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Baqir as-Sadr's Quest for the Marja'iyya by T. M. Aziz |
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From an interview with Talib al-Rifa'i With the deaths of Ayatollahs Khu’i and Gulpaygani, there has been intense competition among relatively junior ulama for the position of the marja’ taqlid in the Shi’i world. Ali Sistani of Iraq, Ali Khamenei of Iran, Muhammad Fadlallah of Lebanon - all of whom are in their fifties and sixties - are just some of the contenders for this illustrious position. It is a phenomenon in Shi’ism that the leading mujtahids in the same age group become maraja’ when the previous generation of senior maraja’ have all passed away - at least those who aspire to this position. It is sometimes said that what ultimately distinguishes one of them above all others (making him the grand marja’) is not his merits or qualifications, but, rather, the death of his peers. For example, it could be argued that Khu’i did not really become the grand marja’ of the Shi’a until the death of Khomeini, though Khu’i’s muqallids always far outnumbered Khomeini’s. Gulpaygai only became known as the marja’ al azim of the Shi’i world when all of his peers, including Khomeini and Khu’i, had died. Furthermore, no one could really be a contender for the marja’iyya until Gulpaygani’s death, which then opened a window of opportunity for this "younger" generation of senior ulama. Competition tends to be more intense after one marja’ has dominated the arena for so many years, as did Khu’i. He, along with other senior ulama, produced numerous students, many of whom would be qualified to become maraja’ and "whose time" could be said to have come. While the issue of the marja’iyya has gained international attention since the Iranian revolution and particularly since the deaths of Khomeini and Khu’i, the situation we are witnessing is not at all new. The death of the Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim also preciptated profound competition. Though in Najaf Khu’i rapidly became distinguished as the senior mujtahid, there were others waiting for their opportunity to lead the community. One such person was Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, a student of Khu’i’s. While Baqir as-Sadr aspired to the marja'iyya , laying the ground work for his ascension to this role, he also set his sights on reforming this institution, which he saw as having enormous potential for bettering his community. In this paper, I will discuss the reforms that Baqir as-Sadr put forward. His execution by the Iraqi government in 1980 cut short his efforts for reform, yet many of his ideas have survived him, his books being read by Shi’a and Sunni Muslims world wide, as well as by Western scholars of Islam. Background Born in Kazimayn in northern Baghdad circa 1936 (there is some dispute over the exact date) to a prominent clerical family, Baqir as-Sadr lived as most students in the hawzas of Najaf: aloof from politics. His friend, Seyyed Talib Rifa’i, who was a student in the hawza with as-Sadr, told me during one of my interviews with him that he encouraged Baqir as-Sadr to participate in political activities and to assist in the formation of the Da’wa Party. Rifa’i himself was associated with the Tahrir party, a Sunni-based organization, influenced by the Ikhwan, and founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, a jurist of Jerusalem in the 1940s. In the absense of a Shi’i political organiztion, it was not uncommon for politically active jurists or Islamists to join Sunni organizations despite the theological differences between the two sects. However, theological differences ultimately drove a wedge between the Sunni and Shi’i members, with the Shi’i members seeing a need to build their own organization, especially in the face of the challenge of communism which grew after the 1958 Iraqi revolution. Thousands of Shi’a were being influenced by this ideology and the jurists saw it as a tremendous threat to the survival of religiosity and to the religious establishment. Hence, Da’wa’s main thrust in those days was to counter communist ideas. Sadr played a pivotal role. He was elected to be the faqhi al-hizb (jurist of the party), the highest religious position in the party’s hierarchy. He was also instrumental in writing its main political doctrine and platforms. In the party, he was exposed to the political writings of the main leftest and Sunni parties that were active in Iraq, ideas that helped shape his own religious and political views. Sadr’s involvement in Da’wa was highly controversial in Najaf and eventually he, as well as the sons of Muhsin Hakim, were forced to abandon the party. After leaving Da’wa, Sadr focused on preparing himself for the marja’iyya. This was done with the encouragement of his Da’wa associates who saw Baqir as-Sadr’s rise to the marja’iyya as being their best hope for kindling a revolutionary change in religious academic circles. In order to achieve his goals, Sadr began teaching graduate courses in the fields of fiqh and usul (bahth al-kharij) and compiling his lectures for publication. Yet, he had to be careful not to appear to be competing with his mentor, Khu’i, to whom he continued to defer for the remaining years of his life. Baqir as-Sadr’s Innovations Baqir as-Sadr saw the