Among the speeches and writings of Lincoln, there are  at least three especial cases in which he
articulated the perspective all this portends in the most definitive terms. During his campaign for the
presidency in 1860, he repeatedly used variations of a stump speech which might be properly identified by
its opening line, "All creation is a mine, and every man a miner." (30) In this address, he distinguishes
man from other laboring beasts by our improvement of workmanship effected by discoveries  and
inventions. He proceeds, using Biblical references, to enumerate a sort of general history of such
advancements in human culture, concluding with a discussion of human harnessing of motive power for
industry culminating in steam power.  While en route to Washington to assume office, Lincoln delivered a
speech in Pittsburgh on Feb. 15, 1861 which built upon this (31), in which he vowed to pursue the stated
course of the Republican platform to mobilize the government toward promoting and protecting the
country's industry and agriculture. Relevant to the question raised by Woodward earlier, he makes special
reference to the prospect that if Americans on both sides kept their heads, such pursuits will settle the
question distracting the nation, and says that "in the long run all classes are benefited" through
renumerating prices, liberal wages, and adequate reward with prosperity for the entire nation. (32). And
on December 3rd of that same year, in addressing the Congress, he delivered an annual address which
even more specifically lays out this course. In order to facilitate firm connection of loyal sections of  the
South and the border states to the Union, he proposed construction of connecting railroad lines, which he
described as valuable permanent improvements, and in addition to a host of logistical matters ranging
from foreign relations to military and administrative concerns, Lincoln clearly enunciated a theory of
labor power and labor theory of value that denounces slavery, as well as outlining a plan to finance the
military action against insurrection through a Hamilton-like government funded debt (33).

     Lincoln was well-schooled in the Whig political economy found in the writings of Henry Carey, but
also Erasmus Peshine Smith and Daniel Raymond. The political ideology from which he operated can be
more completely understood in their work, and the basis of his policies as President is firmly grounded in
them. A firm articulation of government policy to enhance industry and promote labor power  or artificial
labor, inclusive of the contrary character of the institution of slavery is to be found therein. This was the
substance of Carey's 1853 HOW CAN SLAVERY BE EXTINQUISHED?, in THE SLAVE TRADE
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, his 1851 HARMONY OF INTERESTS, his 1857 address attacking laissez
faire free trade, his open letters to William Cullen Bryant around 1859 concerning the causes, effects, and
remedies of financial crises, and his broader tracts on political economy, as well as those by Smith and
Raymond, (discussed elsewhere at length here). They are crucial to interpreting Lincoln's thought.

     Carey refuted the free trade ideology in his 1851 pamphlet, calling for the centralization and
concentration of wealth and power as the mission of the American people "to raise the value of labor" both
domestically and around the world, "governed by that enlightened self-interest which induces man to seek
his happiness in the promotion of his fellow-man." (34) He was quite specific that such direction had to
include raising women and slaves and would necessitate massive immigration into the nation as a
requisite of industrialization. He was also equally as clear regarding what the result of not pursuing such
policy would mean. Carey is important from another perspective. As editor of the New York Herald, he
developed a working relationship with Karl Marx, a relationship which included contracting by his
associate Dana with Marx to write a series of articles for the Herald. Whatever may have been the
deficiencies of Marx and whatever may have been the influence of those and other of his writings on
Lincoln and those around him, they contain some notable commentary on the situation in America. Marx
argues, for instance, that a key political issue to the South before the Civil War was the necessity of
creating new slave states for admission to the Union in order to preserve the balance in the Senate as
against the House which in relation to growth of representation from the North and West it had no
possibility of balancing otherwise. (35) But even more than that, he saw that the South was not either
geographically or morally, a country, but rather merely a battle slogan (36). The war of the Confederacy
was one to perpetuate and extend the system of slavery(37). It was a struggle against the free labor system
of the North (38). However, as much as it was mandatory for the South's system to expand itself in the
effort to survive, the institution of slavery faced eventual extinction given the realities of political
economic development, barring that (39). He clearly identified the British finger in the pie as well (40).
And Marx not only early on in his Herald series posed the strategy of defeating the South through
advances to slice it into sections as was eventually done, he also presaged the eventual development of the
Jim Crow system (41). And yet, while Marx could broach the subject from the labor theory of value, he
was less able to address it in terms of the theory of labor power. For, while Marx seems to have somewhat
rejected entropic notions, sometimes his view of wealth can be problematic, and it is not clear that he fully
came to grips with the negentropic character of the universe. 

