The Soft Underbelly of Europe

An Essay on the Course of the Great War

From the Forcing of the Dardanelles in 1915

To the Treaty of Stockholm in 1917.

Dardanelles Victory Timeline Comparison with Our Timeline, and General Commentary
British and French supplies flowed through the straits and the Black Sea to Russia. The Russian rail net was not well enough developed to permit them to be used really efficiently, so a lot of the supplies, at least initially, consisted of rolling stock and materials for railroads. But even the trickle of war-related supplies meant a lot to such a manpower-rich, industry-poor power. Allied supplies also flowed through Bulgaria to the Serbs, though the Bulgars resisted pressure to permit troops to do the same. I'm told that an improved rail net was high on the Russian wish list, should the attack succeed. Russian industry was so backward that a small (by Western standards) quantity of munitions could have a significant effect.
Soon after, and just as important, Russian exports flowed the other way. Before the war most of Russia's markets had been in the west. The interruption of trade had been an irritant to the western powers but a disaster for Russia. Now Russia's economy could recover from incipient catastrophe and return to nothing worse than depression. This is important to the Russian war effort. But it's every bit as important to the general contentment of the Russian people. It took almost three years of war to infuriate the Russians to such an extent that they would abandon the concept of a tsar. A less parlous economic state goes a long way to extending that time.
On the same day as Turkey signed an armistice, Germany and Austria attacked the Russians at Gorlice. At the last moment, some Austrian troops had to be withdrawn to block the Italians, who had declared war a week before. It proved a costly improvisation, for Gorlice was more successful than the Central Powers had dreamed possible. It was also more successful than the high command had made allowance for, and the opportunity to trap an entire Russian army was missed. Nonetheless, Central Powers troops took Lvov, Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw, and inflicted over half a million casualties. Gorlice is historical, if anything it was considerably worse for the Russians than I describe it here. The Central Powers failed to exploit because they didn't anticipate such success, and in the alternate timeline the Russians get off slightly cheaper still because the Central Powers (read Austrians) aren't really feeling up to the exploitation of anything but a breather.
In the west, planned offensives for May 1915 were cancelled due to obligations in the Mediterranean. The British government, led by Asquith, reformed itself into a coalition. Historically the offensives went ahead, cost huge numbers of casualties and achieved little. So British distraction is a blessing in disguise. I honestly didn't plan this to get a result.
Despite victories against Russia, Austria now found itself in an unenviable position. Gorizia had fallen to the Italians. Negotiations with Bulgaria (once again neutral after the fall of Turkey) had come to nothing: although the Bulgars still wanted the Greek and Serb parts of Macedonia as well as British occupied Constantinople, they were not about to hitch their wagon to an apparently lame horse. Austria had briefly taken Belgrade at the end of 1914 but was going nowhere in 1915, and when the offensive was renewed in October 1915 it again stalled. Already we can see the chain reaction of small events, all leading from the Dardanelles. None of them is crucial, but Austria is learning about the death of a thousand cuts. Bulgaria's failure to enter is quite important: Bulgarian troops under Mackensen were very useful in the Balkans.
An attempt was made to extend the victories of the summer into the Autumn. Germany tried to envelop Lithuania, while Austria attacked eastwards from Lutsk. Neither attack achieved anything of importance. The best news for the Central Powers was coming from the western front, where the Allies lost a quarter of a million men in failed offensives against German trenches in Artois and the Champagne. In September Tsar Nikolai II assumed personal command of the Russian armies, replacing his cousin, Grand Duke Nikolai. The Grand Duke was sent to command the central army group. No change, except that Nikolai was sent to the Caucasus, where he and Yudenich defeated the Ottomans again. In the alternate timeline there is no Caucasus front, and so Nikolai gets sent to fight the Germans. He might end up alongside Brusilov, Evert or Kuropatkin, but the results are more exciting if it isn't Brusilov. Considering his title ("Grand Duke of Poland") it's best to let him try to retake his fief.
