Design Commentary for
Empires in Arms Bug Fixes

This is design commentary for some variant rules for Empires in Arms. These are divided into My web page also provides access to further Empires in Arms material.

[1.1.1] Historically part of Poland, perhaps not quite Polish enough to allow it to form the original core, but neither would some of the other possible "P" provinces.

[1.1.2] It's hard to see Corsica as anything other than an island province of France. It didn't, for instance, fall off when France entered the instability zone in 1814, or in 1815, and has remained unbrokenly French ever since. It was never conquered by Great Britain, or, for that matter, by anyone else. Thinking of it as a province gives near-historical behaviour in a natural way. Thinking of it as a minor country makes it hard to understand how the historical course could ever have occurred.

[1.2] It is a fact universally acknowledged that Wellington's ability to run away at worst 5 times out of 6 is a right pain. At least, I believe it, and I have a friend who agrees with me. Some would argue that Wellington really was good at running away, I suppose this gets us into arguments as to what a withdraw represents.

I think it reduces the Napoleonic mystique to have two 5-5 leaders. A 5-5 leader usually ought to be the greatest of his era. This change brings the Iron Duke down to the neighbourhood of Charles, which I think is roughly fair.

I'm assuming a large strategic rating represents a leader with get up and go, whereas a large tactical rating might refer to a leader who was more solid than brilliant, or a defensive genius (which Wellington was). As far as I can tell Wellington never did anything exciting enough to justify a strategic rating of 5, though he was certainly skilled at winning battles and I'm happy to let him keep his tactical rating.

[4.4.2.1] Loophole plugging: this prevents certain spurious declarations of war which are made in the expectation of immediate surrender.

[4.6.2.3] A power that promises to back up the minor should have an advantage over one that won't. In fact I consider this too moderate a rule: the alternative would be to have three classes of power (belligerents, non-belligerent non-allies, allies) instead of the standard two (non-allies, allies), with earlier classes taking precedence over later.

[4.9] Intended to prevent an ally supplying your enemies, shipping them about, etc..

[6.3.4.2.1-2] I don't think the French, for instance, feel a sudden surge of pride when Nelson is victorious, and a special thrill of horror when he is defeated, relative to their being led to victory or defeat by some other British admiral.

[7.5.2.1-7] Reported by Alec Habig, not sure where it's from.

This makes the Wellesley wimp-out (see commentary for [1.2]) harder, and escalated assault useful for something. And it seems sort of reasonable. A much more complete handling of this idea is part of my expanded operation possibilities chart.

[7.5.2.10.1.3.1-2] Why should anyone other than his subjects care what happens to the Corsican upstart? A Napoleonic victory may be a cause for French pride but any major power ally is likely to downplay his contribution as much as possible to the benefit of their own favoured son.

[8.8.5] I don't see a free state being so agreeable about being told "you are once again slaves".

[10.3.1.2.5] Under the standard rules, harbouring a fugitive is legal. Under these rules it becomes a misdemeanour, but not a felony.

[10.4.1.1.1] The Cisalpine Republic and, I think, the Italian Republic. Formed 1797, subsumed into the Kingdom of Italy 1805.

[10.4.1.1.1.1] Historically accurate but affects play balance. France gets a better stranglehold on Italy. Probably Austria will be forced to go to war with France in 1805 for this reason.

[10.4.1.1.2] In 1832-4 Egypt conquered Palestine and Syria off the Ottomans, and hung onto them when the Turks tried to take them back in 1839-41, until the Royal Navy forced them to give up most of Syria. This rule allows Egypt to do some of that, allowing it to do more might anticipate history too much and would certainly require a more complex rule: Egypt-Syria-Palestine would have to work like the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, and that's more bother than the situation is worth.

[10.4.1.1.3] Formed 1814, dissolved 1905. Sweden wanted Norway as a possession, but it revolted and they had to let it be a personal union as a compromise.

[10.4.1.1.4] Kingdom of the Netherlands, formed 1815, Belgium (i.e. Flanders) revolted 1830, recognised independent 1839. This nation's army fought alongside their British sponsors at Waterloo.

[10.4.1.1.4.1] Whether you believe this may depend on whose accounts of Waterloo you believe. The traditional British view considered the Dutch-Belgians to be basically worthless, some revisionists would claim they were well above morale 3. In any case they never got their two years historically.

[10.4.1.1.5] Kingdom of [Piedmont-]Sardinia. Created 1720(?) by Piedmont trading Sicily for Sardinia. Dissolved in the 1790s by Napoleon, restored 1814(?), acted as the core for the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1859.

[10.4.1.1.6] In fact this minor survived unmolested and more or less unchanged throughout 1792-1815. My source for this is (free plug) the Centennia Historical Atlas Software.

[10.4.3.2] Clearly in the spirit of the rule, but somehow forgotten.

[10.6.4.2.1] Elimination of a bizarre rounding effect.

[11.2] An anhistorical weirdness in the EIA rules: the Kingdom of Italy looks very little like anything that historically existed.

[11.8.1] An attempt to prevent the other major class of spurious declarations of war, and make the gain or loss of dominance better reflect what I think the lists of requirements are aiming at.

[11.8.1.2] There are some rather silly ceding tricks possible here but I can't imagine they'd be practical very often so let them slide.

[12.7.3.2.1] Make the third number mean something, and it seems only reasonable. Note this is optional. Hopefully it will reduce the incentive for one huge army.

[14.3.1] Unclear in the rules.

[14.4.3 & 14.7.3] My preference. If you want war with someone you should bloody well have to pay for it, in my opinion.

[14.7.6] Massena apparently quit because he thought playing with looted treasures and concubines was more fun than stomping across Russia. He was probably right too. Massena was apparently available in 1809, but not in 1812: my choice of the 1810-11 boundary to remove him is arbitrary, one year earlier or later would be just as good as far as I know.

Kutuzov's reason was even better: he was dead, basically of old age. Even in the Napoleonic period that was cause for being put on half pay. The 1812-13 boundary is close enough to correct for when he became too sick to function as a general.


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