The last 200 years have witnessed the emergence of modern nationalism and certain exclusivist
demands on the loyalties of the inhabitants of most states of the world. The peoples of Transylvania
are no exception. The linkage that was created between the conception of nationality and the
conception of state was henceforth an important guidepost in the thinking of Rumanians, Hungarians,
and Germans, as well as of the smaller nationality groups who inhabit Transylvania. The nineteenth
century, in particular, saw the beginning of the assertion of differing, and even conflicting,
interpretations of national destiny. Although the previous centuries had already established the basic
patterns of the respective national cultures and their coexistence in Transylvania, the reigns of Joseph
II (1780--90) and Leopold II (1790--92) accentuated the differences on a political level: Joseph II by
trying to impose German as the official language of the empire, his brother by actively playing off the
nationalities against one another to consolidate Habsburg centralization. International events,
particularly the revolution in France, also added to the tensions between the nationalities by popularizing
both the concept of popular sovereignty and the rightness of nationalistic sentiments.

In Transylvania, the Rumanian peasant rising of 1784 is perhaps the first hint of things to come. It is
followed shortly, on a much higher plane, by the submission of the two Supplexes to the Habsburg
rulers (1790, 1792) and by the ever increasing Hungarian demand that Transylvania and royal Hungary
be reunited.

Joseph Held's study on the Horea-Closca-Crisan rising reflects the changing mood in the relations of
the Transylvanian nations. Although this was a classic peasant revolt, with mainly socioeconomic
causes, its timing and its combination with discontent in the Orthodox Christian fold (composed
overwhelmingly of Rumanians) makes it a manifestation of early ethnic Rumanian "nationalism." The
Held analysis provides a balanced description of the causes for unrest, a profile of the traits and
motives of the leaders, and finally a succinct summary of the consequences.

Sixty-five years of development in "national consciousness" took place between 1784 and 1848. This
continued to increase the emotional and psychological distance among Rumanians, Hungarians, and
Germans.

Consequently, when the Revolution of 1848--49 swept through the Habsburg empire, the inhabitants of
Transylvania found themselves on opposite sides in the struggle. Istvan Deak's study focuses on this
struggle. He does not trace the process of polarization, but seeks instead to answer some basic
questions about this event and the longterm effect it had on interethnic relations. In its sweep, the essay
links the past to present realities. At the same time, it points out that the real winners and losers of the
struggle were not determined on the battlefield.

Paul Bõdy's essay attempts to bridge a larger slice of time in the evolution of Rumanian-Hungarian
relations. Its focus is not on one traumatic event, but on the intellectual developments that provided the
framework for Rumanian-Hungarian contacts between 1840 and 1870. Bõdy's concern is to present
the efforts of reconciliation in spite of 1784 and 1848--49.

The reflections of Edsel Walter Stroup and S. B. Vardy address the same historical events and
questions as Held, Deak, and Bõdy. However, they take issue with some of the preceding
interpretations and draw different conclusions about some of the points raised.

Together, these essays portray the political confrontations of the peoples of Transylvania. They also
reveal that nationalist orientations were reaffirmed rather than restrained by the experiences of the late
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Thus, when the next opportunity for confrontation occurs in
1918--20, the results are again characterized by nationalist exclusivism.