In the last days of 1915 Portugal declared war on Germany. The small Portuguese army would mostly operate within British formations. Portuguese colonial troops joined the British attack on German East Africa. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the German commander, was badly outnumbered, had no external sources of supply and was almost totally reliant on local troops. Nonetheless he succeeded in turning the invasion back. I've brought the Portuguese entry forward a few months for the usual reason: the allies are winning. To tell the truth I've no clear idea why the Portuguese entered the war at all, or what they did once they were there. Lettow-Vorbeck's achievements are historical.
German strategy, as explicated by Falkenhayn, held that victory would be won in the west, by destroying the French army. Since the Austrians were too stretched to do much attacking, any offensive would have to be largely carried out by German troops in any case. The plan was to select a point which was exposed to German attack and which the French could not afford to allow to fall. German attacks would therefore force the French to pour their army into the cauldron to save the target, whose capture was of secondary significance at best. The target chosen was the fortress-city of Verdun, and progress was sufficient if not dramatic. From February through June 1916 the Germans gradually pushed closer to Verdun. The German attack on Verdun is historical, as is the motive. This decision was taken in the context of Russia being too disorganised to interfere, Serbia overrun and the Italian front firmly stabilised. In the alternate timeline none of this is true, so what the Germans will do is anybody's guess. I see this as the point where my prognosis becomes completely divorced from historical imperatives. Almost anything could happen.
The German advance was finally halted when the allies counterattacked on the Somme. But that battle in itself achieved the German objective of inflicting casualties, the allies losing over six hundred-thousand men, and the British suffering the bloodiest day in their military history. The Somme is also historical, I've cancelled one offensive for the sake of Mediterranean distraction so I'll let the Somme go ahead. The British lost more dead on the first day of the Somme than in the Crimean, Boer and Korean wars put together: eight times as many as they lost at Waterloo.
The German High Seas Fleet raided the British North Sea ports of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on April 25th, in an effort to sour the British celebrations of Dardanelles Day. This was also part of a larger German plan to break the British blockade of the North Sea by catching an element of it and destroying it in detail. The British took the bait, and a substantial battle was fought off Jutland, in which the Germans generally had the upper hand. The blockade, however, was not broken, and the High Seas Fleet retreated into port to lick its wounds. Public opinion was dissatisfied with Jellicoe's handling of the battle, and he was replaced by Beatty. The German raid is also historical, and happened on April 25th, so the first motive assigned to the Germans must be considered spurious. Jutland is a less impressive in this setting, because Jellicoe is very aware that the war is being won elsewhere, that he can't win the war in an afternoon but could lose it. Also, he has fewer light craft and will have more trouble finding his opponent, the Mediterranean is tying up many destroyers and cruisers. Beatty's name was suggested by a helpful reader whose name I seem to have mislaid. If the Germans haven't been hammered at Jutland maybe their morale is high enough to have another crack at the blockade, in the dying months of the war. A counterargument is that the morale was broken less by battle than by the fact the German navy's officer corps were stuck-up twits.
May 1916 opened with Austrian offensives against Serbia and Italy. The first made initial good progress and the Serbs had to be reinforced by French and Commonwealth troops and a Greek volunteer legion. On the Italian front German troops made a diversionary attack from the Tyrol while Austria attacked along the Adriatic. The crumbling morale of the Austrian army told against the attackers, and the Austrian attack also had to be reinforced with German troops. Eventually, however, the Austrians retook Gorizia, extirpating the Italian position on the left bank of the Isonzo, while the Germans made limited advances in the Alps. Cadorna took the blame for Italian lack of preparedness on the Tyrol front, and was replaced by General Armando Diaz. The operation sounds a lot like the Austro-German offensive of 1917, that led to the Central Powers victory of Caporetto. The major difference is that the Adriatic attack is the main thrust and the Tyrol the diversion, whereas in our timeline it was the other way around. Historically the Adriatic front was a river boundary and the Austrians, who weren't as thuggish as Cadorna, weren't going to charge across the Isonzo if they could help it. In the alternate timeline the Austrians have a target on their side of the Isonzo and don't need to look for an alternative. In some ways that's unfortunate for them because the Tyrol worked quite well. But Austria achieves its main objectives in this attack (I can't see a disaster-prone Italy holding on to its Isonzo bridgehead forever). Diaz replacing Cadorna is also historical, although, like the event that triggers it, it happens early.
