Behind Enemy Lines: Tito and Mihailovic

          The German barrage and the swift capitulation of the Yugoslav Army caused a crisis among those who were free of direct German control in Serbia. Though the Germans had secured an unconditional surrender, not all parts of Yugoslavia had been subdued. The people had to decide what path to take. Aside from collaboration and flight, two options were available to the Serbs: the Communist resistance or the Chetnik resistance. Let us first discuss the Communists.

          The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had been formed in 1919 on the wave of Communist enthusiasm among leftist political parties, which followed the successful Bolshevik Revolution. Less than two years later, King Alexander declared the CPY illegal due to its subversive activities.⁹ Since the very nature of the Communist ideology was opposed to everything the King and his absolute monarchy stood for, their enmity was inevitable. The CPY was forced to move its operations underground and it continued to function as a loosely coordinated group of activists. The party had almost fizzled out when a shrewd, ambitious Communist, Josip Broz Tito, who had been educated in Moscow and inducted into the Comintern, became General Secretary of the CPY in 1939. His star had been rising slowly in the Comintern, as he quickly and efficiently completed the tasks given to him by his superiors in Moscow. Another factor contributing to his appointment was the fact that he was one of the handfull of Yugoslav Communists who survived Stalin's purges during the 1930s.¹⁰ Tito had kept a low, local profile whenever possible and though he was in Moscow during the height of Stalin's "selections," he lived to become the leader of the Partisan resistance during World War II and, afterwards, Yugoslavia's most preeminent and beloved political leader.

          Tito's political and military accomplishments, both during the war and in the post-war era, deserve an in-depth treatment, the likes of which would go beyond the scope of this study, though it would tantalize those hungry for a tale of initiative, political drama and power. Tito's reign is an excellent study in Machiavellian tactics and his command of Bismarck's "whip and sugar-plum" approach to politics is laudable. However, he will only be mentioned in the periphery of this work, as the commander of the Partisan, or Communist, forces in the Second World War, and later, as the architect and patriarch of post-war Yugoslavia.

          The second option available to Serbs was the Chetniks. Nationalist in orientation, they staunchly supported the royal government, which had fled to London following the German invasion. Jozo Tomasevich describes the Chetniks as "...a resistance force [made up of] a small group of officers, noncommissioned officers, and men of the Yugoslav royal army, almost exclusively Serbs, who refused to surrender at their post near the town of Doboj in northern Bosnia at the time of the collapse of the Yugoslav army in mid-April 1941."¹¹ Draza Mihailovic and his particular group were later given legitimacy by the royal government, but many different Chetnik groups, without an established hierarchy, were operating on Yugoslav territory. Mihailoviæ was only in command of the Serbian branch, the largest and most important of these.

          The Chetniks and the Partisans were unable to overcome their ideological and political rivalries and a full-scale civil war was raging alongside of the conflict with the Germans by 1942. Thus, the first year of the German occupation ended with the de facto declaration of civil war between Draza Mihailovic Chetnik forces and Tito's Partisans.¹²

          The Allies wavered in their decision regarding the delegation of supplies because they were unsure of the dimensions of the two opposing movements. The civil war itself was a matter of discovery for the Allies but the ultimate decision, in June 1943, was in favor of Tito, despite his Communist ideology. The events surrounding Mihailoviæ's abandonment by the Allies is to this day an issue of intense debate. The bitterness of the civil war was vehement and many details of the war are still in dispute. Accusations of collaboration with the Germans have been leveled at each side by the other, and it seems that neither side can claim complete innocence on that count. The relations between the two factions are very complex and there are very few points upon which both sides in agree.

          The dialogue on Chetnik-Partisan relations has been extensive, and the body of literature available is vast, each new rendition of facts differing a little from the last. Some sources overtly contradict each other, even on certain basic facts. The subject is a virtual quagmire of intrigue, possibility, and interpretation. There are very few sources that are not immediately identifiable as "pro-Partisan" or "pro-Chetnik." The truth has been obscured by political agenda and ire at the outcome of the conflict. Draza Mihailovic was captured by Partisans and, after a show-trial, executed in Belgrade on July 17, 1946. Many, justifiably, consider his execution to be a political maneuver meant to aid Tito's consolidation of power. My mention of Tito and Mihailovic will be restricted to the framework of this study.

          The Allies' decision to grant Tito arms and equipment was instrumental in his final victory against the Germans (with the help of the Red Army); thus, Tito's post-war ascension to power was indirectly sponsored by the Allies. Of course, Tito's victory signaled the fall of the royal family and a new era was ushered in: Titoism.