1. The Horea-Closca Revolt of 1784--85: Some Observations
by JOSEPH HELD

INTRODUCTION

The outlines of the peasant revolt of 1784--85 in Transylvania are not very difficult to establish. Unrest
was endemic in the southern portions of the province, where the mountains harbored fugitives and
various highwaymen who periodically raided the traveling merchants. On January 3, 1784, Emperor
Joseph II ordered a trial census of the peasantry for the purpose of signing them up for the border
forces as auxiliary militiamen. This created a great deal of hope, especially among the Rumanian
peasants of the Abrudbánya (Abrud, Gross-Schlatten) region, that they would be freed of their feudal
obligations once they had joined the army. During the summer, however, royal agents were sent to
calm the unrest among the peasants by assuring them that they would have to continue serving their
lords and fulfilling their obligations to them. Obviously these agents were not believed; in late October
or early November, open revolt began at the Zalatna (Zlatna) estate of the treasury, spreading to the
adjoining mining districts, then into Hunyad and Krassó-Szörény counties. By the end of the month,
peasants armed themselves against the lords in some villages of the Maros River valley. The unrest
spread throughout the province. After some initial hesitation, the imperial authorities decided to
intervene and sent regular troops against the rebellious people. They successfully suppressed the revolt
by early December. The leaders were betrayed to the authorities by some Rumanian peasants and
were caught later in the month; they were interrogated in January, 1785, and with one exception (who
either committed suicide or died of some unknown cause) were executed in February in the presence
of representatives of a large number of villages. Their bodies (including that of the one who died in jail)
were quartered and put on exhibit in various regions of the province in order to provide an example for
future rebels. The causes of the unrest were then explored by the royal commission, who placed the
blame partly on inept royal officials but mainly upon the shoulders of a recalcitrant Hungarian nobility
for their alleged sabotage

of imperial reforms intended for the rationalization of the administration of Transylvania. The revolt did
for the Rumanians of Transylvania what the massacre of Mádéfalva had done for the Székelys in
1764,[1] namely, it brought home to them the realization that their conationals across the Transylvanian
borders probably constituted a better guarantee of their well-being than did the existing institutions of
the Habsburg state. In this way the unsuccessful revolt became a powerful catalyst of early Rumanian
nationalism.

Peasant revolts in Europe's feudal age followed a recognizable pattern.[2] Part of this pattern
concerned peasant beliefs that too many innovations --- usually in the form of new tax regulations ---
were destroying a formerly "better" or even "freer" way of life. Revolts of this nature usually began
when improvements in peasant life were promised but not delivered by the authorities, creating
expectations that the authorities never really intended to fulfill. It usually seemed to the peasantry that
royal intentions to improve their lot were being sabotaged by "bad advisors" at court or by the local
nobility; they perceived that their foe was not the royal authority but rather its underlings.

The leadership of peasant uprisings usually came from various social strata, and only a few of the
leaders were peasants themselves. Most often the leaders were disgruntled petty noblemen or priests,
or even craftsmen from nearby cities or towns, and sometimes discharged soldiers. The often
indiscriminate looting and burning that accompanied peasant disturbances as well as the attacks on
villages and individual peasants who refused to join the rebellion resulted in the gradual loss of support
for the peasant warriors among their own social class and the isolation of the rebels from the most
satisfied elements in peasant society. The demands of the rebellious peasants were usually too
particularistic --- centering mainly on the solution to some local problem --- to attract universal societal
support.[3]

Many such peasant revolts occurred from the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, most notable
among them the English rising of 1381, the movement of the French Touchin in the late fourteenth
century, the peasant rising of Bábolna in 1437--38 in Transylvania, the Hungarian rebellion of György
Dózsa in 1514, the Karinthian peasant revolt of 1515, the great German peasant war of 1525--26, and
the French, Russian, and Chinese risings of the seventeenth century.[4] The Horea-Closca revolt of
1784--85 represented a late wave of these classic peasant movements.

This last uprising displayed many elements of classic peasant revolts. These included unfulfilled
expectations for the abolition of feudal obligations, for a possibly freer life for the peasants as
militiamen in

the border regiments, and for the general betterment of life for the entire peasantry. An added feature
that made the short-lived uprising so significant, foreshadowing later popular movements in Eastern
Europe, was the issue of an early Rumanian nationalism. There was also the problem of religious
discrimination against Orthodox Christians in Transylvania, the majority of whom belonged to the
ethnically Rumanian population.[5]

To be sure, we cannot as yet speak in terms of a modern-day national consciousness dominating the
thinking and aspirations of the Transylvanian Rumanian peasants who made up the bulk of the warriors
in 1784; but the fact was that they regarded the nobility, whose majority happened to be Hungarian, as
the chief agents of their oppression.[6] At the same time, since the geographic boundaries of the
Rumanian language roughly corresponded to the boundaries of the Orthodox faith in Transylvania, the
common opponents of the faith and of nationality appeared to be the non-Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or
Protestant Hungarians as a whole.[7]

