But Bellah in the discussion at this point does something quite incredible. He presents Hermann
Melville's argument that "the political Messiah had come. But he has come in us ... " (15) as a version of
the type of 19th century racism cast in Biblical imagery represented by Albert Beveridge (16).The
quotation from Melville actually throws a monkey wrench in the machinery of not only his argument here
but also that of Diggins' Melville. Bellah makes of it something else:

	"Not many years ago we had a Secretary of Defense who believed that what
	was good for General Motors is good for America. Melville seemed to believe
	that what was good for America is good for the world." (17)

While neither of these expressions has anything remotely to do with Beveridge, neither are they at all so
thoroughly wrong-headed.

    For Bellah, the religious pluralism of America, invigorated as it became with the infusion of a neutral
religious language which together with an 'embalmed' symbolism of early leaders like Washington in a
national cult which constituted the incipient civil religion (18). The national consciousness which came of
that was something more than classic liberal theory:

	"America was not simply a neutral legal state within which the individual
	could rationally pursue his self-interest." (19)

     He returns to his misconstruing of Melville, reading his questions about things taking place in America
in the late 19th century as tracking towards  what he called a 'Dark Ages of Democracy.' (20) He is again
lumped together with other literary and reform figures like Thoreau and Garrison whose vision is of a
"choseness that slips away." (21) For Bellah, the American civil faith has become a broken and empty
shell (22). It faltered in its task of making the external covenant an internal one. The process that involved
would be by way of a series of religious revivals, but in the United States, such ethical revival has not
materialized and the faith has fallen to a low point in religious rhythm which has left it, of a manner,
waiting for Godot, diverted on its way to John Bunyan's Heavenly City (23). The pursuit of wealth has
become a frenzied, unhappy quest open only to male WASP's (24) who, in any event, at best grind out a
hollow existence of one-dimensional life as they rot away in front of the wasteland of television. Those
obsessed with the 'glorification of wealth' (25) are relegated to 'lives of quiet desperation' (26) and
numbers outside the favored caste are often joined by some of them for whom:

	: ... the double martinis that become triple martinis in the effort to wash out
	the taste of ashes, as well as the despair of those who have failed in their
	effort to climb the barbaric ladder." (27)

There is a 'deepening cynicism' out of despair and the youth take up 'the burden of guilt' as the 'can't get
no satisfaction' in the realization of failures at attaining ideals held by their fathers. The myth and ritual of
the formerly 'dominant cultural orientation' is stripped naked as the vision fades and:

	"The established structures of economic and political power seem perversely 
	set on maximizing wealth and power regardless of the cost to the society or 
	the natural environment." (28)

Counterculture, drugs, crime, anarchy, and antinomianism are the result for Bellah, and the civil religion
cannot, any more than the institutions, do more than faintly recognize the crisis, let alone deal with it..

    Throughout BROKEN COVENANT, Bellah juxtaposes the 'empty' Alger myth with a number of
alternatives which seem always cloaked in anti-wealth, collectivist, even socialist, interventionism:

	"Our punishment, ironically, lies in our 'success' ... our economic and technological
	advance has placed power in the hands of those who are not answerable to any 
	democratic process; weakened our families and neighborhoods as it turned individuals
	into mobile, competitive achievers; undermined our morality and stripped us of tradition." (29)

     But it is the problematic interpretation of the 'covenant' which has led Bellah to his conclusion that it
has been broken (30). The covenant of the Constitution was to promote capitalist development -- that was
the law to be obeyed. Indeed, it is the very 'solutions' he poses that have blocked that and in the doing
created the sort of problems he attributes to it. The reply to Bellah that should make this clear is in the
'Bread of Life' which resounds in his apparently loved Lincoln. But Bellah instead demonstrates his own,
and probably Mather's, misunderstanding of the idea of perfection as a dynamic process, not a static state
(31). It is no wonder he cannot comprehend the Heavenly City of the filoque and logos. He also very
clearly has problems with economics. The pursuit of profit is not merely a devotion to 'mere private gain.'
(32) Success as great wealth is really not the point at all. (33) On this score, there is considerable
symmetry between his salvation/success polarity and the achievement/equality pendulum in Lipset. (34)
There, too, is the flaw in his inclusion/exclusive dichotomy.  There is stark contrast between Bellah's pity
for those Americans who "at every point in our history ... have tried to pick up the broken pieces, tried to
start again, tried once more to build an ethical society ..." (35) and the campaign song of Ronald Reagan
earlier here placed among our sacred hymnal:

