Case Studies in Serbian Historical Consciousness: The Kragujevac Massacre and Stjepan Filipovic's Valiant Last Stand — by Sarah O'Keeffe

 

 

Sacrifice and Spirit

 

          On March 27, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued Directive No. 25, in which he unequivocally put to rest the torment of uncertainty and speculation regarding Yugoslavia's role in the Second World War. As the slogan "Bolje rat nego pakt"3 echoed through the streets of Kragujevac and Belgrade, signaling the absolute popular rejection of cooperation with Nazi Germany, Hitler's decree sealed Yugoslavia's fate: it was to "be destroyed as quickly as possible."4

          April 6, 1941 opened a new chapter of history for the people of Yugoslavia as the German onslaught began. Without a declaration of war, the Luftwaffe unleashed their bombs on Belgrade, crippling Yugoslav air defenses and inciting shock in the urban population. Fifty-two divisions, consisting of German, Italian, and Hungarian troops, were deployed on the ground and within two weeks, the Royal Yugoslav Army had officially thrown in the towel. On April 17, 1941, an agreement of unconditional surrender was signed in Sarajevo.5

          The story leading up to the German attack on Yugoslavia is lively and intricate, a conflagration of assassination, desperation, and defiance in the name of dignity. In October, 1934, King Alexander of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was assassinated in Marseilles, France by members of an ultra-nationalist Croatian political movement, who were disgruntled at the king's display of dictatorship and his heavy-handed policies toward dissent of any nature. His only son was too young to take the throne, so a Regency was formed, headed by the heir's uncle, Prince Paul. As senior regent, Prince Paul ruled Yugoslavia during the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Thus Prince Paul was left with the unpleasant task of smoothing over the national tensions between the Serbs and the Croats so that Yugoslavia could "present a united front to the outside world."6 Even if such solidarity could be found amidst such deeply entrenched political rivalries, it could not stave off growing angst over Hitler's waxing military, political, and economic prowess. Hitler was becoming progressively bolder in his defiance of the Treaty of Versailles with the remilitarization of the Rhineland (March 1936), the Anschluss (March 1938), and the Munich Conference (September 1938).

          The most disturbing aspect of Hitler's actions was the policy of appeasement with which France and Great Britain met his challenges. Yugoslavia was unable to find an ally among the Western Powers that would support it against the irredentist claims of Hungary, Austria and Italy. Of course, its greatest fear was the shadow of Hitler's Nazi Germany, which loomed over the troubled South Slavic nation while it floundered in inner turmoil. Yugoslavia's increasing political alienation, the economic hardships it incurred because of the German take-over of Czechoslovakia, and the pressure from Italy to relinquish coveted Yugoslav territories finally forced Prince Paul's hand. As Germany's conquests mounted, the Regent decided his attempt to walk a neutral line was unsustainable and Yugoslavia became a member of the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941. This turn of events had been anticipated and it triggered a coup d' etat in Belgrade, led by high-ranking army officers. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were the two representatives of the royal government who signed the agreement, and they were thus arrested upon their return to Belgrade. Prince Paul abdicated and King Peter was left to pick up the pieces. Mass public demonstrations took place in major cities all over Yugoslavia, especially in Serbia, and defiant phrases like "Bolje grob nego rob!" came into being.7 Winston Churchill summarizes the Yugoslav position on the eve of the German invasion with the observation that with the coup, the Yugoslavs "may have saved the soul and the future of their country, but it was already too late to save their territory."8 The Germans regarded the coup as reason enough for invasion, with which one phase of a multi-layered conflict began.


3) "Better war than the Pact."
4) Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Chetniks, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1975) 64
5) Tomasevich, Chetniks pgs. 71-74
6) Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, (New York: Columbia UP, 1976) 79.
7) Singleton, pg 83. "Better the grave than slavery."
8) Singleton, pg 83.

2

 

1