Here are some of the comments about security at ANSTO before and after the December 17, 2001 Greenpeace action in which 40-50 campaigners walked and climbed into ANSTO's Lucas Heights plant, clambered over the reactor and a spent fuel storage building, and generally did whatever they wanted while another Greenpeace campaigner made a mockery of ANSTO's 'secure air space' with a paraglider.

Before:

"All our nuclear facilities and materials are protected in accordance with stringent national and international physical protection obligations. These arrangements are reviewed regularly by the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office and other national security authorities. Very few reactors around the world would enjoy the security arrangements that HIFAR does. HIFAR is located inside its own stringent security zone within the Lucas Heights site which in turn has its own general security arrangements. The site is surrounded by a 1.6 kilometre buffer zone that excludes residential development."
-- ANSTO website, "Q & A - ANSTO Research Reactor Alleged Security Threats", October 23, 2001.

"Following those [September 11, 2001] attacks, the responsible government security authorities issued a general notification to all Commonwealth agencies to maintain enhanced security awareness. ANSTO is presently maintaining increased vigilance."
-- ANSTO website, "Q & A - ANSTO Research Reactor Alleged Security Threats", October 23, 2001.

"Attempts to create the impression that security is wanting at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre are irresponsible and achieve little except raising unfounded anxiety."
-- letter from ANSTO chief executive Helen Garnett to St George & Sutherland Shire Leader, October 10, 2001 (on ANSTO's website)

"Jim Green ... attempts to create the impression that security is wanting at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre. This is far from the truth."
-- letter from ANSTO chief executive Helen Garnett to Australian Financial Review and Daily Telegraph, October 17, 2001 (and posted on ANSTO's website)

After:

"We won't be rushed into any change of security procedures, because we know we have very strong security."
-- Federal Science Minister Peter McGauran

"Notwithstanding the low level of threat, as assessed by the Australian Protective Services, their [Greenpeace campaigners'] whereabouts was monitored."
-- ANSTO media release, December 18, 2001.

"If there is a breach, then the Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation is in the hot seat."
-- A spokesman for the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority, The Advertiser, December 18, 2001. ANSTO in the hot seat? Really? Not likely - ANSTO's Helen Garnett sat on the panel which selected the CEO of the 'independent' regulatory agency ARPANSA.

“There is no question that a nuclear reactor puts an unacceptable level of risk on Australia’s largest metropolis. Nuclear reactors are vulnerable to both accidents and attack - all around the world we are seeing a boost in security measure around what are essentially indefensible targets.”
-- Defense strategist Michael McKinley, Senior Lecturer at the Australian National University, quoted in Greenpeace media release, 'Peaceful protest proves reactor unsafe', December 17, 2001

“An accident or attack that breached the core of the reactor would release a huge amount of radioactive particles, including Caesium and Plutonium, into the atmosphere above Sydney. A worst case scenario could see a radioactive smoke plume drifting across large areas of NSW. The nuclear industry’s claim that a 1.6km safety buffer is adequate in case of an accident is ludicrous. Quite obviously wind and weather will not obey an arbitrary boundary just because ANSTO says so.”
-- UK nuclear physicist Frank Barnaby, quoted in Greenpeace media release, 'Peaceful protest proves reactor unsafe', December 14, 2001.

"There is enough radioactive material at Lucas Heights - both in the core of the reactor and in stored waste material - to pose a massive environmental and health risk. The impact would be severe because the reactor is so close to a major city."
-- UK nuclear physicist Frank Barnaby, quoted in Greenpeace media release, 'Public outrage over nuclear forum farce', December 14, 2001.

"... the literature does not support the minister’s [Nick Minchin] claim that INVAP has a ‘solid track record’. It is not that it has a poor track record. It has no track record on the reactor of significance - that is, a 20-megawatt reactor. My fairly long exposure to the engineers of Technicatome, Siemens and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd leads me to the view that the INVAP choice, though possibly a good choice, was a risky one. When considered against the backdrop of the Collins submarine project, where we again chose to forsake experienced vendors in favour of the new boy on the block, I might even suggest that the decision was courageous."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, evidence to Senate Select Committee Reactor Inquiry, 2000.

"We were surprised that the tender process ... led to the selection of the competitor which is generally considered to be the least experienced. For example, as far as we know none of the reactors built so far by the winning competitor have ... cold or hot sources or neutron guide hall installed, silicide fuel or containment."
--Technicatome, the French company which lost the reactor bid.