By this stage the Russian army was considerably better equipped, though it was still a long way short of Western front standards. In response to Italian requests, Russia advanced its own timetable for a general offensive. The inactivity of Kuropatkin's northern army group wasted some of the opportunity. Brusilov's south-western group, however, was highly successful, using new tactics of infiltration. The central army group, under the nominal command of the Grand Duke but the practical control of Evert, was also initially inactive. The Russians' 1916 offensive had several prongs, but the Russians weren't strong enough to attack everywhere they wanted to. In particular the attack by Brusilov was intended only as a diversion, and everyone was very surprised at how well it did. In the alternate timeline the Russians are doing a bit better and the Austrians significantly worse, the Russians can therefore make reasonably serious attacks on all three sectors.
The attack commenced on 5th June 1916, to general Austrian bewilderment. Brusilov advanced as far as the Carpathian mountains and drove Austria from Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Grand Duke Nikolai took charge of the central army group, bypassed Evert and after a short delay got that offensive moving as well, though without Brusilov's flair. Brusilov's infiltration tactics are an interesting what-if in their own right. Historically Russia was just too crippled to take advantage of the edge they gave, and so it was the Germans who eventually used them to their full effect, in their 1918 offensives in the west. The other change here is to have an authority on the spot who can rejuvenate one of the other fronts, at least to some extent. A basically competent general (Grand Duke Nikolai) was another rare resource tied up by the Ottomans on the Caucasus front.
Brusilov's offensive was partly fuelled by munitions made in Britain. On the same day that Brusilov's offensive opened, however, Britain payed a different kind of price for cooperation with Russia. The Royal Navy cruiser Hampshire, travelling to Russia on a secret mission, struck a mine in heavy seas and sunk. On board was Field Marshall Kitchener. Historical. It's tempting to say that he would have travelled by the Mediterranean, and not been killed, but the northern route is a lot shorter. Anyway, I don't know what Kitchener would have done if he'd lived. Kitchener may need you, but I don't need him.
On the 27th of June Romania, sensing that the winning side was finally clear, declared war on Austria. The Eastern front now stretched in an unbroken arc from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Bulgaria found itself surrounded on every side by allied countries, and informed Berlin that further requests for intervention would not be fruitful. Under pressure from the allies it agreed to permit allied troops to cross its territory by rail, though it persistently declined to make even a pro forma declaration against Austria. This is a two month advancement for Romania's declaration. Serbia's survival, Bulgarian neutrality and a British fleet in the Black Sea are more than enough reason for this change, the Romanians jump at the first news of Brusilov's victories.
Romania was militarily backward and its leadership had more enthusiasm than competence. But in the current environment it was yet another thorn in the Central Powers' side: specifically, in the Austrian side. Twelve Romanian divisions, opposed by just three Austrian divisions, slowly ground their way forward into Transylvania, traditionally claimed by Romania. French advisers were landed in Romania to train the Romanian army in modern ways of warfare, and some French equipment came with them. Nonetheless, German reinforcements drove Romanian troops out of much of their gains in Transylvania. Serbia, however, took advantage of Austrian distraction to recapture everything it had lost in May and June. Historically Romania was outflanked by Bulgaria: the German general Mackensen was sent to assume command of the Bulgarian army and destroyed Romania in a lightning campaign. That just can't happen in this case and so Romania joins the long collection of Austrian irritants. The fact that Romania doesn't collapse means that the Russian front doesn't suddenly get extended, which takes some pressure off Russia. Also, Germany doesn't get the benefit of Romanian oil and wheat. In a way Romania is a miniature Russia, with more manpower than material. This makes it fertile ground for the rich Western allies to inject a little lend lease (little by the standards of consumption on the western front, anyway) and substantially increase its quality.
