it has been rendered largely
ineffective due
to the ministry's lack of political power,
especially
compared to the Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE),
a
state agency which has a monopoly over teak
sales and
funnels revenue to the SPDC.
Indeed, although it is not mentioned in the
report, in 1995
Slorc effectively broke a ceasefire agreement
and went to
war with the Karenni National Progressive Party,
a
resistance group which was undermining the MTE's
teak
monopoly by smuggling logs into Thailand's Mae
Hong
Son province.
Even where logging is kept at bay, a thriving
illegal wildlife
trade has ''hollowed out'' Burma's few
conservation areas.
''Hunting with the aim of selling wildlife parts
to China is
particularly severe,'' according to the report.
''For example,
the rhinoceros population of Tamanthi, Burma's
largest
national park, has been almost completely wiped
out [and]
all indications point to the tiger population
being very thin
throughout much of its native habitat.''
Under these conditions, official plans to
increase the
number of protected areas to cover 10 per cent
of the
country, although admirable, will have a limited
impact,
and in some cases the motives behind declaring
conservation zones seem murky at best. Total and
Unocal,
two oil companies which have built a pipeline to
transport
gas from Burma's Gulf of Martaban into Thailand,
have
proposed the creation of the huge Myanmoletkat
Nature
Reserve in southern Burma which would cover the
area
the pipeline runs through. It would also overlap
with the
Kaserdoh Wildlife Sanctuary established by the
Karen
National Union, another resistance group still
actively
fighting the SPDC.
In the words of the WRI report, the gazetting of
the reserve
''has raised concerns about the extent to which
the
regime's renewed interest in environmental
protection is
being driven by its desire to relocate populations
that
might pose a security risk to key infrastructure
projects''.
The issues surrounding Myanmoletkat highlight
the
political difficulties outsiders face in their
efforts to
promote conservation in Burma. Among all the
international environmental groups, only the
US-based
Wildlife Conservation Society has decided to
bite the
proverbial bullet and work with the government
by helping
to train officials in protected area management,
despite
the criticisms of pro-democracy activists, who
claim it is
helping to prop up the military regime. Most
green groups
seem to agree that constructive engagement -- or
in this
case, protective engagement -- with the military
regime is
not a wise policy, and have opted to stay out.
By all accounts, the authors of the WRI report
had a
difficult time coming to a decision on this
issue, but in the
end they essentially concluded that attempting
to work with
the current Burmese regime simply isn't
worthwhile.
''Under different political circumstances, our
overriding
recommendation to the international community
would be
that it should support the Ministry of Forestry
to implement
its own Forest Policy. In practice, however,
this
recommendation is meaningless because none of
the
preconditions for more rational forest
management exists
in Burma,'' the report concludes.
The authors content themselves with advising the
international community to ''support projects
that shed light
on what is happening on the ground'', include
forestry and
environmental issues in any international
dialogue with
Burma, and use existing treaties to exchange
information
about forestry management with Burma.
In practice, this means that the only hope for
Burma's
forests rests with a more responsible attitude
from the
country's neighbours, and that is a faint hope
indeed. In the
end, like so much else in Burma, meaningful
action to
protect the forests must await some kind of
political
settlement.