That socio-historic dynamic is translated into institutions and shapes a society's values which in this
country "have centered on a tension between egalitarianism ... and achievement," and grew out of the
consequent 'hypersensitization' or each to the appraisal of others. Lipset builds this other-directedness,
using "Parson's criteria of achievement-ascription, universalism-particularism, specificity-elitist" in a
comparative analysis of stable democratic societies which places our society "at the end of the axis in its
emphasis on achievement, universalism, and specificity," which are matters of degrees and not absolutes.

     There are two themes and three questions which Lipset's NATION is built around according to Oscar
Hamlin in the American Historical Review (38) who also raises questions concerning Lipset's reliance on
secondary data and his tendency to push analogies of comparative analysis too far:

	" ... he seeks to define the social conditions that make a stable democracy possible,
	and he is concerned with the extent to which the American experience was representative
	or exceptional ..."

and he presents:

	" ... A consideration of the process of establishing national authority and identity ...
	An analysis of religious and trade union development [which] inquires into the
	extent to which American character has changed. These two sections lead into
	an extended examination of the American value system to which equality and 
	achievement are central." (39)
    
    To all of this, Parsons adds description of Lipset's effort as crucial in the intellectual controversy "about
the nature of American society in relation to the conflict between what in some sense are 'conservative'
and 'revolutionary' values" (40). The American perspective is in Lipset decidedly liberal if not
revolutionary, "authentically at the core of the main liberal trend of modern society." (41)

     Writing in the Journal of American History (42), John Higham describes the authors of HABITS as
having continued Tocqueville's "inquiry into American mores with the special object of reappraising the
tension between individualism and countervailing values."(43) They add to contemporary scholarship in
our intellectual history and classical sociological analyses through in-depth interviews with some 200
people to glean attitudes in both the private and public spheres, and conclude:

	"fragmentation of modern life reinforcing American individualism and thwarting
	the conception of a common good." (44)

The reviewer also references a therapeutic theme in HABITS that he finds reminiscent of others (Rieff and
Johnson) and which prevails in our 'dominant' layers, combing Franklin's utilitarianism with an
expressive romantic self-cultivation, together making for a bureaucratized 'contractual intimacy' in which
calculation replaces older morality, but the book also detects remnants at least "of civic virtue and
Christian obligation." (45)

     Of this attempt to characterize America, William Simons wrote in the Annals (46) that "the discussion
always returns to the influence of individualism on public and private life." Simons says that early
"biblical and republican traditions" had "tied individual interests to the welfare of the community" and
"connected the private and public spheres," but "the rise of national corporations undermined localism" as
well as cohesion and even perhaps mental health. In the resultant contemporary depersonalized society,
the American tradition of individualism finds "expression in utilitarian and expressive modes that
encourage privatism" and past 'virtues' are useful only as they offer personal satisfaction. Bellah, et al, in
"lamenting the decline of American civic life," suggest reintegration of public and private spheres through
consciousness of our interconnectedness. Donald Lutz takes all of that a step further seeing in their
therapy an urging to dialogue "between the biblical, republican, and modern indivdualist strands of our
culture" (47) to be 'an historical conversation' which would deliver us from the depersonalized ethos
through a structuring of a 'community of memory' which builds a future upon the best of past and present
values encompassing a new shared commitment. The present state of the population is a pathological
anomie of sorts in which all of us speak languages unintelligible to others. The conversation proposed
would inform us of our history and interdependence. The New York Times Book Review (48) called
HABITS a sermon, though acknowledging it as a good one. To Weinstein (49), it is 'disconnected
moralizing' to individuals bent on 'infantile demands' -- 'Big children' who are little more than Liebniz'
monads; discrete particulars in a society "fragmented into mutually suspicious groups." "Integrating the
middle class into tradition" will foster a 'recommunalizing' of our society. That, argues Weinstein, will be
accomplished in the authors' scenario by creation of a 'public philosophy,' but one he identifies as a tired
liberalism which cannot "openly discuss itself" let alone articulate program. 

