Ismael's option may not be so much available to us at present. Whenever it is a dark and dreary
November in the soul and one feels like knocking people's hats off in the street, one might wish the
alternative of pursuing the leviathan by following any stream to where it leads and going to sea, even if we
knew the outcome beforehand. But the endeavourors of Ahab's crew were at lest socially constructive,
providing a vital component of human sustenance. We may not possess such options today.
Consequently, our moral choices are perhaps somewhat more constrained. Plotting out a piece of land on
the Yukon in Alaska or otherwise locating a cottage by the sea to watch the decades go quickly by may
seem attractive at times to some, but it may not be moral -- probably not very interesting either. For
reasons explored here, there would seem to be considerable differences between such ideas as those in
Carey and Raymond (and Peshine Smith), and Rawls' conception of 'social union,' related to such things
as wealth augmentation and the character of the individual, although Sibyl Schwarzenbach, writing in a
recent edition of Political Theory (11/91,19:4,539), uses such bases in Rawls to, at least in part, argue a
certain Hegelianism or communitarianism in Rawls. It may be an interesting perspective, but there is
always a possibility in such reductionist analysis of reading too much into spurious analogy.

The 'denuded' individual of Rawls is 'dressed' in this analysis, the other-directedness of the original
position approaching an Hegelian perspective and the social union taking on some of the character of
Hegelian Geist, perhaps. However it differs significantly, in its self orientation, from Liebniz. It may be
rather fanciful to imagine a world of anomic individuals putting themselves in other peoples' shoes, even
blinded by the veil of ignorance imposed. Such denuded individuals would not do as Rawls sees them
doing in the original position. Perhaps they are more substantive (from the Hegelian viewpoint) than they
seem in Rawls to be, or maybe they are precluded from doing what he wants. At any rate, the social union
still seems to cut off the 'fountain' of growth -- the production and deployment of social surplus to fuel
wealth augmentation. Specifically as applies to Raymond, Rawls deduces a private/aggregate dichotomy
which in and of itself may approach Raymond's division between individual and national wealth, but it is
perhaps possessed of much the same poverty of economy spoken to. Furthermore, neither should the
nation be seen as merely the aggregation of the sum of the individual interests, and while that places
Rawls in the same bag as Adam Smith, both viewing it in that manner, it differentiates the perspective
from both Hegel's spirit and Association or Unity.

Raymond goes on to contend that indeed great wealth of individuals may lead to impoverishment of
the nation. Such individuals might thus be able to command peculiar exigencies of luxury which would
preclude by its misdirection of labor the engendering of genuine wealth for the nation. It follows from
that, he says, that "national wealth, therefore, does not consist in the 'totality of the private property of its
individuals.'"(29) The only manner in which any nation may increase its wealth is not through
augmenting it by accumulation, but rather by engaging its population in wealth generating labor in
mutually beneficial fashion, such being the 'sole object of labor:'

"Labor is the exertion of human power for the purpose of producing the
necessities or comforts of life. Human power, exerted for any other purpose,
is not labor."(30)

Importantly, this does not mean that all labor must be 'productive.' for not only may the fruits of such
labor be destroyed short of their enjoyment, but comforts may be enjoyed that range beyond necessities.
Value only is attached to such enhancement, however. He equates the 'source' of such value as "the
fountain from which we derive all the necessities and comforts of life."(31) And there is not greater value
thus generated than in the comparatively advantageous mechanization of labor. Whether that be
agricultural or manufacturing labor as best suited rests upon the peculiar circumstances of the nation, it is
true, but whichever is most profitable (to national wealth) is preferable, and:

"As a general rule, manufacturing labor is the most profitable, because it
requires the most skill,"(32)

and mechanization makes it so, and that is where capital is best applied, thus to augment the quantity and
quality of labor. There may be in Raymond's analysis, unproductive labor where the intended effect is not
produced, but it is not unproductive in and of itself. On the other hand, there definitely are unproductive
occupations. These would include any injurious to society, but more importantly, any that are useless to
society:

"The object of those employed in these occupations is not to produce
any of the necessities or comforts of life."(33)