	"If tomorrow all the things were gone
	I'd worked for all my life,
	And I had to start again
	With just my children and my wife,
	I'd thank my lucky stars
	to be living here today
	'cause the flag still stands for freedom
	and they can't take that away!
	And I'm proud to be an American
	where at least I know I'm free,
	and I won't forget the men who died
	who gave that right to me.
	I'd gladly stand up next to them
	and defend her still today. 
	There ain't no doubt I love this land --
	God bless the USA!"    (Lee Greenwood)


      On the other hand, Bellah might have problems doing or saying that. He almost seems to share
Clinton's 'loathing' of the military, which he decries for the "uncompromising ruthlessness of American
warfare."(36) That is precisely the kind of thinking that gave us Vietnam! In mock jest, Rush Limbaugh
has chastised Clinton for his application of the idea of justice and fairness standards to our military
posture. Perhaps it is being undercut so that in future conflicts, the odds will be 'fairer.' There is no
question that the surest guaranteed that we will have to use military force again is to present a weakened
armed strength to the world. It, perhaps regrettably, the job of the military to "kill people and break
things." To the degree that it is able to do that, it will not have to do so. You cannot ask Americans to
sacrifice their lives if they are not equipped as well as is possible and given a clear mandate to do what
they must to achieve the specifically articulated goals. The New Covenant of Clinton is no workable
sequel to Bellah's 'broken' one. Bellah attempts to construct a break down of community in America out of
the 'advance of industrialization' that has created perhaps the most admirable, and envied, community of
democracy in the world and in history. The greatest 'leveling' of all time is depicted as an "increasing
division of America into rich and poor" which is moving us toward that "most dreaded of all wars, the war
of the poor against  the rich." (37) The real poverty of this analysis is the poverty of economics it suffers
under. The very 'advances' he would suggest are the things that have limited growth. (38) He even
approaches the moanings of the Sounds of Silence of Simon and Garfunkel in describing how "Our lives
are largely ruled by an insistent commercial culture that is a parody of our tradition." (39) For him,
America has even become 'Babylon' (40) and is approaching the edge of the abyss. But he goes even
further over the edge than Hartz or Diggins in advocating a movement that would have an "intellectual
and religious side" toward a moral 'national community' of a "socialist" side (41), as he decries "the
American taboo of socialism." (42)

     And yet, there are places where Bellah flashes with some important insights, thought it is to be feared
they will fall like seed cast on rocky soil only to wither and die if they sprout:

	"The defense of negative freedom, of civil rights and liberalism, while ignoring
	massive injustice, poverty, and dispair will be self-defeating." (43)

But in the positive freedom he would reach for -- that he identifies with Jefferson's public freedom -- he
wants to move beyond their 'means' orientation to that of 'ends' or telos, informed by "a larger religious
and moral context" from which they have become unhinged. (44) But the vision of religion with which he
would attack them seems to be to a Christianity uninformed by economics, by Pico and Ficino, or filoque
(45). His criticism of Christianity, in its historical record of perceived exploitation "is not different from
other religions" (46) at his 'historic stage.' Perhaps he should look to the Islam of Ibn Sina if 'our'
Christianity has only given us a corrupted republic (47). In the end, Bellah turns to the Augustinian
denunciation of Roman 'civil theology." (48) That appellation may be suitable to his American civil
religion, but the spirit of Augustine is very much a part of the 'civic' faith articulated out of this
examination. And if he is going to all on Eldridge Cleaver, it might be proper to accord him the respect of
talking with him concerning the development of his world view before doing so (49). If he did, he
certainly would hear little of DuBois' "white culture's 'dusty desert' of dollars and vulgarity."
 
     Actually, one must feel a sense of pity for much of the apology which Bellah sprinkles throughout THE
BROKEN COVENANT. It is full of concerns as to some of the direction discourse on his proposition of
civil religion has taken. It has reached the point that he has turned to discussion of the cacophony of
languages which engulf America in the wake of its broken covenant. As indicated earlier in this project,
Bellah is often given considerable credit for having initiated what has become an extensive conversation 
of civil religion in America. The concept was not really original with him, being traceable to at least
Rousseau, and indeed much further back than that, as at least the Augustinian comment just entered
would suggest. Bellah's work on Shinto during the Tokagawa Period apparently motivated him to this
exploration.  Along the way, it seems that he became convinced of some dilemna involving our 'faith,' out
of his perception of its failure, and the result of that was his publication of BROKEN COVENANT. It
represents a somewhat less optimistic expression of the construct than his earlier work in the area, such as
VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION. Subsequent research has brought him, as indicated, to development
of a general theme which supersedes the religious category. In particular, in the book HABITS OF THE
HEART, which he co-authored, there is laid out the theory that there are a number of 'languages' spoken
in the United States which reflect differing perspectives of thought and action. (This has been discussed in
much greater detail at earlier stages of this examination). More recently, he has published THE GOOD
SOCIETY which is in many respects a reaffirmation of the prescribed faith which the original covenant
had promised but never delivered on, at least not fully. The tension between the civil religion of America
in this examination and that of Bellah as portrayed here is a final effort to utilize the invention as an
analytic instrument for political research. In that regard, some of his commentary on related discourse is
also worthy of mention.