     The analysis of Henry Carey is even more poignant. Carey wrote to Henry Wilson in Philadelphia on
August 26, 1867:

	"Slavery did not make the rebellion. British free trade gave us sectionalism, 
	and promoted the growth of slavery, and thus led to rebellion. Had Mr. Clay
	been elected in 1844, all the horrors of the past few years would have been 
	avoided." (42)

It was clearly a matter of the promotion of a labor intensive system that would cheapen production not
merely in opposition to but as a countercyclical force against capital intensive development of the
American economy. That relates some interesting thoughts on Fitzhugh's pro-slavery arguments. And
whether no one in the 19th century can be seen as fully free of racialism given the level to which it
permeated the society, as has been suggested, the political economy of Lincoln and his colleagues
transcends that to a considerable degree. Neither can any notions of Lincoln as country bumpkin or
buffoon or evil dictator which Southern commentators seem to have vacillated between be taken seriously. 

     If Hofstader comes closer to an enunciation of the sort of political economic analysis of Lincoln than
other commentators, his perspective still falls short. This becomes clear in his remarks concerning the 
Great Emancipator's views on slavery and emancipation. It is clear that Lincoln had a genuine dislike for
slavery. It was an immoral institution. But his sentiments included anti-abolitionist convictions based on
his perception that these not only made slavery worse but dichotomized the country (43). Such division
could only serve to inhibit the very kind of development which was the only solution to the problem.
Further, there was no way, either legal or practical, to end slavery except to prevent its spread that it
might thus eventually die out as outmoded and inefficient. He had to deal, of course, with elements of his
own party which were less 'enlightened,' yet their support was necessary to achieve the political clout to
prevent extension and effect the real causal forces for its conclusion (44). Where he comes closest to
hitting the nail on the head is in this context. Whereas Douglas and his colleagues would make 'things' of
black people, it was Lincoln's assertion that this would eventually be done to whites as well (45). Any
justification of slavery for any was, to Lincoln, justification of slavery for all (46). Lincoln would prevent
extension of slavery in order to raise the value of labor in the territories, and thereby in the country at
large (47).  In two  quotes, from the 'House Divided' speech and a Chicago address where Hofstader sees
some compromise in apparent contradiction toward political ends (though admitting that Lincoln may
have seen no contradiction), there is not fundamental difference. Any that he sees is still transcended by
the theory of upgrading labor and labor power. The menace that slavery posed was not merely to free
labor, but to the overall value of labor (48). To go that far without comprehension of the whole theory of
artificial labor is the root of Hofstader's problem. It should have been clear. He acknowledges Lincoln's
rejection of compromise that would have 'saved' the Union but permitted slavery and possibly wrecked the
nascent GOP (49). Yet, that must be viewed in the light of the real necessity for preserving the Union
which he clearly enunciated. Hofstader also seems to misconstrue Lincoln's support for the original 13th
Amendment(50). The essence of his position on this proposal was as a ploy to preserve the Union, for
growth ... which would end slavery. There could be no such thing as an unamendable amendment anyway
-- it would merely reaffirm what was already law -- and would be rendered a moot point with adequate
rises in the value of labor through industrialization and technological progress. 