A German counterattack in the vicinity of Lutsk was partially successful, but could not be continued in the face of the Russian reserves brought in from less active sectors. Brusilov continued to attack from around Lutsk in July, taking Kovel and extending a salient to the right bank of the Bug. An army under Yudenich, reporting to the Grand Duke, captured Baranovici. Pinsk found itself a dangerous salient on the wrong side of the Pripyat marshes, and was abandoned in August. The Russian lateral communications were so hopeless that the Germans had time to buttress the sector thoroughly before Russian reinforcements arrived. The counterattack at Lutsk was more successful, and the attack on Kovel was halted. But in the alternate timeline the rail net is better developed, so the Russians arrive a bit sooner, and in any case Brusilov has more starting grunt.
Austria was now dependent on German support on every front. If the German troops were to be withdrawn then Austria would collapse. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that failing some great change in the nature of the war German support was only delaying the disaster, not preventing it. Historically whenever the Germans turned up they and the Austrians took the offensive. In the alternate timeline the Germans are needed just to be able to defend properly. The only good thing about the alternate timeline, from the Central Powers' point of view, is that the allies have been distracted from attacking Germany on the western front. Historically the Germans were always under pressure, and could never provide the Austrians with quite this level of support. But this doesn't even come close to making up for the problems of this timeline.
In France the failures of the attrition strategy on the western front were being unfavourably compared with the success of the indirect Mediterranean strategy. In November 1916 Nivelle replaced the discredited Joffre as commander-in-chief of the French armies. Nivelle and the British commander, Sir Douglas Haig, argued about the best course to take. The offensives planned for February were postponed until April. Nivelle was historically appointed December 1916, in the alternate timeline Joffre's failure is more obvious so he's sacked earlier. The postponement was to April but here the changeover happens sooner so there's less confusion just before the D-day. Also, should replace Asquith with David Lloyd George about the same time, but since Britain is doing pretty well Asquith gets to keep the premiership.
During 1916 influential people were working for peace, mostly through the mediation of the United States. The chancellor of Germany, Bethmann Hollweg, was allowed to present German terms for an end to the war. But the inclusion of such terms as a German garrison in France and Belgium meant that there was no risk of them being accepted. Matthias Erzberger, a member of the Reichstag, had even proposed that in order to obtain a speedy peace Germany should renounce its demands for territorial annexation. The Reichstag voted for peace, but Bethmann Hollweg was replaced and the new chancellor ignored the resolution. Germany even recommenced unrestricted submarine warfare on 1st February 1917, infuriating the United States. No change. If anything the attitudes should be harder line: from the German point of view they aren't suffering as much, from the allied point of view they seem to be winning.
In adopting the stance it did Germany demonstrated her lack of understanding of the dire state of her ally. On 21st October, 1916, Emperor and King Franz Joseph I of Austria and Hungary (respectively) died. The new emperor was Karl I, who wished for peace at almost any cost. Karl had no desire to be the last of the Habsburg dynasty, and he knew that another year of war on four fronts would be the end of the Empire. A one month advancement. Death presumably accelerated by complications arising from a broken heart.
The Austrian foreign minister, Grav Ottokar Czernowitz, insisted that Germany could not be abandoned, and was promptly replaced. Secret negotiations were initiated with the allies, through plausibly deniable agents. When Germany almost immediately found out about them it too came to the table, furious at the ally it had been supporting. Czernowitz got his way, and peace was postponed.