traditional methods of teaching in the hawza as being archaic and lamented the lack of accountability in the system. In the traditional hawza students are free to join any class of their choice. There are no homework requirements, no examinations to test the students' progress, nor set limits on the duration of completion of the course. In the bahth al-kharij (the most advanced level of study), students may keep attending the classes indefinitely. In the lower levels of muqadimat and situh , students may keep changing their teachers as they please. Therefore, there is no way for the hawza to monitor the academic level of students. The problem is accentuated by the fact that once students are in the hawza , they can wear the turban and be considered as part of the ulama class. Furthermore, they can leave the hawza without an ijaza (certificate) and proceed to preach in local communities. In such cases they can function independently, with no accountability to the marja'iyya . They are also in a position to manipulative because of competition among the various maraja'. Sadr wanted students to be required to pass at an acceptable level certain required courses before they are able to leave the hawza. Moreover, he wanted the marja'iyya to have full control of all religious centers so that no cleric could head a congregation without an ijaza from a marja'. This would help ensure that clergy would be competent jurists and religious guides. One of his first tasks was to introduce ideas taken from modern-style secular universities. He participated in a pilot project to establish the ‘sul al-Din college in Baghdad in 1964 and in setting up its academic curriculum. However, his efforts to implement reforms in the hawza itself faced stiff resistence not only from students but from the religious establishment as well. Thus, he had to resort to teaching in the classical style of the hawza : commenting and citing arguments and counter arguments of previous jurists on a particular legal matter. However, he expressed reservations about doing so and, as a result of his distaste for what he considered an archaic style. . He completed only the first part of the lessons in fiqh , namely, "Taharat," (purity), doing so in a period of four years. These lessons resulted in a four-volume treatise written by his students and edited by him. It was later published as Buhuuth fi sharh al T’rwah al Withqa. The publication of some of his writings, Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) and Ihtasatuna (Our Economics), as well as his work on fiqh , drew admiration from educated, reform-minded Shi’a who began to advocate for his marja’iyya. They wanted as-Sadr to write his own risaleh so that they could refer to his religious opinions. Rather than write a risaleh , he chose to record his opinions as footnotes to Muhsin al-Hakim’s risaleh, Minhaj al-Salihyn. While writing a risalah as a footnote to a previous one is common practice, yet, in other respects, as-Sadr's risaleh is highly atypical. In order to popularize his fatwas among the masses, he wrote his religious opinions in a style that could be easily understood by lay people, eliminating the jargon of jurisprudence that makes it difficult for the general public to understand. He wrote his opinions in modern Arabic language, addressing himself, not principally to other jurists as is usually done, but to Islamic activists, professionals, college students, and other educated people in society to whom he was particularly eager to reach. His Al-Fatawa al-Wadihah is unique in its style among such works and gained popularity among Sunni and Shi’a alike because of its straighforward language and detailed expositions of fatwas. Perhaps most importantly, it dwelt on contemporary problems. Additionally, Sadr presented a new taxonomy for legal codes that was a clear departure from the classical treaties of fatwas. The legal Shi’i texts always consist of two major categories; ibadat (worship) and mu’amalat (Transactions). Sadr thought that such a bipolar scheme was too broad and awkward since scholars had to ignore some aspets of Islamic law, or to place others in inappropriate legal categories. Sadr proposed in the introduction of Fatawa that the new taxonomy of the Islamic legal system should be divided into four main categories: 1. Ibadat , which includes the individual acts of worship that require niyah (intention) on the part of the worshipper 2. Amwal (financial capital) which includes all public and private economic transactions 3. al-’ilaqat al-Khasa (Private affairs) which includes matters pertaining to family relations; and 4. al-’ilaqat al-’ama’ (Public affairs) which includes social relations and state authority. This taxonomy has implications for social affairs. For example, traditionally, matrimonial issues are listed under the subheading "financial contract." This subheading emhasizes the legalistic and structural nature of marriage and male/female relationships. It reflects the notion that the woman is purely a sexual partner and the man a financial master. In other words, the man gives a dowry to a woman for the sexual services she provides. The relationship could thereby be interepreted as "money for sex." By separating family issues under a different heading; i.e., "Personal Conduct and Relationships," Sadr set out to reinterpret the