In the last months of 1912 a new class of battleship was laid down in the United States at Quincy, Massachusetts; and Camden, New Jersey; which was to have a most profound and lasting influence on capital-ship design all over the world. The ships were the Oklahoma and Nevada, America's first "Second Generation" Dreadnoughts. They can be considered as the genesis of a family of ten more American battleships, and the family tree of every "Third Generation" capital ship can be traced back to them.
Since the earliest days of the ironclad in the 1860's, a number of theoretical wars had raged between various principles of design and degrees of compromise, between the value of the offensive and defensive, between various forms of propulsion (sail had fought bitterly to the end), between different types of gun. In very few cases was a conclusion reached, because there were very few battles. Deductions had to be drawn from the most tenuous evidence, on maneuvers, and even from accidents. For example, the ram was dropped only when it became disastrously evident that it was a greater threat to friends in peace than it was likely to be to enemies in war. Even from the few battles fought, the lessons were confused, contradictory, and mostly erroneous. The misguided belief about the deadly "hail of fire" has already been mentioned. Another so-called lesson from the Russo-Japanese War was that, after all, the torpedo was no real threat. But during the first fifty years of life of the armored ship of the line, the most violent theoretical hostilities of all had raged between the gun and armor. In the 1870's and 1880's especially, increases in the strength and resistance of armor plate, in the power of the high-explosive shell, and variations in the importance attached to speed, protection, and hitting power, all brought about fundamental changes in the shape and fighting capacity of the battleship, and in the degree of emphasis designers gave to guns and armor. At one stage in the guns versus armor contest the caliber of the primary weapons rose to 15-inch and 16-inch, and finally to 17.7-inch, a caliber to be exceeded later only by British and Japanese ordnance. To meet the threat of these giant shells, the weight and thickness of armor plate rose accordingly. The power of resistance of armor plate was also constantly increased. On some ships in the 1870's, the weight of armor began to account for a third of the total displacement, and the thickness went up to over 10 inches. Everything was sacrificed to a few big guns in impenetrable citadels; in others the armor was spread out here and there over the most vital parts in order that greater speed, and the ability to evade other battleships, could be obtained. These two grotesque and frightful extremes in men-of-war were very early prototypes of the Dreadnought battleship and battle cruiser of forty years later.
Battleships of the 1870's mounting the heaviest possible guns behind the thickest possible armor plate over vital areas were referred to as "all-or-nothing" ships. If you were hit where it mattered, it did not matter; if you were hit where it did not matter, then that did not matter either. That was the theory. Later, theorists thought that after all it might matter if the stern, rudder, and propellers were riddled through and through and that the ship might even sink. Therefore design principles went back again to the earlier compromise arrangement of a bit of armor here and there where it was especially important. This prevailed until 1912. In that year the design staff of the American Bureau of Construction persuaded the Department of the Navy of the benefits to be gained by returning again to "all-or-nothing" principles. The Oklahoma and Nevada were therefore equipped with a single deep 13 1/2-inch belt extending over the machinery, magazines, turret bases, conning tower, and funnel base; a thinner belt of some 8 inches over the propeller shafts, and so on, up to 18 inches on the turrets; and 3 inches on the deck. The secondary battery and large areas of the hull and upper works remained entirely unprotected. All battleships of all nations built after the First World War imitated this arrangement.