United States President Woodrow Wilson suggested that the allies should state their own war aims. The British were too dependent on American credit to say nothing. Robert Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, encouraged them to make those terms just as unreasonable as the German ones, but in January 1917 the British agreed that they would accept American mediation. More or less unchanged, if a little simplified.
The United States informed Germany of the agreement and suggested that the meetings might be held in Stockholm. Germany hurriedly shelved plans for an alliance with Mexico, directed against the United States. This proved to be fortunate, since British cryptographers were reading German traffic on the trans-Atlantic telegraph cable. Germany also held the unrestricted submarine warfare option in abeyance in order not to irritate the USA. The Zimmerman telegram never gets sent. It's possible (but unlikely) that a smart Britain might not have passed it on to the US anyway: they might have needed a sensible mediator more than an enraged ally. German unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram brought the United States into the war in April 1917.
In order to force a peace, allied strategists planned new offensives to keep up the pressure on the Central Powers in general and Austria in particular. Analogy with the Korean war. Everyone knows it has to end. But the killing goes on because of pride, because of sheer momentum, because nobody wants to look weak.
With the Italian front now a less attractive option, allied attention switched to the Serbian front. A plan was drawn up by Radomir Putnik, the Serbian commander, and Field-Marshall Edmund Allenby, commander of the allied expeditionary force in Montenegro and Albania. Allenby's command included troops from Italy, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, India, Montenegro, Portugal and Greece. Allenby is way too cool a general not to have appear: like Grand Duke Nikolai he has to go somewhere (but I haven't found a home for Lawrence of Arabia yet). The multinational nature of the expedition is intentionally evocative of General Mark Clark's army in Italy, in the second world war.
The offensive opened in late February. A diversionary Franco-Romanian attack in Transylvania bogged down quickly. The Italians feinted at the lower Isonzo, and occupied some islands off the coast of Croatia to give the impression of an imminent naval invasion. But the main attacks made considerable progress, capturing Novi Sad and reaching the outskirts of Sarajevo. A feature of the coastal front was the use of amphibious invasions by British and Commonwealth troops, in an effort to unhinge the Austrian line. In military terms the attempt was very nearly disastrous, with an Australian division-strength landing being forced into a series of desperate counterattacks to save itself from being overrun. But the moral effect on the Austrians was severe. The Australian unit trapped on a beachhead salutes the Australian light horse, since as long as we have given command to Allenby we may as well make an analogy with Beersheba.
The Austrian army had almost reached the end of its endurance. The Germans counterattacked using troops they had been hurriedly training in tactics copied from Brusilov. The situation was effectively stabilised, but the troops using this technique suffered considerable casualties. Note the first appearance of German proto-Stosstruppen, which historically came a bit later and were much more dangerous. In the alternate time line they are thrown forward with less training and less development of the techniques, because the situation demands it.
Several columns, made up from British, South African, Belgian and Portuguese forces and under the overall command of Jan Smuts, invaded German East Africa in early March. This invasion was too strong for von Lettow-Vorbeck to stop, and he retreated to save his army. More or less historical. I've put the invasion back a month because the Mediterranean is tying up shipping. Lettow-Vorbeck's remarkable achievements are cut off halfway in the alternate timeline.
The Germans established a new fortified line, which they called the Siegfriedstellung, within their large salient. It had been planned to withdraw to this line in March, but the plan was put on hold in order to avoid appearing weak at the peace table. The withdrawal to the Hindenburg line (as the allies called it) occurred on 16th March 1917.