"The most publicly appealing rationale for a replacement reactor is the provision of medical radioisotopes. ... But of all the programs associated with the replacement reactor this operation also carries the greatest risk, the greatest potential for massive contamination release and the most significant future weapons proliferation potential. ... The reality is that there (is) already a substantial irradiated uranium processing operation at Lucas Heights with all the hazards that implies, including the storage of intermediate level liquid radioactive waste in ammonium nitrate solution which carries the risk of chemical explosion. ... It should be understood that a chemical explosion involving this material would release dangerous quantities of airborne fission products."

"Contrary to my previous impression, the corrosion of old spent fuel HIFAR rods is a real concern. A few rods are already deemed unacceptable for reprocessing in the U.S., although the reasons for this are obscure and may change."

-- Murray Scott, scientist employed at ANSTO for 14-15 years.

"No PRA (probabilistic risk assessment) would have considered the possibility that a licensed reactor operator would actually turn the Emergency Core Cooling system off during a LOCA yet that occurred at Three Mile Island."
"Similarly operators are not expected to disable large numbers of safety related systems in violation of technical specifications, yet this was done at Chernobyl. Thus human errors of commission may be very significant to actual risks, yet at present there is no comprehensive method by which such actions can be examined as part  of a probabilistic risk assessment."
--Reactor Safety Course given by the Technical Training Division, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated November 1997

"If the world’s worst terrorist event, the world’s worst reactor accident, and the worst reactor accidents in the UK and the USA, were all unforseen and could not have been anticipated in a probabilistic risk assessment, am I asking too much to expect ANSTO to admit of this possibility in its PRA?"
"If I could sum up my position on this topic in two sentences it would be: While probabilistic risk analysis is a very important process for improving the safety of reactor designs it is still theoretical in nature and not part of the real world. The real world belongs to Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Windscale, Browns Ferry, SL1 and several near misses I could nominate and the emergency plan bridges the gap. ANSTO does not understand this distinction, hence its misleading public statements on the emergency arrangements."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, presentation to ARPANSA Public Forum, February 17, 2001.

"Another document called the Sutherland Shire Local Disaster Plan is needed to cater for the public. This plan is a most remarkable document. In this case the vulnerable community represents the people in the Sutherland Shire who would be exposed in the event of a reactor accident and it lists a number of hazards to which they might be exposed, such as bushfires, earthquakes, oil spills and aircraft crashes, but there is no mention of radioactivity, among the hazards. In the whole document there is no mention of the words "iodine" or "nuclear" or " reactor" and only one mention of "ANSTO". No one would guess from reading this plan that there was a nuclear reactor in the area. ... Here is a document presented as a reactor emergency plan that doesn’t mention the words "reactor" or "radioactivity" because it doesn’t want to upset people."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, presentation to ARPANSA Public Forum, February 17, 2001.

“Because of inept executive management there is no succession planning within the organisation. Although it will be strongly denied by ANSTO, it is well known by those in the field that the new reactor project is having difficulty finding sufficient nuclear literate staff to address the tender process. It is understood that the current full-time staff on the program had their origins in the AAEC and are up for retirement. Inept management, no succession planning? Who is going to safely operate a new reactor in Sutherland Shire.”
-- ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000.

“The ANSTO Board has a very limited idea of what is really transpiring at Lucas Heights. For instance, the radiation contamination scare last year was only brought to the staff’s attention because of a local newspaper. The incident was of such gravity, that the executive should have made an announcement over the site-emergency monitor about the incident to inform the staff. Instead the management practiced a culture of secrecy and cover-up, even to the extent of actively and rudely dissuading staff from asking too many questions about the event. The unions were outraged at the executive management concerning this incident but passively towed the management line because they wanted job security with a new reactor.”
-- ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000.

“The ANSTO management appears to be endeavoring to muzzle staff comments external to the organisation (through the use of) Acknowledgment Undertaking (forms).”
-- ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000.

"The Committee is highly critical of ANSTO's approach to providing documents. Its attitude seems to stem from a culture of secrecy so embedded that it has lost sight of its responsibility to be accountable to the Parliament."
-- Senate Select Committee Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, Final Report, May 2001.