     Bellah describes how his concern grew as the subject "became a minor academic industry"(50) and
discussion fixated on definition and minutia while "substance was being overlooked." Of special concern
was the identification too many insisted on making of "civil religion with the idolatrous worship of the
state." He is adamant to the contrary, though there are concerns in that regard which have been raised in
this research. Of far deeper import even than that is Professor Bellah's observation of a decline in
academic interest in public religion during the 1980's. He attributes this to "Ronald Reagan's use of
patriotic symbols and, even more recently, George Bush's appeal of patriotism during the Gulf War" (51)
both of which he acknowledges were "examples of civil religion" although in his perspective, "very
slanted examples." In truth, it was a little much, walking through the mall and finding sweat shirts
emblazoned with Desert Storm in the showcases, and next to college and pro football and basketball
shirts. And yet, this is not testimony particularly to any shallowness of the faith or Republican use or
abuse of it so much as it is to the degree of acceptance with which the civil religion permeates our culture.
An intriguing study of this phenomenon might involve a survey and analysis of slogans, insignia, et al on
ball caps or bumper stickers.

     It is rather distressing to find the level of animosity with which Bellah treats those with whom he holds
fundamental differences. Of course, his is but degrees from that seen in Hartz and Diggins. It is evidence
perhaps of a strange twist of the trait of Hartz' liberal absolutism as the suggestion it was being applied
was made here in the earlier discussion of Hartz. Bellah seems disappointed that "liberals have not found
an effective way to appeal to the better instincts of Americans generally ... " (52). He even wonders if:

	" ... the generally negative responses to and persistently distorted interpretation
	of my conception of civil religion as I originally put it forth is an indication of some
	weakness in the cultural resources of a radically individualistic liberalism in America." (53)

It doesn't seem to ever even occur to him that there may be something essentially problematic about his
entire system, something fundamentally bankrupt in his civil religion. It is almost as it Bellah has been
left 'homeless,' finding the observations of those with whom he shares most in terms of their "diagnoses of
what is wrong in the present drift of our society" (54) quite off the mark regarding his civil religion
project but even moreso at odds with the countering vision both of America and the public faith.

     From Martin Marty, he borrows the term of "public church," having made use of this variation in both
of his co-authored most recent books to address at least that aspect of civil religiousity involving
legitimation of the republic (55). Reiterating this infrastructure role toward the significant role the
construct can play today, as it did in Tocqueville's America, of 'schools of citizenship,' he would seek the
building of a discipleship toward the structuring of "a public will for democratic change," but he is
convinced that success in that will require tapping into "deeper sources in our tradition." (56)

     Refreshing as it is to find Bellah putting emphasis on the 'free exercise' clause of the First Amendment
to "begin to dispel the distortion of the extreme separationist position" (57) and his hopefulness about our
recognition of an 'inner spirit' of a 'biblical republic' as our civil religion (58), any success toward such an
end is going to have to be premised on a recognition of much of the public theology this examination has
pointed out if the faith is to even assume more than the marginality his vision consigns it to. "The
religious superstructure of the American republic has been provided," Bellah writes, "only partly by the
civil religion," (59) most of what is required coming from more formal religious communities. Truly
republican values and virtue are going to have to be deeply embedded in mores thusly grounded. There is
the real school of republican virtue, in today's world as in Tocqueville's. It almost seems that his vision of
our civil religion has collapsed upon him.  He enters from John Adams that:

	"We have no government armed with powers capable of contending with human
	passions unbridled by morality and religion. Our constitution was made only for
	a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any
	other." (60)

     The civil theology requisite must be founded in the 'common good' according to Bellah, for as
Washington's Farewell Address warned:

	"Of all the suppositions and habits which lead to political prosperity Religion and
	morality are indispensable supports ... " (61)

     And yet, the sources of the revival he would see to close the 'corruption of the Republic' reach to the
statist control  mechanisms of his advocacy of a liberalism informed by socialist outlook. Such
redistributive justice will only undermine community and subvert the common good as it sabotages the
General Will. The mystic mechanisms of the great engine of progress are as always at work, but we must
come to grips with the reality of just whom Melville's Messiah is. The matter of whether of not we or any
other people may be the 'chosen' people of God is really, in the final analysis, a question of our own
choosing. It is a question of choice as to whether we understand and act as if "here on Earth, God's work
must truly be our own" as Kennedy posed in his Inaugural. There are great tasks to be undertaken, but
failure to recognize that it has not been the 'crimes of America' that have been so important so much as
the fact that our tradition has embodied the processes which are the mechanics of correcting such
injustice, will only leave us lost in the wilderness, confined to purgatory.