     When he expresses problems with Lincoln's earlier support for African recolonization, it should be
kept in mind that while such might effect an overall rise in the value of labor of all domestic workers,
Lincoln also supported the purchase of all slaves and then the granting of freedom as a way of shortening
the war (51). What he seems to overlook is the reality that any reduction in the supply of slaves would
increase the labor value of all, hastening the end of the institution. It should be recollected that there were
those about him including Seward and among the abolitionists who actually favored a secession of the
South as a way of ridding the nation of the plague of slavery. That would scarcely  help either the slaves
or the nation generally in the quest for development -- development would end the travesty. Beyond that,
Lincoln understood, Hofstader does point out, that any sudden emancipation without preparation would
not be real freedom at all (52). He is able to see as well that when the circumstances warranted the sort of
tactical emancipation Lincoln proclaimed during the war, that despite the limitations of that directive, it
unquestionably made genuine emancipation inevitable. (53). Real emancipation would require much more
than merely the variety of agrarian reform favored by such as Stanton subsumed in the notion of Forty
Acres and a Mule. That would have created hardly anything better than the sharecropping that eventually
developed as little more than a revised form of servitude. The big picture must range from Lincoln's
support for the Whig platform to Stephen's opposition to an American steamship industrial capacity in
order to fully comprehend the genius of Lincoln's perspective and the real fight that was being waged. 


     Exactly how other Presidents have been interpreted or evaluated has been no less a problem for
analysis. The long-held notions regarding Eisenhower have been given a fresh perspective by Fred
Greenstein. After over eight years of Reagan bashing, such commentary since the end of his Presidency
has only gotten worse. But in the March 1990 issue of Political Science and Politics, Greenstein raises the
prospect of Reagan as another 'Hidden Hand Ike,' although he concludes with a stark contrast with
Eisenhower. But all the Presidents have undergone similar alterations in scrutiny; not the least of all,
Kennedy, whose assassination elevated him to a level of symbolism akin in some ways to that of Lincoln.
More recently, another version of JFK has been emerging, not just in terms of his 'character' but also in 
the management style of his administration. But if parallels between Kennedy and Clinton run from such
character concerns to the indecision of the two administrations as portrayed in THE CRISIS YEARS
(Belosch) and THE AGENDA (Woodward), Kennedy did offer some redeeming characteristics including
the tax cut proposal, accelerated investment tax credits, the Trade Expansion Act, and a massive military
build-up and promotion of the space program to name a few. If it is small solace that Jennifer Flowers was
no Marilyn Monroe, we may find greater relief in the fact that Dan Quayle was no John Kennedy. And the
Presidency of Nixon has been quite scurilously panned seemingly endlessly, and yet, in time, it is likely
that it may well be remembered not for Watergate and resignation and enemies lists and tapes, but for
conclusion of the Vietnam debacle, improved relations with the Soviets, opening of relations with China,
and dedication to ending some of the major curses that have menaced man, including huge commitment
of resources to cancer research, origination of the effort to wipe-out small pox, nearly universal polio
vaccination domestically, but also a quiet and successful effort to effect school desegregation throughout
the South (Ambrose in ONE OF US). The North American Review in 1887 documented similar
perspectives that had circulated about Lincoln.  In an article entitled "The Renaissance of Nationalism"
from January of that year, in the context of a discussion of revival of interest in the war, there is a
consideration of a "revision of the popular estimate of the central figure of that time" -- Mr. Lincoln.
Citing his taking of office as an obscure figure, it is suggested that here was "a lucky accident," for whom
"doubtless a majority of the Republican Party ... regretted that instead of the inexperienced
backwoodsman, they did not have in the Presidential chair the scholarly and veteran Seward, or the astute
and plausible Chase." The article, written by Albion W. Tourgee, then asserts that confidence in his
administration was primarily due to the inclusion of such men in the government. The view of Lincoln as
capable but simple and unable to do any wrong intentionally with advisers to "show him how to do right"
is asserted to have continued until that time with only slight modifications:

	"While justice has been done to his patriotism, patience, and humanity, 
	it is only recently that his intellectual capacity has been generally recognized
	and admitted, whether by friend or foe. Even the lives of Lincoln published
	after his death  have, until recently, proceeded more or less upon this
	hypothesis." (54)