When exploring the issues in Transylvania in 1784, we will want to know more, first of all, about the
social conditions of the population as a whole; this will help us understand the bases of peasant
grievances. We will also want to explore the leadership of the revolt, to find out who the peasant
leaders really were, what goals were set by them, and what the short-term and long-range
consequences of their movement were. In a short essay such as this, the author does not intend to
provide a more detailed description of the actual course of events than the short account above but will
concentrate on these questions, being fully aware of the tentative nature of the answers provided by
the available sources.

THE SOCIAL ISSUES

By the late eighteenth century, the population of Transylvania, now part of the Habsburg Empire but
administered separately from Hungary, was 1.45 million inhabitants.[8] In comparison with the situation
a century before, this figure represented the doubling of the population. However, the increase was
only partly the result of natural growth; most of it came from immigration, largely from the Danubian
Principalities, consisting mainly of Rumanian peasants.[9] There was also a reverse movement of
Hungarians, especially Székelys, leaving Transylvania for the Moldavian lands. Consequently, by the
mid-eighteenth century, over half, or fifty-five percent, of the population were ethnically Rumanian;
about thirty percent were Hungarian, another

ten percent were Saxons, while the rest were South Slavs. One peculiarity of the social composition of
the population was the fact that only about 52,000 people lived in the cities and towns, while the rest
resided in villages. This pointed to an important social characteristic that was to plague the entire region
for the next two centuries, namely, the fact that it lacked an urban middle class.

Accordingly, the two economically, politically, and socially important branches of society consisted of
the nobility and the peasantry. The nobility made up an unusually large segment of the population ---
close to ten percent --- including women and children. The majority of the nobles were ethnically
Hungarian, although there were many Rumanian noblemen, and a narrow stratum of Saxon patricians
may also be considered in this category. But the nobility as such was not a homogeneous stratum.
About 260 of the richest, most powerful families were the so-called magnates, possessing the largest
estates in the province, dominating practically every facet of social life in Transylvania. The rest of the
nobility lived under more modest conditions, sometimes not very different from those of the
peasantry.[10]

The policies of the Habsburg administration in Transylvania were openly exploitative, representing an
early colonial regime, throughout the entire eighteenth century. These policies were devised to syphon
off the wealth of the province through a system of tariffs and taxes, regardless of the consequences of
such policies on the economic base that was already strained by the population increase. In order to be
able to derive the maximum income from Transylvania for the royal treasury, the administration's first
task appeared to be to free the peasants from landlord control --- and from the accompanying feudal
obligations paid to the nobility. It was at this point that the interests of the peasantry and the royal
representatives seemed to coincide. But this was only apparent. In fact, the Habsburg rulers were not
that much interested in easing the burdens of the peasants; they simply wanted to free them from
landlord control in order to have them exploited by the state.[11] These policies, of course, ran directly
counter to the very survival of the nobility as a social group.

In comparison with the life style of similar social groups in Hungary proper and in the Austrian
crownlands, the Transylvanian nobles were poor indeed. With the exception of the magnates, their sole
means of survival as nobles depended upon the services and obligations rendered by the serfs. In order
to increase their income and "catch up" with the nobility of the rest of the Habsburg Empire, many
Transylvanian nobles (following the example of their fellow nobles elsewhere in the Habsburg lands)
gradually altered peasant obligations until, during

the second half of the eighteenth century, the peasants' burdens were considerably increased.[12]
What was especially injurious was the steep increase in the number of days required of the peasants to
work on their lord's land; by the second half of the century, most of the workweek of peasants was
spent on the robot, leaving them little time to work their own plots.[13] While the Habsburg
administration tried by various means to lower the peasants' obligations to the nobility, the nobles
naturally resisted these efforts as a direct attack upon their lifestyle and social status, and tried to
achieve just the opposite.

