These notes are part of an essay on an alternate history in which the American War of Independence never happened. In particular, this section discusses the effects of the American War of Independence, consequences that need to be considered in determining the way the alternate world would have diverged from our own. Further alternate history material can be found on my web page.
| The Only Good Indian Is a Dead Indian | |
|---|---|
| The displacement of Amerindians by the western expansion of the United States is too well-known to repeat here. Indian rights were a secondary issue (from the British point of view) in the War of 1812. | An America which is still part of the United Kingdom will probably treat Indians better than an independent United States did. In particular, Indian states like the one Tecumseh tried to set up have a better chance of being recognised as administrative units within the empire. The same might be said of the Georgia Cherokee, historically led by Sequoyah. This is all relative, of course: they won't be treated well, just better. |
| The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars | |
| France entered the Seven Years' War against Britain in 1778, Spain following in 1779. France was eventually victorious but paying for it bankrupted the French crown. The French crown and parliament then followed a pattern very reminiscent of Britain and America. Parliament was called in order to get money, parliament demanded concessions, and the country collapsed into revolution. It must have seemed a very elegant revenge for Britain: right up to when French revolutionary armies started rolling across Europe. | Question is, will there still be a French revolution? There's no way to be sure, but I'm assuming yes. Pre-revolutionary France was, it seems to me, incurably aggressive beyond its means. If they don't fight a war with Britain over America then they'll fight someone else. As late as 1788 Britain signed an alliance with Prussia and Holland against France, so I'd probably assume that war for the sake of specificity. |
| The Louisiana Purchase | |
| During the French revolutionary wars Spain fought as an ally of Britain, eventually being forced to make peace with France in 1795. During the lull between the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, The United States purchased Louisiana, which had been French before 1769 but Spanish thereafter, and into which American settlers had been filtering for some time. Spain then fought against Britain in 1805, and as an ally of Britain again from 1808 to 1813. | I assume the transfer of Louisiana from France to Spain happens historically, since my PODs have hardly had an impact at that point. Spain was willing to sell Louisiana to a relatively weak and generally friendly United States, but I'm sceptical they'd do the same for Britain. Assuming that Spanish participation in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is unrelated to the American War of Independence, we can expect Britain to attempt the conquest of Spanish colonies in North America between 1805 and 1808. Louisiana is an obvious candidate: Cuba may be too strong. |
| The Spoils of War | |
| Following the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars Britain was in control of much of the colonial empires of France, Spain and the Netherlands. Most of these were returned to their former owners, but Britain hung on to a few possessions, notably some sugar islands and what became British Guyana. British policy at this time was against large-scale conquest, preferring instead a network of smaller possessions to act as naval bases for the protection of trade, which was where the real money was. | I assume without proof that one reason the British were reluctant to take and hold large chunks of territory was because they would need to administer it. Trans-Atlantic distance and a chronic lack of manpower made that difficult. The presence of a large reserve of British and European manpower, conveniently near to the West Indies and capable of acting as a subsidiary centre, might make the British far more willing to spread their flag a little wider. |
| Spoilt by War | |
| America suffered the effects of a major war on its own soil in the eighteenth century (especially affecting Virginia and the Carolinas) and another in the nineteenth century (especially affecting the south). There was also several rebellions in Canada in the 1830s, which prompted Britain to make Canada its first dominion. | Less devastation means even better economic performance. And the south will be a major beneficiary, so northern economic dominance will be at least lessened. I'm not sure if the Canadian rebellion, which must have been at least partially influenced by the success of the American one and by Canadian disenfranchisement, will happen at all. |
| Hanover | |
| Hanover was in personal union with Britain until 1837, when the dynasties split because Hanover wouldn't accept a Queen Victoria on its throne. The loss of Hanover greatly reduced the potential for Britain to get involved in continental entanglements. |
Will there be a Victoria? An unanswerable question. We just have to make this up.
How about the effect of increased British power and authority on Hanover's decision to leave? Probably not a huge effect, America is a long way away and in 1837 the Hanoverians probably won't see it as critical to their lifestyle choices. On the other hand, perhaps they'll angle for keeping their representation in Westminster while running their own affairs ... much like Scotland in the UK today. |
| The Five-Hundred Pound Gorilla | |
| Even without most of her American colonies the British empire was the dominant colonial and industrial power throughout the nineteenth century. For the first half of the twentieth century Britain shared the front rank with Germany and the United States of America, Russia at times not too far behind. In the second half of the century the United States was dominant, though early in this period the Soviet Union was also important. | Either power on its own has a period when it dominates the world, but their union would be truly awesome. Assuming it stays together it will dominate power projection for a long, long time, probably into the twenty-first century. By the time any other state is capable of competing with it, the British empire will have stamped a mark on the emerging global civilisation that makes the British and American ones look ephemeral. |
| Continue with discussion of indicators of how the future might have been without the American War of Independence | Back to the "No American War of Independence" page |
I welcome feedback at David.Bofinger@dsto.defenceSpamProofing.gov.au.