     Biographies by Holland and Raymond are held to praise his motives but with a distinct implication that
Lincoln "was favored by Providence because of his beneficence and simplicity, as fools are specially cared
for," an innocent subject of manipulation by those stronger and wiser around this 'Great Uncouth.' He was
seen as a tool of varied executive officials who was able to bring harmony to his government through "a
sort of low cunning by which he played one against the other." (55) A biography by Ward H. Lamon is
said to belittle Lincoln's every quality except an ability to deceive. However, in the 'more recent period' (to
1887), deeper research had led to alterations in that view of the former President. One Confederate
general had written of Lincoln as "matchless" in the population for doing what he had to do, while
another Southern supporter lamented the comparative inadequacy of Jefferson Davis. Where one journal
had referenced growing appreciation of Lincoln's intellect, it is said that such would have caused a smile
or sneer five years earlier.  Issac N. Arnold's LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN is described as building
this revised viewpoint, suggesting that what some might have mistaken to be cunning or hypocrisy "was
the  simple result of his convictions," and William O. Stoddard's complimentary volume contributed to the
former's interpretation of Lincoln as not superhuman but someone of great enough intellect to grow in
office without losing honesty or conviction, to whom "truth and policy are one" by depicting "the exquisite
skill of the backwoods president ..." (56) In the final analysis, what Tourgee sees having developed was a
recognition of Lincoln's intellectual powers, compassion, and mastery of tongue, all of which had boosted
him to a position of "the master of all men of his time." (57)                                   

    While such commentary may not qualify as scholarly analysis of ideological evaluation, it does throw
some light upon the emergence of Mr. Lincoln as the sort of symbol described at the outset here. From an
institutional point of view, the precedents set by Lincoln while in office have been an important influence.
It might be said that every President has expanded the role and even powers of the office (with the
possible exception of Calvin Coolidge, but even that should not be taken for granted -- though Clinton
may represent a dramatic change in that assessment) and Lincoln certainly played some definite
exemplary position in that regard. Woodrow Wilson probably contorted that role the most. His
interpretation of the example set by Lincoln is probably better termed a misinterpretation or
misrepresentation, although in some ways the response elicited by his actions has worked to reinforce a
general  nationalization of especially the Bill of Rights (Paul Murphy, ORIGINS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE UNITED STATES) and the predominance of federal authority which Lincoln certainly
contributed to as executive and by his judicial appointments, and as a part of a long process of
development reaching from John Marshall to Earl Warren. But the structuring of the public sector
complex beginning with FDR and reaching acceleration of progression after LBJ have far outstripped
even Wilson.