religious legal concepts and to give a new understanding to them. With the publicaton of his religious opinions, Sadr’s relationship with those close to Ayatollah Khu’i began to sour. In order to prove that he was not challenging the authority of his teacher, Sadr asked one of his companions to write a letter in the form of a question seeking Sadr’s opinion about the marja’iyya. Sadr then replied to that letter at the same meeting, directing people to follow the guidance of Ayatollah Khu’i. Sadr asked that his marja’iyya not be publicly promoted, therefore, his muqallids generally consisted of those who had already been won over to his approach to Islamic law. His followers were drawn from the intellectual and upper middle class groups. They were mostly Iraqis and many were fundamentalist activists and Da’wa Party members. Sadr’s Conceptualization of the Marja’iyya Of major concern to Baqir as-Sadr was the revamping of the marja’iyya so that it could both fit into the modern world and effectively serve as a guide to mankind in the present and future. He saw it has having enormous potential if certain reforms were put in place. He also saw it as an institution that has changed and evolved over the centuries, so that, therefore, there was justification for making efforts to implement further changes. In one of Baqir as-Sadr’s lectures Sadr divided the history of the marja’iyya into four stages. First was the period which he referred to as the "Individual Marja’iyya" beginning with the companions of the Imams until the time of TAlamah al-Hilli (d. 1325). During this period, the marja’ served only as the source of religious laws for the Shi’ Certain things hold constant throughout the periods. For example, the maraja’ have traditionally conducted their policies and made their decisions on the basis of their own individual styles, depending on an inner circle of close associates and family members who gather information, make political statements and commonly make important decisions. Thus, there was no fundamental pattern either for the process of making decisions or for the content of those decisions. The resulting inconsistencies have resulted, according to Sadr, in social confusion which has weakened the relationship between the marja’iyya and the people. Furthermore, there is little or no carry over of trained ulama who could remain "in office" from one marja’iyya to another. Each marja’ has his own entourage; i.e., his own hand-picked representatives and advisors, some of whom are close relatives. In other words, each marja’ starts from "square one" to conduct the course of his business. Therefore, each marja’ differs from all others in his leadership capacity, crisis-management ability, and experience in political affairs. In order to enhance the power of the marja’iyya in society and to heighten its effectiveness, as-Sadr wanted to transform what he called the "individualistic marja’iyya " into an "institutional marja’iyyah." The mararja’ , according to Sadr, must preside over a well-defined organized institution. It is only through transforming the marja’iyya into a complex institution that it can influence events and guide people effectively. The role of the marja’ , in Sadr’s thesis, "al-Marja’iyya al-Mawd’iyya" , derives from his general view that mankind as God's vicars on earth would always have a constant need for some sort of divine intervention to protect him from corruption and to guide him towards the goals of vicarage. Without this intervention, man can always be influenced by his instincts and passions which weaken his potential for progress. . Accordingly, God established the role of shahid (witness), the shahid being the one who would take the responsibility for conveying divine guidance to mankind so as to safeguard the believers from corruption. According to Sadr, the Quran designated the Imams, and then the scholars of religious laws, specifically the maraja’, to succeed the prophets in the role of shahid. Since the Imams and religious jurists understand divine laws and revelations, they will take responsibility for safeguarding the message of God to mankind, and take an active role in guiding man in his historical mission under God. "The shahid , from an ideological perspective, is the authority on belief and legislation who oversees the social journey and its ideological suitability with the divine messsage. He is also responsible for intervening when he sees any deviation from the right path." The only difference among the three types of people who take the role of shahid is that the prophet is the messenger who receives, delivers, and applies the divine message, the imam is the one who is the divinely chosen guide that interpets the message, and the marja’ is the one, according to Sadr, ...who possesses, through his human efforts and long period of hard-work, the comprehension.of Islam from its original sources, as well as a deep piety that disciplines him to control himself and his conduct. He must also possess a suitable Islamic consciousness of his environment with all it overwhelming conditions and interactions. The marja’ thus becomes the successor of the prophets and imams for the ummah in terms of his being a source of guidance and a center of leadership. The man who possesses the ordained qualifications (knowledge of divine laws, Tilm ; and self