Alternate History Philosophy

This is a discussion of the philosophy behind my alternate history, the Dardanelles Victory timeline. Other material can be found on my home page.

Motivation

In practice the terms I quote above mean very different things to different people. To some extent this reflects the fact that different people have very different hopes for and standards in such works as this. So I thought it worthwhile to mention a few of the principles I used in deciding on the course my history would follow. It was probably a good idea for me to get these ideas straight in my head anyway, so I may as well share them with the world. Most alternate history sites have a page along these lines, describing the author's personal take on what alternate history is, how to write it and (perhaps most important) how not to write it. I'm not sure my ideas are any better than theirs, and probably all of them appear elsewhere. But I haven't seen them, so here they are.

Alternate histories, Allohistories, Counterfactuals, Contrafactuals, Parallel Timelines and the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

These are just some of the terms I use to impress people. Another method is to simulate erudition is by including second-rate philosophy in my web page, and that's what this is.

Causality

There are many ways to write an alternate history. I'll mention two of them: they boil down to working forwards and working backwards. I can respect either of these approaches, but I think they have quite different purposes. The danger comes when people present one as the other. My approach in this document has been mostly causal. I more or less sat down with the point of divergence, and let it evolve. I didn't particularly care whether, say, Austria survived, or when the war ended. Although I'm quite pleased with the final result, it wasn't preordained.

Single Point of Divergence

Point of divergence is a very standard concept in alternate history, but I'm going to redefine it here slightly by making a distinction between a de jure and a de facto point of divergence.

There are various de jure points of divergence for the Dardanelles Victory timeline. Two examples are the choice of a different (and, in my opinion, more competent) commander, and the ab initio inclusion of infantry in an operation that in our timeline was initially purely naval. There's only one de facto point of divergence, however: the rapid success of the Dardanelles operation, which in our timeline stagnated and eventually failed. Everything else funnels through that point.

Before the de facto point of divergence the evolution of the narrative is countercausal. All the de jure points of divergence are motivated by the need to bring about the success of the operation.

After the de facto point of divergence the evolution of the narrative is causal. The differences stem, directly or indirectly, from the de facto point of divergence. So the de facto point of divergence acts as the boundary between the causal and countercausal regimes.

I've said earlier that my approach was almost entirely causal, and that's reflected in the fact that the de facto point of divergence comes very early in the story. The vast bulk of the narrative, therefore, is causal. If I'd been writing countercausally I would have started with a de facto point of divergence late in the narrative. One possibility would have been "how might social structures from before the first world war have survived into the middle of the twentieth century", I could have worked from there to "how might the first world war have been much shorter" and from there to "how could the Dardanelles operation have succeeded".

Butterflies in Orbit

Unless you've been living in a water pocket on Europa for the last fifteen years you'll have heard the "butterfly causes hurricane" metaphor for locally unstable systems. In any system that's even close to interesting a small change in the initial conditions leads to enormous changes in the final state, given a reasonable extrapolation time. It doesn't even have to be an obvious trigger like "Adolf Hitler collects a British bullet at the Somme", which everyone can recognise as a point of divergence. A butterfly's wings beating, for instance, affect the weather a week later, which affects the success of a military campaign, which leads to the death or survival of a thousand people who will have incalculable effects thirty years from now.

Is it, therefore, impossible to predict the future in any meaningful way, as is concluded by a character in Spielberg's Jurassic Park? Well, obviously not, because we do predict the future with at least some success in some arenas. So a better way of putting the question is "does that mean that the butterfly effect is just worthless technobabble?"

Well, yes and no. Jeff Goldblum's character may have been talking rot but the loophole that makes it rot has an interesting shape. It's tied up with a concept in nonlinear dynamics that mathematicians call an orbit. These are subsets of the space which, once entered, the system tends to stay within for quite a while. So while the system changes state within the orbit frequently, it only hops from one orbit to another occasionally.

The importance for history is the idea that orbits can be associated with persistent features of world geopolitics: the United Nations, for instance, or the Commonwealth of Australia. Major features can disappear quite quickly (Austria-Hungary, for instance, or the Soviet Union) but as a rule if they exist today there's a good chance they'll still exist ten years from now. So we can't make statements about every element of the future, but we can for some elements.

To make an alternate history believable, therefore, we need to make statements about which orbits the system will probably pass through. Any statement about movement within the orbit is there for flavour. This is fine provided our extrapolation is for times shortish compared with the orbit-hopping time. But what if it isn't?

Analogy

Sometime you have individual events that you recognise can cause an orbit hop. My battle of the Somme, for instance, isn't strictly the same as the historical one. In a sense, the iron dice are being rolled afresh. Should the attack succeed or fail?

The solution I've chosen is to pick the most analogous event that occurred in the historical timeline, and base the success or failure on that, adjusting for any change in circumstance. The historical Brusilov offensive was more successful than you'd expect from an ab initio viewpoint, so the modified Brusilov offensive in the Dardanelles Victory timeline is too. The changes between them all flow, directly or indirectly, from the de facto point of divergence.

I visualise the orbits as stacked rings. I'm being forced to pick a point on a ring, but history never visited this ring: it went instead to a ring a short distance along. So I pick a point adjacent to the point that was visited historically. Never mind that there's no way to get from one point to another (because you can't hop between those rings), it's still a slightly more historical choice than any of the other points I can choose.

And when the event has no analogue? An example is the concentric anti-Austrian offensive of 1917, historically Austria simply never faced such a long front. In this case I make the answer up, and try to choose a result I can defend.

Conclusions

The best I could hope to give anyone who reads this is a mental tool, a new and occasionally better way of looking at these issues. The worst thing I could do is give them a delusion that I know what I'm talking about.


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