     We have indeed "been to the mountaintop" and we "have looked over and seen the Promised Land."
Whether we are able to get there or not is a matter of our own choosing as to our own fate. Bellah, much
like Hartz and Diggins, would lead us back into the Desert to worship at the altar of the beast, the anti-
Geist, of bondage back in Egypt. But we must have the faith that "we as a people will make it to the
Promised Land..."


     We are still living in the 'Great Society,' and in many ways, it isn't always very good. In Robert
Bellah's recent publication, he has tried to articulate a path to what he terms a 'good society.' The dilemna
which liberalism of the current persuasion is going to have to come to grips with is especially transparent
in Bellah. For one thing, the ideology has not been able to overcome Popper's falsification criterion. An
ultimate test of any scientific theory is that there must be a standard by which it can be judged and
evaluated. This is perhaps the most difficult of the three stages -- formulation, implementation, and
evaluation -- to deal with on that basis. If a 'liberal' initiative does not 'work,' it is often described as
having been far too limited in scope. The fact is, it hasn't worked, but the same response comes from
advocates; we haven't tried it hard enough. Hence it is that modern day liberalism is, after all, merely a
dogmatic set of controlling mechanisms. And it's ability to rationalize seems boundless. Writing in his
IMAGE OF AMERICA, the French Dominican priest R. L. Bruckberger has described the trap set for us:

	"The State always discovers excellent excuses for depriving the individual
	of his rights or for narrowing his exercise of them. One of the most persuasive
	excuses is the claim to be acting for the common good and for national unity.
	The founders of the American Republic believed that the best way to safeguard 
	the common good and national unity was to entrust them as far as possible 
	to the private initiative of free individuals. In this they were truly original. They
	were convinced that no political system in the history of the world had relied
	enough on the resources, the intelligence, and the good will of the individual..." (62)

     One of the characteristics of contemporary liberal thinking has been that some group of societal
orchestrators could better determine what is good for the society and the individuals in it than the people
themselves. In fact, given the relative levels of expertise of such social engineers, people en masse even
divided by special interests or self seeking or too uninformed because of information costs, alone possess
the capability of such direction. But in varying degrees, dependent upon the extent of their commitment to
the establishment of such control, the people are asked to surrender aspects of liberty in exchange for the
guarantees which are offered. And any resistance to such "unavoidable demands imperils the liberty and
equality" which only their agenda can bring. (63) 

     Karl Marx once referred to Henry Carey as "the only American economist of importance." (64)
Bruckberger suggests that what Carey represented was a third way somewhere between capitalism and
socialism:

	" ... America was moving toward an economic and social system entirely different
	not only from communist socialism but also and at the same time from the classic
	capitalist system ... " (65)

     The 'third way' reference was as misleading as it was inappropriate. Carey was clearly posing a market
capitalism, though clearly distinct from socialism and at some variance as well from laissez faire
capitalism. Marx had written concerning Carey that:

	"He tries to refute the [various economists] by attempting to demonstrate
	that economic conditions are conditions of cooperation and harmony rather
	than conditions of struggle and antagonism," (66)

but it may not be surprising that Carey understood American capitalism better than Marx.

     To a certain extent, Bruckberger is almost as constrained as to Carey's vision of capitalism as was
Marx, fixating as they both did on the version, or perversion, of it dominant in Europe, and particularly
Britain. Though admittedly aware of Carey's negative view of the English situation, he takes that a bit too
far, referring to Carey at one point as 'anti-capitalist.' (67) It may be a curious enough paradox, too, that
while the relationship between Carey and Marx was not one of vehement animosity, neither was Carey
especially critical of Adam Smith. (68)

     Perhaps the most important insight which Bruckberger offers as to Carey is his observation regarding
relative 'geometries.' (69) Marx remained Euclidean, while Carey, and he says America as well, broke
with it as they did with Malthus and Ricardo. It was his non-Euclidean perspective that opened his mind
to the perceptions it was able to achieve. It brought Carey to the conceptual level where he could argue in
a manner, according to Bruckberger, no one else has:

	"The ultimate object of all human effort [is] ... the production of the being known
	as Man capable of the highest aspirations." (70)

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