However, the situation was not the same on all noble estates. On the lands of the magnates, for
instance, there was enough ploughland available for the use of the peasants, and they were permitted
to till these lands for their own benefit after the fulfillment of their obligations. But the lesser nobles felt
forced to exclude many peasants from lands that the latter had used for generations, as these nobles
saw greater profits if they used these lands themselves. At the same time, they demanded more days
of labor from the serfs. Furthermore, while the magnates were generally away from their estates most
of the year, the lesser nobles were in daily contact with the serfs, who saw in them the personification
of their exploitation. It must be emphasized once again that most lesser nobles were Hungarians, while
a large number of serfs were ethnically Rumanian. Not only did they belong to different language
groups, but to different religious denominations as well. No wonder that the fury of the revolt of
1784--85 was to be directed against the lesser nobility, i.e., the Hungarians.

There also existed a great deal of arbitrariness in peasant-landlord relations, and not only in
Transylvania, but throughout the entire Habsburg Empire. The demands of the lords varied not only
from province to province, but sometimes even within individual estates. This was the case not only in
privately held estates, but also on lands controlled by the royal treasury, such as, for instance, the estate
of Zalatna, where the spark of the revolt was eventually struck. Arbitrariness not only fostered
dissatisfaction and tension in the countryside, but it seriously interfered with the orderly administration
of the province, especially the collection of taxes.[14]

Vienna realized early in the eighteenth century that no systematic taxation could be devised without the
uniform regulation of landlord-peasant relations. In the views of Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II,
"enlightened rule" in the empire required the reduction or even elimination of peasant obligations to the
landlords, in order to free peasant resources for the purposes of the state.[15] Nor could the empire
create a strong military organization, one that it increasingly

needed in the face of challenges from France, Prussia, and Russia, without drawing upon the masses
of the peasantry for soldiers, if not for the regular army, at least for the border guards. Since the
peasants were, for the most part, under the jurisdiction of the nobles, the evident aim of the enlightened
absolutist Habsburg state was to transform and restrict the system of serfdom that, in these instances,
seemed to have outlived its usefulness.[16] But the stiff opposition of the nobility, centering on the
county administrations that they controlled, slowed down or even sabotaged all royal attempts at
reform.[17]

The peasantry itself was divided into several social strata ethnically as well as economically. There
were Rumanian peasants following the Orthodox faith, or of the Uniate church; there were also
Hungarian, Saxon, and South Slav peasants living in the province, belonging to other religious
denominations. They were either dominicales (tenant farmers), having a contractual relationship with
their landlords, or were ordinary iobagiones (serfs), settled on and tied to the land. Although a tenant
was theoretically free to move and did not need his lord's permission to get married, and his sons were
free to chose a craft if they so pleased (all these restrictions were applied to the serfs), the tenant was
subject to the lord's juridical and administrative authority.[18] The Habsburg emperors tried, first of all,
to set limits on the amount of peasant obligations due the landlords. Thus, Maria Theresa attempted to
equalize peasant status by declaring all peasants to be free tenants.[19] When Joseph II came to rule
alone, he was determined to further reduce the weight of feudalism in his realms. Between 1783 and
1785, he not only declared all serf obligations to be abolished in Transylvania and Hungary proper (also
in Bohemia and the crownlands), but also ended the age-old restrictions on marriage, on the freedom to
move, and of occupation. At the same time, he issued a decree imposing a thirty percent tax on
peasant incomes in lieu of the former feudal obligations.[20] Although this was a severe demand, since
the peasants possessed little cash money, the overall intentions of the emperor were interpreted by the
people, especially the Rumanian peasants, as proof of his good will towards them. In turn, the nobility's
opposition to the royal decrees (never cleared by the duly constituted legal authorities) was regarded by
the peasants as an openly hostile act not only against the emperor but also against themselves.

The military situation in the Balkan peninsula after the expulsion of the Turks from Hungary at the end
of the seventeenth century demanded that the empire build up its border forces. In turn, the state
needed more soldiers to man the outposts of the realm. More soldiers naturally meant the need for
more money for their maintenance; this

could only be achieved through the reorganization of the empire's taxation policies and through the
partial elimination of special privileges that exempted the largest group of the wealthiest inhabitants, the
nobility, from the tax rolls.