There may be innocent pleasure as a lawful and 'productive' pursuit, but only the moral affect may
ascertain the worth. In Raymond's system, it:

"is the duty of every man in society to do something towards promoting the general
prosperity and happiness; no man has a right, whatever his condition in life, to be a
drone or an idler, or to pursue an occupation, which is either useless or injurious to
society."(34)

The individual who does not so contribute effectively robs society of labor, and:

"It is the imperious duty of government to suppress all occupations which are
positively injurious to society, and to disencourage, as far as possible, all that
useless, and therefore, unproductive."(35)

Among the capabilities of man which nature has granted is that of 'free agency,' and the development
of our intellectual faculties of mind. For Raymond, only that which promotes these is permissible and to
be encouraged for only thereby may they contribute to national wealth. It is therefore necessary that the
laws of nature be held to as stringently as is possible in society:

"The natural state of man, is a state of perfect equality, as it regards rights.
One man has as much right to life, and liberty, as another. This principle,
therefore, should be reserved in the social state as far as practicable. One
man should not be compelled to support another, by his labor, unless in
some particular cases, when, in consequence of a departure from the laws
of nature, some derangement has been produced in the social system, which
has deprived a portion of the people of the means of procuring a livelihood ..."(36)

However, while there exists in this natural condition this 'perfect equality of rights,' there is not a 'perfect
equality of power:'

"One man has more talents, more strength, and more personal endowments
than another; all of which enable him to procure and enjoy a greater share
of the good things of this world, than a man less liberally endowed."(37)

Nature, writes Raymond, did not intend any such equality and it would violate natural law to attempt
to force such equality. The artificial creation of man, the nation, should seek, as perfectly as possible, to
preserve this natural condition. This is most especially the case with property rights, which, although to a
certain point infringe on natural right to the earth, nevertheless, are to be preserved as natural and as
requisite to the engendering of greater national wealth. It would be therefore detrimental to public good to
either dictate 'equal division of property' or provide special privileges, and:

"A government should be like a good shepherd, who supports and nourishes
the weak and feeble ones in his flock, until they gain sufficient strength to take
their chance with the strong, and does not suffer them to be trampled on, and
crushed to earth, by the powerful."(38)

Were such inequity tolerated, it would impoverish the nation by reducing some to degradation while
augmenting private wealth of some others:"

"The great object of government ... should be to preserve as perfect an equality
of rights and property, as possible, consistently with the natural inequality of
power among men."(39)

At this point, Mr. Raymond makes what may be an important concession:

"It is natural law, and the best interests of society require, that all the private
wealth in a community, should be resolved into the general mass, at least once
in every generation. One generation has no right to make a distribution of this
earth, or exercise authority over it, after it has passed off ... The object of this is,
to preserve the natural equality of rights among men, and to prevent individuals
from acquiring that unnatural, inordinate power, which wealth bestows."(40)

While he seems to delimit this to equitable distribution among children of inheritance, the larger aim is
that each should be reliant solely upon his own industry. However, toward perhaps an expansive
interpretation of this:

"It cannot, with any propriety be said, that a nation enjoys a very great degree
of national wealth, when a large portion of its citizens are destitute ..."(41)

The result of not doing as he prescribes will be the multiplication of paupers -- of those lacking in means
of self-support through their own industry, and thereby reliant on that of others. Unequal distribution of
property may create pauperism, and while some will always exist, the magnitude of it may be
circumscribed. Since the product of labor is more than adequate to provide all with life's necessities,
augmenting that production will produce an excess of needs and unequal distribution will not mean
poverty. The key is the creation of wealth. The duty of the nation must be to guarantee that wealth
accumulated in excess of the product of one's labor be directed toward such augmentation. Hence,
national wealth rests upon the quantity and quality of labor:

"Individual right to property is never absolute, but always relative and conditional.
There is no such thing as perfect, absolute right, but in those things which are the
gift of nature ... The right to property is ... subject to such regulation as may be made
respecting it, with a view to the general interest of the whole nation."(42)

Erasmus Peshine Smith in his MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1853) makes a similar
argument, contending that human progress is measured "by the extent to which the natural agents are
made serviceable."(43) Through improvement of mechanization, the value of human labor will rise while
there is a decline of that of existent capital. He argues that:

"The capitalist obtains a decreasing proportion of the product of labor and capital,
and the laborman an increasing one; while both have a larger absolute quantity."(44)

Peshine Smith even explains a "tendency of the rate of profit to fall with the increase of population and
wealth"(45) although here he is, as did Marx, describing the state of aggregate wealth of the nation. But
he further describes how expansive population laboring through machine augmented human endeavor
effects an expanded national wealth, much as it was described in the Association and Unity principles of
Carey and Raymond. (What he is describing, however, is not diminishing returns).