control of conduct (Tadalah ) shall take the responsibility of shahid. However, the marja’iyya is not assigned to any particular person as is the case with the prophets or Imams. It is the qualificaion for the role that becomes the important criterion to be satisfied by suitable individuals. A wrong interpetaton of the role of shahid occurs when it is thought of as belonging to the person of the marja’ rather than to the role of the marja’iyya itself. The marja’ is the legitimate successor of the imams by virtue of his ilm and adalah , although there are also certain responsibilities for achieving specific goals connected with the role of shahid . The marja’iyya in Shi'ism has entailed the selection of an individual marja’ but has made the role of shahid the consequence of his ability, or the function of the political conditions. However, inconsistencies in the maraja’s activities, coupled with failure to define goals, have resulted in a weakening of the role of shahid. Unless the marja’iyya entails certain well-defined objectives, the ummah will find it difficult to ascertain its social mission. Sadr believed that the current system of the marja’iyya has chronic shortcomings, primarily that the marja’ did not rely on any institutional structure to exercise his authority. Decisions concerning the welfare of the whole community were made largely in consultation with relatives and close associates. In keeping with his views on shahid as outlined above, he conceived the idea of marja’iyya al-madu’iyya (objective authority) that would replace, in the long run, the existing marja’iyya al-dhatiyah (individualistic authority). In other words, Sadr believed that the focus would be on the "office" of the marja’iyyah , rather than on the marja’. The structure put in place, he maintained, would not only prevent the jurist from making arbitrary decisions but would also serve to train new jurists for the responsibilities of "shahid ." The power of the jurists would also be checked by free competition for this position. Sadr prescribed establishing an institution in which the marja’ himself forms the center, and where its structure, role, and process are thoroughly defined. This would allow for continuity and carry over of ideas and practices from one marja’ to the next. He wanted an institution in which tasks and activites were specified and where there was accountability on the part of each person involved in the marja’iyya . He envisioned two types of organizational arrangements: the "office of the marja’iyya ," which would be the central administrative office, and the "representatives," who would act as the sociopolitical branches of the marja’iyya . While in some sense, this arrangement already exists, it is in the specific roles which Sadr envisioned that we come to see the significant differences between his ideal system and the one that currently exists. The central administrative office, in Sadr’s thesis, would initially consist of at least six departments that perform the planning and executive activites of the marja’iyyah and in which the marja’iyya is administered by experts. The marja’iyya , later on, could further develop these offices as tasks and responsibilites expand, to include the whole spectrum of affairs of the ummah. These offices will "replace the court (of the marja’ ) which represents an arbitrary individualistic structure made up of individuals grouped by chance who fulfill some immediate needs but exhibit a superficial mentality without any defined and clear objective." He wanted the marja’ to be at the top of a pyramidal structure. The marja’ traditionally has been represented by ulama in various parts of the world who serve the religious needs of Muslims and act as liaison officers for the marja’ , carrying on such tasks as transmitting his fatwas or collecting religious taxes. As-Sadr does not see this informal relationship between the marja’ and his parochial representatives as being effective in facilitating a centralized system. And centralization, he argues, becomes indispensable in situations in which the marja’ seeks to commit himself to achieving political goals or implementing radical change in the society. Sadr’s prescription is to make the local respresentatives more active participants in the process of the marja’iyya. He proposed that the marja’ form a council that proposes policies and suggests courses of action for the marja’. The council would consist of, in addition to the individuals of the six committees of the central administration, the marja’s representatives and high-ranking ulama. The whole religious establishment in this way becomes a full participant in the decision making process of the marja’, an arrangement which eventually would motivate commitment and ensure dedication to the marja’iyya. Such a broad consultative process would protect the marja’iyya , in as-Sadr’s view, from adopting policies that might be influenced by personal feelings. The (institutional) administration would then replace the hashiyyah (the marja's personal entourage), which is but an arbitrary irrational apparatus composed of individuals gathered by coincidence...to meet immediate needs with a fragmented mentality of no clear and specified objectives. Even the titles of the new organizational structures would be modernized. For example, he proposed using titles