As early as 1762, Maria Theresa had tried to establish a new system of border defenses in
Transylvania (similar to the military border created in the Croatian lands of the empire), which led to
the resistance and massacre of the free Székelys by the regular Habsburg army at Mádéfalva.[21] On
the other hand, large numbers of Rumanian serfs welcomed the establishment of border regiments,
since by joining these forces they expected to gain freedom from their serf obligations. When Joseph II
opened recruitment on a trial basis in 1784, the Rumanian peasants of the Beszterce (Bistritz, Bistrita)
region signed up en masse, as did the male population from numerous villages near Gyulafehérvár, the
capital of Transylvania, and from some villages in the Maros River valley. This only strengthened the
nobles' resolve to oppose the establishment of the border regiments, since they regarded the
recruitment of peasants without their permission as evidence of the high-handedness of the Habsburg
state. Accordingly, they did everything in their power to stop the peasants from joining the army. At the
same time, the imperial authorities became alarmed by the apparent success of their own initiative;
they were surprised at the intensity of peasant response to their call and began canceling the
recruitment drive.[22]

By then, the emperor's reforms included decrees for religious toleration in Hungary and Transylvania,
orders for the unification of the chancelleries of the two political entities, and the creation of new
administrative districts, replacing the age-old system of county government. Joseph II also declared
that ability, not birth, was to be the basis of future appointments to government offices and that German
would replace Latin as the language of the administration in his domains, including Transylvania, within
three years.

Many of the Rumanian peasants greeted these reforms with jubilation. At a stroke of the emperor's
pen, their religion gained equal status with the other religions of Transylvania,[23] their status as serfs
had been greatly eased, and once again they were called to sign up for the border forces. They cared
little about changes in the official language, which was alien to them in any case. When the
administrators tried to intervene with their signing up for the army, they regarded this as a conspiracy
against the emperor's orders. But long-simmering discontent did not break out into open rebellion on the
lands controlled by the nobility. Actual trouble started on the estate of the treasury at Zalatna.

Peasant unrest was, of course, not a new phenomenon in Transylvania. Peasants-turned-highwaymen
periodically raided villages and small towns. After each raid they withdrew into the mountains or, if the
pursuit were too vigorous, they moved into Moldavia or Wallachia through the mountain passes. Entire
counties were made unsafe by these highwaymen during the eighteenth century. In Arad and Zaránd
counties, few merchants ventured on the open road without strong escort, and the villages paid regular
tribute to the highwaymen.[24] Nor were the robbers lacking in local sympathy. They were often
considered the successors to the legendary fighters against the Turks who had freed captive peasants
and took vengeance on the Muslim enemy. For many peasants, the highwaymen were now simply
fighting another oppressor who happened to be either an Austrian official or a Hungarian
nobleman.[25]

Many of the bands were made up of former soldiers who had found army life too demanding and thus
deserted. They were resourceful men who were thoroughly familiar with the locality in which they
operated and often knew the administrators on a personal basis. In Arad County, they even captured
the head of the county administration, Count András Forray, and held him for ransom and for a pledge
of amnesty.[26] Most highwaymen were ethnically Rumanian; according to some reports, entire
districts were involved in their affairs, the peasants accepting and selling their loot and providing safe
havens for them between raids.[27] Some of the highwaymen were to play an important role in the
revolt of 1784--85.