From that juncture, it is appropriate to return to Liebniz. In this perspective, the individual can only be
defined in terms of his contribution, or potential contribution, to the human race. With Liebniz'
terminology, applied identically to the physical and social scientific spheres, the discrete particulars must
be identified by their role in the field of environment or they merely exist as monads. Self-conscious
awareness of one's relation to that is the essential aspect of human character, and the discrete particular or
monad suffering from the absence of such identity defines the state of anomie. Once again, this notion of
inter-connectedness verges on both Carey's Association Principle and that of Unity in Raymond, as well as
the spirit expressed in the statements of Cleaver and King. It is not that any individual may be perceived
as 'useless' or without rights for the essence of any individual is encompassed in their contribution.
Individuals possess the absolute right (and duty) to make that contribution, and any and all other rights
are contingent upon that. It is not merely that 'the death of any man diminishes all men' but that the
diminution of anyone has dilatory impact on the human race. Anomie is the resultant state or the
severance of one's conscious link to that process. This self-subsisting positive essence of human beings is,
however, an identity which possesses a definitive element of free agency. Hence, agency, or the absence of
it, involves a free will choice much as in Raymond there is such agency in individuals contributing to or
being injurious of society. That is not to be cold-hearted at all. Indeed, it would be that to deny to anyone
their rightful contribution. But, as Raymond explains, there are legitimate dependencies and exigencies
which do mediate the situation. Nonetheless, the present and hitherto constant state of man (which helped
lead Malthus astray) has been one of rather marginal existence overall, and the obligation
of human beings toward their contribution is thereby intensified since human existence hinges upon the
maximization of such contribution. Even moreso would be government as conceived under Carey's
tendency to Association. It was in this context, as to the issue of determinism, that Carey took first
exception to Tocqueville in a review of DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA printed at the conclusion of the
third volume of PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (46). The contention arises around the claim
that there had been a general rise of wealth and capital in the United States as part of a world-wide one
accompanying an advance of equality across the world. This development had occurred as:

"... a providential fact, and it possesses all the characteristics of a divine decree:
it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all
events, as well as all men, contribute to its progress."

Carey offers the following response:

"Here our good and evil passions are made equally to contribute towards the execution
of 'a divine decree;' they are 'blind instruments in the hands of God; who employs man
in the work of murder and plunder, of ruin and devastation, for the purpose of establishing
an equality of conditions among them ... it has prevailed universally, and the natural
consequence has been, that not only is this 'divine decree' evaded, but there has been
for centuries past a constantly increasing tendency for inequality of condition, physical,
moral, and political. It does not therefore elude 'all human interference.'"(47)

But after positing this 'irresistible' democratic revolution that was universal and "a step towards the
universal level," Tocqueville continues on to express the opinion that legislators proceed to act to
"establish inequality." After having advanced his determinist argument, he then espouses a willful act of
subjugation onto slavery. To his suggestion that there had been with the development of equality of wealth
supposed, political freedom as a consequence results which cannot be checked as one cannot "resist the
will of God," and he further contends that with equality will come "aggression of power" which make it
difficult for citizens "to preserve their independence. "Carey's response to the Frenchman's attribution of
failure of redistributive schemes in France as opposed to the opposite attendant to America to limited
diffuse government in the United States which breeds stability as opposed to unlimited authority with
accompanying instability in Europe, situations which have created rising intellect among U.S. citizens is
that:

"Political freedom is the necessary consequence of increased productive power,
and improvement of physical, moral, and intellectual conditions; and with every
extension of political rights, there is an increased tendency to further intellectual
improvement."(48)