Even Liberal and National Party senators on the Committee said "... that ANSTO could have been more helpful in providing certain less commercially sensitive information to the Committee and could have been more willing to seek a compromise when sensitive material was involved."
-- Senate Select Committee Inquiry into the Contract for a New Reactor at Lucas Heights, Final Report, May 2001.

"If I had to sum up my concerns in one sentence, it would be that for the first time in my long association with the AAEC and ANSTO I do not feel comfortable with what the organisation (ANSTO) is telling the public and its own staff."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, evidence to Senate Select Committee Reactor Inquiry, 2000.

"I think ANSTO has a problem in so much as it likes to sugar-coat its information."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, quoted in Sydney Morning Herald Online, "Reactor engineer says safety inadequate", December 17, 2001

"If it is normal for the proponent (of an EIS) to tell the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth, then ANSTO's presentation is normal. Sometimes the difference between the truth and the whole truth is quite remarkable."
--Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, EIS submission, 1998.

"I believe that it is very important that the public be told the truth even if the truth is unpalatable. I have cringed at some of ANSTO’s public statements. Surely there is someone at ANSTO with a practical reactor background and the courage to flag when ANSTO is yet again, about to mislead the public. For example, the claim ANSTO makes for nuclear indemnity is indefensible ..."
-- Tony Wood, former head of ANSTO's Divisions of Reactors and Engineering, presentation to ARPANSA Public Forum, December 17, 2001.

"A very disturbing feature of the Maralinga project is the lack of openness about what was done. Even those who might be the future custodians of the land have not been kept truthfully informed on the project. ... The newly formed ARPANSA also has not performed particularly well in its first major assignment - the Maralinga project. Unless their performance as regulators improves, then the new reactor project will be a trail of compromises as is the case on the Maralinga project."
-- Alan Parkinson, former employee of AAEC & Federal Department of Industry, Science & Resources.

"Shonky"
-- Prof. Max Brennan, former Chair of the ANSTO Board, describing the Access Economics study which purports to demonstrate economic benefits deriving from the operation of a research reactor.

"(It is an) unfortunate state of affairs that dear old ANSTO, which lives off taxpayer's money, is feeding us all this propaganda and very little objective information. I thought governmental agencies are there to serve the public - not just to perpetuate themselves."
-- Nuclear engineer employed at ANSTO for over 25 years.

Ex-ANSTO scientist and now President of the Australian Nuclear Association, Dr. Clarence Hardy, complained about the "culture of secrecy" at ANSTO when giving evidence to a parliamentary Public Works Committee inquiry in 1999.

In 2000, the Sydney Morning Herald and Greenpeace were told that to acquire two and 22 pages of information
respectively under Freedom of Information requests, they would be charged $7099 and $6809.

"The real agenda [behind the plan for a new reactor] has nothing to do with science or medicine; it's international politics."
-- ANSTO's medical research director Bill Burch (1997, pers. comm.)

In evidence to the 1993 Research Reactor Review, nuclear medicine specialist Dr. Harvey Turner said that there was strong competition between ANSTO and foreign suppliers for supply of a number of isotopes in Western Australia. According to Dr. Turner, the Australian products were of inferior quality but: “Western Australia, for purely chauvinistic reasons, elected to go with the ANSTO product, because there was a threat that, if they did not have a market, they would close down their production facility for isotopes in Australia. ... In fact, the multi-national companies were considering legal action under the Trade Practices Act, because they considered that what we were doing was not in the interest of freedom of trade and, indeed, I guess it was not”.
-- Research Reactor Review, Transcript of Proceedings, Public Hearing, Perth, March 23 1999, p.780.

“The reactor HIFAR will be shut down from 7 February to 1 May, 2000. ANSTO’s radioisotope production has suffered no dislocation as a result of the shutdown, since bulk supplies of radioisotopes are purchased from the big international players in Canada and South Africa. Indeed it is understood that we can purchase bulk supplies of radioactive molybdenum (ANSTO’s major seller in the form of a ‘generator’) from one supplier more cheaply than ANSTO can produce it. If HIFAR was so essential to the supply of radioisotopes why has there been no effective production dislocation during the shutdown.”
-- ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000.