The problems of the estate of Zalatna were not new either, and they reflected peasant discontent in a
microcosm. The administrators of the estate pressed the peasants for more and more days of labor. At
the same time, they were involved in a scheme to deprive the treasury of some of its income from the
estate, a scheme discovered during 1784. After the scandal, the administrators were replaced by new
ones, who tried to press the peasants to fulfill their obligations to the estate in order to erase the
memory of the past. Another problem was that the peasants were forbidden to clear forest lands for
cultivation, since the trees were needed for the mines administered by the estate. Given contemporary
agrarian techniques and an expanding population, the peasants did need more land; their interests, thus,
clashed sharply with those of the estate. The estate also demanded higher taxes from its serfs for the
support of the ever-expanding population of officials and of the village judges who served both the
estate and the county authorities. A long-standing peasant grievance came to the fore in early 1784,
when the peasants protested the authorities' discriminatory practices

against the Orthodox faith. This had already caused a minor disturbance at the estate in the 1740s.[28]

Yet, the immediate cause of the outbreak was a seemingly insignificant dispute over peasant
innkeeping rights. Such disputes were, naturally, inherent in the system of serfdom. These rights were
included in patents originally issued by the Princes Báthory of Transylvania in the sixteenth century, but
were gradually forgotten and disregarded. In 1784, the estate leased innkeeping rights to certain
merchants. When copies of the original patents were found and submitted by the peasants to the
governor of the estate, they were told that their rights were no longer valid and that the estate was
entitled to lease the innkeeping privileges to whomever it chose. This argument was accepted by the
county administration.

THE LEADERS

Nicola-Vasilii Urs, nicknamed Hora (Horea) for his strong voice,[29] was born around 1730 in Zaránd
County. He is called a serf by all sources, but he certainly was not an ordinary peasant. He was
actually a carpenter by trade; according to the customs of the time, he travelled a great deal, seeking
work and becoming well-acquainted with conditions of life among the simple people. By the time he
appeared on the scene, he was regarded as spokesman for the Rumanian peasants at the Zalatna
estate and was considered a troublemaker by the officials.[30] It seems that he remained a great
traveler; sources maintain that he visited Vienna four times,[31] each time seeking and gaining an
audience with the emperor --- an unlikely possibility --- requesting imperial help against the exploitation
of the peasants by the estate officials and the Hungarian nobles.[32]

It would be well to reiterate that Horea was not a peasant in the ordinary sense of the term; he did not
make his living by tilling the soil or raising animals. Despite the undoubtedly broader perspective that he
gained during his travels, he failed to grasp the full meaning of imperial policies in Transylvania. He
was absolutely, if naively, convinced that the running conflict of the emperor with the nobility placed
the ruler in the same camp with the peasants. He expected imperial approval --- if not outright, direct
support --- in the coming peasant uprising against the "common enemy." He believed that the emperor's
sympathies were strong enough to stay the hands of local military commanders at least until the
peasants succeeded in eliminating the influence of the Hungarian nobles from the Transylvanian
province once and for all.

Ion Oarga, or Closca, was a serf from the village of Carpinis, located near Abrudbánya. He was
seventeen years Horea's junior when the uprising began. He was loyal to Horea to the very end; their
friendship may have begun (and became cemented) during Horea's journeys to Vienna, on which
Closca probably accompanied him. He was the most likely author of the document presenting peasant
demands during the uprising. Although we know very little of Closca's life, he certainly did not appear
to have been just another ordinary peasant of the eighteenth century either.[33]

Giurgu Marcu, called Crisan, the third leader of the peasant uprising, was a former professional soldier.
We do not know if he was discharged from the army or if he simply deserted; we only know that he
was about Horea's age. He was the military organizer of the uprising, an excellent tactician, and a
sharp-eyed strategist. It was probably Crisan who organized the distribution and movement of the
peasant forces during the uprising; he foresaw that only through simultaneous attacks in various regions
could the uprising gain enough momentum for success. We know that he, too, was originally from
Zaránd County, but there is little else in the documents about his earlier life.[34]

The nineteen-year-old son of Nicola-Vasilii Urs, Ion Horea, was the fourth major leader of the revolt.
He worked closely with Closca at the outbreak of the uprising, but he gained an independent command
as the fighting progressed. However, he was nicknamed after his father; this shows that he did not
have enough time to assume a separate identity and, thus, remained the least important of the four
leaders of the uprising.