The British attack at Arras and the French one in the Champagne begun on the 9th of March. The German armies were prepared to retreat to the Siegfriedstellung and were caught halfway between two minds and two postures. The British and Canadians made good progress at Arras, making good use of a new weapon, the land battleship. But the ubiquitous congestion in the rear areas blunted the advance and the German line solidified. One month advancement in the offensive, as discussed above. The change of name from tank to land battleship reflects the greater importance of naval affairs and amphibious assaults in the public mind. The invulnerable land battleship smashing pillboxes would be very reminiscent of the invulnerable battleships smashing Turkish forts. I assume there are a larger number of tanks, since it makes sense that the Royal Navy in general and Winston Churchill in particular would be more influential in this setting than historically. This is the main reason the British part of the offensive does better than historically. On the other hand if I wanted to make the offensive do worse I would have said that Churchill's energy went into the Mediterranean, and that with the western front less the focus of allied efforts there was less perceived need for a technological fix for the trench stalemate. It's very convenient, being the author.
The French attack toward Reims gained a few early windfalls. The German army was hurrying back to the Siegfriedstellung, slightly sooner and much more briskly than it had planned. Units reacting too slowly were caught by the French and mauled. The results get phrased a little differently from history, but that's more the change of viewpoint than a real difference. At this stage, though, definitely better for the French. Most of this is due to coincidental timing, relative to the German move back to the Hindenburg line.
Nivelle immediately ordered a follow up attack on this position, with only the briefest examination of the terrain. The French troops found themselves marching over a carefully prepared killing ground, and suffered a massacre. Nivelle was utterly discredited amongst the high command, and was replaced by Petain. Petain favoured a defensive attitude in the west, while success was exploited in the east. So in the end, much the same as history. Nivelle's dismissal is also historical. So is Petain's attitude, which the strategic situation can only reinforce.
For Austria, peace was now imperative. France was also secretly terrified, because the metropolitan French army was on the edge of mutiny (French morale in the Balkans expeditionary force remained high). With the French concession that most of Alsace-Lorraine would remain German, the last barrier to peace was removed. The mutiny came in May, I'm not sure whether the French saw it coming. Certainly the Germans didn't (which was a good thing for France) so that aspect is historical. Incidentally about now the Russians should be having a revolution, started by striking textile workers who are, indirectly, upset at the fact they have lost access to their markets in the west. In the alternate timeline, of course, they haven't, and don't. Admittedly the Russians still can't use their Baltic ports, so there'll still be substantial disruption, but it doesn't take much of a change to have Russia survive, because the war is so much shorter in the alternate timeline.
Peace terms were finally signed on the morning of the 4th of April, 1917. Germany accepted a limitation on her navy, withdrew from all conquests and accepted the loss of all colonies overseas, and gave up a small slice of territory in Lorraine to France. Italy gained the South Tyrol, Trieste, northern Dalmatia, Istria and some Dalmatian islands. Serbia received the area around Novi Sad, but was refused the rest of Dalmatia except under plebiscite (which it could not and did not win). Belgium, on the other hand, won its plebiscite, to take Eupen and Malmedy. Romania received part of Transylvania. Russia took Galicia, Bukovina, and all Austrian territory beyond the Carpathians. A pointless joke: The fourth hour, of the fourth day, of the fourth month, of the fourth year of the war. Some Slavs who got their own countries in the historical timeline (Czechs, Slovaks) miss out, at least on complete independence. Some who joined with the Serbs (Croats, Slovenes) remain part of Austria-Hungary, but they probably regard that as a good thing. Austria-Hungary survives, though it is severely reduced. Romania gets only part of Transylvania, and misses out on Bessarabia (since Russia is still strong). This is mostly a good thing for Romania, since it doesn't end up saddled with as many minority problems.
The Great War was over. It had lasted almost three years and cost five million lives. The Ottoman empire had been swept away, and the Austro-Hungarian one greatly reduced. Surviving were a superficially mighty Russia of uncertain inner strength, a powerful and resentful Germany, a resplendent Great Britain and a tired and somewhat overextended France. The Great war was over. It had lasted more than four years and cost about ten million lives. Three empires (the Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian) had been swept away. In their place was a profusion of new states with dubious stability, a civil war, and a strange new ideology.
Next part: History after the war. Return to the introductory page. Send me feedback.


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