And yet, while Tocqueville in the one instance agrees, he otherwise argues that there is a tension
between intellectual pursuit and cultivation of the mind, the former being a consequence of democratic
institutions, the latter being their victim, the attainment of which requires that "you must avoid the
government of democracy." He then returns to the argument that "the manner of the people are dependent
upon the increase or decrease of wealth." Where he began by saying that all things evolve of equality of
conditions, he turns to allege "that the laws and manners thus produced are the 'efficient cause' of the
maintenance of the democratic system." Carey then adds:

"A system which establishes perfect equality of political condition, securing
to each individual uncontrolled exercise of his own rights of person and property,
producing a habit of freedom and a necessity for abstaining from interference
with exercise by others of those rights which he desires for himself, in a democracy.
To say that the existence of equality is the cause of the continuance of democracy,
is precisely similar to asserting that the existence of wealth is the cause why people
continue wealthy ... Here we have the fundamental "causes of the increase of wealth
among individuals, and of the growth of democracy in communities."(49)

One aspect of the five general theoretical orientations out of Kymlicka inadequately broached is their
various estimations of human nature. The inadequacy in all of the orientations to on degree or another can
be located and what has been posed heretofore speaks to that deficiency. It is a fundamental problem in
much of political philosophy, and one even more clearly delineated in a comparison of the Declaration
and Locke. What was penned in 1776 was a definitive statement of government delimited but nevertheless
intended to foster the human condition. The utilization of the word 'happiness' where Locke wrote of
'property' echoes with the earlier distinction made between individual and national wealth in Raymond.
For Locke, who had perhaps a more enlightened view of man than others, human avarice toward self-
interest needed authoritarian restraint. For others, man was inherently evil and begged control. Under
the Declaration and perhaps even moreso the Constitution, the function of government was to protect and
promote people's rights to development. But that is not to equate it with the Scotch philosophers or Adam
Smith for in such a system, man was not particularly more enlightened -- it was simply that the 'invisible
hand' would conscript appetites. One might even cynically view that system as a covert license for
imperial plunder. Neither inherent human goodness nor free agency or merely the potential for them
figure in the calculus of either Locke or Smith as it did here. That was at the basis of much of Carey's
articulation of the differentiation between the British and American systems.

Contemporary liberalism is even more subject to these problems. For Rawls at base, there is an
absolute connotation that for mankind to function, there must be continued constraint of his individual
propensity to avarice. The poverty of political economy is even more pronounced. There appears to be no
notion whatsoever of wealth creation. There must be constant and eternal stricture through unceasing
wealth redistribution that is necessary as a conscious effort of government. As referenced earlier, such
methodology must circumscribe the creation of wealth by cutting it off at the roots. Furthermore, the
essence of the human character is in no fashion wise in this regard. Man is perceived as possessed of
rights devoid of economic reality. Even man diseased by anomie has rights even to the abrogation of the
participatory labor which makes him human. Man has a 'right' to be injurious to society.
Marx may represent some sort of special case in some respects on these counts, but he, overall, does
not fare much better. Whereas Marx acknowledges the great contribution of capitalism as contributing to
the human condition of life by having created wealth toward that end, he then runs aground. Were
capitalism somehow to operate to the extent that it was able to produce such levels of wealth that all men
might enjoy exceedingly high standards of living, the fact that a substantive value of the production of
human labor was being appropriated, even if it were for investment toward greater wealth generation
(something Marx would undoubtedly take exception to), the producing classes would still be thereby
exploited by the fact of that appropriation of the value of their labor, and they would still suffer alienation
arising from the relationship still existent to the means of production and the general state of affairs.
Furthermore, Marx falls into the trap containing Rawls regarding redistribution of wealth as requisite -- a
trap he almost seems to recognize in the CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME, but one which he
does not elude. And despite the fact that Marx seems to leave some opening with regard to a potential for
exercise of free agency at some future point in the envisioned communist society in which man is free to
live life as an art, the general tenor of historical, economic, and materialist determinism precludes that
option for the interim, so much so that it is arguable that revolution itself is even thereby constrained, as
addressed earlier. This point may explain Lenin's introduction of the concept of volunteerism as the
necessary prerequisite of revolution. A modern variation grounded in Marxian premise of a sort,
dependencia, does little to alter these problems. Indeed, it not only replicates them but compounds them
through an even more pronounced poverty of political economy, running the gauntlet from the
appropriation of wealth to its redistribution.