There was a sizeable contingent of soldiers and highwaymen --- about 150 or so out of 4,000--5,000
fighters --- who made up the second echelon of the leadership of the peasant troops. They provided the
tactical know-how for the insurgent army, teaching the peasants the swift, organized movements that
characterized their type of warfare. Their major problem was the poor armament of their troops. As
long as they faced only the frightened and disorganized nobility, they had an easy and victorious
campaign; however, as soon as they had to contend with the troops of the regular army, their fighting
spirit quickly disappeared.

The demands of the insurgents were formulated as the revolt progressed. At first, in the white heat of
hatreds that accumulated over the years, the only desire of the peasants was to kill the nobles, burn
their castles or houses together with the documents of peasant servitude, and carry away as much of
the nobles' property as could be found. However, after the initial fury of the revolt was spent, Horea
and

Closca proceeded to formulate more precise --- if simplistic --- aims that, they seemed to believe,
corresponded to the ideas of the reform-minded emperor.

The demands were few and to the point. First of all, the peasants asked for the abolition of the
privileges of the nobility. This meant that the peasants were no longer to be required to provide a living
for the noblemen. However, mindful that the nobles would need a way to make a living, they
suggested, perhaps somewhat naively, that the nobles be given positions in the imperial bureaucracy as
suited their individual abilities. This way the emperor's declaration about ability as the basis for office
would have been fulfilled. The next demand was the confiscation of all noble estates and their
distribution among the peasantry. Finally, the last demand argued that the nobility, no longer being in a
privileged position, should be required to pay state taxes, as were the rest of the population. By this, the
public burdens would be distributed more evenly among the population.[35] In plain language, the
Rumanian peasants wanted political equality and land reform; if fulfilled, these demands would have
automatically taken care of local grievances and ended serfdom in Transylvania in fact as well as in
theory.

These demands also reflected the influence of the European Enlightenment as it filtered down from the
royal court through the provincial administrators to the peasantry. If Joseph II really wanted to
rationalize his administration, so the peasants seemed to reason, and if the major obstacle in his way
was the resistance of the nobility, the peasants would not only eliminate this obstacle by force, but
would make sure that the emperor would have enough men to choose from to upgrade his
bureaucracy. If he were anxious to establish an equitable system of taxation, the peasants would help
him in this endeavor by making all people equal. The demand for land reform reflected the conviction
that land, the basis of all wealth and security in that age, should be shared among those who could
derive the greatest benefits from it.

THE CONSEQUENCES

The immediate consequences of the revolt were not as severe as could be expected or as the nobility
wanted them to be. Despite the hundreds of noble families indiscriminately massacred by the
insurgents, the retributions were comparatively mild. It was true that about thirty-seven men were
executed in a most barbaric manner (though not at all unusual in that "enlightened" age) by the
authorities to instill in future would-be revolutionaries fear of the power of the state.[36] But

the commission set up by Joseph II to examine the causes of the revolt suggested leniency towards
ordinary participants, freeing many of them and commuting the sentences of others. Joseph II believed
that the royal administration of Transylvania was at least partly to be blamed for the uprising, and he
also maintained that, had his reforms been executed without obstruction by the nobility, the revolt could
have been avoided. Accordingly, the emperor urged the Transylvanian administrators to proceed with
the execution of royal decrees without further delay as the best guarantee of the social peace of the
province.[37]

But the long-range consequences of the uprising were more serious. They included the intangible but
certainly greater consciousness of national hatreds and suspicion between Rumanians and Hungarians
in general. Just as the Rumanian peasants and their spokesmen after the uprising, the Orthodox priests,
and the emerging Rumanian intellectual class transferred their hatred of the Hungarian nobility to all
Hungarians regardless of class, so the Hungarians reciprocated. Both peoples were to enter an age of
strident, jingoistic nationalism. The ideologues of each nation were eventually to deny the other nation's
right to existence. The struggle for national supremacy in Transylvania was to be buttressed by all sorts
of myths and outright lies, usually based on the primitive argument of "who was there first," as if ethnic
groups who have lived on a territory for nearly a millennium could ever be regarded by anyone as
"newcomers."
 
 

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