Dialectical Logic

There are numerous books on dialectical logic; however, only few of them are concerned with its specifically logical aspects. This was a side effect of class struggle in the ideological domain, when dialectics became a slogan of one party, and a curse for the other. It has been forgotten that the origin of dialectics can be traced up to the most ancient times, and that it was advocated within philosophical idealism no less than by materialists. As any logic, dialectics is universal and cannot reflect the interests of specific social layers. As any logic, it can be used to support quite different ideas, and it is only in practical activity that one way of thought may overcome another.

For a few thousand years, the humanity developed within the three socioeconomic formations based on expropriation of the product's of one's activity by individuals or social groups not involved in any production processes; this phase of human development was necessary to break the primitive syncretism of the earliest communal cultures, but its analytical nature manifested itself in all-penetrating social discrimination, and class antagonism. Classical logic was well suited to reflect such a social organization, commonly known as civilization. Now, when the last formation of this development phase, capitalism, is approaching its end, accents will shift in all kinds of philosophy to a more dynamic approach allowing for drastic changes and revolutionary development. Dialectical logic perfectly matches this demand.

Unfortunately, dialectical logic mainly developed outside the English-speaking culture, and it may be difficult to translate many of its categories so that their many-faceted meaning would remain intact. Even in classical logic, a notion could hardly be expressed with a single word or phrase; the more so in dialectics. Up to now, dialectical logic is considered by many people brought up in the classical spirit of stability and determinacy as mere play of words, without any practical importance. Dialectics is difficult to grasp by most scientists, whose essentially analytical occupation forms their minds in a rigid professional mould. It is only in crisis situations that the limitations of the traditional modes of thought become evident, demanding new logical principles to complement the static (structural) approach of classical logic.

Dialectics - what's that?

While classical logic stressed the static, structural aspects of reality, dialectics is all about change. No thing can remain the same in dialectical logic, and there are no clear shapes and rigid boundaries. The adepts of classical logic would call it absolutely illogical - and it is certainly not logical in the classical sense. However, despite all the apparently arbitrary, and even chaotic look, dialectical logic remains perfectly rational, being controlled by quite definite principles. As the opposite of classical logic, it is as crisp and formal, and its very arbitrariness is merely an explicit form of the imminent arbitrariness of abstract classical logicality. And, like classical logic, dialectics can be made into scholastics, if no rapport to reality is maintained.

The motion of thought, and the course of any other human activity, must reflect the motion of the world, for the activity to be successful. This means that dialectical logic, like classical logic, is inseparable from ontology, being the same philosophy viewed in a different aspect.

Origin of dialectical logic

Traditionally, Heractiles is said to be the farther of dialectics in Europe. However, dialectical elements can be found in practically any teaching of Ancient Greece, and, of course, in Aristotle's lectures. It is much later that dialectical and classical logic became split and even opposed to each other. In the XIX century, the inverse process of synthesizing the two approaches on a common philosophical basis was initiated, but it is still far from being completed.

As any logic at all, dialectical logic is not an arbitrary construction, and its roots should be sought for in the specific modes of human activity. While classical logic ascends to binary discrimination and categorization, dialectical logic is an abstraction of change in general. It is complementary to classical logic in the same sense as considering two distinct things is complemented by considering their difference as a manifestation of their unity.

It was quite natural to express the ideas contrary to the classical approach in the paradoxical form. Zeno's paradoxes have long since become a standard example.

Logical forms

In classical logic, we consider notions, statements and inferences as different levels of hierarchy. In dialectical logic, these forms cannot be considered as distinct enough, and notions or arguments can become statements, statements become notions etc., within the same activity. Does it mean that there are no logical forms in dialectics? Certainly not.

In any act of change, there are three aspects universally bound to the very idea: first of all, there is something that changes (thesis), something into which it is to change (antithesis), and the way of transforming the former into the latter (synthesis). These are the basic logical change in dialectical logic.

1. Thesis
   Anything can change, and hence become a thesis. The possibility of distinguishing the thesis as such implies its relative stability, which open a broad way for applying classical logic to describe it. Notions, statements and conclusions are equally possible as the means of formulation (formalization).

2. Antithesis
   As the opposite of the thesis, it is as well abstracted from anything else, and as well describable in a classical manner. The antithesis is a specific thing essentially different from the thesis in some respect. The transformation of the thesis into the antithesis necessarily looks like a leap, a jump from one side of a crevasse to another, something unexplainable from the classical standpoint.

3. Synthesis
   The important point in any act of dialectical reasoning is that both thesis and antithesis are the states, phases or aspects of the same thing, which hence must be able to manifest itself in the opposite ways recognizable as thesis and antithesis. Otherwise, this is a quite ordinary thing, which can be classically described as long as its relation to thesis and antithesis is not considered.

Fundamental principles of dialectical logic

While the laws of classical logic have been formulated millennia ago, the principles of dialectical logic had not received a clear formulation until the beginning of XIX century, marked by the works of Hegel and Marx. These formal rules are yet too young to become commonly accepted, or even widely known.