Carey had developed something of a relationship with Marx. They maintained a correspondence and
Carey's associate and friend Charles Dana contracted with Marx to do a column for the New York Tribune
throughout the 1850's and into the Civil War. In the GRUNDRISSE (50), Marx offers criticism of the
system for reasons that may in fact have been Marx's problem, the inability to distinguish the peculiarities
prevalent in Europe versus America. The idea of harmony of interests is, however, quite at odds with
class conflict, as well.

Probably the most basic area of convergence revolves around the idea of expanded reproduction and its
development out of what Marx would characterize a rising ratio of surplus to constant and variable
capital. The fact that we do not find Carey expressing it in terms of S'/C + V aside, the similarity is
nonetheless profound. In Marx, the falling rate of this social surplus would create the conditions
militating the overthrow of the capitalist order. There is really very little delineation of what would be
needed to expand the ratio, however, in Marx, whereas in Carey, et al, that is clearly spelled out as a
critical feature. Indeed, some of the things that may have been Marx's policies of choice such as wealth
redistribution would bankrupt the process.

Nor was the object of the Carey/Raymond/Peshine Smith/List system intended toward any utility
maximization any more than Marx's was. Kymlicka has made reference to the problem of the relative
weight of demands (51). This seems to be a particular problem for utilitarianism for it seems grounded in
maximization of gratification of the senses. Raymond's condemnation of this, although it may seem quite
too austere or puritanical, does not preclude pleasure, but giving equal weight to hedonistic preferences or
assuming that an anomic individual has similar entitlements does not work unless they contribute to the
enhancement of the world's wealth for necessities and comfort. Where they do not, they are illegitimate.
Similarly, in the case of the question of repaying of loan(52), what must be evaluated is not 'potential
preference satisfaction maximizing,' but rather the impact of payment/non-payment on labor power such
that only where it is injurious would either option be prohibited. Further, all of this says nothing of
utilitarianism not accepting the claim that preferences for what rightfully belongs to others are
illegitimate. What is right is what maximizes utility. It is a small step really, in philosophical terms, from
a neighborhood using a lawn as a dog run to segregated neighborhoods or schools, et al, to Auschwitz.
But, afterall, it is suggested, utilitarianism is only a 'standard of rightness' and not a 'decision-making
procedure.'(53) This does not work, however, because, especially in utilitarianism, our moral belief
structures determine or influence our decision making.

Mention was made earlier here of a supposed tension between our Declaration and Locke, for example.
This once again crops up in some of the commentary in Kymlicka on utilitarianism. To be quite fair, it is
not clear at all whether the nuance would seem to fit the utilitarian perspective. In the Declaration (and in
Association/Unity ), rights derive from creation and human activity and governmental power flows from
the people to protect their rights, but Hare (54) is referring to this in the language of government 'giving'
rights to people. Probably most critical, however, is that the utility system seems to neglect the problem of
the rate of 'profit' in growth in its concern for equality. It hence negates the possibility of equality by
aborting the economic base for creating it. One of the dilemnas of this perspective is indicated in the
critique of the pleasure machine, although it is not developed, involving problems stemming of its use
(55). If it maximized utility by having farmers 'experience' growing wheat and not by actually doing so,
for example, what would people eat? Is it possible that the pleasure machine also permits us to derive
sustenance by experiencing eating merely? Kymlicka probably has a point where he calls for a theory of
fair share to prevent utilitarian excesses. It is legitimate to protect certain rights. The 'essence of morality'
he requires had been posed well before as expressed above. But the larger system hoped for, he says, must
at least be pegged in conversation with John Rawls. The general theory of justice central in Rawls that "all
social primary goods ... are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these
goods is to the advantage of the least favored."(56) While it is apparent why he wants to do this, the
problem is that (as has been delineated) there may be advantages for the least favored in unequal
distribution.

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