C. Chinese Military Strategy
Since the early 1990s, the focus of Chinese military strategy has been on preparing for potential military contingencies along China's southeastern flank, especially in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. China's military strategy emphasizes acquiring capabilities to counter improvements to Taiwan and other regional military forces, as well as preparing for capabilities the United States might bring to bear in any conflict.
Beijing’s military strategy places a premium on fielding forces capable of rapidly deploying to fight and win a future regional war under high-technology conditions along China's periphery. The Persian Gulf War and Operation Allied Force graphically underscored for Beijing the need to improve the PLA's ability to fight against an adversary that possesses advanced information technologies and long-range, precision-guided weapons. China’s perceptions of an emerging military-technological revolution have increased the urgency of acquiring the capability to fight a high-technology war.
A fundamental objective of China's military modernization program is to create a force sufficient to defend against any regional opponent, maintain the credibility of territorial claims, protect national interests, maintain internal security, deter any moves by Taiwan toward de jure independence, and deter aggression.
Even though ground force modernization has a low priority, force reduction efforts and selective new equipment fieldings focus on building a more mobile, combat ready core within the larger ground force. Currently, Beijing is downsizing its armed forces. The manpower reduction will contribute to a restructuring of the PLA into a military force consisting of three components: a small number of high-technology forces for flexible use in regional contingencies; a larger number of forces equipped with low-to-medium technology weapons for internal security; and, a modest nuclear force to maintain a viable deterrent against other nuclear powers.
China’s military leaders already have begun to develop the tactics these forces will employ. Concurrently, military schools and academies have assumed a more important role in professional development, with the aim of creating a better-educated and technologically skilled force, both in the officer and enlisted ranks. To support and sustain these forces during times of war, China also is trying to establish a more effective national mobilization system.
If Beijing perceived that war was inevitable, China's would attempt to contain and limit the conflict, but fight with sufficient force and tactics to achieve a military solution before outside powers could intervene militarily, and before vital trade and foreign investment were disrupted.
If a third party were to intervene militarily in a regional conflict involving China, the PLA would employ all means necessary in the hope of inflicting high casualties and weakening the intervening party’s resolve.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE DOCTRINE AND FORCE STRUCTURE
A. Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine
Traditionally, China’s defense strategy and force planning priorities have been determined by the need to maintain a large armed forces capable of responding to a wide range of internal and external missions. This continues to be reflected in China’s reliance on a force comprised of three main elements: 2.4 million PLA; a 1.3 million member People’s Armed Police (PAP); and a reserve-militia component of approximately 1.5 million personnel. The last decade has seen major efforts to resize and restructure China’s military forces in an effort to respond to changing threat perceptions.
Over a decade ago, the PLA began shifting its strategic focus from the protracted, large-scale land warfare that characterized Mao Zedong’s "People’s War" to fighting small-scale, regional conflicts along China’s periphery. China's "active defense" doctrine focuses on conducting what is officially called "people's war under modern conditions" but is better described as "local wars under high-tech conditions." This doctrine addresses rapid response to a range of contingencies along China’s land and sea borders, particularly within a strategic envelope which encompasses the East and South China Seas. China expects to encounter a more technologically advanced foe, such as the United States or Japan, if conflicts concerning its interests within this strategic envelope arise. Moreover, a cross-Strait conflict between China and Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the dominant scenario guiding PLA force planning, military training, and war preparation.
China’s military planners are working to incorporate the concepts of modern warfare attributed to the "revolution in military affairs" and have placed a priority on developing the technologies and tactics necessary to conduct rapid tempo, high-technology warfare in Asia. China’s military strategies still bear the indelible mark of Mao's teachings, particularly as they apply to concentration of firepower by a technologically inferior force at select times and places on the battlefield to overcome a superior foe. The key change is the application of these doctrinal concepts in scenarios other than the classic "People's War". The concepts of limited high-tech warfare, protection of China's coastal economic centers, and provision of credible intimidation in support of foreign policy are central to current Chinese strategic thinking.
The Persian Gulf War impressed PLA strategists with the need to prepare for "local wars under high-tech conditions." The NATO operation in Kosovo during 1999 served to reinforce and even increase the PLA’s sense of urgency in pursuing the notion of "active defense" and pre-emptive strikes. Many officials in the PLA view the Kosovo conflict as the first example of a purely "no contact" war, in which control of aerospace and information systems were the deciding factors. They view future wars as being increasingly wars of "no contact" in which ground engagements will be shorter and shorter--or non-existent--and airpower will become the primary means of achieving tactical, operational and strategic goals. Recent articles in Chinese military journals argue that Yugoslav and Iraqi forces were defeated due to excessive passivity, and the PLA should be prepared to take the operational initiative and give top priority to attacking key targets in the enemy’s operational systems.