1. The principle of integrity
   Dialectics cannot rely on the identity of a thing, since any thing can become its opposite, under certain conditions. Still, there is a more general principle that states that every thing is the unity of its opposite aspects, and that it remains the same despite all the transformations. On the other hand, its internal complexity will make it exhibit its opposite sides to the rest of the world, and any thing is bound to develop all its possible forms in full until it can cease to exit. Sometimes, the presence of opposite aspects in the same thing may take the form of internal struggle, when two opposite tendencies shape the final appearance of the thing, one of them dominating over another. This why, in the Marxist literature, the principle of integrity was called the law of the unity and struggle of the opposites.

   From the classical viewpoint, the internal complexity of every thing looks like contradiction in the definition, ascribing opposite attributes to the same notion. In other words, the first principle of dialectical logic says that every thesis is contradictory. Applied to the classical logical forms, it implies that no notion statement of conclusion can be fully determinable, and hence every construction based on classical logic is essentially incomplete. As negation of the identity of any notion, the principle of integrity was sometimes called the law of contradiction, compared with the law of non-contradiction in classical logic. The idea of dialectical contradiction is a core of dialectics as such.

   Practically, the principle of integrity demands that every change were based on the properties of the real things, rather than abstract manipulations. To make anything out of something, one has to use that something according to its inherent tendencies (albeit hidden and non-trivial), and never rape the world trying to make things what they cannot be (the ideological position known as voluntarism).

2. The principle of negation
   While the internal definiteness of a thing is determined by the principle of integrity, the succession of the apparent manifestations of the thing is determined by the principle demanding that every next development phase should be a negation of the original state. In other words, every thesis can (and will) transform into its antithesis under appropriate conditions.

   The idea of dialectical negation is quite simple: to produce the antithesis, we have to add something to the thesis that was not in it originally, and, inversely, remove something that should not be present in the result. Adding new features can be considered as removing (negating) their absence. However, in dialectical logic, the changes must be small enough, to preserve the thing's integrity, and there is no absolute change in every respect (which is more like the complement operation in classical logic).

   The principle of negation is important to prevent dogmatism. It puts stress on a well-know, but often overlooked, fact that every act is only appropriate in a definite context, and there are no absolute laws, truths, or attitudes.

   Dialectical negation is different from negation in classical logic. While the latter lead to an entirely different idea, the former leaves the thing the same, only making it apparently (or functionally) different; it merely shows how the internal opposites of the thing can manifest themselves in the thing's relation to the world. On the other hand, the negation of negation in classical logic restores the original thing; in dialectical logic, negation of negation is opposite not only to the antithesis negated, but also to the original thesis, negated by the primary negation.

   The negation of negation was often said to lead to the thing or situation resembling the original that existed before the primary negation. However, such a view is too simplified to be correct. To return to some features of the original thesis, one must negate the antithesis in the same respect, which is not always possible; rather, the negation of negation will result in yet another manifestation of the same thing, which will be different from both thesis and antithesis, retaining them both as its history, and resembling them both, in different aspects. The negation of negation is a synthesis of the thesis and antithesis. Any circularity does not belong to the level of dialectics, merely outlining the zones of relative stability, where classical logic could be applied.

3. The principle of measure
   The fundamental principle that relates the internal complexity of every thing to its apparent motion via a series of negations says that every thing has its measure, a unique balance of its internal definiteness (quality) and possible external manifestations (quantity). The category of quality conveys the idea of a thing as it is, as that very thing, and not another. The philosophical category of quantity cannot be reduced to mere numerical value; it also includes any structural aspects, systemic behavior, or other external manifestations of internal complexity.

   Everybody knows that most things can be slightly varied without ceasing to be the same things. Such changes are called quantitative. However, the principle of measure states that quantitative changes can reach a threshold, beyond which the quality of the thing would change, and it something quite different from the original. This is the mechanism of dialectical negation.

   The other side of the same principle is that it is the quality of any thing that determines when its quantitative changes will put the end to the existence of the thing as such: every thing is the cause of its own death.

   It should be noted that, since dialectical negation does not entirely annihilate the thing negated, but rather retains it within the negation, qualitative changes do not produce anything from nothing, merely transforming the already existing things, but never annihilating them. Change in quality is still change, which implies the retention of something that undergoes the change. This something is reflected in the category of measure.

   While the principle of negation says that every thing has its limits, the principle of measure states that the limits of every thing are determined by itself. This is crucial for the methodology of science, since allows, for every scientific model, to express the limits of its applicability in terms of that very model. One does not need to explain how important the idea of measure is in the arts: it is enough to indicate that, for an artist, the feeling of measure is the principal criterion of achieving the desired result. The principle of measure is a cornerstone of any philosophy, since it is concerned with the very ability to express the infinite and universal in finite and partial philosophies.