     The Journal of Politics  Symposium continues (50) with a review by Williamson who sees the issue
addressed as a national 'identity crisis.' The reviewer seems to exhibit considerable disappointment over
the secular fixation of both our society and this analysis of it. And this essay makes much of tension
between utilitarianism and expressive individualism, the latter potentially satisfying the former; the
family, the church, the community, etc. forming the basis for such an exercise. But this was more readily
available in Tocqueville's America and the best substitute that HABITS  can suggest is what this critic
identifies as Burkean intermediators -- "independent nuclei of power strong enough to challenge the state
if necessary" -- not the firm biblical and republican convictions our Framers really held and which
Williamson scores the authors for relegating to mere 'sentiments.' (51)

     "The authors of HABITS OF THE HEART," says Shelley Burtt in the final Symposium critique (52):

	" ... consider themselves heirs to Tocqueville, examining as he did the conditions
	by which democratic freedom might be saved from the isolating effects of American
	individualism. But their book is more properly read a critique of modernity, recommending,
	as works of this genre usually do, the recovery of a language and practice of community
	to cure the cultural ills of our liberal society."

     Not to accomplish this and overcome an atomized state of private interest pursuit that is in some
measure reminiscent of some of the Scottish philosophers, and in particular, Adam Smith, and his modern
disciples from Mises and Hayek to Milton Friedman, who viewed national interest as the composite of
individual self-interests, will lead to Tocqueville's "administration despotism (53). Such a heteronomy of
aggregates may be apocalyptic, but Burtt finds the quest for communitarian language at least partially
persuasive and sees the emphasis in HABITS on replacing notions of careers with avocation as most
constructive.

     By way of response to the reviewers, one of the authors of HABITS, William Sullivan, reiterates the
central theme of social construction of reality (54) that permeates the study. His bearing is one of
acceptance of the criticism as being very much in line with the course of discussion which the authors
were intending to initiate with the book. A clear sense of commonality seems to begin to emerge from
these reviews. It remains to succinctly argue NATION and HABITS as commensurable from the common
currents which flow throughout each. In Lipset, the point at which to commence this element of the
examination is with the tension central to the book between achievement and equality, an outgrowth of the
Parsons typology identified above (55). he begins to lay out the importance of these values, and to trace
their development in our history, from the very outset (56), and defines his intent as an attempt "to
reconcile these two pictures" of America which they represent. But even before that, in the Introduction to
the Norman Edition, Lipset addresses himself to this rudimentary premise:

	" ... the history of American social change reflects a shifting back and forth
	between these core values ..." (57)

both of which we believe in deeply. In politics, liberals and conservatives compete through emphasizing
one, and typical of their role in the area of racial attitudes is the distinction between 'preferential
treatment' and 'compensatory action:'

	"a sharp confrontation between egalitarian and individualistic values." (58)

     The dualism between these 'twin' values exists because they are not entirely compatible! (59)
These values, having sprung "from our revolutionary origins" (60) and having been basic to the shaping
and sustaining  of our political structure, one aim of the book is to "demonstrate that [such] values are one
important source of variation among social systems." (61) And among those he sights as precedent-setters
in such analysis are Parsons and Weber. (62) In reiteration of that theme toward development of political
structure based upon such values, NATION argues the liberal democratic evolution  of interest groups and
trans-state cleavages he prematurely describes as parties which united them, and it views the writing of
the Constitution as such an effort. (63) But Lipset posits the establishment of national authority on the
success the young nation experienced in economic development (64). The account he renders of this and
the formulation of national identity runs fairly well until he begins to attempt to superimpose a left/right
dichotomy on political cleavages (65) which begin to roughly cohere to the twin emphasis on achievement
and egalitarianism, and here his political economy begins to break down along the lines identified earlier
in the examination of a 'jaded Americanism.'  In brief reiteration of that, suffice it say that, contrary to his
analysis, (66) it was the Jeffersonian-Jacksonians who were 'conservative' and aristocratic force, seeking to
use the trappings of democratic liberalism as a weapon for the status quo against economic development.
However, interestingly enough, the dual value system he describes may still work albeit in a somewhat
different way, given this analysis.