Chinese strategists believe that if a war against a technologically superior foe breaks out, the enemy likely will deploy forces rapidly and then launch a massive air campaign. While the enemy is assembling its forces, there exists a window of opportunity for pre-emptive attack. This approach--"gaining the initiative by striking first"--is viewed as an effective method to offset or negate the advantages possessed by a more advanced military foe. Conducting preemptive strikes against the enemy’s most critical targets--often referred to as "winning victory with one strike"--constitutes the most direct means available to Beijing to convince an enemy to desist without having to defeat his military forces, or to make political decisions in line with Chinese objectives. This tactic requires concentrating China’s own chief strengths to "attack the core of the enemy’s defense" and achieve piecemeal victories across the operational spectrum against a superior force. To achieve this objective would require a smaller, more mobile, and more technologically advanced military force than China currently has in place. Much of China’s research and development, as well as acquisition and training programs, are centered on gaining the capabilities to accomplish such a force concentration.
The technological level of China’s defense industrial complex is too far behind that of the West to produce weaponry that could challenge a technologically advanced foe such as the United States or Japan for an indefinite period of time. However, the predominant view within the PLA, as advocated by the late Deng Xiaoping, is that "selective pockets of excellence" are sufficient. Rather than shifting priority resources from civil infrastructure and economic reform programs to an across-the-board PLA modernization, Beijing intends to focus on programs that will give China the most effective means for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in adversarial defenses. This approach could give Beijing the "credible intimidation" needed to accomplish political and military goals without having to rely on overwhelming force-on-force superiority, a concept known as "victory through inferiority over superiority."
China's strategists are seeking to identify innovative tactics for those systems and technologies that the PLA has used successfully or can be reasonably expected to use in the next two decades. Beijing has placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of standoff weapons such as ASCMs, long-range LACMs, and SRBMs. China also is working to ameliorate weaknesses in C4I training and placing increased emphasis on "electromagnetic warfare" to degrade or destroy enemy operational systems.
China’s military planners recognize that high-technology systems are extremely complex, and over dependence on information systems is a potential weakness. By launching swift strikes with elite units and focusing on the enemy’s potential vulnerabilities, they believe China can deal "symmetrical" blows at the enemy with "asymmetrical" methods. "Winning the battle piecemeal" means destroying selective reconnaissance, electronic and support systems in order to disrupt and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s coordinated air operations. Combining information warfare--such as computer hacking--with irregular special and guerilla operations, would allow China to mount destructive attacks within the enemy’s own operations systems, while avoiding a major head-on confrontation.
These asymmetric tactics and systems designed to engage a more modern potential adversary also could be used to lay the foundation for the comprehensive defeat of a lesser regional foe. When combined with overwhelming numbers of conventional low-tech systems, these assets also could give Beijing decisive advantages over potential regional opponents. China's strategy would be to use sufficient force to bring the adversary to the negotiating table under Beijing's terms and to undertake operations with enough alacrity to preclude third-party intervention.
B. Force Structure Modernization
Modernization priorities within the PLA are focused on the missile, air, and naval arms, but ground rapid-reaction forces also are included. PLA strategy calls for building elite forces, which will be able to respond quickly to a regional hot spot and dominate land, air, sea, space, and electromagnetic spheres of the battlespace.
China’s military modernization will depend, to a large degree, on the availability of defense resources, defense industry performance, access to foreign technologies and weapons, and ultimately on the PLA’s ability to integrate these systems into the military. If the economy fails to perform at levels close to Beijing’s objectives, the military could face budget cuts that might slow the pace of modernization. China’s defense industries have gained access to a wide array of advanced Russian and Western technologies but few can produce significant numbers of high-quality weapons. Should Beijing’s defense industry reforms fail, the PLA could become increasingly dependent on imported foreign arms.
China will continue attempts to seek self-sufficiency in defense technology and production capabilities. Purchases of weapons systems will be made to satisfy critical near-term needs and to gain access to technologies. Nevertheless, the PLA will remain heavily dependent on foreign sources for key modern weapons and hardware, platforms, and technologies, as well as for systems engineering and integration. Even if the PLA were to acquire the modern weaponry it seeks, integrating those systems and training commanders and troops to employ them will remain a difficult task and will inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.
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