“We understand that ANSTO has been obtaining supplies of samarium from South Africa since the HIFAR shutdown in February with no dislocation, this isotope is usually manufactured by ANSTO. It is further understood that ANSTO has stopped its importation of samarium from South Africa to “prove” the need for a new reactor. If this is the case it would appear that ANSTO is orchestrating its own circumstances to ensure a new reactor.” (Note: ANSTO management says that ANSTO imported samarium during the early stages of the 3-month reactor shutdown, but the imported product - presumably from South Africa - was of poor quality and it was too expensive. ANSTO management refused my request for independently-verifable information on these claims.)
-- ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000.

"I don't believe it will make much difference to patient treatment whether we have a new reactor or not."
-- Dr. Alan Zimmet, cancer specialist, who noted that many radioisotopes are imported and some hospitals produce their own with accelerators. The Australian, November 5, 2001.

"I do not know exactly why the strategic thinkers within ANSTO pushed the radiopharmaceutical line [to justify a new reactor]. They would have been aware that the case was not entirely solid."
-- Former head of a nuclear medicine department in a capital city teaching hospital.

"For a guaranteed high standard of nuclear medicine practice, a reliable supply of diagnostic and therapeutic radioisotopes from a new research reactor at Lucas Heights is vital."
-- Dr Barry Elison, President of the Australian & New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, press release, June 13, 2000. In July 2000, when asked how doctors coped during the 3-month shut-down of the Lucas Heights HIFAR reactor from February-May 2000, Elison admitted he was not aware that the reactor was shut down!

"Probably not life threatening. I think that's over-dramatising it and that's what people have done to win an argument. I resist that."
-- Dr. Geoff Bower, President of the Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine,when asked if it would be a life threatening situation if Australia did not produce medical isotopes locally. ABC JJJ radio, December 3, 1998.

Professor Barry Allen, former Chief Research Scientist at ANSTO, Fellow in the Department of Pharmacy at the University of Sydney, Head of Biomedical Physics Research at the St. George Cancer Care Centre, and author of over 220 publications:

Prof. Barry Allen: "(The new) reactor will be a step into the past .... (It) will comprise mostly imported technology and it may well be the last of its kind ever built. Certainly the $300 million reactor will have little impact on cancer prognosis, the major killer of Australians today. In fact, the cost of replacing the reactor is comparable to the whole wish list that arguably could be written for research facilities by the Australian Science, Technology and Engineering Council (ASTEC)." ('Search' science magazine, October 1997)

Prof. Barry Allen: "One couldn't escape the conclusion that because you can't generate alpha-emitting radioisotopes on a reactor, then it wasn't core ... business of ANSTO. The question is really what the tax-payer of Australia' wants. Do they want new therapies or do they want the reactor to be the centre of all research." (ABC Radio National, Background Briefing, 29/3/98)

Prof. Barry Allen: "Its reported that if we don't have the reactor people will die because they won't be getting their nuclear medicine radioisotopes. I think that's rather unlikely. Most of the isotopes can be imported into Australia. Some are being generated on the cyclotron. But on the other hand alot of people are dying of cancer and we're trying to develop new cancer therapies which use radioisotopes which emit alpha particles which you cannot get from reactors. And if it comes down to cost-benefit, I think alot more people will be saved if we can proceed with targeted alpha cancer therapy than being stuck with the reactor when we could in fact have imported those isotopes." (ABC Radio National, Background Briefing, 29/3/98)

Prof. Barry Allen: "What worries me is that it might have an impact on the scientific development of new directions for the 21st century because at ANSTO for instance it will certainly require a lot of focussing of research to utilise the new reactor. That's absolutely inevitable. Nobody builds a $300 million new reactor and then lets people do non-reactor-based research. So there's really two aspects of it. There's the dollar cost and then there's the redirection of research interests into areas where the potential is already known I would say." (ABC Radio National, Background Briefing, 29/3/98)

Prof. Barry Allen: "I don't see why these things have to be closed door. I mean this is science and technology. If there are better facilities which would demonstrably serve us better in the 21st century we should be looking at them and comparing them to a new reactor. And if it turns out the new reactor stands head and shoulders above everything else, OK ... But I really don't think that would be the case so that's the real problem. There's nothing intrinsically wrong with the new reactor; its just that its too late and its not taking us in the new directions we should be going." (ABC Radio National, Background Briefing, 29/3/98)