     Of more recent vintage and perhaps more critical value is a 1957 article by Harry V. Jaffa from the
Anchor Review. Beginning with a consideration of the famous 1858 debates which are of some repute in
our political history, he counters that with a much less important view of them than that held today by
scholars. Ranging from Albert Beveridge to James Randall and Douglass-partisan George Fort Milton,
these see little worthy of note in the debates. Randall goes so far as to reject a popular notion that there
was in the debates one great issue upon which Lincoln confronted Douglas.  In a review of the series of
events or compromises over the extension of slavery that culminated in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Jaffa
continues with the contention that this was one great upheaval that gave birth to the Republican Party, and
goes on to demonstrate that the positions taken by Douglas may have lost him the Presidency in 1860.
Particularly due to his fight against the Lecompton Constitution as a corruption of popular sovereignty,
Douglas alienated the Southern Democracy. In the process of doing that, however, he won considerable
sympathy from northern free-soilers, including such important Republican leaders as Greeley and Seward,
so much so that he was being mentioned as the 1860 Republican candidate. Such a candidacy would have
probably swept him into office with Republican and a large Democratic minority behind him, and given
such events, the South possibly  might not have seceded. In such circumstances, Lincoln must be seen as
having undermined a great opportunity to have decapitated the movement that resulted in the war. Jaffa
suggests that the Lincoln strategy through this period, at least the interpretation most widely held, was to
use the division over the repeal of Missouri as a path for him and his party to achieve power. Such
partisan motivation, he says, is widely held to be quite irresponsible; but here Jaffa rises to a defense of
Lincoln who justified his opposition to Douglas on the necessity of restoring the Missouri Compromise,
based on Lincoln's belief that the spread of slavery had to be stopped because it was wrong everywhere.
The rationale formed by Jaffa to that point, while probably valid in its conclusion, suffers from some
problematic reasoning en route, which also overlooks some mattes of great import.  An effort by Lincoln
to stop Douglas from claiming the leadership of the nascent GOP should not be seen as a pro-war move,
but rather as an attempt to salvage that party and the anti-slavery struggle. And the possibility that the
Nebraska/Missouri question was both the 'raison d'être of the Republican Party' and the one firm point of
divergence between Lincoln and Douglas, only reinforces that prospect. Further, the contention that to
Lincoln saving the GOP meant fighting slavery and saving the Union, is additional proof of his
fundamental opposition to slavery. Jaffa's assertions in the course of developing his argument that a
Douglas Presidency would have prevented secession is by no means a certainty. If it could have postponed
it, there is no reason to think that it would have done so permanently. The basic tension was still existent
(unless one takes the position of its extinction through rising labor value of labor, which Douglas did not).
Nor does this take into account such broader consideration as the effort afoot to create a slave empire of
the Caribbean, a structuring which undoubtedly would have been formalized around a splitting of the
Union. Further, as Mark Kruman of Wayne State University's History Department emphasizes, the
sectional realignment of political forces in the country through the late 1850's would probably have at
least severely complicated Jaffa's argument.  The article delves into an interpretation of Mr. Lincoln's
pedagogical conceptions central to his overall ideology, and Jaffa sites the Lyceum address as key to 
understanding his connection of ambition and honor. His posture is unquestionably akin to Hamilton's in
the FEDERALIST regarding fame as "the ruling passion of the noblest minds," but Jaffa's argument there
is a contradiction between the American experiment as proof that self-government is possible and that it
was the accomplishment of a small heroic group is fraught with problems. It may be, as Jaffa suggests,
that the Framers Lincoln identified as 'the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle' were like Aristotle's
magnanimous man, but it would seem that they are more readily identifiable with Plato's Golden Souls.
That distinction runs deep. There is a clear distinction between such men and those of whom Lincoln
seemed to show such concern of as a threat to the Republic, and of whom Kelley would probably see
Lincoln as perhaps the most diabolic.  Regarding the Framers, in the sense that such men are unique and
different and able to seek the wresting of government for the people from a repressive elite, whereupon the
people can govern themselves, Jaffa's usage of the term 'superior' to identify them creates problems. There
are derogatory implications inherent in such usage that misrepresent the case, much as Plato's
philosopher-kings are often misconstrued (as is Hamilton's 'elitism'). Jaffa, the Aristotelian, cannot see
beyond Lincoln's (or the Framers') 'ambition,' which is in reality the essence of the Golden Soul -- which
is not elitism in the basest sense. It is, rather, a distinction that runs to the core of the difference between
the Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions of man and human nature, bound and determined or possessed
of free-will creative potential. And yet, here, even Jaffa's (and Fahrenbacher's) assertions about Lincoln's
ambition are of at totally different manifold than the foolishness spouted by Fleming. Even the noble
Hofstader has told us that Lincoln was ambitious. But in a Republic, that is no grievous fault. Indeed, it
would seem that a sort of distinction between Aristotle's Magnanimous Man and Plato's Golden Soul
involves the drive of the latter, and the ambition typified by people like Lincoln is that notion incarnate
(as opposed to say Clinton for him ambition seems to be his agenda). Perhaps one can envision a
Magnanimous Man without ambition (maybe by definition), but the Golden Soul is Promethean.



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