This was not the only formidable feature of the Oklahoma and Nevada. The 45-caliber 14-inch gun, first installed in the New York and Texas, was a fine piece of ordnance. In these new ships it was most economically installed in two triple turrets (the first in an American battleship) and two superfiring twin turrets, offering a broadside superior to all but the 15-inch gunned British and German ships. However, when it became known that the latest class of Japanese battleship, laid down before either the Oklahoma or Nevada, showed a superiority of broadside amounting to 20 percent, steps were taken in 1913 to increase the gunpower yet again, with a corresponding rise in displacement, for the first time in the United States Navy to over the 30,000-ton mark. The Pacific battleship race, that was soon to dominate the naval scene and was stimulated into momentum by the North Sea contest, was already well under way. The Pennsylvania and Arizona, carrying twelve 14-inch, were built rapidly, and represented, according to Fighting Ships (1919), "one of the most successful, if not the most successful, of all Dreadnought designs up to the present time." The similar New Mexico, Idaho, and Mississippi of the 1914 program were followed by the California and Tennessee; and in 1916 authorization was given to yet another group, this time armed with eight 16-inch guns in four twin turrets. The last of these not completed until the end of 1923, a date that marks the end of the "Second Generation" American Dreadnought. Their influence was fundamental; twelve vessels produced were not surpassed anywhere until the "Third Generation" Dreadnoughts of the late 1930's and 1940's.
The characteristics of the American "Second Generation" ships were greatest acceptable artillery power mounted on a platform protected, "where it mattered," by armor plate up to 18 inches thick on the turrets and 16 inches on the deep belt. These two qualities were obtained at a sacrifice of speed, contrary to contemporary Japanese practice, the revolutionary Queen Elizabeths of the Royal Navy (about four knots faster), and the robust German battle cruisers. To deal with the guns first. The twelve 14-inch of the Pennsylvania, Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho, Mississippi, California, and Tennessee offered a broadside weight of 16,800 pounds, compared with the German Baden's 13,200 pounds and the Queen Elizabeth's 15,360 pounds. The turrets in the American ships were roomy and well arranged. In the earlier ships the guns in the triple turrets could be fired together as one piece; in the later ships they were mounted in separate sleeves. Their rate of fire was higher than that of British and even of German heavy ordnance. Three rounds a minute were attainable. "To the foresight and good judgement of the men responsible for our battleships we owe the fact that ... our gunners will be able to fire from 20 percent to 40 percent more projectiles in a given time than the enemy," reported Current Literature as early as July, 1911.
Experimental work on the 45-caliber 16-inch weapon was completed in 1917, just before the first of the Marylands was laid down. The decision to go over to the 16-inch gun had been reached only after prolonged and fierce argument in the Navy Department. It was accepted that the 14-inch shell could pierce anything the 16-inch could pierce up to the gun's maximum range. On the other hand, the muzzle energy of the 16-inch was 100,000 foot-tons, compared with 70,000 of the 14-inch, and the range of the 16-inch at 30 degrees' elevation was some 33,000 yards, or almost 50 percent greater than that of the smaller gun, although this was improved by higher elevation and by the 50-caliber 14-inch in later ships. And of course the 16-inch shell was much heavier at 2,100 pounds. However, in 1917 rumors of a British 18-inch, German 17-inch, and Japanese 16-inch were rife, and these settled the matter. All future American battleships were armed with 16-inch guns.
The 5-inch topedo-defense weapons were mounted mainly in unprotected casemates on the upper and main decks, the lower ones being removed later when their limited value was recognized.
The rise in the standard displacement of these twelve vessels from 27,500 tons to over 32,000 tons was accounted for mainly by the improvements in internal defense and in deck protection. The dangers from plunging fire and internal explosion (as at Jutland), from submarine attack (the most fearful preoccupation of fleet commanders in the First World War), and the future threat of the aerial bomb, were all being increasingly recognized from 1916 to 1920, the years when the last five of these ships were laid down. All twelve "Second Generation" battleships were turbine-driven, with oil-fired boilers. All but the first four were fitted with a unique form of turboelectric drive, which was highly successful and was developed to a more sophisticated level later.
"Second Generation" Dreadnought construction was marked by two main trends of fundamental importance. The first was the elimination of the lead in material gained by Germany over Great Britain. The second was the consistency and conservatism of American policy compared with the daring experimental trend in Japan. The United States Navy Department, having once found the secret of the best possible compromise formula in the Oklahoma and Nevada, stuck to it for ten years. In Japan the restless, pioneering, experimental spirit prevailed, to dominate the policy of the Imperial Admiralty.
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Last Updated 16 January 2000