     In addressing the changing American character possibility, Lipset once more echoes this premise:

	"Two themes, equality and achievement, emerged from the interplay between
	the Puritan tradition and the Revolutionary ethos in the early formation of 
	America's institutions ... As we have seen, equalitarianism was an explicit part
	of the revolt against the traditions of the Old World, while an emphasis upon
	success and hard work had long been a part of the Protestant ethic." (67)

     And Lipset goes on throughout the next three chapters of the book to argue that, rather than societal
changes having altered our social character:

	"... the basic value system, as solidified in the early days of the new nation ...
	can account for the kinds of changes that have taken place in the American
	character and in American institutions as these faced the need to adjust ..." (68)

There has been an unchanging American character and unchanging American values, instead. That is not
to suggest that the two values have not gone together -- indeed, their complicity is one of the major points
(69) along with their role in the construction of reality, but:

	"... although the equalitiarian ethos of the American Revolution and the 
	achievement orientation of the Protestant ethic are mutually supporting,
	they also involve normative conflict. Complete commitment to equality
	involves rejecting some of the implications of valuing achievement, and
	the opposite is also true." (70)

     James Sterling Young, in his book THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY, makes a strong case that the
early 'parties' were barely that even in name only. Possibly, Lipset does not really intend for these 'parties'
to be interpreted in the manner we think of parties today, but he does not indicate as much, and if that was
his intent, it should have been more clearly pointed up. The theme reverberates throughout the book. He
sees the persistent traits in formal American religion as reflecting value continuity (71), suggesting
secularity and volunteerism (71), as distinguishing it and rooted in the liberal tradition (even among
Catholics). (72) Institutions of business, on the other hand, emphasize individual achievement (73), but:

	"American secular and religious values both have facilitated the 'triumph of
	American capitalism,' and have fostered status seeking. The focus on equalitarianism
	and individual opportunity has also prevented the emergence of class consciousness
	among the lower classes ... and the historic weakness of American trade unionism ...
	[and] depreciated a concern with class." (74)

     What Bellah and his cohorts argue in HABITS is not only conflict, but a conflict of three identifiable
traditions found in American political thought -- individualistic, biblical, and republican. The first
tradition is manifest as utilitarianism (ala Hobbes or Locke) where basic appetites to be pursued toward
maximization of self-interest, and expression, which embodies a more complex goal of self-interest as self
realization with the individual as the basic political unit (ala Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, etc) (75). The
biblical tradition is grounded in the notion of covenant by the individual and society with God and the
authors connect it tightly to the Puritan tradition (76). And the republican tradition embodies a notion of
'republican virtue' (77) in emphasizing political and economic equality together with commitment to
private property. It may be identified, too, with agrarian or small scale capitalism and a tendency toward
the legislative as opposed to the dynamic executive in government. These competing traditions function
submerged in the nation's history so that this country's political thought has been a continuous series of 
debates among the three languages somewhat incomprehensible to one  another in the supposed dialogue
(78). This notion of different voices is developed in Bellah as a 'second language' which has evolved and
which contrasts with our primary tongue that somewhat unites us around common values of success,
freedom, and justice (79). And Bellah further elaborates four 'representative characters' (those people
introduced at the outset of the book from the larger sample are representative of each type) through which
the tension of these values and strains or traditions is expressed, and which are held out as reflecting
American society: the independent citizen, the entrepreneur, the manager, and the therapist (80). Bellah's
connection of this trilogy of forces to American religion (81) puts considerable import on the role religion
has played as an extension of the liberal democratic evolution and in reforming America. It has descended
to earth, in a manner of speaking, having undergone a process of 'privatization.' (82)


     What is ultimately the point in HABITS is what Tocqueville called American 'nervousness' (83) and
the authors' effort to formulate the sort of dialogue which can serve as therapeutic for it seeking to resolve
the conflict into consensus in an improved future state of affairs. There is, of course, much more. It would
be impossible to do anything like justice to the arguments of Lipset and Bellah within the confines of this
discussion, although some greater effort will proceed in discussion of problematic anomalies to each
system in particular. But what commonality seems to emerge from the critical reviews now grows into a
much stronger indication of commensurability from these synopses. A final stage in the quest involves
consideration of the degree to which such commensurability extends, an important aspect of building the
case of their relationship to this examination of our public faith.