ABC Radio National, ‘PM’ program, July 13, 2000:
PROFESSOR BARRY ALLEN (former chief research scientist of ANSTO and cancer researcher): I don’t really believe there has been a thorough and complete investigation into how the reactor itself could be best used for medical purposes. And I mean, this is already a major failing I can see in the design specifications of the reactor. So overall it’s a fairly disappointing performance, I would have to say, from my point of view as a nuclear research specialist, particularly in the cancer therapy area.
ABC: The Government and ANSTO maintain the cost of the new reactor will not be more than $278.5 million when its cost was projected back in 1997. Professor Allen however says that money could go towards research into better cancer therapies.
PROFESSOR BARRY ALLEN: The thing that worries me is that a lot of money is being spent on this reactor which will not advance our ability to develop new methods and new techniques. The reactor will continue to product isotopes which we’ve been using in the last 10, 20 years.
ABC: What do you believe, then, the hundreds of millions of dollars for the cost of this reactor should be spent on?
PROFESSOR BARRY ALLEN: Well, for instance, there are some accelerator sources which could produce different types of radioisotopes. The type that I’m working with now are called alpha remitting and these are really very difficult to produce on a reactor but they do offer new opportunities and new potential for having improved cancer therapy methods. Most of the reactor isotopes are good for diagnosis and imaging but not so good for therapy, so the search is really for improved radioisotopes which will give better therapeutic results.
ABC: And will this new nuclear reactor provide that?
PROFESSOR BARRY ALLEN: No. No. And the other thing the reactor won’t be doing is, in fact, providing a neutron beam which would be suitable for an experimental therapy called boron neutron capture therapy which is being studied quite successfully overseas in the United States, Europe and Japan. But in this new reactor the design does not include such a facility which in principle might improve results, therapeutic results, for high grade brain tumours, metastases to the brain and so on.

Q: Does ANSTO believe the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency's independence was compromised by the involvement of ANSTO's Executive Director in the selection process leading to the appointment of the ARPANSA CEO?
A: ANSTO does not see what relevance this question has to the Committee's terms of reference.
-- ANSTO, submission to the Senate Select Committee inquiry into the contract for a new reactor, 2000.

"The Australian Contract is believed to be the largest contract undertaken by Invap. This violates financial and management criteria of prudential and sustainable development."
"It is not considered sound financial or management practice for an Organisation to undertake work greater than say 25-30% of its normal annual turnover. It is additionally imprudent to advance the scale and scope of work by large increments. Invap appears to be violating both these areas. ... Such companies are poorly placed to meet contingencies which arise, largely because of their lack of experience."
 -- Dr Robert Turtle, a fellow of the Institution of Engineers Australia and a member of the Australian Nuclear Association. Submission to Senate Reactor Inquiry, 2000. Turtle said it has proved difficult or impossible to obtain Invap’s financial reports and accounts even though it is a government-owned agency.

Comments in a Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (DIST) briefing paper, April 1998, obtained by Sutherland Shire Council under Freedom of Information legislation:

"Be careful in terms of health impacts - don't really want a detailed study done of the health of Sutherland residents."

The document then ponders the best euphemism to describe the health risks from radioactive emissions from the planned new reactor. "Don’t say no extra risk - acceptable risk?? ... There are risks associated with everything."

Spent fuel from the reactor is not "waste", according to the DIST document, it is a "resource".

The document also reveals that the government did not want to close off the option of building a domestic reprocessing plant at some stage in the future. "We may look at new technologies to deal with spent fuel at a later date. ... Do not mention a reprocessing plant."

The document says there is “no point in consulting with potential/hypothetical recipients of a new reactor. It was discovered through the course of inquiry into the new airport that such a course of action serves only to inflame the communities for no good reason.”

Senior government official interviewed on ABC Radio's Background Briefing, March 29, 1998.

"The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn't win it on rational grounds .... they decided, right, we'll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don't write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely."

"The government decided to push the whole health line, and that included appealing to the emotion of people - the loss of life, the loss of children's lives. ... So it was reduced to one point, and an emotional one at that. They never tried to argue the science of it, the rationality of it."

"When Cabinet finally made the official decision in August, it was decided that tactically, it would be a good idea to wait for the Minister for Transport, John Sharp's, announcement on Holsworthy, so that on the one day the people of Hughes would see a good and a bad decision. The strategy was to appeal to the people of Hughes on the day of the announcement especially, so you have the relief of their fears about Holsworthy, and supposedly confirmation of their fears about a reactor."

