notas misceláneas sobre información e
infodinámica
-
El conocimiento cognitivo no siempre está asociado directamente con objetos del mundo externo, ya que el objeto del conocimiento suele ser abstracto. Este tipo de conocimiento es debido a la asociación de neuronas en regiones del cerebro lejanas (en términos de circuitado) con los órganos sensoriales (Fischbach)-
Todas las cosas tienen en el fondo la misma estructura, lo cual es siempre un reflejo de la estructura del cerebro en general y de las neuronas combinadas entre sí en particular.
Las cosas construídas por el cerebro son los carriers de información y las relaciones entre esas cosas son los elementos de información. La información es siempre información sobre algo y por consiguiente dependiente de restricciones entre situaciones.
-La estructura de las cosas consideradas como constructos del cerebro se puede entender como analogos de la estructura neuronal del cerebro, constructor de esas cosas. La estructura del carrier de información (vehículo) y la estructura del elemento de información deben ser coherentes con la estructura o modelo del cerebro. Las neuronas serían los vehículos de información no mas divisibles (atómicos) y las sinapsis serían los elementos de información no más divisibles (atómicos) La información como ceros y unos, sin embargo, no es en si misma el objeto de la información: es apenas una representación de la misma pero no idéntica con la información pura.---En la teoría de la información el bloque constructivo básico es la cosa o sea el constructo del cerebro.. neuronas-La información no es materia. Si así fuese, se vería alguna diferencia física entre los cerebros mentalmente enfermos y un cerebro sano. Tampoco es energía, porque la sangre que abandona al cerebro es solamente una fracción de grado más caliente que la ingresante. De lo cual deduce
--Wiener: Información es información, ni materia ni energía
--Nauta: Hay un enlace entre información e improbabilidad. Información es noticia. Lo que ya se conoce no es información. De esta suerte algo es información en la medida que sea desconocido, inesperado, sorprendente o "improbable". La información pierde buena parte de su valor
--Titze: La información es un evento que produce un estado con un mayor nivel o grado de orden y puede gatillar una nueva serie de eventos. (sinónimo del concepto de causa)
La información no es posible sin una operación causal referida a la materia (como receptora) involucrando un cambio de energía (canal). La información no es posible sin materia y sin energía y no puede ser un tercer principio al lado de la materia y energía.
This is a contribution to the development of a unified concept of information. The paper begins with a short survey of the history of the concept of information. Then a list of open questions, something like a specification for the definition of the concept of information, will be given, followed by a summary of a new approach developed in [Flückiger 1995 a], enabling us to provide an answer to each of these questions. This approach takes its cue from modern neurobiology according to which all things perceived or thought by an individual are to be understood as constructed by the brains of these individuals. Using a thought experiment, it is shown how the gap between the seemingly contradictory statements of two very different information theories can be narrowed until they are finally reconciled on the basis of the new approach presented here. -
-The leading idea of our conference, Koichiro Matsuno's statement according to which a principle of information science is - unlike in physics - "actio non est reactio", whereby the difference between "actio" and "reactio" represents a measure of information, is to be concretised in the present article. An information process ("actio"), which is to be understood as an individual's private process, doesn't primarily cause an adequate reaction, but leads to the enlargement of the individual's brain structure ("non est reactio"). As an effect thereof we diagnose an augmentation of the individual's capacity to interact with its surroundings.
-We are justified in asking for a universally valid definition of the terms of information carrier and information element. Generalising from the hypotheses concerning binary decisions and combining them with the insights of chapter 3, we can hypothesise that the things constructed by the brain are the information carriers and the relations between these things the information elements. There are several indications that this assumption is plausible: First of all Nauta's claim that a sign in Morris' sense functions as the information carrier is in keeping with the generalisation of the concept of information carrier proposed just now, because according to chapter 3.1 a Morrissian sign is a special case of the thing. Moreover, Barwise and Perry's situation theory also supports this thesis: According to them information is always information about something and thus dependent on constraints between situations. Therefore there are situations that contain information about other situations, which is indicated by the constraint between them. Such a constraint always has a direction from the situation carrying the information to the situation referred to by the constraint or informational relation. The elementary information of situation theory is thus always an element of the d_semantic closure of that situation which functions as the information carrier. Because moreover the concept of the situation according to chapter 3.2.2 is only a variant of the more general concept of the thing, the situation-theoretical view of information is also covered by the definition proposed here. The structure of things considered as brain constructs can now be understood as analogues of the neural structure of the brain constructing those things. Therefore the structure of information carrier and information element would have to be deducible from the brain model, which is consistent with the hypothesis made above. The neurons would then be the ultimate and atomic information carriers. According to the same model the ultimate information elements would have to be sought in the reciprocal relations between the neurons, which are in turn represented by their synapses.
The theoretical framework that allowed these answers to be formulated also makes it possible to clarify further difficulties identified in the course of the present study. For example, the issue of the persistence of information can be answered easily in the new framework. Peter Heyderhoff and Theodor Hildebrand's claim that information loses its value after it has been evaluated because it is only needed for one decision and is exhausted after the decision (cf. [Heyderhoff/Hildebrand 1973, p. 2]) can no longer be upheld. Since both the information process and its outcome are only aspects of information, it has to be mentioned that the individual information process effects an overall increase in information. Heyderhoff and Hildebrand can only be said to be right insofar as they intend to claim that the destination's difference of knowledge about the information object relative to that of the information source is reduced after the information process.
C.I.J.M. Stuart has criticized in detail the metaphorical use of the term information in biology (Stuart 1985a, 1985b). He introduces the concept of 'the bio-informational equivalence' denoting the equation of biological process with 'information transaction', and identifies three kinds of such equivalence. The first and the second kind consist of an analogic application of mathematical information theory to biology, namely the theories advanced by Shannon and by Brillouin. According to Stuart the application of these theories raises serious epistemological problems. It is not clear what should be the physical interpretation of the order measure in statistical mechanics. The third form of the equivalence amounts to the idea that biological information is a central concept for modern biology, though a concept different from the physical or mathematical concepts of information. Thus, the informational metaphor in biology has to do not with the quantity of information, but with its value, quality, or role within the biological process. As noted above, it is often incorporated as an intrinsic concept of modern molecular biological theory. The bio-informational equivalence absorbs, from our experience with ordinary language, the idea of referential information: information about something. Stuart (1985b) attempts to eliminate the anthropological basis of the equivalence in all three forms by eliminating the notion of reference 'in favour of concepts that fit into the conceptual-analytical framework of classical mechanics' (1985b: 442). The bio-informational equivalence is a 'conceptual stumbling block' (1985a: 612) for biological theory because it introduces an epistemological confounding of the observer's information about a given system and 'properties intrinsic to the system itself' (1985b: 444). Thus, the informational metaphor, according to Stuart, attributes to phenomena of biological organization 'properties (such as cognition, reference, and intensionality ) which (...) would not exist in the absence of human observers' (1985a: 614).
En general muy poca gente entiende lo que algunos físicos explican de estos temas.