     Undoubtedly, the easiest way to demonstrate commensurability between Lipset and Bellah would be to
utilize Connally's conflict/consensus method. But it has been argued that it runs far deeper than that. On
this theoretical level, there would not appear to be a great deal of self-conscious effort required to bridge
any seeming differences between NATION and HABITS. Both Lipset and Bellah argue conflict in their
systems, and both look toward some method of bridging that with some important new consensus.
Epistemological, while both theories utilized different instruments of analysis to measure reality, their
theories converge around values which construct that reality, such that Lipset's functionalist approach and
Bellah's cultural explanation dovetail. The also approximate a sociology of knowledge approach to a great
extent. When individuals think, it is actually their groups that are projecting through them, and with
modernization, there has been a process of individualization in which motivation is self-interest but in
which all knowledge is socially determined. There is also similarity in their common anti-utopian
ideological demeanor in reference to that system of analysis. And to whatever extent they might be able to
stake any claim to being positivist, they are both without doubt normative interpretists as well. Nor does
there appear to be any significant divergence in their theories of human nature. While the two are largely
determinist in orientation, there is not only a special role for conscious human effort to alter the
construction of reality, but a major impetus of both books involves conscious schemes to resolve conflict
into consensus. Ideological commensurability would thus seem to be a bulwark of each system Further,
human nature would seem to embody some element of inherent goodness, which, however, has been
somewhat sullied by reality, but for which therapeutic remedies are proposed in both Lipset and Bellah.
Both are, as well, ideologically 'liberal' in their orientation. Furthermore, there appears to be little
divergence conceptually. Not only are similar concepts similar in character, but there is conceptual
similarity between alternative terminologies, thus rendering the two theories conceptually and
definitionally commensurable. In fact, commensurability fails virtually nowhere. The overall approach
methodologically, even where it appears to differ somewhat in the compilation of data, not only follows
virtually compatible or even identical paths toward their conclusions, but as was suggested here, the
commensurability thus entailed may even be said to have the same name (it might even be possible to add
Mannheim's name to the previous trilogy of Parsons, Weber, and Tocqueville). And, although Lipset does
not explicitly speak of 'tongues' as Bellah does, he may be said to seek an ultimate 'speaking in tongues' as
resolution of the described conflict, so to speak. 

     There is a sense in which Lipset and Bellah do seem to diverge, at least in the minds of some; a sense
by which Lipset describes a constancy of values from the earliest days of our colonial period down to the
present (at least to his present prior to the upsurges of the sixties) while the Bellah book can be seen as
about the change in America as the biblical and republican strands were supplanted or spoken over by an
individualism which began to emerge about a century ago. Parsons (84) and Lutz (85) addressed this in
their discourses. This would seem indicative of a somewhat opposing view of the character of
individualism. However, as has been argued here, there is another sense in which they converge in which
the perceived static state of Lipset is more properly seen for its tension as not so dissimilar to the Bellah
argument. It is also this that delineates the conflict described here where others have indicated consensus
(and yet, even this liberal consensus notion falls far short of, for example, Hartz). Whereas the former
might contribute to incommensurability in that other sense, this latter would suggest commonality, albeit
somewhat at odds with that argued here. In any event,  neither perfect symmetry nor identical conclusions
may be required where there is a degree of commonality of analysis. 

     It would be appropriate to in some small measure begin to catalogue the commonalties. Common
strains abound throughout the two books. A partial listing of them would begin with their connection to
the signatory quartet of Parsons, Weber, Tocqueville, and Mannheim. It would also include the following
themes, in no particular order:

conflict				elitism vs popular sovereignty		depersonalization
social construction of reality	other-directedness and status-seeking	stable democracy goal
public by private sphere		civic virtue and republicanism		individualism
unchanging American character 	effects of values on social action		socio-historical dynamic
biblical strand			structural correlates of behavior		critique of modernity
Puritan/Protestant Ethic		privatism and privatization			public philosophy
political experience of the		American creed of liberalism		quest for consensus
     Revolution			hypersensitization of nervousness		historical conversation
commitment and community	recommunalization of society		     and languages
religious secularity and 		fragmentation of American life and		public good
     popularized religion		     lifestyle enclaves			bureaucratic mess and
egalitarian/achievement value	success, freedom, justice			     administrative                
     structure								     despotism


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