"I understand that Cabinet considered reprocessing, but decided it was an issue for another generation. They knew that they could dispose of the current spent fuel rods in the US and the UK and then not have a storage problem until the year 2015. You see the new reactor comes on stream 2005, the spent fuel rods have to cool down for seven years and then be stored for another five, so 2015 they've got to worry about their spent fuel rods. Someone else can worry about it. And reprocessing is a possibility then. The technology might be better, the costs lower, but that's 20 years away. So the government thought, we're not going to make decisions about reprocessing 20 years before we have to. But there was a strong lobby within the science community and even industry that said 'Its a legitimate technology. Its safe and relatively inexpensive. Do it.' In fact the reprocessing option was roughly the same cost as the repatriation of the spent fuel rods."

"The big ticket item was the new reactor and it was felt that politically you just couldn't win the reprocessing argument and the new reactor."

"CSIRO is of the general opinion that more productive research could be funded for the cost of a reactor."
-- CSIRO, Research Reactor Review submission, 1993.

"(Expansion of the Lucas Heights nuclear facility) is one option which can be crossed off the list here and now. The reactor itself was built at Lucas Heights 40 years ago when this area was uninhabited bushland. Now, new residential development, over 10,000 new homes, have been built close to the site. ... If we are to continue with a nuclear facility, it is the Government's role to find a suitable site in a safe and responsible location."
-- Danna Vale, Liberal Member for Hughes, media release 5/3/97 - before her backflip.

"There is no way that a research reactor, a new one, built in Australia, would ever make a return on the investment for scientific, commercial and medical uses, which would even get towards a fraction of what it would cost for a cost-benefit analysis on the normal industry basis."
-- Professor Ken McKinnon, Chair of the 1993 Research Reactor Review.

"Fundamentally, no thorough cost-benefit analysis for the replacement reactor process has occurred."

"Instead of construction of an appropriate repository for highly radioactive waste deriving from spent fuel or residues arising from treatment from overseas, ANSTO and the Federal Government have chosen to manipulate definitions of nuclear waste. Notwithstanding whether high level or intermediate level nuclear waste is derived from the spent fuel rods, both require disposal in a geological repository, according to international best practice. Such a repository is not even under investigation."
-- Sutherland Shire Council, 1998, Submission to Senate Inquiry

"I would be surprised if the fraction of ANSTO's work which actually depended on the output of the reactor facility ... exceeded ~1/3. Overstatement of ANSTO's reactor-dependence persists in the Draft EIS."
-- Murray Scott, Submission on 1998 draft EIS. Scott's analysis in 1993 indicated that 79% of ANSTO's  work does not depend on the reactor. An independent study in 1993 by Professor Geoffrey Wilson found  that 69% of ANSTO's work does not depend on the reactor.

"If you want to have influence, you usually have to get your hands dirty."
-- Foreign affairs bureaucrat. Public Hearings, 1993 Research Reactor Review. "Getting your hands dirty" means operating a nuclear reactor in suburban Sydney.

"Although the construction of HIFAR and other facilities at Lucas Heights have resulted in about 3% of Australia's public science expenditure going into the ANSTO operation, the returns have been comparatively modest. The output of scientific papers is modest, whether measured per researcher or per unit of expenditure, and it is not possible to show the impact of this work as being unusual. The rate of invention and patenting makes little contribution to the nation as a whole."
-- Professor Ian Lowe, Griffith University, 1993 RRR Submission.

ANSTO "Staff Representing Truth in Science", letter to Sutherland Shire Councillor, April 3, 2000:

“It has been heavily rumoured that ANSTO is financially in the red to the tune of $6 million. The radioisotope production group is in the red by $2.2 million. If ANSTO cannot manage simple finances, although it has a large number of staff devoted to the task, how can it possibly hope to manage a complex reactor.”

“Further, it is known that the reactor replacement costs are projected to blow out considerably more than the amounts told to the Federal Government, but once the project is started it will have to be completed irrespective of costs. A number of staff believe there should be an independent external review of financial management at ANSTO and the real costs of a new reactor.”

“The last 4 years have seen unprecedented industrial actions resulting in lost-time for ANSTO. The staff morale is exceptionally low ... because of unprecedented ineptitude at senior management level.”