such as, "The Board of Trustees for the Religious Academies," "Propogation Affairs Committee," "The Foreign Affairs Committee," and the "Political Task and Outreach Committee." While Sadr concedes that the individualistic, traditional practices have some positive aspects, such as quick action, higher levels of secrecy, and limitations on the influence of unqualified people, the proposed arrangement, he argues, would have greater and more important results (Sadr, p. 96) The formation of the central administration and "council of the marja’iyya, would ensure the continuity of the role of the marja’ beyond his lifetime. The structural organization would provide expertise and long-term planning for achieving goals set by the previous marja’. In addition,the institution of the marja’iyya would serve as a training field and selection agency for the new marja’. One of as-Sadr’s complaints had been with the traditional manner in which the marja’ ascends to his rank. He complained that there were no specific qualifications for the position except that of Tilm and adalah. Although these qualificatons might be considered necessary for achieving the first goal of shahid (i.e., safeguarding the divine message from corrution), qualifications for the second role (i.e, guiding the ummah in its historical mission) are lacking. Such a political/social role requires skills that go beyond mere religious knowledge and righteous behavior. It requires an understanding of the social conditions and the way in which these conditions need to be changed to safeguard religion and guide the believers. Yet, Sadr did not suggest dispensing with the old system altogether. In fact, in some respects, his prescription is not at all a radical departure from the traditional system. Sadr still believed that it was necessary to go through the traditional stages in which a marja’ builds up his credentials and gains trust and influence within the hawza and the ummah. The marja’ who wishes to implement reforms must "start forming an institutional structure gradually, such as establishing a limited number of consultative committess and specialized (offices) to perform some of the tasks of the marja’iyya. He must not act rashly and quickly in implementing changes so as to avoid resistance and resentment from the traditional sector of the hawza and the ummah who would not be aware of his objectives. Sadr believed that the formation process of the institution should progress gradually; its evolution should take place naturally. The marja’ , in bringing about changes, should concentrate on educating the ummah to the point of realizing the goals and benefits of the "objective marja’iyya. This way, the marja’iyya will develop as anatural part of the culture of the umma and reach its maturity. It is only then that the "objective marja’iyya" will enter its final stage of being the sole marja’iyya and dominate religious authority that will guide the ummah towards restoring the leading role of Islam in society. Conclusions The focus on the Iranian marja'iyya and the competition that has arisen among the mujtahids since the death of Khomeini have overshadowed the life and contributions of Baqir as-Sadr. Yet, I believe that his legacy will continue through the debates taking place in religious, academic, and political arenas. Baqir as-Sadr was a member of the Shi'i religious establishment and a pioneer of reform. This made him both a focus of love and envy. He was not an outsider like Ali Shariati of Iran, nor was he a scholar of dubious merit. He was a true product of the hawza and also one of its greatest achievements. Yet, there is much ambivalence about him. He was an inspiration to the youth and a bonafide martyr on the one hand. But he was also a critic of the establishment and considered detrimental to the traditional way of doing things. Modernization brought changes to the hawza with regard to the sort of students who were enrolling. Prior to mass, governmental education, the educational background of the hawza students were mostly from elementary schools or basicaly illiterate. During Baqir as-Sadr's time this changed so that students were likely to be graduates of government high-schools and colleges. To such students the traditional text books, such as Ansari's al-Makasib on fiqh and Kurasani's al-Kifayya seemed archane. For these students Baqir as-Sadr became the author of choice. On the other hand, as-Sadr's Durus fi elim al-usul were written for university students and continue to be used in the Arabic hawza in Qom. Sadr's intellectual contributions have become the foundation for political Islam in the post-Iranian revolution period. In the wake of the revolution, people wanted less rigorous literature, turning to dogmatic journalistic writings and fire-breathing political speeches. But after the dust settled somewhat, the Islamic intelligencia and activists were confronted with social and political problems that required complex answers. Today Sadr's writings are in demand to much the same extent as those of the Iranian intellectual, Ali Shariati. Sadr's ideas and contributions are used as the building blocks for the call for change in the religious establishment. I believe that Sadr's call for reforms, religiously and politically, will come to dominate the debates within the Islamic movements in the decades to come. |